The 'Abbasid Caliphate, 132/750-170/786. by Omar, Farouk

ProQuest Number: 10731350
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10731350
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
o  C  p )  I
T k j ) .  I K 7  . r  /5t
C T 7  I
f.
London
THE ‘ABMSID CALIPHATE
b y
Farouk Omar
Thesis submitted for tl 
o f
Doctor of Philosophy
January 1967,
/'him,a
| LOriiUM 
\ n m v
Abstract
In the early decades of the second century A.H./eighth century A.D., 
the supporters of the ‘Abbasids overthrew the Umayyads and put the eAbbasido 
in power in a revolution which not only substituted one dynasty for an- . 
other, but had significant and far-reaching political, religious and social 
consequences.
Since this was a formative period in Muslim historiography, one is 
faced by an overwhelming wealth of material, including numerous contra­
dictory accounts which must be conscientiously sifted. Moreover, as is 
unavoidable in a period of transition and revolution, there are various 
loyalties to be unravelled and guarded against. Chapter I shows how 
historians dealt with the early ‘Abbasid period. The controversial nature 
of the ‘Abbasid revolution with its messianic aspect, the secrecy with 
which certain doctrines and principles were concealed from the uninitiated, 
the deceptive character of the occasional slogans destined for general 
consumption and the conflicting statements of 4Abbasid propaganda and 
Umayyad counter-propaganda make it difficult to form an accurate picture. 
However, as the ‘Abbasid revolution must be viewed in the light of pre­
ceding and following events, Chapter 11 reviews the situation in Khurasan 
and the relations of -the Khurasan! Arabs with the central regime. The 
chapter leads to an exposition of the political aspect of the ‘Abbasid , 
revolution and to the attempt to substantiate the outdated, but still 
accepted, in some quarters, racial interpi’ctation of the revolt by the 
theory already outlined by some scholars that the ‘Abbasid revolution was 
essentially the work of the Ai*abs in Khurasan and was conducted, throughout
3.
most of its stages, by Arab tribal groups whose role was predominant 
in the revolution. Chapter XXI deals with a recurrent feature of every re­
volution, namely internal rivalries among the revolutionaries, as is 
.evident in the conflict between Abu Muslim on the one hand, and Abu 
Salama, Sulayman al-Khuaa *i, Ziyad b. §ali^ etc., on the other.
Having achieved power the *Abbasids discarded the extremist wing, of 
the da*wa and adopted Orthodoxy in an attempt to win the support of the 
traditionists (A^iab al-Jadith), a move which resulted in the R&wandiyya 
risings in Khurasan and Ira£. Simultaneously, the ‘Abbasids got rid of 
certain ambitious da‘is who had grown too strong to be tolerated (Abu 
Muslim), or had deviated from the ‘Abbasid path (‘Abd al-Jabbar al-Azdi).
As the *Abbasids failed to fulfil the hopes and expectations of the 
lower strata of society, other messianic and revolutionary movements 
arose and attracted disappointed elements. These opposition movements are 
dealt with in Chapters XV and V. Chapter IV shows that as all Bani Hashlm 
had equal rights to the-inheritance of the Prophet, one can hardly speak 
of an *Alid '’claim'* to the caliphate. Hie majority of ‘Alid sympathisers 
were, in fact, fighting not so much to enforce this claim, as to improve 
their own lot and give vent to their hatred of the ‘Abbasid authorities.
Chapter V deals with the Umayyad and Kharijite opposition. Though 
Irak regained its position as the centre of the empire at the expense 
of Syria, the Syrians did not yield, and expressed their resentment in 
a series of risings, some of which were connected with the Sofyani myth, 
while others had no messianic connotations.
The Kharijites were, contrary to the generally accepted view, still
active under the ‘Abbasids. Their risings often proved dangerous to 
the authority of the ‘Abbasid caliphate. ‘Uman and Ifriqiyya were their 
sphere of influence, and many Kharijite risings in the Jasira, the Taman, 
Sis tan, and Khurasan had lasting success. Chapter VI ti'eats of major 
political events, selected to illustrate the trends which characterized 
the early ‘Abbasid period. It shows how tribal ‘Agabiyya still played 
an outstanding r§le in the politics of the now regime, how al-I-langur 
utilized it to weaken the influence of the txdbal confederations in 
many parts of the empire, and was able to consolidato the new regime 
before expanding in 'J'abaristan or trying to regain Spain from the Umayyad 
It finally shows how intrigues which arose at the ‘Abbasid court early 
in the a&ign of al-Mahdi resulted in the raurdor of al-IIa&i in 170/786.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION  ^
SURVEY Of THE SOURCES
The following passage, marred by the obvious flattery by 
which it is inspired, represents an attempt by al-Jatyis to exalt 
the ‘Abbasid achievements and to discredit anti-‘Abbasid historians
"If Ahl Kliurasan had preserved the memory of 
their bat11es^against Ahl si-Sham, of the political 
skill of their kings and the policies of their pro­
minent figures, and of the noble ideas they expressed, 
the words, the deeds and the achievements of al-4Iangur 
alone /which were/ destined for posterity, would largely 
matoh^all the Icings of Ban! I-Iarwan. Abu ‘ubayda al-_
Na^awi, Abu *1 Hasan al-Hada ini, Hisham b, al-Italbf 
and ol-Haytham b, ,‘Adi have collected divergent tradi­
tions and fragmentary sayings; what they have achieved 
represents only a hybrid part of a coherent whole. At 
any rate, when we refer to what remains of the accounts 
of al- ‘Abbas b. Muhammad, *Abd al*41aXik b. gali^, al~
‘Abbas b. Husa.... who derived their information from 
the Mashyalcha and Hawaii of Ban! Hashim, you will' be 
able to realise, thanks to these authentic documents, 
the extent of the adulations due to al-Haytham^b. kdi 
and falsifications for which Hisham b. al-Kalb! is re­
sponsible."
/~3ayan, vol. 3# pp. 317-lg/
Scholars1 who, in one.way or another, dealt with the ‘Abbasid 
revolution and the ‘Abbasid caliphate in its oarly days often depended 
for their information on the easily accessible chronicles. Since then 
other chronicles, heresiographies and biographical dictionaries as 
well as the rich invaluable material preserved in subsequently dis­
covered manuscripts such as the anonymous Akhbar al-‘Abbas wa Wuldahu, 
the Ansab al~Ashraf of Bala&huri, the Tarikh and Tabaqat of Khalifa b.
  _ gWijriJtwnin^ .dluT^ lTU'-.'.11 *1 - «*r *
Khayyat, the Futub of Ibn A * tham al-Kufl and the Tarikh al-Hau§il 
of Atju 2akariyya al-Azdi, which in one way or another throw new light 
on the pei’iod in question.
On the basis of these and other manuscripts as well as the re­
valuation of old published sources an attempt has been made in this 
thesis to re-examine the nature of the Abbasid revolution as irell as 
the main trends and characteristics of the early ‘Abbasid caliphate. 
Significant and decisive events of the first tiro centuries of the Hijra 
have been treated by the pioneers among the Muslim Kawis and historians
G. Weil, Geschichte dor Chalifen, 5 vols., 184-6; J. Wellhausen, Das 
Arabieohe Reich und sein Sturs..,1902; Van Vloten, La Domantion arabe.
ib'DAg TOzudari, Muhajarat fi Tarikh al-Dawla al- *Abbaslyya, 1938; 
Duri, Al- ‘Xgr al- ‘AbbasT al-AwwaT, 1949.
ir
in concise works on general history or particular events. A large
number of these works, which are listed in Ibn al-Nadim’s Fihrist, 
are devoted to the ‘Abbasid period. It will suffice to refer here to 
those which were of particular relevance to the early ‘Abbasid period, 
and would be of great value if they were extant.
1. Kitab al- ‘Abbas b. ‘Abd al-frluttalib by al-Mada * ini
2. Kitab ‘Abdallah b. Al-‘Abbas . . . .
3. Kitab Ali b. Abdallah b. Al- Abbas n
4. Kitab Muframmad ,b. *Ali b. ‘Abdallah "
5. Akhbar Khulafa* ban! rl ‘Abbas
6. Akhbar al- Abbasyin
7. Risala fi Tafdil bani Hashim
wa ‘awliya’hum wa dham bani
Umayya wa atba‘uhum
8. Akhbar al-Saf f ajji
9. Akhbar Abl *1 ‘Abbas
10. Akhbar Abi Ja far al-Mangur
11. Akhbar al-Mansur
" Muhammad b. Ahmad b.
*Abd al-gamld al-Katib 
2
" Snmaka
,f Ibn al-‘lmad al-Thaqafi
" al-Mada9 ini
11 Afctmad b, al-garith al-Khazzag 
lf Ibn ‘Abda 
” ‘Umar b. Shabba
Tihrist, vol. I,pp.89ff; Al-'Ali, *Ilm al-Tarikh ‘inda al-Muslimin,
pp. 373 ff. (The Arabic translatioiT"OT ^ "sS'hthar ^  Hl'gggr.V arTflifellm
historiography, with valuable additions); see also ga.j.ji Khalifa, 
ICashf al-Zunun, vol. I, p. 283.
2 *■ —
On A\imad b. Isma‘il b. Samaka see also al-'Jusi's Fihrist Najaf, 1961,
p.55, where his book is entitled Kitab al-‘Abbasi.
J  ( J  u J r j ) *  p J & j }  o\^-> IJ-*
<X
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20. 
21. 
22 ♦
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
Tarikh Mawgul bi Kitab Abi Ja‘far by Abu Isfcaq al-Sa<j};i
) \ y  tv4>\
J ^  ^  . sa * ,  ' y*
Manaqib bani *1 *Abbas
Akhbar Abl Muslim £Sa£iib 
al-da ‘wa
Kitab Muhammad wa Ibrahim Ibnay 
‘Abdallah b. Hasan 
Kitab Muhammad wa Ibrahim 
Ibnay ‘Abdallah b. Basan 
Kitab IChilaf *Abd al-Jabbar 
al-Azdi
Isma* man qutila min al- 
Talibiyin 
Kitab al-dawla 
Akhbar Ibn Sirin 
Akhbar Abi ganifa 
Akhbar Ibn Harama 
Akhbar gammad *Ajrad 
Kitab Khurasan
Kitab Kutug Khurasan
Kitab Nizul al- Arab bikhurasan
wa’l sawad 
Fa^a’il Khurasan
11 Mugammad b. al-‘Abbas al-Yasidi
M . al-Harzubani
" ‘Umar b. Shabba
** Abu ‘Ubayda
" al-Mada’in!
M al-Mada9 ini
” al-Rawandi 
11 al-Mada ’ ini 
n al-Marzaban’i 
” al~Zubayr b. Bakkar 
u Isgag al-Maugili 
n Abu ‘Ubayda
u al-Mada*ini
” al-Hay tli am b. Addi 
" al-Balkhi
However, few of these early works are partly available in 
extracts in the works of some later historians such as Baladhuri, 
Yaf<qubi, Dinawari, Ibn A <tham al-Kufi and Tabari. Speaking on 
Arabic historians Springling says "On the whole they are surprisingly 
full and fair even when their report is not very complimentary to 
themselves and their people. More than most historians in other 
languages they enable those of us who can see it to write history
1
not merely as a register of dead facts but as living human reality."
This may be so but the full and contradictory accounts preserved in
them renders it hard for the student of history to extract the truth
from the confusing mixture of reports and fabrications he is faced
with, and the earlier the period the less manageable the'material.
For the period under study the sources at our disposal are of various
kinds; annalistic, literary, local, sectarian, geneological, bio-
2
graphical and geographical.
The following is a rapid survey of the major sources of this
1
"From Persian to Arabic", A.J.S.L., vol. 56, 1939, p.207.
2
The sources consulted in this thesis have already been examined in 
different works. However, most of these surveys are either general 
surveys of Muslim historiography (such as Margolioth's Lectures on 
Arabic historians, 1930; B. Lewis and P. M. Holt, Historians of the 
Middle East. London 1962; Rosenthal, History of Muslim historiography); 
or monographs on certain historians and their works (such as J. 1 Ali1s 
Mawarid Tarikh al-Tabari, see bibliography). Those works have also 
been examined from the viewpoint of their relevance to specific periods, 
reigns or events (such as Sadighi, Les mouvements religieux..., 193S;
B. Lewis, The ox^igins of Isma*ilism, 1940; S. Hoscati, "Nuovi studi 
storici...", Orientalia, 14, 1945, Roma; Idem, "Per una storia Dell* 
Anticasj^a," R.S .0., 1955; D Sou riel, Le Vizirat ‘Abbagide, Damascus, 
1959, chap. I.
Zo*
study with special emphasis on those hitherto unknown or not 
utilized.
Historical sources
1. Akhbar al-‘Abbas Wa Wildahu This work, preserved in the library
of the Institute of Higher Islamic Studies in Baghdad, is still in
manuscript. The first pages are missing; the name of the author is
unknown. Professor Al-Duri believes that the book was written in
the middle of the third century of the Hijra and suggests the possibility
of the authorship of Muftammad b. §nli£ b. Mahan (d. 202 A.H.) or
1
Muhammad b. §ali^ al-NaJfa^u The work is invaluable for the under­
standing of the organisation of the *Abbasid movement in Khurasan 
including the tactics adopted there, the importance of Arab tribal 
leaders, the Arab settlers in the villages of Marw and the Arab key 
figures appointed to administer centres of strategic importance in 
this province. With its abundant information on the inner circles of 
the da*wa it possesses the value of a contemporary document of the 
revolutionary movement. While Tabari only mentions the committee of 
the twelve ffaqibs, Akhbar al-*Abbas enumerates all their committees 
and sub-committees. It.reveals the strict form of its organisation, 
whose propagandists were divided into twelve Naqibs headed by a 
Chief Naqib, and twelve deputy Naqibs (Nu^ara* al-Nuqaba’), then
seventy da*is and about thirty-six chief da*is (Du*at al-Du*at)
^aw* Jadid.V, B.C.A., 1951, p.65; See also gajji Khalifa, op.cit., 
vol. I, p.28?., al-gafadi, al-Wafi bi *1 Wafiyat, ed. 1931, vol. I, p.51 
By comparing the rdle of Abu Muslim with that of other Abbasid 
partisans such as Sulayman al-Khuza*i or Arab tribal leaders such as 
*Aii ibn al-Karmani the author enables us to re-assess Abu Muslim's 
r61e in the ‘Abbasid revolution, and shows us to what extent Abu 
Muslim*s very position in Khurasan depended on Sulayman al-Khuza*i and 
his circle.
Akhbar al-‘Abbas which comprises 204 fols. is actually an annalistical 
work in biographical form concerned, as the title indicates, with al- 
‘Abbas and his descendants. It ends in the bequest of the Imamate by 
Ibrahim to Abu *1 ‘Abbas and quotes the text of Ibrahim*s will, with 
final notes on Ibrahim*s sons.
The author relies on trustworthy authorities such as his predecessors, 
Abu Miidi&f (d. 157 A.H.) and Mup‘ab al-Zubayri (d. 235 A.H.) and his 
contemporaries such as ‘Umar b. Shabba (d. 262), Baladhuri (d. 279 A.H.) 
and al-‘Abbas b. Hisham b, al-Kalbi. On the details of the revolutionary 
propaganda the work mainly depends on partisans of the revolt such as 
da‘is, ‘Abbasids and eye-witnesses.
One rightly wonders why later historians never refer to the book 
or the author although some such as Dhahabi, Mubarrad and Ibn Abi . *1 
gadid copied from it verbatim.1 However, it seems that the book was 
never intended to 1 put in circulation as the material it contains 
was derived from internal ‘Abbasid revolutionary information which gives
1 Duri, op.cit., p.65.
1.1.
it the character of a private document. What it discloses on the
relations of the ‘Abbasid Imams with the propagandists and the struggle
for power within the ‘Abbasid chiefs* propagandists is first class.
Some details of this information concern: the two letters of Muhammad
b. *Ali b. ‘Abdallah to the da‘is after the execution of Khidash,
one version seems to have been for the inner circle the other for the
public, the facts of the promise of Ibrahim the Imam to both Abu
Muslim and Abu Salama to divide a great part of the empire between
them which partly accounts for the struggle for power between these two
exponents of the ‘Abbasid da‘wa after the ‘Abbasid victory; the deep-.
rooted rivalry between Abu Muslim and Sulayman al-Khuza‘j which proves
the greater influence Sulayman had on the conduct of the propaganda,
1
and finally the employment of women da is in the movement.
2. Uubdha min Kitab al-Tarikh by an anonymous author of the 11th 
century* A photocopy of the manuscript work has been published with 
Russian translation, introduction and commentary by P.A.Gryaznevich 
of the Orientalist Institute in Moscow. The work is part of a larger 
whole, as is shown by a remark on the first page which refers to the 
previous treatment of the Orthodox and Umayyad periods of the caliphate
and announces the immediately following account of the ‘Abbasid times
 ^   2
calling it al-dawla al-‘Abbasiyya al-Mubaraka.
On these accounts see below, Chapter I. 
2Nubdha, fol. 235b.
13.
The author makes it clear from the start that his account of the 
‘Abbasid caliphate will be concise "although the proximity of its 
occurence as well as its good deeds and virtues might tempt /one/ 
to give a detailed account." The author is obviously ‘Abbasid in 
tendency as he himself states that he is bound to the *Abbasids by 
tfala*1
However, a comparison between the Nubdha and the Akhbar al-‘Abbas
imi ii iiij m * ----1 — ai a ~ T — r~  ---
reveals that the former is a brief adaptation of the latter. The author 
of the Nubdha has reduced to 294 fols. the bulky accounts of the Akhbar 
by quoting only the main authority instead of the whole chain of trans­
mitters, and by combining different accounts and giving one well- 
digested account. He also omits the long lists of the da‘is, deputy 
naqibs and chief da‘is preserved in the Akhbar. He has achieved con­
ciseness by giving the bare facts of the happenings and ignoring vital 
and secret details revealed in the Akhbar. The following juxtaposition 
proves to what extent the author of the Nubdha depended on the Akhbar.
Nubdha Akhbar
fol. 245b 74a
" 246a-b 84b
" 24.6b-247a 79a
" 247b 80b-81a
.QCO<M 85a
^Op.cit., fol. 236b.
vs. '■'v ' *‘p" * ^  f
2.f ♦
Nubdha . Akhbar
fol. 249b 88a
II 254a 102b
I 254b 106a
1 282b 183a
1 290a 202b
The last instance of a coincidence between the two works is the 
account of Ibrahim's death in the last two fols. 290a/202a. Here 
the Akhbar ends,-while Nubdha proceeds to narrate the conspiracy of 
Abu Salama and the proclamation of Abu *1 ‘Abbas. The abrupt manner 
in which both sources finish prove that both manuscripts are incomplete.
-l
3* Khalifa b. IChayyat, Shabbab (d. 240/854-55) was one of the 
renowned traditionists and historians of his time. He lived in Bagra
for most of his life. His works were unknown until recentLy although
-  2 -part of a work on the Tarajim has been preserved in the Zahiriyya library
3 -  -  -  -
of Damascus. Mr. S. Zakkar has located a copy of Khalifa1 s Tarikh
an(^  yabaqat in the Awqaf Library at Morocco, and has undertaken the 
task of editing both works which are soon to be published in Damascus.
In his Tarikh Khalifa applies the method of the traditionists in quoting 
chains of authorities, some of which - for the early ‘Abbasid period -
^Khalifa, Tabaqat, p.5; ffihrist, p.324 ed. Cairo 1348; of. Flugel edition 
where he mistakenly writes Shabib.
2 (
Al-*‘Ali, op.cit. , p.684.
^Y. al-‘Ushsh, ffihrist al-Maktaba al-Zahiriyya, 1947# p.199-
2,
are ‘All b. Muhammad, Muhammad b. Mu*awiya, Baybas b. gablb, Abu 
‘Ubayda Abu *1 Yaq^an and Khalifa b. Khayyafr (the author*s grandfather).
His annals begin with the first year of gijra and end with the year 
230/844-5. In contrast to Tabari who is a compiler, Khalifa isselective 
and brief, concentrating onspecific vital events, some of them turning 
points in Islamic history such as the murder.of ‘Uthman, the revolt 
of al-Mukhtar, the ‘Abbasid da‘wa, the troubles in Khurasan and Arab- 
By2antine relations. Every account of the reign of a caliph is concluded 
by a list of governors of provinces, qadis« chiefs of police and directors 
of the diwans. Of outstanding value is the account of the correspondence 
between the caliph al-Mahdi and the Kharijite, rebel *Abd ’l-Salam al- 
Yashkuri, this correspondence is not found anywhere else and only 
partly quoted by al-Azdi, is fully preserved here. It.is almost in­
conceivable that a book of such qualities has fallen into oblivion.
However, Khalifa lived in Ba^ra of the second century of the gijra, 
which was hostile to the government and housed prosperous Umayyads.
His Tarikh reveals moderate Umayyad sympathies. Several of the narrators 
of the work were actually Umayyads. Khalifas citation of the letter 
of the Khari.jite *Abd !.l Salam to al-Mahdi must have been another source 
of annoyance for the authorities and an additional reason for the un­
popularity of his work especially in Irafc.
4. Al-Tabari (<j. 310 A.H./923 A.D.). Generally speaking his Tarikh 
contains the fullest and most comprehensive account on the history of
the caliphate from its emergence until the year 290 A.H. For the period
of the early ‘Abbasids his narrative of the events fails to provide a
clear and coherent picture of the political situation in the empire.
His main concern is with the heartland of the caliphate Ira£. He gives
more attention to the eastern parts of the empire than the western parts
such as Syria, Egypt and Ifriqiyya, He rarely mentions the Kharijite risings
in the turbulent ^azira, and dismisses the Khari.jites of Uman or Ifriqiyya
in a few lines. That is why Van ’l-Athir who mostly depends on Tabari
finds himself obliged to resort to other sources such as Abu Zalcariyya
al-Azdi on matters such as local risings and events,
A comparison of Tabrl's text with the information given by other
eax^ly sources such as Baladhuri1 s An sab t the anonymous Ajdiibar al-» Abbas,
Kufi's Futufc. and Azdi's Tarikh al~Mougil clearly shows how cursory and
vague he is in his treatment of certain events. Kufi is superior to him
in that he lakes the trouble to elucidate the situation in Khurasan in
the Umayyad period and pays sufficient attention to the tribal feuds
2 ~3
and grievances of the Arabs• As to al™Azdi he has fully recognrzed
the significance of the r61e some Arab tribes of the Jazira played in the
struggle between Umayyads and Abbasids, in throwing their lot m  with
the advancing Khurasani army. Xn. more than one occasion he makes brilliant
T ~  ’ ' ' ” ■
Breckelmann, Geschichte der Arabischen..., vol. I, Leiden, 1943* p.148;
E . 1.11 (TabarT), (T ar i S X  "
A
Sha‘ban, The social and economic background of the *Abbasid revolution..., 
Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, I960.
^Tarikh al-Maugil, MSS. Dublin, fols. 107ff., 118, 124.
remarks on the important rdle of the Arabs in the revolutionary movement. 
Tabari is vague even on the factual aspect of risings such as those of 
Bassam b. Ibrahim, *Abd al-Jabbar al-Azcli and Khalid al-Dhuhli and seems, 
somehow, purposely to omit accounts unfavourable to the central regime,1 
Fresh and different material on these risings and political events is 
to be found in Baladhurl’s Ansab and local histories. The comparatively 
clearer and most coherent picture can be obtained from the accounts of 
Ansab who quotes Mada'ini. Tabari's most detailed accounts on the *Alids 
are those connected with the struggle for power between the gasanids and 
the *Abbasids where he registers every detail of facts and correspondence 
with meticulous care. Though he gives more than one facet of the picture,
2
he seems to have fully utilized ‘Umar b. Shabba's book Muhammad wa Ibrahim,.
As a traditionist Tabari applied the method of the Huhadithun by 
quoting the authorities for a large proportion jf his accounts. His 
main authorities on the early *Abbasid history are: *Ali b. Muhammad al- 
Mada'ini, Ahmad b. Zuhayr, Abu *1 IChatjab, ‘Umar b. Shabba, ‘Umar b.
Rashid. He sometimes combines several accounts in one version adducing 
the chain of transmitters. This disregard of narrators is especially 
obvious in dealing with political events in distant provinces. It is at 
any rate precisely due to the method of presenting more than one 
version of a particular event and providing the account with the chain
He openly admits suppressing information, Tab., I, pp. 2858, 2862, 2965> 
2980.
2Tab., III, pp. 143-519.
lr. ‘All,"Mawarid Tarikh al-Tabari',' H.H.X., 1954, 1961.
of authorities which renders it both comprehensive and trustworthy 
that Tabaris history with all its defects, remains one of the important 
sources on the early ‘Abbasid caliphate,
5. Futufc al-Bui dan by Abu *1 * Abb as A^mad b. Yafcya al-Baladhuri 
(d. 279/892 A.D.), In this work he deals in the first place with the 
administrate aspect of the provinces conquered by the Arabs, However 
scattered historical information can be found in the accounts on events 
in remote provinces such as Armenia, Khurasan and the Byzantine frontiers. 
He is also rather illuminating on-the treatment of Ahl al-dhimma and the 
policies adopted by caliphs towards certain revolts such as the economic 
boycott of the gijaz by orders of al-Mangur during thexevolt of Hu^ammad 
Dhu *1 Nafs al-2akiyya. The authorities he quotes vary from Mada’inI
to Waqidi, Hisham b. al-Kalbi and Abu ‘Ubayda. As has been shown by
many scholars and lastly by Goitein it is impossible to discover any
partisan tendency in Baladhuri1 s works. He was f,a partisan of one class
only his own class of authors who wish to be interesting and who therefore
1cannot resist a sensation and even a touch of scandal". He was trusted 
by his successors and many of them quoted him, such as gull, Jahshiyari, 
Maqrizi, Dhahabi and ‘Ayni,
6. A1-Akhbar al-Tiwal by A£tmad b. Da’ud al-Dinawari (d. 282/895). 
Although his accounts on the early ‘Abbasid period are at times concise,
1 - - • ■
See the introduction of the Jerusalem edition of Ansab al-Ashraf, 1956.
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confused and unconfirmed by other early sources, they are useful as 
they contain some original information utilized in the course of the 
present thesis* Certain confused or exaggerated accounts are easily 
detectable. The image of Abu Muslim,"1* for instance, is noticeably ex­
aggerated in al-Akhbar al-yiwal. This is significant because it helps 
to determine the period in which the myth of Abu Muslim began to form 
and consolidate until it later developed making him a Persian national 
hero. Abu Muslim’s figure is more than life-size, and his importance 
is clearly exaggerated. Some examples in which Abu Muslim’s r61e is mag­
nified are: The account of his meeting Abu *1 ‘Abbas, the installation
of Abu *1 ‘Abbas on the caliphal throne, the execution of Abu Salama and 
the suppression of ‘isa b. ‘All’s revolt at al-Anbari According to 
Dinawari it was a commander sent by Abu Muslim who installed Abu *1 
‘Abbas as caliph. It was Abu Muslim who killed Abu Salama without 
consulting the caliph. It was Abu Muslim who crushed an attempt made 
by ‘Tsa b. ‘All at al-Anbar to seize the power from al-Mangur. It is 
worth noting that Dinawari ignores many noticeable political events 
such as al-Khallal's conspiracy against the ‘Abbasids, the revolt of 
‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali, the Barinacids etc. The names of his sources are 
frequently omitted.
7. Al-Ya‘qubi, AJunad b. Abi Y# *^ub b. Ja*far b. tfahab b. Wa$i£
(d. 284/895). An Arab historian and geographer. He was a moderate
1 2  ^
Dina, p.358; See also_-B.l. ^Dinawari). This tendency is also
noticed in gamza Igfahani’s Tarikh, p.139*
^ B . I (Ya*qubi).
pro-**Alid by sympathy but this feeling did not influence him in his 
writing of history. Though concise his accounts on the early ‘Abbasid 
era are clear, unbiased and coherent. Although he does not often refer 
to his authorities, it is obvious that he derived some of his information 
from sources other than fabari. He brings to light many interesting 
points which contribute to a better understanding of men and policies 
of the early *Abbasid period. His version, for example, on the revolt 
of ‘Abdallah b. ‘All is commendable in that he stresses the fact that 
Abu Muslim was from the very beginning suspicious of the intentions of 
tie caliph towards him. Moreover the lists he gives of the governors, 
the qadis and the sababa of every caliph is indicative of the high 
proportion of Arabs at court and in the administration. He emphasizes 
the initiative of the caliph al-Mangur in appointing his own Hawaii and 
ghilman to governmental posts although the influence of the Arabs 
was still prevalent, the tribal policy pursued by early ‘Abbasid caliphs 
in facing dangerous political situations, and the rivalry between various 
groups at the court in the contest for power. Finally he supplements 
Jabari's fragmentary information on Ifriqiyya, ‘Uman and other distant 
provinces with brief, but unlike Tabari, coherent and intelligent 
accounts.
Ya*qubirs essay on the caliphs entitled Mushakalat *1 Nas Lisamanikim^ 
is characterized by clear thinking and a sense of history. In this work
Ed. by tf. Hillward and trans. into Persian by $usayn Khudoy.jum, Teheran 
cW>yv* (j ij Al obr >>
31.
fait i~p. t ?.$(
he mentions what was characteristic of the caliph which was followed 
by the people. For the early ‘Abbasid period one notices the contrast 
between the serious approach of al-Man§iur the founder of the new state 
and the laxity of al-Rashid who was the first of the early *Abbasids 
to spend time playing chess in the company of slave girls.
_  *i
8. Al-Futufr by Abu Muhammad Aljmad b. A 4them al-Kufi (d.314/926 A.D.).
He was an Arab historian who lived in the 3rd century A.H./9th century
A.D. Though he was. a contemporary of many renowned historians of his
2
days nothing was known of his life or work until recently.
The first volume of al-Kufi*s Futub begins with the caliphate 
of ‘uthraan b. 4Affan and ends with the revolt of al-Mukhtar in 66 A.H./ 
685-6 A.D, The second volume continues the account of al-Hukhtar1 s revolt 
and ends with the suj>pression of Babak's revolt in the reign of al- 
Hu4tagim (218-227^. The first volume consists of 270 fols. while the 
second volume consists of 278 fols. As it is still in a manuscript form, 
this work has been utilized by a few scholars. As al-ICufi states at 
the very beginning that his work is a combination of several versions he 
has consulted, he refrains from referring in the course of the book to 
the authorities cited in the introduction.
Al-Kufi is one of the earliest extant sources on the history of 
the Arabs in Khurasan and provides the means of controlling the accounts
1
Brockelmann, Op.cit., vol. I, p.150, supp., 1, p.220; the Persian 
translation of the Arabic origin is published in Bombay 1300 A.H.
2
C.A^Storey, Persian literature, I, pp. 207-209; A.H.KurattKitab al- 
Futub, A.&.T.F., vol. 7, 1949, pp. 255-282; Shaman, op.cit., 
pp. viii-xiii, The XII, I.C.O.. 1961.
of other historians such as 'pabari and Baladhuri. He ends his 
account of the Futub with the emergence of the Kusawwida and obviously 
considers the *Abbasid revolution and the events which followed it as 
a new phase, for he quotes a number of authorities such as Mada^ni, 
Baladhuri and al-Haytham b. ‘Ady some of which are different from 
those adduced at the beginning of the book. He evidently intends to 
convey the impression ttat it is a question of another part of the 
book which has nothing to do with the Futub*
tjj U> >  X-'<J} t? (jVV1 a
l) J o  d > ‘J \
tJ> ^ jf
As far as this period is concerned al-Kufi is valuable in that he 
provides vital data on the Arab settlement in Khurasan and fresh material 
on provinces such as Armenia. Besides his infoxmaation on political
i
events is complementary to other sources and provides useful opportunities 
for control and comparison. On the other hand his sympathies are clearly 
pro-‘Alid. His accounts on the eax\Ly ‘Abbasid da‘wa are biased and must 
be treated with extreme caution. In Kufi*s account, the reign of Abu 
*1 ‘Abbas is surrounded by an aura of vengeance on the Umayyads for 
the persecution of Ahl al-Bayt. His bias is so evident whenever the 
‘Alids are concerned. He gives the impression that the revolt of Khurasan
was waged in the name of Ahl al-Bayt and not of the ‘Abbasid in 
particular, and that it was only after the arrival of the Khurasanjs 
to Kufa that Abu *1 ‘Abbas was chosen by Abu Salama as the best among 
the Hashimites. He never refers to the conspiracy of Abu Salama. 
Interesting is that al-ICufi quotes as other historians do the letter 
of Abu Muslim to al-Mangur adding - unlike other historians - a few 
sentences which praise the ‘Alids and state that they had a better 
title to the caliphate, these sentences are an obvious fabrication and 
bear witness to his pro-*Alid feelings. He also differs from every other 
historian in asserting that Abu Muslim reached Karw after his quarrel 
with al-Man^ur, and only then returned to al-Mada/in for his fatal 
meeting with the latter. On the whole his accounts on the political 
events during the early ‘Abbasid period are sometimes superficial 
and not quite trustworthy, the more so as he only quotes his main 
sources, not the whole chain of authorities. His style of narration 
differs from that of Tabari in that he is selective with regard to 
topic and details so that the picture he gives on the early ‘Abbasids 
is far from complete. This is justified as he was writing Futub and not 
Tarikh. His accounts are short especially from thereign of al-Mahdi 
onwards. Speaking on thereign of al-Hadi he says "there are some accounts 
that tell about his relations with the ‘Alids which we do not like to 
narrate". He does not enlarge on ‘Alid risings and refrains from 
givingdetails which might discredit the ‘Alids.
H -
9. Al-Uazara* wa*l Kuttab by Abu *Abd Allah Muhammad b. ‘Abdus al-
*1
Jahshiyari (d.331 A.H./942 A.D.). His work is important in so far as 
it provides an inside version of the ‘Abbasid court and administration 
derived from officials and court associates. Although it has more 
importance for the administrative institutions it also contains 
material on the polit ical situation, especially the intrigues 
between the wasirs and other political groupings such as the Mawali, 
the Arabs, the Saftaba and the IChurasanja. Jahshiyari clearly shows 
that the downfall of seveml wazirs was due to intrigues of this 
kind. Jahshiyari also enlarges on subjects like the death of Ibn 
al-Kuqaffa‘ and cites part of the Aman he composed for ‘Abdallah b.
j  —
Ali. The book in factl is one of the bureaucratic writings as Jah­
shiyari and his father before himxere officials in the ‘Abbasid 
administration. Thus the authorities he cites are more or less different 
from Tabari1s and mainly consist of Kuttab. Harragin and ‘Abbasid 
courtiers, but include also Mada‘ini and JajLiz.
10. ICitab al- ‘Uyun. wa’l frada’ifr fi Alchbar al-fra^a * iq: by an anonymous 
author. It starts with the reign of al-V/alid b. Yazld when the Umayyad 
dynasty had already begun to crumble, and ends with the reign of al- 
M u ‘tagim. It is-valuable in that the author does not rely for his 
information only on known historical works, so that a comparison of his
X
Brockelmann, op.cit., suppl. vol. I, p.219;' Sourdel, he Vizirat, 
pp. 8f; idem, Jahshiyari, Melanges Louis Massignon. Vol. Ill, 1957.
version with those of Jabari or Ya‘qubi is especially fruitful.
He rarely quotes his authorities.
11. Al-Maa‘udi, Abu *1 gasan ‘All b. al-gusayn (d, 345/956)
He states in his ICjtab al-Tanbih wa'l Ishraf that the object 
of his work is not to give a detailed account, but a simple 
and succinct narrative which could be remembered byfhe reader.
Thus he only gives an outline of the important events in the 
early ‘Abbasid period. In his Huruj al-dhahab, he always 
refers to other books of his, such as Akhbar al-Z^man and al-ICitab .
al-Awgat. He selects episodes which attracted his attention
which results in an incorporation of legends and anecdotes 
current at the time into his text. This sometimes impairs the 
trustworthiness of his account, a thing which is the more danger­
ous as his elegant style may induce thereader to accept accounts 
and details which are less authentic. In his Huru.j he provides 
somewhat detailed data on the origins and the development 
of the ‘Abbasid da‘wa and ‘Alid-‘Abbasid relation. However, 
he cites his authorities though not so fully as 'Jabari. His 
works consist of rather disconnected though useful anecdotes but 
cannot be described as a coherent annalistic history. Although 
his writings are not affected by partisanship, moderate pro- 
‘Alid leanings can occasionally be detected. On the attempt 
of Abu Salama to transfer the caliphate to the ‘Alids, he 
alleges that the Wazir of Al Muhammad could not find among the
3 6 .
‘Abbasids a single suitable figure. He therefore called upon the
prominent ‘Alids to accept the caliphate. Mas‘udi also criticises
the pro- ‘Abbasid al-Ja^iz for his views on the most controversial
2
subject, i.e. the Imama.
11. Ibn Qutayba Abu ‘Abdallah Muhammad b. Muslim (d. 276/889)“^ is
one of the earliest authorities on the ‘Abbasid period. However most
of his works are not, strictly speaking, history but belong to the
category called Adab literature which deals with history as part of
its educatinnal purposes. One of his works with historical connotations
is al-Ma‘arif which is an encyclopaedic work in which he briefly
outlines the ‘Abbasid period mentioning the main political events
with lists of ‘Ami^s appointed during the period concerned. His main
source is the Mubabbar of Ibn $abib although he also derived some
information from other sources and from his Shuyukh.
It will not be amiss to mention here the Kitab al-Imama wa’l Siyasa
4
which is erroneously ascribed to Ibn Qutayba. The author gives a 
brief narrative to the early ‘Abbasid period with occasional original 
information. However, one should be cautious in utilizing ICitab al- 
Imama wa*l Siyasa as it was the author’s aim to reproduce anecdotes 
in a way that it would impress the reader and serve as a maxim. His 
work also contains accounts unconfirmed by any other historian. He
^Muruj « VI, p.93.
Sluru.i. VI, pp. 56-58.
^E.I.1 (Ibn Qutaiba).
4 -It has been suggested that ICitab al-Imama... was written by Ibn al-
Qujiyya - that is in the Umayyad Andalus (see G. Lecomte, Ibn Qutayba.... 
pp.174-6). This may account for the presence of strange unconfirmed accounts
(cont.)
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sometimes quotes his sources of information, especial al-Haytham 
b. *Ady, but often confines himself to the term "they said'1
12* The manuscript ICitab al-Fitan*' (the book of dissensions), by al- 
Khuza‘i contains traditions ascribed to the Prophet and early gafraba, 
and referring to the civil wars and revolts in early Muslim history.
Though it is by its nature a book on traditions it is reviewed here 
together with the historical sources as most of these predictions - 
especially those of the decline of the Umayyads and the advent of 
the ‘Abbasids - were made ex post and bear signs of historical experience 
on which the author has evidently drawn.
Local histories
General chronicles such as Ya‘qubi and ^abari show more interest 
in the imperial province of Ira£ and its surrounding districts rather 
than distant provinces which they only mention on the occasion of sig­
nificant incidents or rebellions. Even then the information they provide 
is vague and scanty. It is for this reason that our information on 
Khari.jite activities during the _early ‘Abbasid period is so fragmentary.
It is here that information derived from local histories such as Tarikh
al-Maugil and Tarild>-i S is tan is most vital. However, not all Muslim
provinces and cities were lucky in having their history recorded by one
"(co’nt.) in the work. If this suggestion is true it could be argued 
either that the author was influenced hy his pro-Umayyad tendency ov that he 
felt less constrained in expressing himself as he lived outside the sphere 
of ‘Abbasid influence.
^Khajib, vol. 13, pp. 306 ff; Brockelmann, op.cit., Supp., I, p.257;
(Arabic trans., Cairo 1962, p.157); Er. Krenkow, The book of Strife, I.C., 
III, pp. 561-68.
of their own learned natives and not all that were written have
survived. Speaking of ‘Uman, for example, Brockelmann Justly states
that its internal conditions remained unknown to the lest of the Islamic
world until the 11th century, so that he is only able to find names
1of authors from that time onwards.
It is worth noting that some local histories of cities or provinces 
are by no means annals but biographies of prominent people who lived 
or visited the city or the province concerned. Typical examples 
/ of that are the History of Baghdad by al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, History of 
Isfahan by Abu Nu *aym al-Igbahani and History of Damascus by Ibn ‘Asakir. 
Prom these works sporadic historical information can be extracted from 
a mass of irrelevant data by which it is buried.
1. The local history of the greatest importance for the study of
this period is Tarikh al-Maugil of Abu Zalcariyya Yazid b. Muhammad
b. Iyas b. al-Qasim al-Azdi (d.334/945). Its only extant part is volume
two, which comprises of 361 fols., and covers the period from the year
101 A.H. to 224 A.H. The manuscript utilized in this study is that
2
of the Chester Beatty Library in Dublin,
Although, as its title indicates, the work is a local history, it 
deals nevertheless with the whole histoiy of the Muslim empire in a
■^Brockelmann, op.cit., Supp., HI, p.1297.
2 -  Arbury, Catalogue of Arabic and Persian..,, Vol. 1, p.11; A. §abiba,
A study on Abu Zakariya1 s work..., Ph. D. thesis, Cambridge Uni­
versity, 1965.
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chronological order. It has been ranged among the local histories 
because the events outside Mosul or the jazira area are only treated 
in detail when they are, in some way or another, relevant to Mosul,
He proceeds in the annalistical manner arranging his material according 
to the years with headings and topics. He quotes his authorities as 
often as Tabari if not more than him. They are written iforks, traditions 
handed down by chains of transmitters and accounts of living eye witnesses, 
He quotes for example al-Mada*ini, al-Haytham b, *Ady, Atymad b. Zuhayr, 
Abu Mi^har al-Sindi and Khalifa b, Khayyaj. Although al-Azdi was not 
pronouncedly partisan in his Tarikh al-Maugil his affection for the 
‘Alids is discernible.*1* However, he was right when he described his
K. as lOX-LUYJS;  ^^  V 1
^  ^  _<r>vu' t>* F* -  »
His is one of the fullest accounts on the history of Mosul and 
the region of the Jasira during the early ‘Abbasid period. He fully 
describes the decisive battle of al-Zab. He gives a most pathetic 
and dramatic picture of the tragic massacre of Mogul perpetuated by 
the governor Yafcya b. Muhammad in 133 A.H. Y/e owe to him the complete 
text of official letters such as the Aman given by al-Mangur to his 
uncle ‘Abdallah b. ‘All, documents written by both Abu ?1 ‘Abbas and 
al-Mangur conferring estates on Arab tribal chiefs in Mosul in recognition
^Tarikh al-Maugil, fols. 206, 171, 167, 158 
^Op.cit., fol. 217,
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of services rendered in quelling Marwan's resistance and a letter 
from al-Mahdi to a Khaxajite rebel ‘Abd al-Salam al-Yashkuri. 
Besides the work is also valuable for this study as it reveals 
the motivation of the early ‘Abbasid caliphs and how they made 
use of tribal antagonism to rule by weakening the tribal 
frilf, i.e. alliance.
Tarikh al-Mau^il is complementary to the sporadic inform­
ation of Tabari and Ya‘qubi in that it provides detailed ac­
counts on Khari.jite and other risings in the Jazira and even 
other districts of the empire. It is particularly in these 
details that Ibn al-Athir is indebted to al-Azdi. He also 
relates events of general importance such as the rebellion of 
Bassam b. Ibrahim in Syria, the ‘Alid revolts in the gijas and 
Bagra, enlarging on the support given to Muhammad and Ibrahim, 
the gasanids,by religious circles. He also supplies information 
on circles of traditionists in Mogul and other cities.
It is difficult to account for the neglect of this so useful 
work by contemporary or late historians, some of whom, such as Ibn 
al-Athir, quote from him without even mentioning his name. It 
has been suggested that the ruling circles and their associates 
boycotted the work due to its anti-‘Abbasid attitude. ** It is, 
however, also possible that the author who lived in Mogul never
^gabiba, op.cit. , p.27.
came into contact with those in power who consequently disregarded his
worlc. Moreover, although markedly non-partisan in his accounts he
accused the ‘Abbasids in connection with the massacre of Mo$ul of
1
being non-Muslims.
2. The chronicle ascribed to Dionysius of Tell Mahre. He was the mon-
2
physite patriarch of Tell Mahre in 816 A.D. His work which is one of 
the few contemporary still extant works, deals specifically with the con­
ditions of the Jazira in that period. Originally written in Syriac it is 
a local chronicle chronologically arranged. The framework is divided
not only by years in question but also by headings referring to the in­
cidents described. He seems to have been the eye-witness of the tremendous
3 {
upheaval which was the aftermath of the Abbasid revolution. The rather
gloomy picture he gives of the conditions of life of the people of the
Jazira is preceded by the following statement:
nWe propose to tell everything and to transmit its 
memory to those who will come after us in the world 
so that they should have a memory of the burden under
which their ancestors were bowed and take care lest
they themselves should be oppressed.’1^
However, his work must be approached with caution for his hostility
towards the Muslim central regime induces him to make several sweeping
statements. It is often noticed that local historians express anii-central
^Tarikh al-Haugil, fol. 121.
2
Segal, Syriac chronicles.., in Histoirians of the Middle Bast, pp. 253-£- 
0. Cahen, fiscale, propriete..., Arabica, 1964. J. B. Ghabott, Chronique 
-de Denys de Tell-Mabmre. introduction.
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Although Dionysius1s chronicle is not an apocalyptic work it, somehow, 
had the same purposes of apocalypses. These purposes wei’e as Professor
Lewis maintains "To console the oppressed with hopes of imminent triumph,
to iustify the ways of God to men by showing that tlierr suxieriflbs
J   hOOjij^ -L
government sympathies and side with local rebels exposing the grievances 
which led to their rebellions* This tendency is traced in some of the 
accounts of al-Azdi, Dionysius, the author of Tarikh-i Sistan and al- 
Harshakhi.
It is rather interesting to compare Tarikh al-Haugil and the 
chronicle of Dionysius of Tel Mahre. They both describe the last battle 
fought by Marwan II and the subsequent turbulent situation in the Jazira 
caused by the unruly tribal elements and IChari.i ites as well as by the 
misrule and oppressive taxation imposed by the central regime. They 
both agree that it was heavy taxation that compelled some of the popu­
lation to leave their villages and cities. Dionysius gives more details 
and somehow exaggerates the persecution and stigmatization of Christians, 
They both argue that al-‘Abbas b. Muhammad was one of the best governors 
of the Jazira, while Musa b. Mu§‘ab treated the people very harshly.
They both give some information'on the confrontation with the Byzantines. 
However Dionysius is more concerned with the economic and social conditions 
of the Jazira while al-Azdi puts more stress on the political history 
although remarks on the economy of the district do occur, Dionysius is 
strictly locally orientated while al-Azdi has a wider horizon. Dionysius1 
accounts teem with lengthy quotations from the Bible and apocalyptic pro -
phesies, which not only cause confusion but also obscure the causation
""not arbitrary but part of a divinely ordained sche"nie of t h i n g s ( B . L e w i s , 
"An apocaliptic vision...," B.S.Q.A.S., vol. 13, p.308)
^Dionysius, op.cit., Chabott trans., p.116.
iof the events.
Other local historians vary in importance and relevance. On 
Syria Ibn al-^Adlm’s Zubdat al-galab fi Tarikh galab, not limiting 
himself to Aleppo, deals with the local political conditions of the 
whole of al-Shaiu.^ The earliest work on the history of Egypt is 
Kitab Futufr Mi^r wa akhbdraha by Ibh *Abd al-gakam (d. 257/871).
He was a traditionist by profession and always quotes his soui’ces,
n  ^
whether oral or written. Al-ICindi’ s(d350/961) Kitab al-Wulat wa *1 Qudat
covers the ‘Abbasid period till almost the middle of the 4th century.
The most celebrated and relevant local work on Egypt is Maqrlzi’s 
(d. 845/1441-2) Khitat. It contains various kinds of information on 
governors, local revolts, the attitude of the Dhimmis towards the new 
regime and a chapter on religious sects, Abu *1 Majuasin b. Taghribaldi* s 
(d.874/1469) Hu.jum is mainly concerned with Egypt from the Arab conquest. 
However like Abu Zakariya he gives information on other general political 
events which occured in Ifriqiyya, Jazira, Khurasan etc. That is why 
this work has been in preference to others the object of attention of 
scholars.
The best relevant works on the early Islamic history of the Yemen 
and Ifriqiyya are al-Khazra.ji1 s al-Kifaya , and Ihn ‘Adhari’s
al-Bayan al-Maghrib fi Akhbar al-Andalus wa *1 Maghrib. The latter starts
Starting from al-Awza‘i (d. 157 A.H.) who is said to have written a book 
on the history of Syria many authors wrote on the local history of Syria 
or one of its cities. Many of these works are either lost or still in form 
of manuscript. (For the origin and development of the local Syrian histories 
see S. Dalian’s article in Historians of the Middle Bast, pp. 108-117;
S. Dahan, Al-A‘lak al-Khatira.. (introduction)•. . —... . - — — ■ r ■ •- - -
^See H. Brunschvig,"Ibn ‘Abd al-H’akam...y A.I.E.Q., Tome VI, 1942-47, 
pp. 108-155.
3See preface of the English translation of part one., by W, Popper.
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with the Arab conquest and finishes with the year 667 A.H, The author
depends either on written sources such as Tabari, Bakri, Ibn Jabib, Ibn
gazm and al~Q;u$a‘i, or on authentic narrators. On ‘Uman there is an
important work entitled Kashf al-ghumma written in the 18th century by
Shaykh Sir^an b. Sa‘id. This work was copied for the most part literally
2
by another local historian called Salil b. Haziq, The latter being 
a fanatic Iba^ite, disregards many facts which might discredit the 
Kharijite Imams. By comparing the accounts of both works with the accounts 
of another local historian, namely al-Salimi , as well as other general 
chroniclers, one can obtain a clear picture of *Uman in the period con­
cerned insofar as this is possible.^ Among the comprehensive local 
histories of the ?ijaz are al-Samhudi’s Wafa’ al-V/afa.. and al-Azraqi’s
Akhbar Malcka. They are, however, informative on topography rather than
5history.
Several local histories deal with the eastern provinces. Prominent 
among them are al-Qummi’s Tarikh-i Qumrn, the Persian translation of part 
of a lost Arabic original containing scanty political information 
especially on ‘Alid figures. However, its greatest importance lies in
the information on revenue and taxation; Ibn Igfandiyar’s History of
_  — 6 
Tabarigtan, the anonymous Tarikh-i Sistan and Harshakhi's Tarikh-i Bukhara
^Ibn *Adhari, Leiden, 194B, vol. I, pp. 2-3. -
2
History of the Imams., trans. by C. P. Bodger, London, 1871.
^Tubfat al-A‘yan.., Cairo 1961.
A  ^ m ^
On the local history of jUman see L.V.Vaglierj, L 1 Imamato..., pp. 247-50; 
S.B.Miles, The countries and tribes of the Persian Gulf, Vol. I, p.16. 
This is how the local Iba^ite historian al-Salimi attempts to account 
for the lack of historical writings on ‘Uman;
k€-
all of these are of certain limited importance to this study. They 
provide detailed or complementary accountson political events which 
occurred in the provinces. Among them ares the revolt of fabarisjan 
under al—Mangur and al-Mahdi, the revolt of Sharik al-Mahri and al- 
Muqanna* in Khurasan, the Kharijite rising of gamza and his bold letter 
to al-Rashid. Considering that early general historians such as Tabari 
or Ya‘qubi give only general outline of incidents in remote provinces, 
the accounts of local historians supply the complementary detail.
Although some of the local historians are prejudiced against the central 
regime one can obtain a fairly close idea by comparing the accounts of 
both general and local historians. One should, however, be on one*s 
guard against their anti-‘Abbasid bias. With few exceptions, it should 
be admitted, the information supplied by local historians is rarely of the 
kind to satisfy the curiosity of a student of history or requirements : 
of modern research.
J
Literary works
The most important literary works relevant to this period are the 
works of Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, al-Ja^iz, Ibn Qutabya and Abu *1 Faraj al- 
Igsbahani and finally the Pi wans of celebrated early ‘Abbasid poets.
(con t.) ~ " [ " J J*
(see Tuhfat al-A‘.van, vol. I, p.4)
, "H
On the local history of the §ijaz see F. Wttstenfeld^ Pie chroniken der 
stadt Mekka, Leipzig 1859; S. al- ‘Ali, Ual-Ku *alafat al- ‘Arabiyya ‘an al* 
Madina wa 1 gijaz’1, B.C.A., 1962, pp. 118-157.
r
See R. N. Frye, "City Chronicles", Avicenna Commemoration. Volume,
1956, pp. 89-92. ,
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Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ Abu Muhammad ‘Abdullah b. Rozbih (d. 159/756) 
was a Persian by origin and a Manichian by religion until he was 
converted to Islam late in his life after the advent of the ‘Abbasids.
He was one of the most celebrated writers in Arabic prose adab. He 
admired Persian civilization and culture which he regarded as an ideal
to be followed by the society of his own time. His most important works
— — — 4^  —
are Risala fi *1 gafraba and ai-Adabyal^gaghir-wa- Adab al-Kabir.
In his Risala which was addressed to al-Mangurhe gives the latter 
advice on the right attitude of the ruler towards various groups of 
society and army. It Is most revelatory of the politics of the time.
It also points out to the importance of the r61e played by the gafraba 
of the caliph, most of whom were Arabs with great tribal followings, 
in the politics of the day and gives precepts on polity and ethics. In­
teresting is the advice to the ruling class to seek the help of the 
people of knowledge, the *Ulama, In running the affairs of the state.
It was due to these and many other daring ideas rather than to his 
alleged Zandaqa that his death is to be ascribed.
Al-Ja^iz Abu ‘Uthman ‘Amr b. Bahr (d. 255/868) is the most fertile 
writer of the early ‘Abbasid epoch. Almost contemporary with the early 
‘Abbasid caliphs his works reflect the ups and downs of the ‘Abbasid
1
Goiten, ''Turning point...", I. C ., 1949; Sourdel, "La Biographie dMbn 
d. Muqaffa*", Arabica, 1954, pp. 507-525; Dawud, A comparative study..., 
Ph.D. thesis,1964,
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regime after the great revolution in Khurasan. He touches on any and 
every topic he likes and is brilliant in presenting his arguments. His 
works deal with Adab, Mu‘tazila theology, sects and politico-religious 
polemics but his favourite subject was the Imama, in the treatment of 
which he shows sympathy for the ‘Abbasids. He attacked bitterly the 
Shi‘a, the pro-Umayyad Nabita and the Shu‘ubiyya. He tried to represent 
the achievement of the ‘Abbasids as superior to those of the Umayyads, 
but goes too far in describing the bloody massacre of Mosul by Ta^ tya^  b. 
Muhammad as an act of bravery and valour. Intelligent information re­
levant to the political history of the ‘Abbasid dynasty is found scattered 
in his books and essays.
Ibn Qutayba*s al-Shi‘r wa’l shu*ara?, Ibn al-Mu‘tazz (d. 296/908)
Iabaqat al~Shu ‘ara*, and Abu *1 karaj al~I§bahani1 s (d. 356/966-^ Aghani 
are of great relevance to the period, The first two deal briefly with 
the ‘Abbasid plots among others. The third, though nominally dealing 
with poetry, gives numerous accounts of political events among thou on 
the struggle for the succession, and manifold intrigues and rivalries 
between various political groupings in the court. Despite Igbahani's 
Umayyad descent he was ‘Alid in sympathy. He lived under the patronage 
of the Shi‘ite Buyids especially the wazir al-Muhallabi. He was also 
welcomed by Sayf al-Dawla to whom it is said he presented his work Kitab 
al-Agftani. As to the question of the authenticity of his accounts he 
often gives his authorities which enables us to check on the information 
he provides. Heeven sometimes does not depend on his source of information
ifS •
but goes further to investigate the matter by himself and records 
his own view about it. He calls the ‘Abbasid state Dawlat Ahl Khurasan.
An exhaustive critical study of the early ^bbagid poets and the impact 
of the politics of the period on them has not yet been made, Neverthe­
less the diwans of al-Kumayt, Abu hulama Zand b. al-Jawn, Bashshar 
b, Burd, Bi^il al-Khuza*!, Muslim b. al-Walid and others contain 
verses relating to various political events such as the crushing 
of rebellions, campaigns against the Byzantines, the influence and
i
power of individual wazirs or courtiers, the struggle between different 
political groupings, and the continued existence of Mufakharat between 
different tribes. They are also of help in tracing the development of 
the ‘Abbasid claim to the caliphate and of their conflict with the 
‘Alids.
Genealogical and biographical works
Apart from certain works such as Ibn Sa^'s Tabaqat, Baladhuri* s 
Ansab, Ibn al-ICalbi's works, Khalifa b. Khayyat1s Tabaqat, Kashshi's and 
Najashi's Ri.jals, al-Kh a jib* 3 Tarikh Baghdad, Ibn *Asakir’s Tarikh 
Mraashq, Ibn Khalikan1 s Vfafayat and Dhahabi1s works, the bulk of 
geneological and Sunnite or Shi'ite biographical literature is too late 
to be of much value for this thesis, Tedious work is necessary to dis­
entangle the few historical informations from the mass of irrelevant 
data* What is worse these informations are copied from earlier sources 
and there are very few fresh details or comments.
M-
As for early geneological works they are important in that they 
not only contain1 information on personal data of many of the personal­
ities of the early ‘Abbasid period, but also provide few interesting 
lines on their political or social career* The fact that works of Ibn
Baladhuri are early works adds weight to their short notes on 
each personality and permits checking of the information found in 
later sources. It is from these works that one derives vital in­
formation on facts such as the presence of a great number of Arab 
sab aba at ‘Abbasid court, or special favours such as the generous^.- 
‘afa by al-Mahdi on the people of the gijaz. They are also helpful 
in clearing up the confusion still reigning on the issue of the 
elimination of the TJmayyads by the ‘Abbasi&s, the cruelty of which 
is somehow exaggerated by . . many sources.
Al-Baladhuri1s Ansab al-Agfrraf is a historical work arranged 
according to geneological criteria. &vents of historical importance 
are fitted into the geneological framework so that names of persons 
provide the headings under which there are t,epical headings and sub­
headings. Thus the ‘Abbasid propaganda is dealt with under Muhammad 
b. ‘All, the ‘Abbasid revolution under Ibrahim the Imam and Abu *1 
‘Abbas, the rising of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali in Syria under his name.
The ‘Alid risings of 145 A.H. in the gijaa ahd Bagra under the names 
of Muhammad and .Ibrahim, the sons of ‘Abdallah al-Ma&$* Under the 
name of Abu *1 ‘Abbas there are subheadings such as:
al-Kalbi and his son Hi sham as well as Hug ab al-Zubayri and
$  o .
while under the caliphate of al-Mangur there are subheadings such
as * f • ^  * I i 1 1 1 ’ v i *
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Baladhusd quotes numerous authorities, among them al~MadaAini, ‘Umar 
b. Shabba, al~Haytham b. *Ady, Abu I4as‘ud al-Kufi, Hisham b. al-Kalbi,
Abu ‘Ubayda and al-V/aqidi. He often quotes sources anonymously
and uses sentences such as:
t (/&-J ^  <z/&^  cpa-p^
' 1 . »
* 1 y S  <jUj C C
He uses ^  many times when speaking of ‘Alid revolts, probably
because the transmitters did not wish their names to be known. He 
also sometimes quotes his main authority such as Mada’ini adding CA
This is due to the fact that the authorities of the quoted narrator 
were so well known at that time that an explicit mention of the whole 
chain is considered superfluous. He also sometimes combines two or 
more versions in one statement, in which case he cites the authorities 
at the beginning. Some of his combined accounts however are summarised.
On the early ‘Abbasid period especially on the reigns of the first 
two caliphs, Ansab al-Ashraf is invaluable; its accounts are most 
helpful as a check on other sources when it is a question of events 
such as the ‘Alid revolts. It is also eminently useful in that it 
sheds light on some too brief and vague accounts of Tabari such as 
those on the revolts of *Abd al-Jabbar al-Azdi and IChalid b. Ibrahim
al-Dhuhli in Khurasan. It is only after consulting sources such 
as Ansab al-Ashriif and Tarikh al-Haugil that one realizes how summary
. n_. n m—I IBM ■ H n ~  ---------  ll II 1^ ■'■^ 1.11 ■!
and sometimes confused Tabari*s annals are.
_ m ^ — 1 
Muhammad b. £abib * a (d. 245/859-6) Asm a * al-Mughtalin min al-Aghraf
deals with a large number of prominent figures who were assassinated 
in the disturbed transitional pex'iod which is hei’e our concern. The 
fact that the author lived in the early 3rd century A.H. adds to the 
value of this and other works written by him, such as his "miscellanies” 
known as al-Mubabbar. Some of the topics discussed here have a bearing 
on the period in question, e.g. al-‘Abbas's pre-Islamic rOle, the names 
of the ‘Abbasid Uaqibs and accounts of sporadic political events.
Unfortunately for our knowledge of history Ibn Sa‘d fs (d. 250/844/5) 
Tabaqat only gives detailed information on pious and religious figures, 
while disregarding personalities who though important politicians or 
military men, had more worldly leanings. Y/hat renders the historical 
information found! in the Tabaqat valuable is that it is one of the 
earliest biographical works. Ibn Sa*d gives us an idea of the short­
lived cordial ‘Alid-*Abbasid understanding which followed the ‘Abbasid 
victory, when the new regime was referred to as Pawlat Ban! Hashim and 
their partisans as Shi‘a. He also confirms the authenticity of the 
YJa^iyya of Abu Hashim to Muhammad b. ‘Ali. Other valuable though
^ed. by A. Harun, Uawadir al-Ylakhtutat, Cairo, 1954.
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scanty information on the Saftaba of tie caliphs and the Q.u$at who
were known for their piety could he found • ■
But the most important asset of the work is that it provides one
of the earliest informations on Arab settlers in Khurasan which proves
the existence of Arab settlers in villages around Kerw. Fortunately
there was a proportion of religious figures among those early
settlers, for Ibn Sa‘d mentions no one except pious men. Had they
only been warriors and statesmen, Hie scanty information on early
Arab settlers in the villages of Khurasan might have been completely
ignored by the author. Khalifa b. Khayyam's Tabaqat deals with the
gafraba of the prophet and Tabi‘in whose names are arranged according
to the cities and provinces they lived inor visited with traditions they
transmitted from the Prophet. He seems to have finished the Tabaqat
in 326 A.II. shortly before his death. Due to its brevity, the work
has little to offer on the political history of the early ‘Abbasid period.
AI-Khajib al-Baghdadi's (463/l07l) Tarikh Baghdad is of special
importance for it contains in its first volume accounts on the foundation
of Baghdad by al-Mangur. Besides Ya‘qubi’s Buldan and Tabari’s
Tarikh it is the best source on the topography of Baghdad. Hajji 
1
Khalifa considers if chronologically the second work dealing with
2Baghdad, while Ibn al-Nadim quotes, in the Fihrist , three earlier
works, the first being Fad'a*il Baghdad by Yasdajard b. Mahmand of which
7 “  T  T
Haj3 i Khalifa, Kashf al-Zunun, vol. I, p.288- The first being
T ay fur * s Tarikh Baghdad (op."ol t., vol. 2, p. 142).
^ Fihrisit, vol. I, pp. 129,146.
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only a few pages are preserved; the second al-SaralcJisi1 s Fada’il 
Baghdad wa Akhbarha, which is no longer extant; the third fayfurs'
Tarikh Baghdad, only a small part of which dealing with the political 
history is still available. However after dealing with the topography 
of Baghdad al-Khaflb proceeds to give a biographical data on all 
important personalities who visited, lived in or even passed through 
Baghdad, He arranges his biographies alphabetically, and usually 
quotes his* authorities among which there are Yfaki‘, Naftawayh and 
Tanukhi. Information could be found on different personalities who 
played prominent rOles during the early ‘Abbasid period. This work was 
held in high esteem by learned circles of the time, and led Ibn Khali ilcan 
to say "Had he written nothing but his history, it .would have been suffi­
cient for his reputation".
Ibn ‘Asakir's (d. 57l/ll76) Tarikh dimashq, a huge work which 
according to al-Munajjid comprised 80 volumes. The first deals with
i
-  1the virtues of al-Sham and its conquest by the Arabs; the second is 
devoted to the topography of Damascus and also contains the beginning 
of the biographies. But Ibn ‘Asalcir in his biographies does not limit 
himself to people of local origin or visitors of Damascus, but includes 
all Syrians and important visitors to the province. As a traditionist 
he paid a good deal of attention to the chain of authorities. As a 
result the book is rather tedious and monotonous. In its arrangement
For Ibn al-‘Adim* s Bughya al-falab, see Historians of the Middle Fast, 
pp. 112 ff.
as well as the emphasis put on topographical data, Tarikh Dimashq 
resembles its predecessor Tarikh Baghdad* Being a late historian,
Ibn ‘Asakir uses a large variety of sources. He made use, for instance, 
of Mada‘ini, Ibn Sa‘d, Jahshiyari, Tabari, al-Khafib, Bayhaqi and others. 
He occasionally quotes contradictoiy statements regarding a certain 
event or personality.
It contains useful though scanty informatinn* on the early ‘Abbasid 
period gathered from different earlier works, some of which have not 
been preserved. However some of his accounts on the ‘Abbasid revolution 
are legendary and sometimes convey the anti-‘Abbasid version of the 
events.
Ibn Khallikan*s (d. 68l/l282) Wafayat al~A‘yan is arranged according
to the alphabetical order because in the words of the author himself,
1
"It is easier than arranging it according to the years". He deals 
with all sorts of people and his method is to cite several sources on 
each personality he includes in his work. His matez'ial is well- 
selected from carefully vetted sources. For example his authorities 
on Yazid b. Hubayra the renowned governor of V/agit are: Mada * ini,
ICHalifa b. Khayyaj;, Ibn Qutayba, Tabari, Ibn *Asakir and the Hamasa 
of Abu Tamam. He made a great use of local as well as general histories 
of Damascus. His entries are coherent, concise and convey a fair
picture of the person concerned. However, he sometimes attributes 
information to sources such as Tabari which are not to be found in 
the actual work. In view of the meticulous care with which he treats 
his sources, it could be assumed that the woidcs in question were 
originally larger than in the form in which they are now known.
Haqrlzi's al-Muqaffa is similar to its main source of information 
Ansab al-Aghraf in that it is history arranged in a biographical 
framework. This is at least true of the ‘Abbasids. It contains 
mention of many ‘Abbasid personalities such as Abu *1 ‘Abbas, al- 
Mangur and ‘Abdallah b. *Ali. On al-Mangur, for example, al~Kaqrizi 
more or less copies or summarizes Ansab al-Aghraf. ' Maqrizi rarely 
adduces the entire chain of authorities but only mentions prominent 
ones such as Mada* ini, al-Haytham b. *Ady, aHMufaflflal al-pabbi etc.
He also provides sub-headings in the margin of the page.
As to the Shi‘ite biographies, al-Kashshfs (d. end of the 4th C./ 
10th A.ID.) and al-Najashi's (d. 450/l058— 9), Ri.jals are valuable 
to this study. Kashshi's Ri.jal is the earliest and tie best of them.
It is a collection of traditions about the doctrines and personalities of 
the Shi*a movement in the early formative period. It is more valuable 
when it speaks of "Shi‘ite" partisans and their activities and circles 
round the Imam rather than when it deals with the Imam himself as it 
relates accounts which are not mentioned by other Shi‘ite works. That
is the reason for certain reservations with which the work is 
looked upon by other Shi*ite authors such as al—'Jusi and al—Kajashi, 
a fact which renders the work even more valuable and trustworthy from 
the historical viewpoint.
The militant and activist ‘Alids, i.e. the Zaydids and the gasanids, 
are mentioned in detail in historical works. Less considered by the 
chronicles are the gusaynids who adopted an acquiescent policy. As 
a result, for informatinn on the gusaynids one has to depend mainly 
on Shi‘ite biographies which are late and of little historical value 
as factual information, especiallycn the Imams, is buried under a mass 
of legendary and semi-legendary accounts. The ‘Alid Imams emerge
i
from the description given here uniformly as virtuous, bold and full
of initiative. YJhat makes matters worse is that some late Sunni
1 —
writers accept these recorded Shi‘ite accounts on the Imams such as
Ja*far al-gadiq unquestioningly, so that such Imams are semi- 
mythical rather than real persons. Abu *1 Faraj al-I^bahani*s 
Haqatll al-Talibiyin wa-Akhbaruhum occupies a special place in this
i
category. It deals with the Talibite "martyrs* who were killed in one 
way or another and ends with the seventieth martyr who died in the 
reign of al-Muqtadir 908-932. Although Igbahani was pro-‘Alid 
(Zaydite) by tendency he does not seem to be biased in his historical 
accounts as he quotes his authorities and gives more than one version of
Such as Abu Ifa/aym's gilyat al-Awliya*.
2 1 —
E.I« (igbahani); Brockelmann, op.cit.» vol. I, pp.Ig2-153» supp. I, 
p.225.
the event, nevertheless one should be cautious in dealing with his 
work especially when dealing with £fasanid risings of the gijaz and 
Bagra or the battle of Fakhkh.
Heresiographies and sectarian works
Most of heresiographic and sectarian sources have only been
accessible for a score of years or so. They were, therefore, not
yet available to the historians of the late nineteenth and early
t
twentieth century. Most of these works are late and mainly concerned 
with the sects, their doctrines, their development, divisions and sub­
divisions, They concentrate on the enumeration of the heresies, 
the classification of their errors and their subsequent refutation.
They are mostly pi'ejudiced in their approach. Heresiographers such 
as Ibn gazm (d. 459/1064) who state that he does not want to use 
against the heretics other arguments than those derived from their 
own explicit statements are rare indeed. Earlier works such as the 
Shi‘ite Sa‘d b. ‘Abdallah al-Ash‘aris (d. 301/915)? Kitab al-Haqalat 
wa*l Firaq, the Shi*ite Hawbkhti1 s (d. 310/922) Firaq al-Shi*a, the 
Sunnite al-Ash‘ari* s (d. 321/933) Maaalat al-Islamiyyin. Molatils 
(d. 377/987-8) Kitab al-Tanbih and Baghdadi*s al-Farq bayna’l Firaq^
•1
See the remarks of Moscati,“Per una storia Dell*antica Si*a,nR.S.Q.,
1955, pp* 251-267; idem, "Studi su Abu Muslim1', II, Rendiconti Lincei,
1949, 474-495. See also the review of Ibn al-Murtada* s T d 84o/i437T Tabaqat 
al-Mu *tazila in B.S.O.A.S., XXV, 1962, pp. 347 f#
2Erroneously ascribed to Nawbakliti, the workjhas been, recently authenticated 
as the work of S a a l - A s h ‘ari by Dr. Hashkur who points out how material- 
ly^the Kitab al-Haqalat, which was composed after Nawbalditi13 Firaq al- 
Shi *a and relies on the latter as well as other authors, differ from 
Raubakhti's work. In fact it contains much information not found in
(cont.)
rs- . ■
contains items of historical information, hut they are few and far
between. They speak of the origins of the ‘Abbasid party and its
connection wiiii the Hashimiyya movement and show that the Kharijites
of Khurasan made, for a period of time, common cause with the ‘Abbasid
dawa, They refer toihe support Muhammad and Ibrahim the g&sanids as 
w _ found
well as Abu *1 Khattab/in the sectarian and religious movements. They
point out that even though the gusaynids were non-political in their 
tendencies, the activities of their extremist wing did not escape the 
keen and cautious eye of the ‘Abbasids. Several revolutionary or ex­
tremist partisans of the gusaynids were imprisoned or executed by 
the authorities, Most of the heresiographies are written by Sunni 
writers, caution therefore is indicated in accepting their data on 
"heterodox11 sects. Most of them tend to forget, for example, the 
extremist phase the ‘Abbasid propaganda went through before the ‘Abbasids 
finally re-defined themselves as orthodox, and accuse only Khidash or Abu 
Muslim or others of having expressed extremist ideas.
As only to be expected in late sources there is a certain amount
i
of confusion about personal or place names. They also contain some 
remarks which can only be termed as frivolous such as the attribution 
of pro-‘Alid tendencies to Abu Muslim or the entirely unsupported 
assertion that he offered the caliphate to Ja‘far al-gadiq. Abu Muslim’s
(cont.) Nawbakhti. Sa‘ad al-Ash‘ari was one of the great Shi‘ite 
traditionists. His method is typical of the traditionists in that 
he quotes unlike Hawbakhti, chains of transmission and also often 
refers^to his sources. Many trustworthy Shi^ite author's such as al- 
Kashshi and al-'J'usi rely on Sa‘ad al~Ash‘ari and quote his book.
environment and his upbringing might suggest these possibilities 
but there is nothing in early authentic accounts which would point 
to Abu Muslim ‘Alid sympathies. The offer of the caliphate to 
Ja‘far al~§&diq can only be regarded as an invention to enhance 
al-§adiq.*s prestige.
Dhimmi sources
The period of our concern is mentioned by a number of contemporary, 
semi-contemporary and late Dhimmi sources. The contemporary and semi- 
contemporary ones comprise works and treatises written by Dionysius, 
Sevorus Ibn al-Muqaffa, Timothy the Nestorian patriarch and Rabbi 
Simon ben Yebya;. among the late chronicles are those written by 
Michael the Syrian and Bar-Hebraeus and others.
Dionysius’s chronicle has already been dealt with ii the section 
on local history.
1
The text of the Mpfrawwara. i.e. discussion between the patriarch 
Timothy (d. 208/823A.D.) and the caliph al-Mahdi is one of the 
earliest Christian polemics against the Muslims. It throws some 
light on al-Mahdi*s attitude towards the Christians for Timothy 
praises the kindness of the caliph towards him.
The "prayer** of Rabbi Simon ben Yafcya (2nd century A.fl.) is 
one of the interesting Jewish apocalypses. As Professor B. Lewis
^See al-Mashriq ♦ 1923, pp* 359-374, 408-418.
LO '
maintains,"^ part of it was written during the wave of Messianic hopes 
connected with the Stoll of the Umayyad dynasty. It relates events 
which occurred during the ‘Abbasid upheaval and in its aftermath, 
especially in the reigns of the first two ‘Abbasid caliphs, such as 
Harwan 11*3 death, the violent death of Abu Muslim, the Messianic risings 
in Syria and the against Abu*l ‘Abbas and Abu Ja‘far. Although
one cannot expect accuracy in what is after all an apocalyptic and 
not historical narrative, it js felt that several of its accounts which 
deal with the period concerned contain a certain element of historicity.
Severus Ibn al-Muqaffa*s (d. end of the 4th C.< A.II.) History of the
Coptic patriarchs of Alexandria deals with political events in Egypt
against the background of successive patriarchs who headed the Coptic
community. Nevertheless it contains details complementary to early
Muslim accounts and illuminating remarks on the political events and
fiscal conditions in early ‘Abbasid Egypt. Thus he relates that the
new ‘Abbasid regime exempted the Coptic community of Bashmur from taxes
for the year of victory (l3l/l32 A.H.) and gave them aswards where they
2
had given help against Harwan II, but after a short period, fiscal 
burdens became heavy again. His narrative is the more important as 
it depends on certain contemporary Coptic and Greek documents preserved 
in churches and monasteries.
^An apocalpytic vision,’1 B.S.Q.A.S.» vol. 13, 1951, p.310. 
2
History of the Coptic...,pp.188f, 197.
LI
The chronicle of Michael the Syrian (d. 596/1199) though late, 
contains some fresh information especially on the persecution of 
the Christians by the ‘Abbasid authorities in the reign of al-Mahdi. 
According to Michael the Syrian, some Christians were accused of 
heresy, but what is rather interesting is that their persecution 
is represented as part of the general persecution of Manicheans
i
(Zan&icjs).1 However, this view may be to some extent exaggerated.
He also gives some political details on the Arab-Byzantine.conflict
and comments on the life at the court in al-Mahdi!s .reign which is
portrayed as luxurious and rather dissolute. Abu *1 Faraj Gregorius
(d. 685/1268) has written two works on general history, the more
2
important of which is in Syriac. Here the author expresses himself 
freely and attacks ‘Abbasid authorities, while he is more concise 
and restrained in his Arabic work. His accounts are generally 
brief and give on certain events, such as the treatment of the 
Christians, merely summaries of corresponding passages in Michael 
the Syrian. For the later period, he depends on Ibn al-Athir. Gener­
ally speaking, tha< se authors being Dhimmis could not but look upon 
the history of the Muslim state from an angle different from the 
Muslim authors.^ The main stress is put on the somewhat exaggerated
1
Chronique de Michel le Syrien, ed., J.B.Chabat, p.3; G. Vajda,
Les Zindigs.... R.S.O., 1937-40, p.229*
2Ed. and Translated into English by W. Budge,. The chronography 
of Gregory..., London, 1932.
*¥
JIbn al-‘lbri, Mukhtagar Ta1rikh al-Duwal, ed. Sal^ani, 1890.
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On these Syriac chronicles Professor Segal says "In the Islamic 
period these chroniclers are no longer to be relied upon for a record 
of the major events of their times. They lived the separate Irre oi
 ^Qnn t. )
*expression of the sufferings and hopes of their co-religionaries.
Some of them, such as Dionysius of Tell Mahre who is favourably
disposed towards the Byzantines and attacks the equivocal rOle
played by the Armenians who occasionally informed the Muslim arny of
the tactics and dispositions of the Byzantine army,*** or Bar Hebraeus
2who hails the Mongol invasion of the caliphate. Despite this 
partiality as well as other defects such as vagueness of events 
or distortion of the names and relationships between prominent figures, 
their accounts are worth considering as they are either complementary 
or occasionally supply new information, especially on their own 
localities and denominations*
Other late historians
General^- speaking, late historians such as Ibn al-Athir, Ibn
al-YiqJiaqa, Ibn Khaldun, al-Maqrizi, al~Dhahabi, Maqdisi al-Suyufi,
Xbn al-jawzl and al-Qalqashaudi depend on early sources. Their
accounts on the early ‘Abbasid period are more often than not summary.
They are more or less free adaptations of earlier accounts and are
3 -
full of misread names of persons and places.
(cont.) a minority community, isolated from the courts of kings 
and princes by political inferiority, passive and uninterested - even 
disillusioned - spectatox^s of the passage of events. (See Historians 
of the Middle East, p.251).
I — — — mm
1Dionysius, op.cit., p.102.
2
Notice the great interest helms shown in the history of the Mongols 
(Budge, op.cit., pp. 475 ff.)
3To avoid lengthy references in footnotes, late sources are not quoted 
unless necessary.
1
Bal‘amis’ (d. 563/972) Persian Chronicle is more or leo3 a
summary of Tabari's Tarikh» However, he occasionally gives some
comments or cites accounts which aie not found in Tabari, such as
that on the revolt of *Abd al-Jabbar al-Azdl in Khrasan. Ibn al-
Athlr too follows the accounts of Jabari with certain deviations
mostly disregarding the chains of authorities. Whenever he finds
Tabari's version lacking he adds information from other sources such
as Abu Zakiriya al-Azdi on e.g. the Khari.jite revolts in Jazlra and
on other political events especially on the western part of the empire*
An anonymous manuscript of the 4th century called Qhurar al-Siyar
differs little from other late works on this subject. However, the
author quotes a fourth letter written in reply to al-Mangur's second
letter by Muhammad hhu *1 Hafs al-Zakiyya which is not mentioned
by earlier historians and can well have boon the work of latex' pro-
2Alid nax*rators and was inspired by party politics.
As the author himself states under 560 A.H*, "As I have been long 
absent from Ira£, I cannot be sure of the /authenticity of the/ news from 
there, so that I could write it down", the anonymous Tai^ikh-idawlatt*Abbasiyya 
was probably written in the early 2nd half of the sixth century A.H.
Being a late historian the anonymous author finds it difficult to
1French translation by M.H.Zotenberg, London 1867.
2‘Similsr documents are not unfroquently found especially in works of 
late historians. See for example parts of the bulky correspondence 
allegedly^exchanged between al-Hansur and Abu Muslim in Muqaff, fol.
94a, fAyni, fol. 266; Bldaya, fol. 10, p.69, see also Train!, "La 
oorrespondenza,, p.l., footnote 1.
(>k.
distinguish between the rdle played by Muhammad b. (Ali and Ibrahim 
the Imam, Abu Muslim and Abu Salama. Moreover he exaggerates the
rOle played by Abu Muslim and attributes to him a part in every
1 - “ crucial decision. It also accuses Abu Muslim of pro-Fatimid ten­
dencies, and regards this as the main reason for his execution by 
aL-Mangur. The confirmation of the suspicion that it was al-Khayzuran
* *  PMr
and her entourage who conspired to kill al-$adi is also interesting.
What detracts from the importance of the work is that the author 
does not quote his authorities and his sympathies are clearly with 
the ‘Abbasids.^ Although Ibn al-Tiqtaqa (d. 70l/l30l) is late his 
accounts in al-Fakhri are coherent and his remarks on the ‘Abbasid 
regime and the charter of the caliphs are intelligent. Certain 
veiled hints he gives when speaking of obscure political events 
such as the murder of Abu Salama and the mysterious death of the 
caliph al-Hadi are indicative of the atmosphere of intrigue and 
treachery which prevailed at the court. Ibn al-Tiqtaqa was one of 
the few historians to realize the impact of Kfrarijism in the early
^Anonymous, fols. 10b, lib, 12b, 13a,
2
Op.cit., fols. la, 9b. Though the work is, to all intents and purposes, 
an Arabic work, the title has Turkish connotations and has apparently 
been added later, especially as the script of the title differs from 
that of the text proper, unless the author himself was of Turkish origin 
but wrote, as usual, in Arabic. The circumstance that the manuscript 
contains a tradition ascribed to the Prophet to the effect that Turks would 
be among the supporters of the ‘Abbasids (fol. 9b) .supports the latter 
opinion.
if-
‘Abbasid period. In his ‘ibar, though Ibn Khaldun (d. 804/14-06) 
follows Ibn al-Athir,the work contains some fresh information 
and comments on the period In question. He relates, e.g., that 
Sul&yman al-Khuaa‘i was executed by Abu Muslim because he protested 
against the assassination of Abu Salama,an account not confirmed by 
early sources though worth considering. It is remarkable that he
<J « » t  —
calls the ‘Abbasid state dawlat al-ghj a. Ibn Khaldun is more
critical and objective in his Muqaddima. Characteristic of his
insight is the realisation that the Arabs played a predominant
rdle in the early ‘Abbasid state.
Al-Dhahabi Muhammad b. A£mad (d. 748/1347) should be mentioned
here as a mine of information on history and biography. His Duwal
al-lslam and Tarikh al-Islam al-Kabir are worthy of note. Both
are arranged in chronological order. The former is the only source
to state that when Abu Muslim decided to return to Khurasan after
the quarrel with al-Mangur he intended to instal an ‘Alid caliph
there. The latter is mox^ e comprehensive and valuable especially
- 1
as al-Dhahabi quotes some of his authorities, Al-Nuwayri Shihab 
fl-Din A^mad b. ‘Abd ‘l-Wahhab (d. 732/1331-2), parts of whose 
encyclopaedic work.Nihayat al-Arab..., are preserved in the B.N.
One of them is entitled Akhbar man Naha^a fi ^alab al-Khilafa min 
al-Talibiyin fi Athna* al-dawla al- ‘Abbasiyya. He begins his treat-
1 Brockelmann, op.cit., Supp. 1, p.590.
Lit,
i
ment of the revolts with that of Muhammad Dhu *1 Uafs al~Zakiyya 
and continues in chronological order until the 4th century A.H.
The part which concerns the early ‘Abbasid period is on fols. l~27b. 
Another part speaks cf the foundation of the Umayyad dynasty in Spain 
and the attempts of the early ‘Abbasid caliphs to regain it. The 
only merit of his accounts is that it gives a coherent though hrief 
picture of the events for it contains no new information; al-Huwayri 
relies on earlier sources such as fabari. Similar in character is 
al-Khagra.i i 1 s (d. 803/1400-1) al- ‘As.jad al-Masbuk which in its
A 1
early Islamic part, deals only with the ‘Alid risings * against the 
Umayyad and ‘Abbasid authorities. However, Khaaraji*s accounts are 
derived from earlier sources which are rarely referred to and have 
thus no special merit, A number of initial pages of the manuscript 
are missing, so that it begins with the rising of Zayd b. ‘All which 
is followed by that of Muhammad and Ibrahim the gasanids. The pro- 
*Alid sympathisers of the author are obvious.
Al-Haqrisi1s Huntakhab al-Tadhkira is extant in a manuscript 
from in the B.N. It is in two parts, one containing brief biographical 
notes on each caliph and his reign according to the caliphs, and the 
other a history, according to chronological order. The manuscript 
comprises 165 fols. The events dealt with are selected and the accounts 
depend on earlier sources without quoting them. The fols. which con-
1 —F. Sayyid, Fihrist al-Hakhtujat al-Mugawara, vol. 3, p.212 (see the
important footnote). "
h i *
oevn the ‘Abbasids early period are those from 80 to 138b. Maqrizi
starts the work by saying
j  ^\ s \ P j f  " I ^  ^  ^j?r^
{3 V ^ >  <^3iv\ ^ C a  \jj\y 
^v ' ' '
<kOLJi oj/0^ (J jZkS' .)asjAv ^V ' J j ^ ■ pJ ^  \ Ir^
,f b ^  s ' v k ^ J ^  b f , ^  V > ^vA V
This proves that this work is a summary of a previous book of his, 
and that it was his aim to select anecdotes which are advisory and 
admonitory in character, ^resh and interesting remarks such as his
i
comments on the personality of Muhammad b. Abu *1 *Abbas and that 
of al-Mangur by which he knew the nature of men occur in the work.
Mahmud al-fAyni’s (d. 895 A.H./1490 A.D.) Dawlat bani al-*Abbas 
w& *1 Tuluniyixi wa *1 Fatimiyin (208a fols.) contains a late but clear, 
coherent and interesting account of the *Abbasid era. Al-*Ayni 
seems to have selected his material with the instinct of a historian. 
Moreover, his book is immensely readable. He quotes his sources which 
are either very early accounts or books composed by his predecessors. 
Among his authorities there are al-Haytham b. *Ady, ‘Umar b. Shabba, 
al~Mada*ini, Muhammad b. Sulayman al-Nawfali and Khalifa b. Khayyafr as 
well as Baladhuri, yabari, §uli, al-Khatib al-Baghdadi and Ibn *Asakir. 
He sometimes only says or < 3 ^  °tc. He has been
quoted in this thesis as he utlizes sources such as Ibn ‘Asalcir, §uli
M  I M
and Baladhuri which are hitherto unpublished.
Geographical works
Generally speaking these works describe the provinces in the
time of their authors. However,bits of earlier historical information,
remarks, or quotations of popular proverbs help to elucidate some
1
issues such as the Arab settlement in the villages round Merw. On
the foundation of Baghdad and its early history, the geographical
works with the exception of Ibn al-Eaqih al-Hamadani either copy
earlier sources or describe Baghdad as it was in their own times.
It is for this reason that Y a ^ u b i ^  Kitab al-Buldan is the most
2
valuable because it is the oldest source. He himself stresses that 
his description is based on Baghdad as it actually was in the time 
of al-Man§ur. However the geographers are not to be blamed for the 
lack of historical information; it was not their aim at all to write 
history.
Numismatics and inscriptions
Early ‘Abbasid caliphs did not inscribe their names on the coins. 
However, as the date of minting was recorded on the coins, they can 
be attributed to particular caliphs. In the transitional year of 132/ 
749-50 both Umayyad and ‘Abbasid coins were issued but an ‘Abbasid coin 
is recognizable by the Quranic verse inscribed on It
11 c>yClk (J PJ
*
n —
See below chapter 2. See also Hamd*, pp. 307, 311# 317; Maqdisi, pp.
. 302-303; Mu‘jam, p.410.
2 —On sources for the topography of Baghdad see p. J£jt; see also
J, Lassner, "Notes on the Topography of Baghdad", J.A.O.S., 1963,
pp. 458-469.
nhanima, al-Nuqud al-*Abbasiyya, SOmer, vol. 9, 1953, p.108; R. Guest,
 * <-■ TOT r>_^4 ..
19.
Information derived from coins is likely to throw new light or 
confirm information provided hy written works. The early ‘Abbasid 
coins preserved in various museums confirm, for example, that al- 
Mansur conducted a large scale propaganda to enhance the prestige 
of his son and heir apparent, al-Mahdi, for 1bhad al-Mahdils name 
inscribed on coins since 146 A.H.^
I jj£ I Vx
This precedent was followed by later caliphs and the names of the heirs 
apparent continued to appear in the lifetime of their fathers. Musa
al-Hadi is given on his coins the title of Wali *Ahd al-Muslimin,,
« » 2 
vdiile Harun’s name is not followed by a title. It was In 170 A.H.
*z 1
that Wall *Ahd al-Muslimin was appended to his name, a fact which . 
indicates that the final breach between the two brothers had not yet 
taken place. Governors used to inscribe their names on the coins 
since the days of Abu Muslim’s governorship in Khurasan, a usage which 
helps to ascertain the exact period of office of certain governors.
It is from the inscription on a coin that we know that the title of
W. /j.
Abu Muslim was Am±x" Al—II •
^Lane Poole, Catalogue of Oriental coins..., vol. I, p.43.
2
Op.cit., p.53; see also Walker, Arab-Sassanian..., pp. 130-145.
3Lane Poole, Catalogue of Mohammadan coins..., p.4. 
tr.R.A.S.. 1932, p.554.
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No name3 were inscribed on dinars until the reign of al-Hadi»
when (Ali b. Sulayman al-‘Abbasif the governor of Egypt, minted
- 1 ( «dinars bearing his name. Ali b. Sulayman is represented by some
accounts as an ambitious aspirant to the caliphate. The fact that 
he had inscribed his name on the dinar seems to confirm this alle­
gation, and may have been the cause of his dismissal. The semi- 
hereditory dynasty of al-Sarrib. al-gakam (200-211) in Egypt and
the Aghlabids of Ifriqiyya also used to inscribe their names on
- • 2 the dinars.
As regards inscription on buildings, we are told that al-I-lahdi
3
removed al-V/alid's name from the mosque of the prophet in Madina.
Otherwise, all Irajfii extant inscriptions come from a period later
( « 4
than early Abbasid times. . .
Finally it should be pointed out that other occasional comments
on the sources and their methods in dealing with the events in
questioq can be found in the body of the thesis.
"Si. al-Naqshabandi,"al-dlnar al~*Abbasiy Somer, vol. 2, 1946, p.238. 
^op.cit.. Somer. vol. 3, 1947, p.275.
5Tab., III, p.535.
^B. Fransis, Somer, vol. 4, 1943, p.110; see also R.C.E.A., 1932, 
vol.1, pp.29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39 ff.
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Chapter II
THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF 
THE ‘ABBASID REVOLUTION
’’The caliph Ahu Ja‘far al-Mansur affirmed 
in reply to a Qaysite protest that he preferred 
the Yaraanites, saying: 1... Are we not right
if we recognize their/the Yamanites/support 
for us and their endeavour to conduct our propa­
ganda and to establish our regime, and reward 
them for it?”
^Lzdi, Tarikh al-Maugil, fol. 1947
"The Arab tribesmen of Khurasan 'were tired 
of the /existing situation and longing for a 
new one to arise ... the Yamanite partisans of the 
‘Abbasid da*wa called upon other Yamanites. So 
did the Rabi ites and the Mu^arites. Thus the 
‘Abbasid following began to increase."
/Akhbar *1 ‘Abbas, fol. 119a/
"7JL -
Introduction;
One of the main and still current interpretations of the *Abbasid 
revolution put forward by Van Vloten and Welhausen^ in late nineteenth 
and eai'ly twentieth centuries is that it was mainly a national struggle 
of the Iranians against the oppressive rule of the Arab ruling class•
There is some evidence in support of this view in contemporary Arabic
literature; Ja^iz e.g. states that "The ‘Abbasid state was Persian
*. 2
and Khurasanian that of the Marwanids Umayyads and Arab". However,
3the opinion that it was a renaissance of Iranian nationalism, was 
mainly due to the influence of racialist ideas circulating by the turn 
of the 19th century.^" An attempt at understanding better the ‘Abbasid
revolution and the decisive rOle of the Arabs in it made by Professors
5 6 ( ••
Gibb and Lewis was substantiated by D.C.Dennett and Dr. A. Sha ban.
7D. C. Dennett, refutes the outdated ideas of Van Vloten and V/elhausen 
and concludes by emphasizing the political rather than 'the x^eligious 
nature of the ‘Abbasid revolution, and representing it as an Arab tribal
r  ~   ^ ! r~  ' * *
Van Vloten, G., Recherches sur la domination Arab, Amsterdam, 1894# 
p.l; V7elhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, tr. H.G.Weir, 1927.
2 «Bayan, vol. 3# p.366.
^Van Vloten, op.cit., pp. 34ff; of. G. Wiet,"Lfempire neo-Byzantin des
Omayyades," J.V/.H., 1953, p.68ff.
  !
^B. Lewis, The Arabs in history, 1958# pp. 80-81; "Some observation on the 
significance of heresy in the history of Islam", S .1., 1953# pp. 44-45-
The Arab Conquest in Central Asia, pp. 93-94; Studies on the civilization 
of Islam, pp. 43-44, pp. 9-10.
Si.I.2 (‘Abbasids)
7 -Harwan b. Muhammad, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University 1939.
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strife in which naturally the Arabs rather than the Marwjli played a 
decisive rOle.
Dr. A. Sha‘ban explains the change from the Umayyads to the *Abbasids 
as brought about by mainly the Arab element in Khurasan whose inter­
pretation of Islam was broader than the limited Umayyad Arab inter­
pretation. Those Arabs were the settlers of Merw and its surrounding 
villages who "had lost their privileges as members of the Arab ruling 
class and who also were grieved by their situation as subjects of the 
non-Muslim aristocracy of Merw”.3*
It seems to be the crux of the mattei* that the main appeal of the 
*Abbasid da*is in Khurasan was made to the Arabs whether Muqatila or 
settlers in the villages of Merw. There were da‘is in the villages of 
Merw, where there trere Arab settlers, and in every city where Arab 
garrisons were stationed. The da*is realized that the Arabs were the 
lever of power and the only striking force in Khurasan and that to win 
them meant to win the power of government. In the early stages of its 
struggle to win the Arabs the *Abbasid da*wa did not favour one tribe 
against another although it gained more support among the Yemenites 
rather than the I&i^arites. However, they were always willing to accept 
Mu^arites amongst their ranks. Though no doubt some non-Arab Muslims or 
Iranian natives joined the *Abbasid movement, their rdle was not comparable 
with the decisive rQle of the Arabs. The main historical events of the 
last quarter of a century of the Umayyad rule in Khurasan, including the
1Op.cit., p.iv.
‘Abbasid propaganda, have been dealt with by several scholars,1 
What remains to be done is to reconstruct and clarify the political 
nature of the ‘Abbasid movement and expose the important rdle played 
by the Arabs in the revolution.
The IQiurasani phase of the da ‘wa
The family of al-‘Abbas the paternal uncle of the Prophet was 
one of the branches of Ahl al-Bayt which, in its broadest sense, 
included, all the Bani Hashim whether 'falibites (including *Alids) 
or ‘Abbasids.^
The ‘Abbasid claim to the caliphate went through two different 
stages: During the revolutionary period which was a period of com­
promise, the movement was represented as, generally, working for.the 
Ahl al-Boyt of whom the ‘Abbasids claimed the succession to the 
Imamate on the ground of the Vfagiyya of Abu Hashim, ‘.Abdullah b. Muhammad 
b. al-ganafiyya. After the establishment of their dynasty, the ‘Abbasids
claimed that they were the legitimate successors to the Prophet through
< -  3his only surviving paternal uncle al- Abbas, forgetting all their 
ties with the extreme Hashimiyya movement.
Concerning the ‘Abbasid claim to the caliphate, historical "accounts
1G. Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen, Mannheim, 1846; Van Vlotenj, op.cit.; 
Welhausen, op.cit.; Lewis, op.cit.; Duri, Al Aga al- Abbassi al- Awwal, 
Baghdad; Moscati, Abu Muslim I-III Rendiconti Lincel, 1949,
1950, pp. 323ff, 474ff, 89ff.
^Ibn Hanbal, IV, p.367, citing Zayd b. al-Arqam.
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Firaq, p.43; Sa d al-Ash ari, pp. 38-40, 65f, 69; /dchbar, fols. 74a- 
74b; Abu Dularaa, p.134; Bagh., p.271; E.I. (Hashimiyya).
do not state explicitly that al-‘Abbas b. *Abd al-MuJ^alib who survived
the Prophet, or his son ‘Abdallah, had any claim to the caliphate, Al-
‘Abbas was not an early Muslim, as he was converted shortly before the
bonquest of Mecca in 8 A.H./650 A.D. He, therefore, despite later 
i T-‘Abbasid traditions which are generally extensively exaggerated and
which depict him as a sincere friend of the Prophet who had rendered
him great services before the conquest of Mecca and had finally worked
out a reconciliation between him and Quraysh, did not play a prominent
part in the early history of Islam. Nevertheless the Prophet confirmed
2on him the privilege of the Siq.uya i.e. dispensing water to pilgrims.
This important religious status of al-‘Abbas in pre-Islamic and Islamic 
times, and his close relationship with the Prophet enhanced his prestige
and gained him the reverence of the people and was later to be counted
£ *3
an by the Abbasid in their struggle for the caliphate. Nor does it
seem, contrary to later traditions,^ that ‘Abdallah b. al-‘Abbas ever
entertained political ambitions for hiniself or his descendants. He
indulged in religious studies and became one of the prominent traditionists
of the ^ijaa in the first century. Both ‘Abdallah b. al-‘Abbas and his
father took the side of ‘All b. Abi 'palib in the struggle for the caliphate
1Sa‘d, IV/i, pp. 1-20j ‘Asakir, IX, p.448; E.I.2 (Al-‘Abbas).
Ansab, fol. 707b; Sa‘d, IV, p.10; gabib, pp. 164-165; Jamharat, vol. I,
P.57. ;-V '-
Tab* III, pp. 211f; tJyun, vol. I, p.5.
^Aldibar, fols. 4b-6b.
^Sira, II, pp._1008f; Ya‘qubi, I, p.138; Akhbar, fols. 9a, 12a; Rijal, 
pp. 40ff; Nisa*, pp. 54ff; Mug., fol. 199b; ‘Smili, I, p.144.
Nevertheless ‘Abdallah b. al-‘Abbas used to visit Ku‘awiya at Damascus
during the latter1s caliphate (41-60/661-680). Eventually he even paid
homage to Yazid X. Later fabricated Abbasid traditions tried to
justify this amicable relation with the Umayyads by depicting him as
the defender,of*Ali, at the Umayyad court. They also show him as having
2
voiced bold political ambitions for himself and his descendants. In
1
any case, ‘Abdallah1s relations with the ‘Alids especially Muhammad b. 
al-ganafiyya seem so have been cordial,''7 and it is thought that if 
‘Abdallah b. al~*Abbas had ever mentioned the rights of his family he 
would have stressed the x’ights of the Ban! Haohm,ln general and not of 
the ‘Abbasids, particularly,^ as was usual in circles before and at 
that time. If the account in Akhbar al-‘Abbas is authentic, even Mu‘awiyafs
. OTK.ll   ................. .... ■ . i,. ,, , , ,.!,.
efforts to instigate him to claim the leadership of the family of Ahl 
5al-Bayt, presumably in order to sow the seeds of discord among the 
Hashimites, failed to reach their aim. Having rejected the claim of Ibn 
al-2ubayr, and declined to pay homage to him, both ‘Abdallah b, al-‘Abbas 
and Muhammad b. al-ganafiyya were expelled to j£*if.^ It is significant 
to point out, here, that although the struggle for the cause of Ahl al-Bayt
1Akhbar, fol. 12a, citing Muhammad b. Is^aq fol. 55b citing Ja‘far b. 
*Abdallah al»-‘Alawi; Nubdha, fols. 240b, 242b; Ansab, fol. 724b, vol.
IV, B, p.3. For cordial relations between A U d  personalities and Umayyad 
caliphs see Ibn Sa*d, Vol. V, p;, 78-79, 83, 195; Bayasi, fol. 32b;
Tha‘alibi, La^a’if, pp. 17, 21-22.
^Akhbar, fols. 6b, 14a, 16b, 36a-38a; see also ‘Uyun, I, p.204; Ansab, 
citing Mada ini. ~
^ ‘Uyun, I, p.14; Akhbar, fol. 13a, 33a, 36s-38a, 44b;
^ *Uyun, citing al-Shu‘bi, I, pp. 5-6; Akhbar, fols. 16b, 17b-18a, 30a ff. 
•^ Akhbar, fol. 13a, citing Muhammad Isljaq; Sa‘d, V, pp. 73f*
6Akhbar, fols. 43bff, 36a, 49b, 60a; Ansab, IV 13, fols. 28 , 59; Ibn/cont )
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in its early stages after the death of the Prophet was represented
by Pafimid ‘Alids, all branches of Ban! Hashim had equal rights
to inherit the Prophet and could rebel in the name of Ahl al—Bayt.
A1-Mulch tar * s rising at Kufa in the name of Muhammad b* al-Janafiyya,^*
a son of ‘Ali by Khawla al-$anafiyya and, later, ‘Abdallah b. Mu‘awiyya
2 »
b. ‘Abdallah the Ja‘farite's l’ising in Ira^ and Persia had opened a
new door. Now it could be argued that there was no reason why the
‘Abbasids should not rebel in the name of Ahl al-Bayt if a non-FaJimid
‘Alid and even a Ja‘farite had done so.
It was, therefore, ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah b. al-‘Abbas who was the
first ‘Abbasid to have ever expressed political ambitions and was
consequently looked upon by the Umayyads as a potentially dangerous
figure. He frequented the Umayyad court and his relations with the Umayyad
caliphs had their ups and down. He also atti'acted the people of the gijaz
who used to call him al-Sajjad, i.e. "the one who prostrates himself",
and Dhu ’l-Nafathat, i.e. "the one with callouses which he had developed ——   —*—— *
3 e -
due to an excessive amount of daily prayers". However, Ali*s relations 
with the Umayyad ‘Abd *1 Malik b. Marwan ( 685- 705 ) seem to be cordial
(cont.) al-Kalbi, fol. 9a; Akhbar, fols. 59b, 60a; Muq., fol. 209b 
citing Abu Mikhnaf; Duwwal, fCT. 99b.
^Ibn al-ganafiyya* s example shows that only the male parentage in the 
Arab society was of real importance. See B.I. (ibn al-ganafiyya);
Calien, op.cit., p.313.
^Khalifa, Tar ikji, fol. 269; Sa‘d, V, p.242; Tab., II, p.1879; Maqatil, 
fol. 118 ff.
^Akhbar, fol. 64b; Ansab, fol. 740; ffilya, vol. 3, p*207.
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Ansab, vol. XI, pp. 226, 254, citing Mada ini.
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presumably because the latter tried to avoid any clash with ‘All which
vrould onlyenhance his prestige among the people. But the fact that the
Umayyad caliphs after *Abd al-Malilc b, Marwan had the feeling of extreme
provocation indicates, that the ‘Abbasids were giving vent to active
political ambitions, *Ali suffered most during al-YJalid’s reign (705-715).1
He was flogged twice, once because of his marriage to Lubaba bint
‘Abdallah b, Ja‘far who had been divorced by ‘Abd al-Kalik, as al-¥alid
accused him of purposely trying to humiliate the memory of his father.
The second time when he was suspected of political activities, he was
given 500 strokes, and then was paraded on a camel facing its back.
Many other accounts preserved in Akhbar *1- Abbas and other sources
speak of the hostility between al—Halid and ‘All the ‘Abbasid. Though
the authenticity of these accounts may be doubted, the fact that ‘All
was considered a dangerous political figure was obvious. Consequently
al-Ualid accused him of murdering his brother Sallj b. ‘Abdallah b. 
c 3 val- Abbas and after imprisoning him for a while he was ordered to leave
£ m  A
Damascus for the province of Shurat. Ali settled in gumayma on
the route between Damascus and the gijaa and owned a small farm of 500
trees.
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^Ansab, vol. XVB, p. 76; Ansab, fols. 744a, 745 b, citing Haytham b, *Adi; 
Sa*d, V, p.229; Akhbar, fol. 62b citing Haytham b. ‘Adi; Hafayat, 
citing Tabari, voTT I,' p.579; Duwwal, citing Ibn al-Kalbi, fol. 99a.
^Akhbar, fol. 65b citing Ruzayr; Ansab, fol. 745b, citing Abu Kasud al-Kufl.
^Ibid; Ansab, fol. 744a citing ‘Abbas b. Jisham; Akhbar, fol. 66b;
Jamharat. p.17.
^Akhbar, fol. 69a; _cf. Ansab, fol. 744b, 745 a, citing Hisham b. ‘Ammar 
and iiaytham b. *Adi respectively.
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After ‘All<s death In 118 A.H./756 A.D.1 at gumayma his son
Muhammad emerged as a prominent figure among the ‘Abbasids. Muhammad * s
relation with the ‘Alid Abu Hashim b. Mu&ammad b. *Ali, were very
p
friendly and intimate. It has been said that he also maintained cordial
relations with ‘Abdallah b. al-yassan, but it is to be noted that
cordial relations were not usual among the Ahl al-Bayt. As long as the
Umayyads were strong, the Ahl al-Bayt were generally united but as the
Umayyads weakened thb Bani Hashim broke apart, as several prominent
members of them evidently each hoped eventually to hold the caliphate.
Muhammad b. ‘All the ‘Abbasid was a student of Abu Hashim ‘Abdallah
b. Muhammad undex* whom he studied religious knowledge, attending to
his needs in Damascus where Abu Hashim used to live under the watchful
4eye of the Umayyads. These contacts and cordiality continued between
them as Mufcammad used to visit Abu Hashim occasionally on his way to
'W, 5
join the ga ifa expedition against the Byzantines, This cordial relation
between the ‘Abbasids and other non-PaJimid branch of the ‘Alids is
understandable as both their claims were rejected by the Fa£imid ‘Alids
(^ussaynids and Jasanida).^ This, in fact, explains why the ‘Abbasids
warned their partisans not to join the rising of Zayd b. ‘Ali the gussaynid
Ansab, fol. 746a, citing Uadiqi another vez’sion puts it in 117 A.II. 
Akhbar, fol. 72a, biting Abu.Ma‘shar.
^Akhbar, fols. 78b citing ‘isa b. ‘All, 87a; Dhahabi, Tarikh, IV, p.21.
3 *
Akhbar, fol. 75b citing Al^mad b. Jabir.
^Op.cit., fol. 78b, citing ‘isa b. ‘Ali, fol. 82a, citing Sa‘id al-Barzi.
^Op.cit., fol, 79a, citing ‘isa b. *Ali.
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See for example Akhbar, fol. 79a; Firaq, p.48.
to
or his eon Ta&ya» while many *Abbasid personalities joined ‘Abdallah
b. M u ‘awiyya the Ja‘farite even though with ulterior motives* However,
Muhammad was more active than his father. His activities did not
escape the shrewd eyes of caliph Hisham h. *Abd al-Malik. Many Umayyad
Hawaii wore, pi’esumably, sent to bother him and keep a close watch on 
1
him at gumayma. Hisham also used to tease him whenever he bad a request, 
saying: "Wait for the realm which you expect and on which you relate
traditions ascribed to the Prophet and put up your youngsters as candi-
i
dates for it", “Wait for the black flags and your debt will be paid",
— 2
or "Wait for Ibn al-garithiyya". On one occasion he attacked him
saying that "Bani Hashim have turned the Prophet into a market ^ /selling
false traditions ascribed to him/".^ Ultimately Mugammad was imprisoned
in Damascus on the charge of appropriating 100,000 dirhams, but his
ahi‘a headed by Abu Husa al-Suraj managed to pay the sum and eventually
liberated him.^ Whether authentic or not, these, traditions indicate the
threat on the part of Muhammad and his sons anticipated bythe Umayyads
which led to his imprisonment. Hit al-Abrash al-ICalbi advised Hiq£am 
5to froe him to prevent his acquiring publicity and to avoid the develop­
ment of hero-worship.
^Ansab, fol. 748b citing Abu §afg al-Shami, fol. 750b; Akhbar, fols. 73b- 
Tda," A^unad b, Ya^ya b. Jabir (al-Baladhuri).
Ansab, fol. 751a_citing Sulayman b. al-^ajaj, fol.^749n citing Zuhayr b. 
al-Husayab; Akhbar, fol. 82a, citing Sa id al-Baral and al-Abrash.
^Ansab, fol. 72a.
4Op. cit., fol. 749a-749b, Zuhayr b. al-Mussayab.
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Op.cit., fols. 749b-750a, Hisham b. Ammar.
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It twas, therefore, around Muhammad b. *Ali b. ‘Abdallah b, al-
‘ Abbas that the nucleus of the pro-‘Abbasid revolutionary movement
formed. Ostensibly the cordial contacts between Muhammad the ‘Abbasid
and Abu Hashim the leader of the Hashimiyya sect continued,1 and Abu
2
Hashim nominated on his death Muhammad as his legatee.
Modern historians differ on the testament of Abu Hashim to Muhammad
b. ‘Ali. Van Vloten, Professor Lewis and Professor Moscati accept it
3 Aas authentic, while Y/elhausen regards it as ’’probably fictitious”. ^
r
C. Cahen does not commit himself and remarks ’’The question of the reality
of the testament of Abu Hashim in favour of Muhammad b. ‘Ali no longer
has the importance today that it seemed to have until quite recently.”
Then he adds "In fact it is scarcely possible now to doubt that the
men cf the Shi*a of Abu Hashim carried their allegiance to Muhammad and
that the latter behaved as their Imam”.
As for early sources, many differently phrased and therefore presumably
independent accounts agree in confirming that Abu Hashim made Mubasiniad
— 6 - «...
his legatee on his deathbed. According to Baladhnri1s Ansab, Abu Hashim,
Akhbar. fol. 87a.
‘"Among some revolutionary ‘Alid sects succession by tafwifl or appointment 
was permitted., see B, Lewis, the Origins, p.48; Duri, "da* Jadid",
B.C.A., pp. 68-69.
Van Vloten, Opkomst der ‘Abbasiden, p,18f; B. Lewis, The Arabs..., p.78,
E.I.^ ( Abbas ids" ); Moscati,"11 Testamento de Abu Hashim,” R.S.O., 1952, 
pp, 9f» "per una storia dell* antica si a”, op.cit., p.259.
^Y/elhausen, op.cit., p.503.
5C. Cahen, op.cit., p.311.
^Ansab, fol. 746b.
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realizing that he was poisoned on his way to the £ijaz, turned to Mu&ammad 
at ^umayma and made him his legatee, gave him his books and introduced 
him to a number of his shi‘a. He also told him that "We thought that 
the Imamate and the affair were in us but now there is no doubt that 
you are the Imam and the caliphate is in your sons". But the author*" 
of Akhbar *1-‘Abbas in one of his accounts on the testament dates
^ a r r ;    .............- .................
the nomination much earlier than the death of Abu Hashim. He states
t ■
that while Muhammad b. ‘Ali was taking knowledge from Abu Hashim their 
relations grew intimate and Abu Hashim asked his partisans to follow
Muhammad after his death. At any rate this event is mentioned by
2 3
different chroniclers and heresiographers. Some of these accounts
do not stop at the testament itself but carryon relating the recommendation
~  «  4
made by Abu Hashim to Muhammad. They are so detailed and anticipatory
on the future of the ‘Abbasid movement that it is obvious that they
are latex' fabrications ox* elaborations of the oi'iginal texts, especially
5 «. «  ________
as the version of Baladhuri, Igbahani, Tabari and Ibn Qutayha and Ibn
Sa*d do not mention this anticipatory information. -
It is, therefore, very probable that, in the year 97 A.H./715 A.D. 
or 98/716 A.D.^ during the reign of Sulayman b. ‘Abd al-Malik,^ Abu
1Akhbar, fol. 78b, citing ‘isa b. ‘All.
i
Ansab, fols. 686a, citing Qays b. al-Rabi‘,_786 citing Mada‘ini, 787a
citing Haytham b. *Adi, 787 citing Abu Mas‘ud; Tab., IX,pp. 24* 2500
Akhbar,fols. 75a citing Isa b. ‘All, 75b, citing Muhammad b. al-Khattab; 
Nubdha, fols. 246a, 248b.
^Firaq, pp. 29-50; Sa‘d al-Ash‘ari, pp. 39-40; Maqalat, pp. 5, 21-22;
Shah., pp. 10-11, 112-113; I$far., pp. 19, 72-73; Bagh., pp. 28, 227;
Ibn gazm, "The heterodoxies,11 J.A.Q.S., 28, II, pp. 89, 128.
^Xa‘qubi, II, p.356; ‘iqd, IV, p.376, see Cairo ed., 2, p.230; Tanbih, 
p.338, Muntaldmb, fol. 80a.
(cont.)
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Hashim was just released from prison in Damascus, after having been 
jailed on an accusation of political activities^: on the part of Zayd b.
al~0asan with whom he had quarrelled about the gadaqa of <Ali b. Abi
— 1 - 2 
'Palib. On his way back to the $ija3 he either fell ill or was
poisoned^ by Sulayman*s orders because of his great influence and prestige.
Abu Hashim stopped at al-gumayma and was nursed by Mubaflmad b. ‘All.
Before dying he nominated Mubammad his legatee and told him of the
movement under his command. He also ordered his chief partisans who
c — 4
were with him in this journey to follow Mubammac-^ the Abbasid. The 
authcr of the Kitab al~‘Uyun wa ’l-ffada^iq adds that "When Abu Hashim 
gave up his rights to the ‘Abbasids, he told them about his missionaries,
their signs of recognition and gave them his seal. He finally asked his
< - 5partisans to accept the Abbasid leadership which they eventually did.”
(cont.)
Ansab, fol. 787b citing Haythorn b. (Adi; Haqatil, p.91 citing Mada‘Ini; 
Tab., Ill, p.24; cf. Imama, 2, pp. 208-209, citing Haytham b. ‘Adi; Sa‘d, 
V, p.241.
^Ya‘qubi, II, p.558; Wafayat, citing Tabari, vol. 2, p.230.
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Some accounts put it in al-Walid's reign (Akhbar. fols. 85a, 79a,79b).
^Akhbar, fol. 79aff citing Is^aq b. al-Fa^l al-Hoshimi; ‘Asakir, 5.,p.460 
citing Abu Mi‘shar.
2  ^ M 
Ansab, fol. 686a, Qays b. al-Rabi‘; Akhbar, fol. 75b citing Mubammad
b, al-Khattab, fol. 84a; Hubdha, fol. 248b; Hafayat, citing Ibn Qatayba,
vol. I, p.575. *
^Ansab, fols. 746b, 788b, 787a, 787b, citing Mada*ini and Haytham b. ‘Adi; 
cf, Akhbar, fol. 86b ff.
De G61je™suspects the alleged poisoning of Abu Hashim by the Umayyads as 
too artificial to be^ believed. Z.D.H.G., 1881, p.394. However, his alle­
gation that the ‘Abbasid should have poisoned him has no evidence to sub­
stantiate iti cf. Moscati, "II testament di Abu Hashim," R.S.O., 1952, 
p.15. ~  —
(cont.)
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"One of the signs which were handed over to Muhammad was a yellow
** 1letter i.e. Al-gabifa al-gafra*. It contained information on the
uprising of the black flags of Khurasanf its signs and time and certain
sections of the Arabs who would support it. Whether the accounts about
■this Sabifa true or not, Ibn Qutayba and Ibn Sa*d simply state
that Muhammad b. ‘Ali was the one to work for the matter (caliphate)
after Abu Hashim who entrusted him with M s  books, signs and partisans
2some of whom witnessed the event. Mufreunmad became, thus, the
leader of the Hashimiyya. Historically that time marked the beginning .
of his active political propaganda.
The sectarian connections of the *Abbasid revolutionary movement
with the Hashimiyya as well as the first period of the da*wa have been
3examined and stressed by Van Vloten, Welhausen and Professor Lewis.
It is not the concern of this study to re-examine the nature of the 
‘Abbasid movement, but rather to reconstruct and reassess certain 
aspects in its development with special emphasis on its political aspect.
It seems as though Abu Hashim1s partisans were mainly concentrated 
in Kufa.^ Abu Hashim advised Muhammad to direct.his attention to Khurasan
.(cont.)
Akhbar, fols. 82a ff citing al-Abrash, fol. 84a, citing al-FaJl b.
Salim, fol. 85a citing ‘Abdallah. b.^umayr. Ibn Abi *l-gadid states 
that in addition to Muhammad b. ‘Ali there was Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah 
the Ja‘farite at the^deathbed of Abu Hashim. This accounts for the 
latter'a claim of Abu Hashim1 a wasiyy-a. But there is no evidence to 
substantiate this claim. Sharb Nahj al-Balagha, II, pp. 211-13 - compare 
Nubdha, fols. 248a-248b.
5F.H.A., p.180; cf. Tanbih, p.338; Muntakhab,fols. 80a-80b.
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Akhbar,fol. 84b citing Hubammad b. Ali b. al-basayn; Hubdha, fols. 246a- .
2!©>'“  •------
2  ^  ^ to*
Imama, 2, pp. 208-9^ citing Haytham b. Adi; Sa d, V, p.241; Akhbar, 
fol. 84a, Fa$l b. Salim. (cont,"}
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as well as ICufa. The Kuf ite phase of the ‘Abbasid movement'which had
*“* 2
been initiated in the name of al~Rida min *al al-Bayt was so passive 
and so cautious in recruiting partisans that very little was known 
about it, which accounts for the lack of information. The nucleus of
the propaganda was formed among the Ban! Musaliyya, a Harithite tribe,
< «■ — *5
who had family connections with Muhammad b. Ali, and its Hawaii.
In addition to Ban! Musaliyya, which seem to have been trusted by 
Muhammad very much as he recommended them to his son Ibrahim on his
A m  R
deathbed, the movement attracted some Arabs from the tribe of Hamdan. ■ 
ICufa was, in fact, not a suitable place for the revolt because of its 
*Alid tendencies and the untrustworthiness of its inhabitants, observed 
many a.time in the past during *Alid risings, Muhammad b, *Al! is said 
to have exhorted his missionaries "Do not xecruit many members from 
the peoxDle of ICuf&> and accept but people of the right nature". He 
added "Beware of the people of ICufa... for no one can count on their 
help."^ Moreover the people of Kufa were exhausted by the wars with 
the Umayyads. They are related to have said to the Ja*farite rebel ‘Ab-
i
dallah b. Mu4awiya "There is nothing left of us, our majority was 
(cont.)
-Van Vloten, op.cit.; V/elhausen, op.cit., p.492 ff; E.X.^ (*Abbasids), 
(Hashimiyya).
^Ansab, fol* 747b, citing Haytham b. *Adi.
^Ansab, fol. 768a; cf. Tab, IX, pp. 1358, 1988.
^Akhbar, fol.^89b; Tab., Ill, p.24 citing Mada‘ini, II,,p.1988 citing 
Abu al-KhajJab.
3
Akhbar, fol. 88a citing Muhammad b. Salim.
j*|
Ahhbar, fol. 113b; cf. fol, 89a, citing Muhammad b. Salim.
.clt,, fol. 88b. citing Ibrahim b. Sa lama.
(cont.)
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1
perished fighting for the cause of Ahl al-Bayt." As a result the
< -  -  2
Ahbasid partisans in ICufa were not more than thirty. Muhammad,
therefore, decided on Khurasan which had been suggested to him by 
his chief da*i Abu Hashim Bukayr b. Mahan. A tradition transmitted 
by many chroniclers and geographers is, though differently phrased, 
fundamentally the same. This tradition is ascribed to Muhammad b. ‘Ali
and shows why he preferred Khurasan to other regions of the empire.
4In.its most coherent and reliable form, it runs as follows:
“The people of Kufa are followers of ‘Ali and his de­
scendants, those of Bagsra are ‘uthraanites, who say 
’Better to be the murdered Abdallah than the murderer 
‘Abdallah*, the people of al-Jaaxraare Kharijites, they 
are degenerate Arabs, half Christian Muslims. The Syrians 
obey only Mu‘awiya and the Umayyads, they are the enemies 
of all Muslims. The people of Mecca and Medina tiink only 
of Abu Baler and *Uinar. Hold on to Khurasan. There, one 
finds a numerous and strong people. They have generous 
hearts which passion does not divide nor fear will trouble, 
an army of brave and powerfully built men with bearded 
faces and formidable voices who inspire terror. After all 
I have good hopes in the East where the sun rises."
This statement defines clearly the conditions in the empire in the
late Umayyad period. It is interesting to note that neither Egypt
5nor Ifriqiyya are mentioned in Muhammad*s statement. As for Egypt
(cont.)
^Akhbar, fols. 89b, 93b, __________
1 m*
Haqatil, p.121, *Ali b. Muhammad al-Nawfali.
^Akhbar. fols. 89b, 91&. • .
^On.cit., fol. 92a-93b.
Slamad,, p.315; cf. Manaqib. p.9; *Uyun. I, p.204; Ansabt fols, 747a-747b 
citing Haytham b. *Adi; Huntakhab. fol. 80b; Bad1, 6, p.57; compare 
a similar statement attributedto al~A§ma i the grammarian (122-216/740- 
83l)) in Wafayat, English trans. II, pp. 123-127.
^0n the nature of the people of Egypt see the opinion of Hamadani (p.175); 
Maqdisi (p.34), Muqadima (see index).
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it was a place too near to al~Sham, the centre ,of the Umayyads, to he
counted on as the headquarters of a revolt, especially if compared with
~ 1 Khurasan* While in Ifriqiyya the struggle took a different turn,
for the Berbers, resenting the Arab rule, had adopted Khari,1 ism to
express their opposition to the Arabs as early as the reign of Hisham
(724-743). it is significant that the Umayyads feared Khurasan already
i 2 —in ■ the asign of Abd al-Malik, Why Khurasan and not other provinces
inspired this fear is not easy to account for. It is probably becauoe 
Khurasan was the centre of the Arab Huqatila who strongly expressed their 
resentment against Umayyad policies and were potentially dangerous as 
they were hardened by the Jihad in Transoxonia. According to Akhbar 11 
^Abbag^ the Arabs of Khurasan were "the skull of the Arabs and the 
knights among them, i.e. Pi Khurasan Jurajumat al-^Ai’ab vra fursanuha".
1
In its early phase in Khurasan (103 or 104~128/721-722~745)» the 
‘Abbasid propaganda approached first and foremost the Arabs who repre­
sented the real striking force in Khurasan. It appealed to them by 
using such slogans as "the vengeance of Ahl al-Bayt". stressing that they
(Ahl al-Bayt) had a better title to the caliphate than the Umayyads
4whose "tyrannic and oppressive" rule must be brought to an end.
^Tab., 1, p.2815; Van Vloten, op.cit., App. Ill; Cahen, op.cit.. p.320* 
^Akhbar, fols. 62a-*62b, 65b; Dina, pp. 245-6.
•^ Akhbar, fol. 190b.
^Ibid,, fol. 95a citing ‘isa b. gamza; Nubdha, fol. 252b; Dina, p. 557. 
Cf. V.H.A.» p.62.
The *Abbasid character of the movement was clear to the inner circles of
the da*is who had the strict order "Not to call for a rising until they
1were permitted to do so,” and they were also warned not to join any
1 *Alid rising.^ Those early ‘Abbasid partisans were, therefore, called
■5
Kafiyya or Ahl al-ICaf, i.e. indicating the orders not to rise in 
arms unless it was necessary and to obey their leaders blindly. They 
were mainly Arabs from the Arab quarters of Kharqan and Saqadim of Merw 
such as Ziyad al-Azdl, Khidhan al-Kindi and gams a al-Bahili. ^ V/hen 
the Khuza*ite Sulayman b. Kathir was won over he opened his house as 
a meeting centre for the propagandists. Sulayman also played a decisive 
rdle in winning over many active figures especially from his own tribe
IChuza*a such as Malik b. al-Haytham, *Amr b. A*yan, Ziyad b. §alik
~  -  5
and Khalid b. Ibrahim.
The first da*is in Khnasan did not have much success, and in its early 
period the 'da*wa was under constant surveillance on the part of the 
Umayyads. Nevertheless, it survived^ thanks to its efficient internal 
organisation. Twelve Naqibs were selected to form a committee with
-  (J
headquarters in Merw. Its head was Sulayman b. Kathir al-Khuza I, i.e.
- M M . ■ > ■    . — I . .    1. i n  1 1 1 . 1 .. . . . . . . . .  1 1 , -  ■  . . . . 1 1 ,  , L  —  .
^Akhbar. fols. 95b, 96a-*96b, fols. 128b-130a.
^Op.cit., fols. 93b, 115b.
^Op.cit., fols. 95b ff; Tab., II, p.1957 citing Abu al-Khattab; Muq., 
fol. 80b.
^Tab., II, 1957 citing Abu al-Khattab.
^Akhbar, fols. 94a~94b, 101a; Tab., II, 1954 citing Abu al-Khattab.
^Tab., II, p.1586; Vfelhausen, op.cit.» pp.510, 514.
^Ha*d, fol. 64a; Ansab. fol. 770b, citing Abu Mas*ud al-Kufi; Akhbar, 
fol. 106a: Jamharat. p.231.
*9.
Al-qa’im bl * amr Khurasan, who was to talce his orders fi'om the chief 
da*l in ICufa. The connections with ICufa were,, therefore,not severed.
The main responsibility of the committee of the twelve seems to
have been to organise the &a‘wa all over Khurasan with special re­
sponsibility on ICerw. There was an absolute equality among the Naqibs.'*' 
Several lists of their names are preserved in historical accounts, 
which show that they were Arabs in their majority. The difference in 
some of the names in different accounts is understandable, as some of
Naqibs might have been replaced for reasons of policy or withdrawn
-2
due to illness or death. In one of the lists transmitted by ^abari 
the proportion of the Arabs to the Hawaii is 8:4 while the proportion
1V
in another list preserved in Akhbar * 1-*Abbas is 7i5* Ibn Jabib
maintains that there were only two Hawaii among the twelve ‘Abbasid Naqibs
while, according to Ja^ tis and Aadx, all the twelve Naqibs were Arab
Yamanites.^ The variations are often due to the uncertainty as to the
identity of a certain Naqib or to changes in the definition of this identity,
as one Naqib is described as a mawla by one and an Arab by another
—5chi-onicler. However, Tabari has preserved a list of the names of the
^Akhbar, fols. 101a, 102b.
2Tab., 111,^.1353.
^Akhbar, fol. 102b; Nubdha, fols. 253a-254a.
%abib, p.465; Hanaqib, p. 12; Azdi, fol. 194.
^Tab., Ill, p. 1988, citing Abu al-IChatfrab.
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Naqibs which seems to be the most coherent one. It contains the 
following names:
from the tribe of IChusa*a 1) Sulayman b. Kathir
2) Malilc b. al-Haytham
5) Ziy&d b. galify
4) Jal^a b. Ruza^q
from Tamlm 5) M^sa b. Ka‘b
6) ‘isa b. Ka‘b
7) Lajjis b. Qurays
8) Al-Qasim b. Mujashi*
from Jayy 9) Qa^taba b. Shabjb
from Shayban 10) Khalid b. Ibrahim
from Bajila 11) Aslam b. Sallam^
Amwla of Bani £ an if a 12) Shibl b, ^ahman^
Apart from those twelve Naqibs there were fifty eight da *13 scattered 
throughout Khurasan. Forty of them came from Merw itself, of whom 
it can be safely assumed that the majority were Arabs.^ It is worth 
noting that unless the identification of a da‘i is given by the source, 
it is difficult to identify him. It is true that sometimes the name of
1Tabari does not identify him, but in Akhbar he is' mentioned as a Bajlite 
(see. fol. 140b; see also Agh., where prob'ably the same man is mentioned 
as a Kufite (13, p.6); cf. Dennett, op.cit., p.281.
is identified as a Rabi*ite by Baladhuri (fol. 769a) and Ibn |Jabib 
(tlabib, p.465). If this is true then all the Naqibs were Arabs.
Akhbax*, fol. 103a; Tabari II, p. 1987; compare Akhbar. fol. 104a,where he 
states that the twelve Naqibs were not included in ’die seventy da * is.
^Akhbar, fols. 103a-104a.
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a person indicates his nationality and we see, in fact, some purely 
Arab or Persian names in the lists, but one realizes that it is rash 
to judge by that as many well-known Arabs were named after Persian towns
they lived in or were b o m  in such as the Azdite Jadi* b. *Ali al-
„ _ 1 ~ -2 - 
Karmani, ' the famimites al~Fa$l b. Sulayman al-'Jtisi and Khazim b.
Kkujsayma al-Merwusi  ^ and ‘Amir b. ‘Umayr al-Samarqandi,^ and many
Arabs adopted Persian names such as al-Haytham b. K u ‘awiya al-*Atki
‘llmar b. $af§ al-Muhallabl who were called Hazarmard, and vice versa*
Many da*is were also selected to propagate the cause in parts other
than Merw. In Hasa the da * is were all Arabs.  ^ They were Asid b.
‘Abdallah al-Khuza*i, al-#A^jam b. ‘Abdallah al-Khuza‘ i, Muqatil b.
gakim al-*Akki, al-Harish b. Sulayman, Qhllan b. ‘Abdallah al-
i
Khuza ‘ i and Majjqin b. Ghazwan al-‘Abdi. In Abi ward the seven da* is 
were also Arabs. They were ‘uthman b. Huhayk and ‘isa b. Nuhayk the 
*Akkites, al-Fa^l b. Sulayman al-fJa *i, *Abd al-Jabbar b. *Abd al-Ra^man 
the Asdite and his brother Yazid, al-Haytham b. Mu‘awiya al-*Akki and 
Zuhayr b. Muhammad al-^Azdi. Other da‘is were sent to Balkh, Merw -
1Tab., II,p.1858 citing Mada’ini.
2Tab.II, pp. 1422, 1522; Dina, p.362.
3Tab., II, p.1959.
Ansab. fol. 781a; Akhbar, fol. 155a.
5  C mm |  ^
Ha d, fol. 64b; ffutub* vol. I, p.275; A§im b. Umayr was also called
Hozarmurd. See Tab., II, p.1691, indices p.406; Khalifa. Tarikh, fol.288.
6 —
.Alchbar, fol. 103b.
7Ibid.
n .
— Xal-Rudh, Amul and Khawarizm. These lists indicate the importance of 
the Arabs in the revolutionary movement, and also show in which districts 
the ‘Abbasid propaganda was concentrated. It is obvious from the names 
that it was aimed mainly at Arab settlers in Merw and the Arab 
Muqatila stationed in other garrison cities of Khurasan.
Furthermore the central committee of twelve Naqibs at Merw decided 
to choose twelve more members, called Nuflara* al-Nuqaba* to substitute 
fox* any of the twelve Naqibs should any of them withdraw or be dismissed 
or killed; Some of these nuflara* were counted among the seventy da‘is 
such as ‘Asid al-Khuza‘ i, ‘isa b. Kalian and ‘hthman b. Nuhaylc, but
others were not. The da‘is were responsible for their own districts
— 2 and they had the right to appoint U^mana* i.e. trustees or confidants.
Sulayman al-Khuza ‘i, Qah;fcaba al-'J’a*!, La^is al-Tamimi and Malik
al-Khuza‘i, the prominent ‘Abbasid da‘is, used to pay visits to the Imam
especially during the pilgrimage season and to pi*esent him with sums
of money as a contribution from the ‘Abbasid partisans. Although the 
*
< - 4financial subscription to the Imam was not an Abbasid innovation,
nevertheless it was one of the interesting features of the ‘Abbasid 
movement. It is also noteworthy that in earlier days of the da*wa 
certain wealthy Hawaii of Kuf a such as Bakir b. Mahan, Abu Musa ’l-Sarraj
1Akhbar, fol. 103b.
2Ibid.. fols. 101b-102a.
'’Tab., XI, pp. 1953, 1962, 1916; Akhbar, fols. 106a, 125a; Imama. p.217; 
Dina, p.34.4; Ya'qubl, II, p.398; F.IP... pp. 182,190.
Imama. 2, p.207 citing Haytham b. *Adi.
nand. then Abu Salama al-Khallal were v;on over. However, the partisans
*»  1
used to subscribe a fifth of their property to the ‘Abbasid cause,
as Bakir b. Mahan puts it "The Imam is in need of money in order to
2
uphold the right and destroy the evil”.
When Muhammad b. *Ali died in 125/742-3 he nominated his son 
Ibrahim as his legatee. A new active and militant phase of the movement 
started with Ibrahim the Imam. When the missionaries headed by Sulayman 
al-IChusa *i met Ibrahim they urged him to declare the rising, and 
exclaimed "How long will the wild birds feed on the flesh of your 
family (Ahl al-Bayt) and its blood be spilled? We have left Zayd 
(b. ‘Ali) strangled in the Kinasa and his son (Ya^ya) wandering in 
the country, and you are all afraid. The days of the evil house (Ahl 
Bayt al-Su1) / the Umayyadj^ have lasted too long. Credit must be 
given to Ibrahim for this vibrant and active phase of the movement.
M M  w i  M n
He kept in close touch with Sulayman b. Kathir al-Khuga x through the
«, ■» mm 1
ohief da‘l in Kufa, Abu Salama al-Khallal. He is also credited with.
r
the choice of black as the ‘Abbasid colour as distinct from others.
1Tab., XI, p.19X7.
Akhbar, fol. 106a; see further fols 113a f, 125a, 129a; Tab. II, pp. 1769,
IBb9; Denne11, op.cit., p.282.
^Ansab,_foI. 770b citing Abu Ma‘sud al-Kufi; Imama, vol. 2, p.209;
Yarqubi, II, p.398* Tanbih, p.337; P.H.A.. p.182.
^Akhbar. fol. 115a.
^Akhbar, fol. 118a? Muruj, VI, p.60; Dina., p.35^; w On the ITraayyad 
attitude and comments towards the Sawad, see Ibn ‘Asakir cited in Bjdaya, 
vol. 10, p.51; Al-Mulcafat, p.70.
^ •
To justify the choice of black several other explanations were put 
forward such as that the banners of the prophet and of ‘Ali as well as 
the die cast by ‘Abd al-MufcJalib in his dispute with Quraysh had been
black. Many traditions were ascribed to the Prophet and ‘Abdallah b.
** *"• 1al-‘Abbas the ‘Abbasid ancestor to justify this choice. One also
must not forget the eschatological significance of this colour. Legends 
and Malahim were circulated at that time referring to the black banners
which would be hoisted in the east indicating the end of the Umayyad*s
2 3rule. The association of black with mourning for Ahl al-Bayt who
were killed by the Umayyads seem unfounded and it is more likely to
have been a symbol of protest against oppressors deviating from justice,
with additional implications that hopes would be achieved and a new 
4
ora realized, ^he ‘Abbasid partisans therefore bore the name al~Husawwida 
, *
and the new regime was dawlat 1 Musawwida. Ultimately it was Ibrahim 
who sent in 128/743 Abu Muslim *Abd al "Ragman b. Muslim to Khurasan to 
be his personal representative in leading the revolt.
Abu Muslim the famous ‘Abbasid partisan, and one of the chief 
architects of the ‘Abbasid victory seems to lave been a myth not only
t
to us or to the Muslim historians who wrote the histoxy of Islam 
shortly after his death, but even to his contemporai’ies. G. Cahen writes^
^Akhbar, fols. 117a ff; 118a citing ‘Amr. b. Shabib; Abu Yusuf, 
al-ICharaj, p. 119.
'Vitan, fols. 48b, 49a, 51b ff; Van Vloten, Rechers...., pp. 46ff;
B. Lewis, An apocalyptic, op.cit., p.314. The adoption of black was, 
therefore, not an ‘Abbasid innovation. Apart from the Prophet’s banners, 
al-$arith al~Murju*i and the Kharijites had raised it in their revolts 
against the Umayyads. (Tab. II, pp. 1624, 1570, 1981; Agh., vol. 20,p.112),
^Ansab, fol. 683a; Haqatil, p.137; Akhbar,fols. 109b f.
Vab^^I, p.1574; Akhbar, fols. 117a-118a; see also Ja^is, Rasa* 11, ed.1964.
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"It. is an extraordinary fact that the man to whom the ‘Abbasids owed
their victory, the man who enjoyed such prestige in his own time and
in later times, the man whose many deeds are related by chroniclex-s,
■
remains for us what he was in his own time, an enigma.” Not only
his political rOle in the ‘Abbasid movement has been challenged, but
also his origin and social status. The mystery is, probably, largely.
attributable to happenings after his murder in 137/754 by al-Man^ur.
Both pro and anti-‘Abbasid traditions tended to exaggerate or belittle
the r61e he played. On the other hand, Abu Muslim became a martyr in
1
the eyes of the disappointed Iranians, and as Professor Gibb states,
"The tradition of the enthusiasm of the Iranians for Abu Huslim is true
only of the period after M s  success." This obscurity has no doubt
2 — led Frye to say "The origins of Abu Muslim cannot definitely be deter­
mined from Islamic sources." Modem scholars are divided on Abu Muslim*s
3 4origin, some define him as a Persian Mawla, and others as a slave.
What complicates the situation is Abu Muslim's own silence on this
subject during the da wat probably for political reasons. The only
statement concerning his origin which is attributed to him represents
him as saying "I am a man from among the Muslims. I do not belong to
one tribe against the other... But my faith is Islam and allegiance to
X cont.) 0? A o\
5Cahen, op.cit., p.326; Gh. Yusufi, Abu Muslim  pp. 4-5.
1
Gibb, Arab conquest... p.94.
2 - 
Prye, *The rOie of Abu Muslim in the ‘Abbasid revolt", H.W.. 1947,p.28.
jj 2
Welhausen, op.cit., p.506; Lewis, E.I. (Abbasids); Duri, op.cit.. p.27.
4 2 —
Moscati, P.I. (Abu Muslim); Bennett, op.cit.. p.227.
%Al-Mubammad and I am Tight in my cause.’11 Afterwards, however, he 
is said to have claimed to be the son of §ali£ b, ‘Abdallah b. al-
f ** 2
Abbas in order to establish a connection with the Abbasids.
Numerous contradictory details concerning this dubious origin are
related by several chroniclers and biographers. Baladhuri describes him
- « 3once as a Mawla of B&ni Ijl from Igbahan, or "a Mawla of a man from
w 4. 5 ( w
Herat or Bushanj", or a slave of the Ijlites bought by Ibrahim the 
Imam for 700 dirhams, Tabari is rather vague on that, and transmits 
only scanty data. ' He describes him either as a 'mawla or an agent
Qahraman of ‘isa b. ‘ijl originally from the village of Khufcamlyya off
f* n
ICufa, or as a slave of ‘isa al-*Ijli. Ya‘qubi remai’ks that "Abu
Muslim was in the service of ‘isa b. Ma^il",8 while Ibn Qutayba states
that Abu Muslim was "Laqit" i.e. waif.^ According to Dinawari when the
-^Akhbar, fol. 137b., citing A si am b. §abi£; cf. Ansab, fol. 745b, citing 
Al>uTasud; Tab., II, p. 1965.
2Tab. Ill, p.114; F.H.A., p.183; Jamharatt p.17; *Ibar. vol. 3, p.217.
^Ansab, fol. 770b, citing Abu Mas *ud al-ICufl, fol, 771a citing Hisham Ibn 
al-Kalbi.
^Op.cit., fol. 771a citing *Abd al-Ragman b. Musa b. Muhammad b. Ibrahimj
^Op.cit... folc.771b-772a, citing a son of Qafrfcaba.
c «
Tab. II, pp. I960, 1726; see also Huru.i, VI, p.59. '
^Tab., citing Mada'ini, II, pp. 1726, 1769.
8Ya‘qubi, II, p.392.
^ ‘Uyiin. 3, p.106.
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‘Abbasid propagandists met Abu Muslim at ICufa he replied to their 
inquiry "My mother was a slave girle of ‘Umayr b, Bujayn al-‘loli 
who sold her before 1 was born to ‘isa b. Ma‘qil al-‘ljli, I was,
therefore, born in the latter1s house and I am a kind of Hamluk to
1 ** *"* 2
him.” The anonymous author of Alchbar ,1-‘Abbas gives the most
detailed and contradictory accounts of the origin of Abu Muslim,
according to whom he was a mawla, or a ^hulam, or a slave. Finally
it is interesting to quote an Umayyad point of view on the origin of
Abu Muslim, according to which he was "none but a saddlemaker slave"
who held power In Khurasan after "instigating the slaves of Khurasan
3
to murder their masters".
If one is to accept the version on- which most traditions seem to
agree, one must assume that Abu Muslim was born in a village near
Igbahan^ as the son of a Persian mawla named IChatkan and a slave girl 
•» R
called Washika. His father found himself in a difficult financial 
situation and had to sell the slave girl to ‘isa al~‘ljli who owned a
number of farms in the vicinity of Igbahan. The slave girl was pregnant
— *» 6 
and gave birth to a boy who was named Ibrahim by the Ijlites.*
^Dina, p.338.
Akhbar, fols. 121 citing Abu al-Khajjab, fols. 121b, 123a citing Sabiq 
lfawla~Ma‘qil, fols. 126b, 128a citing ‘Amr b. Shabib, 126b citing 
Ibi'ahim b. Hisham.
3 1 — ■*- iAsakir, 2, p.^  291 citing Hisham b. Mubammad.
^Akhbar, fol. 123a; F.H.A., p.183; Wafayat, vol. 2, p.102. Ibn Igfandiyar 
describes him as "a villager of a humble origin and low position" (ll,p.ll0).
^Akhbar, fols. 121b, 123a; V/afayat, vol. 1, p.352.
^Akhbar, fols. 121b, 12?b; Dina, p.338; Ya*qubi, II, p.392; V/afayat, English 
traoST. vol. 2, p. 100. - III is a north Arabian tribe and an important 
tribe of Baler b. Wa'il. It is significant to note that before tfie
(cont.)
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Ibrahim was brought up and educated with the sons of the ‘ijlites. Early
in youth, Abu Is]ja]p Ibrahim served *Isa and Idris the ‘ijlites collecting
the dues of their farms in I^bahan and Kufa. He also used to accompany
*isa al-‘ljli to Kufa where he became acquainted with extreme Shi‘ite
1ideas, and sympathized with Ahl al-Bayt. He even joined the rising
0
of al~Mughlra b. Sa‘id al~‘ljli in 119 A.H./737 at ICufa, but seemed to 
have managed to escape when the opportunity presented itself. Then he 
associated himself with Abu Musa al-Sari’aj, a prominent agitator for 
the cause of Ahl al-Bayt who taught him saddle-making and Shi ite ideas.
It was when some ‘ijlites were impxlsoned in Kufa either on suspicion 
of ‘Abbasid activities, as was the case with *A§im b. Yunus al~‘ljli,^ 
or on a charge of disagreeing with the governor on matters of revenue, 
as was the case with ‘isa and Idris the ‘ijlites, that Abu Muslim 
learned, for the first time, of the ‘Abbasid revolutionary movement. While 
passing through Kufa to the $ijas to visit Ibrahim the Imam, ‘Abbasid 
propagandists visited the imprisoned ‘ijlites and saw Abu Muslim serving 
them. They won him for their cause and took him to Ibrahim after requesting 
Abu Musa al-Sarraj to dispense with his services.^ Ibrahim took a liking 
to him, changed his name to ‘Abd al-Ra^man b. Muslim andgave him the
(cont.) "appearance of Abu Muslim " among the' ‘i jlites of K^fa, Abu Mansur, 
Hughira b. Sa id, both extremist pro— Alid partisans, were also described 
as Ijlites, ii«.I. ( Idjl); E.l.2 (Bayan b. Sam‘an). Goldsiher, op.cit.. T, 
pp. 48,103. See below, chapter IV.
1 ‘ - ~
Akhbar, fol. 123b, citing Sabiq Maula Ma*qil.
2 « ’
Tab., n ,  p.1620, citing Abu Zayd; Moscati,"Studi su Abu Muslim,"11, op.cit. 
pp. 478, 480. ‘ ------
^AMVbar, fols.l21b, 122a; Nubdha, fol. 259b.
^Ansab, fol. 770b, citing Abu Mas‘ud al-Kufl, Tab., II, p.l?27; cf. Dina., 
^  (cont.)
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^  1
kunya of Abu Muslim. He remained in his service and used to be dis- 
patched with secret messages to Kufa and Khurasan until 128/745 when 
he was sent to Khurasan to lead the rising, Abu Muslim was, therefore,
"A _
a Persian Mawla who spent his youth mostly at Kufa before he was en­
trusted with the mission in Khurasan.
When the ‘Abbasid Naqibs saw that, after about a quarter of a 
century of an active and unfailing propaganda, the situation in Khurasan 
had come to a head, Sulayman b. Kathir al-Khuza‘X and other chief 
propagandists urged Ibrahim the Imam to send a man of his own house 
to represent him in Khurasan.^  Having failed to persuade Sulayman al« 
Khuza‘i, Qahjiaba al-'Ja,i and Ibrahim b. Salama, Ibrahim the Imam 
decided to send Abu Muslim, He named him as "One of the family of 
the prophet ", i*e* Anta Minna Ahl al-Bayt and gave him the daughter 
of the propagandist Abu al-Najim ‘Amran b, Isma‘il, a mawla of the 
same social status as Abu Muslim, in marriage. Abu Muslim, however, 
had visited Khurasan several times before, once with Abu Salama al-Khallal.^
(cont.)
'’Tab., II, p.1727; Akhbar, fols, 122a, 124a; Wafayat, English txvms., vol. 2,
p.101.
Akhbar, fol. 122a; Ta‘qubi, II, p.393.
'Sla‘arif. p.370; Imaina. 2, p. 217; Ya'qubi, II, pp. 392, 398; Akhbar. 
fols. 121bf., 129b; Hubdha, fol. 260a; Tab., II, p.1937* For TKe
significance of givihg''aH5lnya to a Mawla. see Goldziher, Huh. Stud.,
vol. I, p.267; E.I.2 (‘Abbasids).
^Tab., III, pp. 24-25 citing Mada*ini^ Akhbar.fol. 125a; Hubdha, fol. 260b;
Dina, p. 339; E.H.A.. p. 183; V/ af ay at ,~~vo'l. 2, p.102. ™
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The allegations that he was a Turk (cf. Spuler, op.cit., p.229) or a Kurd 
(Akhbar,fol. 122b; F.H.A.. p.183; V/afayat, English trans., vol. 2, p.108; 
YaiT*i7 fol. 81b) or Khurasani by origin (Ansab, Paris, 771a; Akhbar,,
fol. 122b) have no evidence to substantiate^them. However, it is inter­
esting to note, that the Turkish origin of Abu Muslim was probably due
(cont.)
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He must have been highly trusted by Ibrahim to be appointed as his 
personal representative. Nevertheless he was ordered to remain in 
constant touch with Abu Salama al-Khalial in ICufa and to obey the orders 
of Sulayman al-Khuza*i in Khurasan.^
Historical accounts preserve several versions of th© instructions 
given by Ibrahim the Imam to Abu Muslim on the occasion of his Khurasani 
mission. According to the version of Tabari and Ibn Qutayba Ibrahim said;
11 Oh *Abd al-Ragman you are one of us the Ahl al-Bayt. 
learn my instructions. Behold the Yamanites, honour them 
and settle among them for verily God will not fulfil this 
matter Abbasid cause7 except through them. Behold the 
Rabi(ites and blame them. Behold the Mu^Larites, they are 
the close enemy, slay him whose affair you doubt... and 
if you were able not to leave an Arabic speaking tongue 
then do that, and everyone who reaches five feet J±n 
height/ and jou accuse^him kill him. Bo not disobey Sulay­
man b. Khathir al~Khuza‘i and consult him if you i are in
trouble.”2
The above version of Ibrahim's instructions is by no means unanimously 
agreed upon by Muslim historians, and cannot therefore be accepted at 
its face value. It occurs in Tabari without a chain of authorities 
and in Ibn Qutayba in a vague and somewhat incoherent form* It is not 
mentioned in Baladhuri or in Akhbar ‘l-Shbas* Later historians do not
(°ont*) to the epic literature of the guilds of the Alehin, which made of Abu 
Muslim a Turkish national hero (see Melikoff-Sayyar,"Abu Muslim partisan 
des Akhis”, 1.0*0., 1957).
4
Ansabj, fol. 771a; Tab., II,p.I949 citing al-Hada’ini; cf. Akhbar, fol* 125a; 
Wafayat* English trans., vol. 2, p.102.------------------ ------
5
Tab., II, p.I960; see also Ansab, fol. 771a. This title was already in _ 
use before Abu Muslim. It was conferred by the Prophet on Salman al-Farsi, 
a Persian from I ^b all an whom the Prophet had adopted as his mawla. It is 
reported that both the Prophet and *Ali had regarded Salman as one of 
-fciie Ahl al-Bayt. However, as Massignon maintains this move by the Prophet 
should bo interpreted as the expression of personal liking for an early 
partisan of Islam and did not possess the religious significance this kind
(cont.)
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count in this matter as the5r rely on earlier accounts. Howevei% it
I *** <«»> 1 j  ^
is significant to note that Dinawari and the author of the Kitab 1- 
*Myun wa * l~IJada1 iq2 do not mentinn the alleged order to kill Arabs 
indiscriminately. The former states that the orders were to kill any 
Arab who refused to join, while the latter asserts that the orders 
were to kill 11 All the suspects" wa~*aqtul man shakakta fi *AmrihI.
Light on the matter is thrown by Akhbai’ ’l-‘Abbas which quotes Atnl 
Muslim as saying "The Imam ordered me to live among the Yamanites, 
to be friendly with Rabi*a and not to avoid those Mudarites who are 
good and to warn the majority of them not to follow the TJmayyads and 
to gather the A.iam around me". On another occasion Abu Muslim reminded 
Sulayman al-IChusa*1 of the Imam's orders to associate with the ^amanites,^
(cont.) of adoption seems to have later acquired. For the extremists 
the title implied that the bearer shared the secret religious knowledge 
of his Imam. Several Hashimites gave it to a number of their Hawaii.
When Ibrahim decided to send his Mawla Abu Muslim to Khurasan, he con­
ferred the title on him in a tactical move intended to invest Abu Muslim 
in the eyes of the IChurasanis, with the qualities of trustworthiness, 
religious knowledge and devotion to the cause of Ahl al-Bayt, (See 
Sa*&. IV, pp. 53-57, 59, 81; Sifat al-Safwa, vol. I, p.219; L# Massignon
Salman pak .....  gp. 16-19. (Arabic translation by A. Badawi in
Shakhgiyyat qaliqa fi *1 Islam, Cairo 1946, See also below p.£/0),
f
Tab., Ill, pp. 24-25, 1949, citing Mada‘ini; Akhbar, fol®.128b, 129b,
Tab., III. p.1937; Akhbar, fol. 130a; F.H.A., p.183.
I 'I JTHl'i I uml "r"^- ■
2Tab., II, p.1937; Imama. 2, p.213; fflfiza1. pp. 50-51.
^ina, p.552.
2F.H,A.. p.184.
^Akhbar, fol. 158b; Nubdha, fol. 260a. 
Akhbar, fol. 139a.
and, furthermore, in his letter to ‘Ali b. al-Karmani the leader 
of the Yamanites in Khurasan he says: "... my master /Tbrahim
the Imam/ has ordered me to depend on you’1.*1' It is interesting 
to add that according to Ibn *Asakir, Ibrahim ox*dered Abu Muslim 
"to remove every big tree on his way1' and he adds "what he meant 
was to kill every /rival/ man of high esteem'1 * ^
Ibrahim’s instructions as formulated in Ibn Qutayba* s and Tabara*s ,
versions have been accepted by some modem historians and taken as
< ” 3an evidence of the anti-*Arab tendency of the Abbasid movement.
The version seems to be partly fabricated. The fabrication, probably
of px*o-TJmayyad origin, is easily detectable as it is separated in
the account by a conversation between Ibrahim the Imam and the da‘Is
4from theiest of the instructions. What confirms the assumption that
it is of a fabx*ication is that its reeuri’ence in another tradition
where it is a question of the arrest and murder of Ibrahim the Imam
5
as if it wei’e a justification of the murder, Furthermox*e the internal
criticism of the alleged version of Ibrahim’s instructions reveals
numerous contradictions. How is it possible that Ibrahim, who has
realized the importance of the Arab Yamanites and Rabi ‘ites as a decisive
1 ' ' ~ —  - —  " ! 
Op.cit., fol. 148a; see also Huntalchab. fol. 88b.
2 < -
Asakir, vol. 2, pp. 291-292, citing Hisham b. Hubammad. Professor
C* Cahen also states that the Imam’s order was to kill all the rival
claimants to the caliphate (op.cit., p.3t).
3 -
Van Vloten, be opkomst der Abbasiden, p.103; Welhausen, op.cit., p.534;
Spuler, op.cit.. p.41. Spuler accepts it on the ground that a fabricated 
piece of this kind would hardly still have been mentioned by Tabari 
under the ‘Abbasid rule (op.cit., p.4l). But E. L. Petersen and Ch. 
Pellat have px^oved that the pro-Umayyad traditions w(ere still alive under 
the Abbasid rule. (See *Ali and Hufawiyya, part II, p,109ff; Pellat,
Jahiz.., pp. 191ff, 202.
^Imama. 2, p.218. (cont.)
factor in the victory of the ‘Abbasids, sbill orders Abu Muslim to 
kill allihe Arabs in Khurasan, In fact Abu Muslim*s behaviour is not 
compatible with the alleged instructions, as he even accepted Mujlarites1 
together with other Arab factions in his ranks.
It was very difficult for the Arab Sulayman b. Kathlr al-Khuga*i 
to accept Abu Muslim as the representative of the Iraam. To put it in 
his own words: had suffered a bad /time/; terrified, sleepless,
some of us even lost hands and legs, others had their eyes and tongues 
taken out. We have lived under every kind of persecution and flogging 
and imprisonment were the easiest punishment we suffered. As we started 
to breathe life and the fruits of our planting ripened this unknown 
person appeared to us, we do not know who he was neither where he was 
from. By God I had known the da*wa before he was bom." The reason
behind Sulayman’s refusal to accept Abu Muslim readily, apart from his
3 - 1relative youth and, as Sulayman thought, lack of experience which might
endanger the future of the da*wa . there was, perhaps, the fact that
Sulayman had asked the Imam Ibrahim to send "a man of the family of the
(cont.') ~ ~ ~ ~ "
I*
^Tab., III, PP* 25-26, citing *Ali b. al-Jasan b. Rashid; Athir,vol. 5,p.313 
^Akhbar, fols. 139a, 141a, 150a.
2IbicU, fol. 130b; cf. Tab., II, pp. 1937, I960.
^Tab., II, p.I960. According to Nubdha (fol. 260a) he was only in 
his early twenties, cf. V/afayat, hnglish trans., vol. 2, p. 104* Yafi‘1, 
Mss., fol. 81a.
IProphet" i.e. of an ‘Abbasid descent for instance, to represent him
in Khurasan as he thought that this would be necessary to ensure
the success of the movement in Khurasan. The destiny of Abu Muslim
was at stake for a while until he found support in another Arab
propagandist namely Abu Da*ud Khalid b, Ibrahim who backed Abu Muslim's
„  1
appointment as it was by the orders of the Imam, Khalid was seconded
by other da‘is who resented the haughtiness of Sulayman and thought
that it would be "much better and more proper if an alien were their leader
rather than the one among them". Sulayman yielded to the decision and
Abu Muslim was accepted and settled first in a village where Khalid b.
Ibrahim lived. However, it was clear to Abu Muslim from the v ery
beginning that a friendly approach to Sulayman was vital for the success
of his enterprise. He, iherefore, showed Sulayman the letter from the
Imam ordering Abu Muslim to obey him, and he added nDo not suspect me
2
for I am more obedient to you than your right hand."
It was not possible for the *Abbasid da*is to act until tribal 
conflict between the Yamanites and Rabi‘ites on the one hand, and 
Mu$arites on the other hand, reached its climax. Baladhuri followed
by Tabari state that Abu Muslim could only act after the ‘Agabiyya
3 *
flared up in Khurasan. The situation in Khurasan as in other provinces
of the empire was affected by the tribal factional policy of the Umayyad
^Akhbar, fol. 130b; Hubdha, fol. 268; Imama, vol. 2, p.217; Tab., II, 
-1962. --
^Akhbar, fol. 131a-131b; Nubdha, p.263a.
^Ansab, fol. 773b, citing Haytham b. ‘Adi; Tab., II, p.1949.
f
/osr.
- i
caliphs. By appointing Nagr b. Sayyar as governor of IChurasan,
Caliph Hisham was hoping to find a remedy for the serious situation
there. Although Nagr b. Sayyar belonged to 'the small tribe of Kinana
in Khurasan, he in fact had a large tribal following. However, the
real trouble started when Nagr b. Sayyar was recalled from Khurasan-
in 125/742. But the murder of the caliph al-VJalid IX enabled him
to defy the newly appointed governor Hanzur b. Jahwar and remain
in office. In order to defend his position Nagr had to preserve cordial
isolations with all tribal chieftains of the province. Although he won
3many Yamanites over and appointed them in administrative posts, the 
chiefs of the *Azd Jadi* b. *Ali al-Karmani defied his authority.
Hagr and Jadi* al-Karmani were men of different pursuits. They had 
both considerable influence on the politics of Khurasan.^ However, 
later on Nagr seems to have stood a better chance to obtain the 
governorship of Khurasan, to which they both aspired, as he was, apart 
from his influence within a large tribal grouping, a capable adraini- 
strator and a man of tactics in war. In July 744 Hagr succeeded 
in imprisoning Jadi* al-Karmani and appointed garb b. *Amr al-Washi.ji
n
Tab.,^11, p.1478 citing Hada*ini; cf. Dennett, op.cit., p.141;
Sha‘ban, op.cit., p.176.
2Tab., II, p.1845, citing Mada4ini.
^Tab., II, pp. 1847-1848, citing Mada‘ini, cf. Dennett, op.cit., p.267. 
^On this subject see Sha‘ban, op.cit.. pp. 213 ff.
^Bayan, vol. I, pp. 47-48;. cf. Tab., II, p.1478 citing Mada^ini; Dina*
PP* 342-343; ff.H.A., p. 184, where the author^says that Jadi* b. al- 
Karmani was not appointed governor of Khurasan due to a superstitious 
fear that his name might bring ill luck, as Jadi * means "cut off" 
while Hagr means "victory".
f o b  .
as a leader of the Azd, but the latter was not able to cope with 
the task, and was replaced by Jamil b, al-Mu ‘man who proposed to 
kill Jadi* al-Karmani. Na$r, however, spared his life.1 Na§r's 
action should be viewed against the background of the tribal situation 
in Khurasan. Having already been in a serious trouble with the central 
government, did not want to stir a new trouble at home with Jadi*
al-Karmani. Al-Karmani was a man of considerable prestige, and is
4 m **** wm 2
described by sources as shaykh al- Arab, and shaykh Khurasan wa farisuha.
He commanded the blind obedience of a considerable number of mainly
Yamanite followers. It is even said that he once refixsed to ally himself
3with Hagr in marriage relations as Wa$r was not his social equal.
Jadi* b. ai-ICarmani escaped from prison through a canal with the help
4of a-slave of his, and continued in his defiance to Wa^r'3 authority 
demanding his withdrawal from the political scend and the appointment 
of a governor from Baler b. Wa il, a Rabi ite tribe, which was, apparently 
a neutral tribe.
It seems that the dismissal of Jadi* al-Karmani and the appointment 
of a more agreeable chief as head of the Azd by Nagr had gravely 
alarmed the Arab tribesmen in Khurasan. The Yamanites and their allies 
the Rabi‘ites as well as certain Mu$arites joined al-Karmani*a ranks.^
1Tab., XI, pp. 1858, 1859. ‘All b. ‘Abdallali b. al-Mubarak.
Ha*d, fol. 67a; Imaina. vol. 2, p. 218; Tab., II, p. 1829; ff.Ii.A.. p. 186: 
Dina., p.355.
3 -
Dina., p.355.
^Ansab, fol. 777a; cf. Tab., II, p.1861.
c  ^
Tab., II, p.1866 citing Mada'ini; Rabi‘a was the ally of Azd.
6,rab., II, pp. 1925, 1933; Sha'han, op.cit., p.230.
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However, the same groups were represented in Hair’s camp. Although 
al-Karmani's partisans were generally called the Yamanites and those 
of Nagr the Ku^arites, the conflict was not, strictly speaking, that 
of Yamanites against Ku^arites. Ha$r b. Sayyar was, ultimately, 
confirmed in his office by the new governor of I r %  in 126/744 
This infuriated his old rival al-Karmani who declared now an open
rebellion demanding that "The book of God and the Sunna of the Prox^het
2 «. —
should be put into practice”. Thus al-Karmani*s rebellion which had
started as a struggle f 01^ power between him and Nagr took now the
form of tribal warfare between two contending tribal groupings. In
alliance with al-farith b. Surayj al-Hurju1! another tribal leader
of Khurasan who had been in rebellion since 116 A.H., al-ICaimiani
*2
occupied Merw which had been deserted by Ka^r. Al-Karmani was, 
subsequently, recognised as governor of Khurasan by his followers and 
on this occasion he, naturally, got rid of his rival al-garith b.
Surayj al-Murj,i vdiom he killed in 128/746.^
Meanwhile chaos reigned in the central province of Syria. Harwan b. 
Muhammad’s legal claim to the caliphate rested on uncertain foundations.
Tab., II, p.l855‘ citing Mada/ini.
^Op.cit., p.!93o, cf. p.1858.
^Tab., II, p.1890 citing Mada/ini; Khalifa, Tarikh, fol. 267; Dennett, 
op.cit., pp. 272 ff.
Tab., II, p. 1934 citing Mada'inl.
1
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He had* in fact* risen on behalf of the legitimate claimants to
the caliphate, the sons of the murdered caliph aL-Walid II (743-744)*
who were killed in obscure circumstances. However, he was ironically
enough proclaimed caliph in 127/744 with the help of his experienced
troops of the ^azira and Armenia as well as the Qaysites of Syria.
Harwan had, therefore* no legal right to the caliphate. Historical
accounts describe him as a *?usurper” of the caliphate from its legi-
3
timate claimants. The Syrians made no move to oppose him, but soon 
discontent grew steadily in many parts of Syria and Jazira. The gijaz 
and the Taman were devastated by Khari.jites. In %ypt the army commanders
_ A
defied Harwan and raised up a governor of their own choice. In the
ever resentful province of Irag, as well as in the eastern provinces*
the death of Zayd b. *Ali b. al-gusayn and that of his son Yagya
stirred up a great deal of resentment, and the vengeance for them
5became the very basic motive for the anti-Umayyad propaganda. Marwan, 
in his turn, had to face another rising in Kufa led by the Ja‘farite 
‘Abdallah b. Mu *awiya. ^  A sectarian at Inart he was ahead of the Janabiyya 
which was characterized by its extremist (ghuluww) dogmas. The interesting
^Op.cit.t p.1874.
2 J -m, rrp
Op.cit.t p. 1890 citing *Abd *1 Wahhab b. Ibrahim. On the legal status _
of Harwan as caliph, see Dennett* op.cit.. p.231.
jAldibar, fol. 120a; Azdi, fol. 56; ^
see' also F.H.A., pp. 156-158; Tab* II., pp. 1891-92; Ibn aQi-^Imad 
shadharat al-Dhahab, vol. I, p.172.
4On the chaotic situation of the empire, see Welhausen* op.cit.. p.371ff; 
Dennett, op.cit., p.226ff. •
Baladhuri states that Abu Muslim rebelled demanding revenge for Ya^ya 
b. Zayd... and he pui on Sawad /black/ in mourning for the martyrs 
of Ahl al-Bayt. (Ansab, fol* 683a, citing Abu Ubayda. cf. 682a too).
See "also Haqa til /TiTf Akhbar» fols.l09bf; Dina., p. 345. { GOnt )
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point of this rising, as far as this study is concerned, is that it 
was joined by several ‘Abbasids such as ‘Abdallah. b. Muhammad (Abu 
Ja‘far), ‘Abdallah b. Muhammad (Abu *1-‘Abbas) and ‘Isa b. ‘All.
It may seem curious that prominent ‘Abbasid figures had joined and aided 
‘Abdallah b. M u ‘awiya, and yet the very same man, after his final
defeat at the hands of the Syrians, was ultimately murdered by the
w 2
chief ‘Abbasid propagandist Abu Muslim in 129/746. This, in fact,
was typical of the ‘Abbasid strategy. ‘Abdallah b. Ku‘awiya had achieved 
a considerable degree of sixccess, and at first he conducted it in the 
name of al-Rida miai ahl al-Bayt which resembles one of the ‘Abbasid 
revolutionary slogans. Thus this ‘Abbasid expedient was aimed at 
extending the Umayyad army and diverting their attention from Khurasan,
«S> M*
the centre of Abbasid subversive activities, to lra*f and Pars. The 
‘Abbasids might also have thought it advisable to encourage ‘Abdallah 
b. Hu‘awiya to try his luck in a rising which was, in some aspect, 
a rehearsal for their own rising. However, no sooner did Ibn Hu‘awiya
•7
claim the Imamate for himself than the ‘Abbasids considering him a 
dangerous rival* did him to death in Khurasan where the ‘Abbasid
^.(cont.)
°Haqatil, p.118; Tab., II, p.1878; Ash*ari, p.85; Sa‘d, V, p.242;
Agh., vol. II, p.74. cf. Hoscati, "studi su Abu Muslim1,* II, op«.,q;Lt.. * 
p7484; idem, op.cit., per una storia dell* antica si‘a, pp. 259-260; 
Cahen, op.cit., pp. 316-317. '
Hlaftatil, p.167; Agh., vol. II, p.74; Akhbart, Igbahan, 2, p.42.
H^ a ‘d, fol* 26a; Bayan, vol. 2, pp. 85-86; Ha‘arif. vol. I, p.207; 
‘A'sakir, vol. 7, p.156.
Agh ., vol. II, p.74, Hu&aramad b. Ja far b. al-v/alid.
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propagandists would not tolerate any claimant whether he were from
the family of the Prophet or not.
These favourable circumstances made the 'Abbasid propagandists
realise that it was time for vigorous action. Abu Muslim spent his
first year (128-129) in active propaganda to win supporters in
"• 1the villages of Khuza'a in Merw. The struggle between Ibn al- 
Karmani and Na§r b, Sayyar had reached a stalemate and the Arab 
tribesmen of both factions were 11 tried with the ^xistin,g7sTtuation 
and longing for a new one to arise... The Yamanite partisans of 
the 'Abbasid movement called upnn other Yamanites. So did the Rabites
t ** 2
and the Mu^arites. Thus the Abbasid following began to increase."
The author of ICitab *1- ‘Uyun^ confirms this view and states that 
when the people noticed this state of rivalry between the contending 
Arab leaders they started to join Abu Muslim. Abu Muslim received, 
in 129A.H., the order of Ibrahim the Imam to notify Sulayman b.
ICathir al-Khuaa'i in order to proclaim the revolution.^ Ibrahim 
also sent Qal^aba al-'Ja‘ i with two banners al-gi 1, i.e. the shadow 
(as there is always a shadow on earth, so there would always be the
‘Abbasid cause) and al-Safoab, i.e. clouds (clouds cover the whole earth
4 * \ 5and so would the Abbasid cause;.
hab., II, p.1952, Mada’ini; Akhbar, fol. 132b.
2
Op.cit., fols. 119a, see also 151a.
5F.H.A., p.188.
i ■ m w h m  i i i  ■ *  ^
Tab., II, p.1952, citing Mada’ini.
5Tab., II, p.1954; F.H.A., p.186.
Opinions differed as to what place should ba chosen to declare 
the revolution, Abu ’l-Hajim Amran bf Isma il, a mawla, suggested 
Khwaraaim as the district was far away from Na§r's army and once the 
revolution was declared ‘Abbasid partisans would join in before the 
Syrian army would reach them. This suggestion was strongly opposed 
by the Arabs Sulayman al~Khuza*i, Musa b, Ka‘ab al-Tamimlf and La^ tis 
b. Qurayz al-Tamlm^, They suggested that Herw al-Shahjan was Hie 
most suitable place for the revolt, probaJbly due to its unique geo­
graphical position, surrounded by villages inhabited by Arab settlers 
who wex*e the main target of the ‘Abbasid propaganda* Furthermore 
the Umayyad government is weak and "Once we got hold of Merw we got hold 
of all Khurasan” because *if the root were destroyed the branches would 
not last long”. The Arabs in Merw and its surrounding villages had 
already lived there for a long time, and a considerable part of the
previously Arab Huqatila had, possibly, acquired lands or practised 
2
trade. There they mingled with the native population, married from
them, adopted many of their customs and spoke their language in addition 
•5
to Arabic, The Arab settlers of Horw, in particular, also shared 
the grievances of the natives against the Dihqans who had, by the treaty 
of Merw, signed by Arab conquerors, been left in charge of collecting 
tlie tribute.^ However, many Arab notables seem to have owned or lived in
^Akhbar, fols,132a ff.
2Akhbar, fol. 132b, f0i. 135a f0i. 153 ^  U'Oj,
- y & l w  147a, 132a
See also Sha ban, op.cit,» pp. 53$ 76, 154* ^
Haywan, 4, p.71; Hanaqlb. p.40; Jatyiz, Rasa il. ad. 1964, p.220; Xa‘qubi,
II, p.294.
villages with their tribal groups and Hawaii. Scattered historical 
accounts provide us with examples of such cases: §arb b. ‘Amir al-
Washiji, Sulayman b. ICathir al-Khuaa ‘i, Asid b. ‘Abdallah al-Khuza*i
1 * 2 had villages of their own; so had Bani al- Anbar. The inhabitants
of the village of Qa§r Asfad were Arabs in their majority. Khulm was
an Aadite country.^- The Mu^arite al-Mu^tafas b. ‘uthman had a house in
« . 5
the village of Al-Lin which, probably, means that a number of his 
tribe were settling there too.
As to Merw, it was the centre of the Arab administration in Khurasan 
as well as the rallying point of Arab Huqatila who waged war against 
Mawara* al-Nahar and Transoxania. Tabari describes it as "Bay$at 
Khurasan”^ indicating its important strategic and administrative
*7 «.
position. Maqdlsi calls it "Umm al-Qura" of Khurasan as Mecca was
called Uhun al-Qura of the gijaz. There is no exact information about
the number of the Arabs who lived in Merw or its surrounding villages.
However, it seems that it was the practice of Arab Huqatila to entrench
- 8themselves in villages surrounding cities during the process of Tamgir.
Tab., II; p.1862; Akhbar, fols. 132b, 133b; Tab., II, p.1963.
2Tab., II, p.1579.
*2 tm mm
Tab., II, p.493 citing Made*ini. For further reference see Buidan. p,280 
Tab., II, p.1969.
Slaqdisi, p.303. 
r
^Tab,, II,pp.l969f.
^Tab., II, p.1558; Al-‘Ali, Al-*Arab fi Khurasan, B.C.A.. 1959, p.65.
^Haqdisi, p.229.
8 *
Akhbar, fol. 177a; Shaman, op.cit., p.56.
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It is worth recalling here that when Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bahili occupied
Balkh he took residence in the village of Baroqan near Balkh, and even
when Asad b. ‘Abdallah al~Qa§ri the governor of Khurasan shifted his
capital from Merw to Balkh he had new villages built and settled
1most of his troops there. It was very probable, therefore, that Arab
Mucatila during the Arab conquest were allowed to live in the villages
2surrounding the city of Merw. Speaking on the effect of the environment
,on people, Jatiz states "if we see ,the son3 of Arab men and women who .
- 3settled in Khurasan we can hardly distinguish them from native villagers"*
Though indirect, this is onecf the earliest references to Arab settlements 
in the villages of Khurasan. Safidhanj, Al Lin, and Kanin were villages
i rifa an
of. Khnza a, Bunya was the village of Bani fay; while Basan was the 
village of Bani Ragr. It is, therefore, no surprise that Maqdisi 
preserves the Khurasani proverb which says “Rijal Merw min quraha’*,^  
i.e. the men of Merw are from its villages. It was those Arab countrymen 
and hard fighting villagers who were sought by the ‘Abbasid propagandists. 
The ‘Abbasid revolt, in fact, started in the Khuza‘ite villages of
^Tab., II, p.1602 citing Mada’ini; Sha‘ban»*op.cit., p.215*
2 «.
When Ibn al-Athir refers to the village of Sinjan he states:
J f f '  <J \J> V/V W d  J L ^ 1
see Lubab. vol. I, p.369.
J^aJjdLz, Rasa * il * ed. Cairo 1964, p. 220. t ^
4Tab., II, pp. 1579, 1952, 1964; Akhbar, fol. 32b.
Tab., II, p.1026.
Slu‘.jam, vol. 4, p.511.
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Safidhanj, Al-Lin and Kanin. Tabari states that it was the Arab 
quarter ,of Kharqana including the village of Safidhanj which was among
^ X i
the first to declare for Abu Muslim. The ‘Abbasid partisans who flocked
< 2to the district of Merw found refuge and food in the Khuza ite villages..
The Arabs then were fully justified in priding themselves on being the
t - 3
earliest and most loyal partisans of the Abbasids.
The ‘Abbasid propagandists cleverly realised the importance and 
the military strength of these Arab tribal groups which blindly followed 
their chieftains, and utilized them for the cause. Once won over,
t
those tribal chieftains were joined by their followers en masse.
Historical accounts in Baladhuri, Akhbar *1-*Abbas, Azdi and ^abari 
dealing with the progress of the ‘Abbasid army to Ira^ : and Syria often 
mention the names of those Arab chieftains who were given the military
j A £ ■ **
rank of Qa id. They supported the abbasid cause and fought for it
-5against many a revolt later on. Ibn al“I(aibi speaks of many Arabs who 
distinguished themselves by their deeds for the da‘wa such as Khafaf 
b. Hubayra, "the bravest cavalry man", ‘Uqba b. $arb, "a Qa’id in the 
da‘wa", and Zuhayr b. Muhammad al~Azdi* *Alqama b. gakim and al-‘Ala’ b.
Tab., II, p.1954.
^Akhbar. fols.133a f. „ . , . ^  ’
Mano^fb, p.12. «
^Ansab, fols. 672a-72b, citing Mada’ini; Tab., II, p.2001,III, p.291 
citing Sahl b. *Aqidi; Akhbar, fols. 132b, 164b, 165a, 166a, 172b, 184a, 185
^Ka‘d , fol. 66b; Jamharat, fols. 91a, 92a. See also Akhbar, fol. 164b.
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Salim joined Abu Muslim with 700 men, ‘Abdallah b. Sha'ba joined
—  2 -  Abu Muslim with 1,000 men, and Khazira b. IChuzayma occupied Merw al-
Rujh with the help of his tribe Tamim. A tribal leader of Bani al-
Jarith joined the ‘Abbasid army with 100 men.^ Furthermore, Baladhuri
preserves an account which mentions several names of Vfajuhquwwad
■■ft £
Khurasan, i.e. the prominent Khurasani commanders who were with Abdallah 
b. ‘Ali in Syria. They were all Arabs. ** According to Akhbar 11 * Abbas,
I
the Safrifatu *1 Safra1, reported to have been handed by Abu Hashim
to ^u^ammad the ‘Abbasid contained particulars of the timing of the
revolution and what is important, information on the Arab quarters which
were ready to support it Being
more or less a local historian, Azdi disregards the detrimental tribal
feuds in Khurasan, though he emphasises the internal strife between
tribal confederations as the important aspect of Muslim politics of
7that time. He relates a statement made by al-Mangur in reply to a 
Mu$a.rite protest that he favoured the Yamanites. Al-Mansur maintains 
that Marwan XI favoured the Qaysites and neglected the Yamanites, which 
resulted in a rising of the Yamanites in every region. Finally the Yamanites
1Akhbar, fol. 132b.
■ i. i  ii* r r „ „ .u ip.i.
2
Op.cit.. fol. 146 a.
3Tab., II, p.1959 Mada’ini.
4Alchbar, fol. 176b.
^Anaab, fols. 762a-762b citing Mada’ini; Tabari also mentions a number - 
of Arab Khurasanis in many different accounts. Apar t from the well- 
known personalities of an Arab origin, see II, p.2001, III, pp. 5, 7# 67, 
94, 136, 137.
^Akhbar, fol. 84b. 
^Azdx, fol. 194.
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sponsored the *Abbasid da*wa and assassinated Harwan IX. Moreover,
when ‘Abdallah b. *A11 faced a rising in Damascus he wrote to the
Yamanites of the city "You and your brothers from Rabi4a were our
Shi*a and Angar in Khurasan. You have captured for us the city
of Damascus and killed al-Walid b. Hu ‘awiya. You are part of us
and our affairs depend on you. /l ask you/ to give up /the siege/
1and let us deal with Mu#ar." If these accounts are to be credited 
the *Abbasid revolution was to a great extent a Yamanite-Rabite 
protest against Harwan*s Qaysite policy.
It is probably significant to note here that the term Ahl Khurasan
2 -  -  '
has been wrongly taken by some scholars to moon non-Arab Khurasanie or
«  »  3 _
Persians, Jo^iz often speaks of the Khurasani Arabs; 'Tabari as has
already been mentioned gives a number of Khurasani Arab names. In one
of his accounts he states "When Ibrahim rebelled in Bagra, al-Mangur
sent the two sons of *Aqil who were commanders from Ahl Khurasan from
A — —
the tribe of Tay...” Many other Arabs were called Khurasanie, such as
*Abd al-Malik b, Yasid, Malik b. ■Jarif, al-Haytham b. Mu*awiya al-*Atkir^
^Op.cit.» fol. 124, see also 112-113, 116,
2Sadighi, op.cit.. p.48; Wiet, J.W.H., 1955, PP. 68ff. One cannot help 
noticing that the term Ahl Khurasan as used b^ early chroniclers almost 
certainly denotes the settlers of Khurasan in the same way as the
terms Alai al-Bagra, Ahl al-Kufa and Ahl al-Sham used to designate the 
Arabs of these cities and pi’ovinces. The more so as early historians such 
as Ibn al-Muqaffa*, Baladhuri and Azdi often stress the non-Arab origin 
of certain Persian Khurasanis when they happen to mention them, (see e.g. 
Ibn al-Muqaffa*, Risala fi *1 gababa, p.124)*
JKanaqib» pp. 35, 37.
4 ' t
Tab., Ill, p.291, citing Aqil b. Isma il.
5Op.cit., p.137.
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giimayd b. Qa^fcaba al-'Ja’i, Basssm b. Ibrahim and al— Abbas b*
rz _
al-A^inaf. The reason of the confusion about the term Ahl Khurasan 
is presumably due to the ‘Abbasid policy which tried to keep the 10aurasanis# 
whichever tribe or district they belonged to, as intact and separate 
unit in their army.^ Consequently they were regarded later as a Persian 
unit in contrast to the other units which bore Arab tribal names.
*■* / 5After proclaiming the revolt on the 25th Ramadan 129/June 747
in tli© name of al-Rida min al al-Bayt. and to establish "the book of
God and the sunna of the Prophet", Abu Muslim entrenched himself in
the IQmzajte village of Safidhan.i. and sent da‘is to the surrounding
villages and cities to announce the battle cry of the revolt, and to
rally the ‘Abbasid partisans. In these early days of the revolt Abu
j Y
Muslim'was not as strong as some sources imply. His followers, in
fact, numbered between 5,000 and 4,000.^ It is worth noting that when 
the *ld prayer was held it was the Arab Sulayman al-IChuza * j and not
the Mawla Abu Muslim who led the prayer introducing new religious forms
9 * -differing from the Umayyad practice. To increase his followers Abu Muslim
^Manaqib. pp. 35* 36; Ibn al-ICalbi, fol. 160a*
^Tab. Ill, p.75# see further Tab., Ill, pp. 94, 67.
3
Aflh., vol. 8, p.15.
^Tab., Ill, p.366 citing Khalid b. Yasid.
3 . .
Tab., II, p.1954 citing Abu al-Khajtab.
^Akhbar, fols. 135a, 136a; Tab., II, p.1953 citing Abu al-Khatfrab.
75ab., XI, pp.1475, 1499, 1962, 1952; Dina, pp. 355, 344, 359-60, 335;
p.188.
®Akhbar, fol. 134b; Hubdlia, fol. 264a; Tab., II, p.1955* of. Imam a, 2, p.219. 
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even welcomed slaves,1 who began deserting their masters, to join him.
When their masters demanded their return Abu Muslim denied any responsibility
i
and left it to the slaves to decide. They, not unnaturally, opted to stay, 
saying "Our masters are Al Muhammad"» Subsequently, Mug ab b. Qays was 
appointed for the sole purpose of recruiting slaves and Abu Muslim then 
organised them in military units under the command of the Arab Da^id 
b. b. ICarrat. A body of them ms sent to reinforce the ‘Abbasid da*i 
Musa b. Mug‘ab at Abiward, and also to Nasa. They seem to have inflicted 
heavy casualties among the Umayyad troops and the natives of these cities, 
a fact which was utilized by Nagrfs propaganda and Abu Muslim, naturally,
2
tried to disassociate himself from these acts of devastation mid revenge. 
However, using the slaves in war was not an ‘Abbasid innovation, as they 
were several times used by the Umayyad governors of Khurasan to reinforce 
the Arab army and were even promised their fi'eedom in a desperate moment. 
Meanwhile Merw al-Rudh was an easy gain to the ‘Abbasid, owing to the 
brilliant move of Khazim b. IChusayma al-Tamimi, an ‘Abbasid partisan 
from Tamim, who played upon the tribal sympathies of his tribe saying 
"I am one of you and I wish to gain control of ^erw. If 1 took it, then 
it will be yours as well as mine." In this way Merw al-Rudh fell to the
(cont.)
^Tab., II, p.1955 citing Abu al-Khattah, F.H.A., p.187.
w  BI.P mm *** t !■
1Akhbar,_ fol. 136b; Hubdha.fol. 264b; cf.JI'ab., II, pp. 1968-1969 citing 
HfaSa*rni; ‘Asakir, *2,” p7291» citing Hisham b. Muhammad; B. Lewis, "An 
apocalyptic.. . op.cit., pp. 308 ff.
^Akhbar, fols, 138a, 141a.
^Tab., II, p.1976, citing Hada’ini.
‘Abbasids.1
In attempting to regain Merw al-Shahjam from the rebel Jadi* al-
Karmani without success, Uagr wrote from Nishapur to Harwan II asking
for help and warning the caliph of the great dangers lying ahead. He
2
ended his letter by exclaiming: "Is Umayya awak.eor sleeping?" Harwan
was certainly not dormant, he was very much occupied with the revolts
~ - 3In Syria itself, Egypt, the gijas and Ira£. VJhat worsened the situation 
was that the relations between Ma$r and lazid b. *Umar b. Hubaya seemed 
to be those of jealousy and x'ivalry. If Ibn Hubayra had had his own 
way he would not have allowed Na$r to be the governor of Khurasan;when 
the latter appealed for help Ibn Hubayra did not respond, Tabari 
states that Ibn Hubayra justified himself as not having enough men to
i  p
spare , Has ludi','? says "He pretended to be occupied with the troubles 
of Irajf", Mnawari^ relates that Ibn Hubayra maintained that "the 
people of Ira£ were not to be considered loyal ^/for the Umayyad cause/". 
Ibn Qutayba clarifies the matter by saying that "Ibn Hubayra was eager 
to bring about Nagr*s downfall and to humiliate him". This isolated
■^ Tab., II, p.1959 citing Hada’ini.
2Bayan. I, p.153; Agh.. 7, p.128} Ya'qubi, II, p.408; Tab., II, p.1973.
3 -Imama, 2, p.220, cf. Dennett, op.cit., pp. 292 ff; Uelhansen, op. cit,, 
pp. 379 ff.
4Tab., II, p.1974.
hluriij, VI, p.65.
Dina, pp. 358-359.
' ‘Uyun. I, p. 128; of. AlAbar, fols. 157a, 159b.
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Nagr who had to find a way out for himself* He approached Jadi* al- 
Karmani suggesting a meeting to whiGh al-Karmani surprisingly agreed*
But at the meeting place al-Karmani was assassinated by gatim b. al-garith 
b, Suray) al—Ilurj* i in revenge for his father. Napr seems to have had 
a hand in this conspiracy as he strangled al-ICarmani.1 However ‘All 
b. Jadi* al-Karmani succeeded his father as a leader of the Asad. As for 
the ‘Abbasid partisans, Hapr conducted a vigorous campaign of propaganda 
against them. He represented them as atheists who "worship cats.*J and 
heads", "They are none but mobs, cattle, slaves and unworthy Arabs 
and Hawaii". They are, on many occasions, described as *UIu.i. Ha.ius 
i.e. magijin. } Sufalia1, i.e. foolish mob; Suqat al-*Arab, and
The TJraayyads were the only representatives of the Sunna and Jama 
One of these accusations seems interesting and worth further attention. 
*Abbasid partisans were desci*ibed as Suqat al-*Arab i.e. the lower Arabs 
or the dregs of society. This was certainly true of ’the early followers 
of Abu Muslim who flocked to him from the villages of Merw al-Shah.ian and 
were those Arab settlers deprived of their Arab privileges, who lived on 
the land like the Iranian natives and paid tribute to the Dahaqin. This 
term, in fact, could never have been used to describe the Arab Huqatila.
1,j;ab., II, p.1975; cf. Xa'qubi, II, p.407; Ansab. fol. 777b.
2  ^
if the account of Dionysius of Tell Mahre is correct, "Head worshippers"
may also refer to Manicheans. (Dionysius, op.cit., pp. 69f).
^Akhbar* fols. 142a, 141b, 140a,_137a; Hubflka* fol. 265b; cf. Tab., II, 
pp" 1991-2, 1856 citing Ma&a'ini.
^Alchbar, fols. 166b, 180a; van Vloten, op.cit., pp. 55, 72.
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This religio-political propaganda made some kind of appeal to the
1
religiously inclined and the common people, and for some time worried
the ‘Abbasid propagandists, who naturally applied the same tactics
in their counter propaganda* A public meeting was held and Abu Muslim
and other Haqibs followed by the ‘Abbasid partisans swore allegiance
before Sulayman al-Khuaa ‘ i 11 To call for the book of God and the Surma
2
of the Prophet, and to uphold justice and oppose oppression"* These 
accusations and counter-accusations were merely for propaganda reasons, 
as Nagr and Abu Huslim continuously approached each other for an agreed 
reconciliation* The famous -®rses of Na$r appealing to the tribes to 
unite against the ‘Abbasid partisans, and the reply of an Arab partisan
of the ‘Abbasid movement to him throw ' a vivid light m  the x^ropagandiot
3character of the movement. Furthermoro the Umayyads themselves in a 
later stage addressed the ‘Abbasid army by the wox’ds "Ya Ha‘char al- 
Huslimin" i.e. "Oh Muslims",^" Another tactical move by Abu Muslim 
intended to counter Naur's propaganda was to treat tko captives well and 
to fi’ee them so that they might go back and tell their fellow-tribesmon 
in the Umayyad camp what they had observed in the ‘Abbasid camp, namely, 
that the ‘Abbasids were pious and humane* It is rather significant that 
in one of the early engagements between the ‘Abbasid troops led by Malik
“j
Tab., II, p.1965, citing Hada*ini; Akhbar, fols. 141b, 142a.
^Akhbar, fol* 142b.
Nagr, „■ referring to the ‘Abbasid partisans said (Dina., p*360);
Al-‘iUdci an Arab pro-‘Abbasid partisan replied;
i.e. for the sake .of,Uod we do not favour any of 'those whom we are 
asking be they Hawaii or Arabs. (Akhbar, fol. 154a). ,
r    (cont.)
!£■% •
b. al-Haytham al-Khuza4! and the Umayyads led by Yazid, a mawla of
Na$r, Yasid was arrested and then freed to tell Na$r about ‘Abbasid
1
piety and sincerity.
It seems that the tribel feuds were accelerated in Khurasan by the
arrival from Irafc of a new political figure, the Kharijite Shayban b.
- * 2 
Salama l-§aruwri. Until recently modern scholars were puzzled by his
sudden appearance and about his identification. This is largely
3due to the confused historical accounts of him. In the lightcf
new evidence offered by Dennett^ on the basis of an account of Baladhuri,
we are in a position to judge his previous activities in Irafc and Pars.
Shayban trie little (al~gaghir) was a partisan of al-pa^ak b. Qays the
Khaxrljite rebel of Ira|f; after their defeat Shayban al-Saghlr joined
‘Abdallah b. Ihi ‘awiya, but after the latter*s defeat Shayban made his
way to Khurasan through Sistan. *Ali b. al-Karmaai took the opportunity
of exploiting the presence of -this new adventurer by seeking his collabora-
5
tion against "the supporters of the Satan", i.e. the Umayyads.
(cont.)
^Akhbar, fol., 166b.
^fab., II, p. 1957 citing Abu al-IChafrtab.
2
Welhausen, op.cit. t p.498.
^ An sab, fol. 777b; Tab., II, p. 1948 citing Abu I-Iikhnaf, III, p. 78*
4Dennett, op.cit. ._p p . 290-291; see also L. V.. Vaglieri, R.S.O.j, 1949, 
xxiv, p.31. BEayban al-gaghir is not to be confused with Shayban al- 
Yashkurl.
^Ansab, fol. 777b; see also IChalifa, Tafikh, fol. 267; Akhbar, fols.
144a ff; Tab., II, p.1992; F.H.A., pp. 165-166. ~ ~ ~
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In the summer of 747 there seem to be three prominent powers
in Khurasan, *Ali b. Jadi* al-Karmani, occupying Men?, with a
considerable number of followers from the Yamanites, Rabi‘ites and 
even Mu^arites. He also had Shayban al-gaghir on his side; Nagr b. : 
Sayyar, occupying Nishabur, with tribesmen from Mu$ar and Rablea 
and part of the Syrian troops'- and Abu Muslim with supporters who 
mainly came from the Arab villages of Merw.
Noticing the growing danger of Abu Muslim and realising that no
reconciliation with *Aii b. al'-ICarmanl was possible, Nagr proposed a
truce between him, Ibn al—Karmani and Shayban the Kharijite. Modem
** J
historians misled by the generalisation of some accounts in Tabari, ' 
which represent the one year truce as an agreement among the three Arab 
leaders to crush Abu Muslim, have over-emphasised this unsuccessful 
diplomatic move by Na$r. In fact, the truce was only apparent. What had 
been reached was not an agreement between allies, as the enmity 
smouldered on, but only a temporary truce. The political atmosphere . 
was very tense. At a meeting with a religious group of the people of 
Merw, Abu, Muslim threatened, by a slip of the tongue, to kill Nagr h.
Sayyar and Shayban the Kharijite, a mistake criticized 1 ater by Sulayman
•_  -•» 2 *• 0 
b. ICathir al-ICuza i. As a result Shayban was driven closer to Nagr,
while *Ali b. al-Karmani was far from reaching an understanding with him.
■Sab., II, pp. 1964, 1984; Athir, vol. 5, p.279. 
^Tab., II, pp. 1965 f citing Mada’ini.
^Alchbar, fols. 144& f *, 146a f.
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But when Herat was occupied by the Arab al-Na$r al-pabbi in the 
name of the *Abbasids, Nagr took the opportunity to draw the attention 
of Ibn al-Kannani and Shayban to Abu Muslim1s danger, and proposed 
the above-mentioned truce. *Ali b. al-Karmani and Shayban endeavoured 
to utilize the situation to destroy Naur's followers. They realized 
that If they came to terms, temporarily, with Ha$r, Abu Muslim would 
fight Ma§r because "the authority is in Mu$ar". If they do not sign 
the truce, on the other hand, Abu Muslim would become reconciled with 
Na$r and attack them. So the truce was only a stratagem to make Na§r 
and Abu Muslim attack each other, in order that "Their eyes would 
rejoice at their £  the Hu^ai'ite/being killed".^ As to Nagr's motives, 
they were not sincere either. He Intended »to utilize *Ali b. al-Karmani 
and Shayban to put an end to Abu Muslim, which he could!ave done if 
the truce had been successful. This, in fact, was the motive behind 
that temporary truce which has wrongly been called in some accounts 
of Tabari, ffulp al-*Arab, while the author of Akhbar *1-‘ Abbas rightly
** t 2calls it Huwadaa I.e. truce. It is worth recalling that the relation­
ship between Jadi* al-Kaxmiani and Nagr was never marked by friendliness 
and trust. The only occasion when al-ICarmani put his trust in Nagr he 
had to pay very dearly for it In terras of his own 3ife. It was, therefore, 
impossible for *All, the son of the murdered Jadi* al-KarmanX to trust
hat)., II, p.1966 Hada’ini.
2Ta’D._, II, p.1980 citing Atm al-Khafrtab, p.1965 I  - o-J’J
Akhbar, fol. 145a. On the meaning of gulfr and Huwada*a , see I. Mu^Jafa, 
al-Miif;]am al-Hasit. vol. I, pp. 522, 1052. ^
/3Lf .
Nagr. However, Naur’s move put the ‘Abbasid propagandists in a precarious 
position. In accordance with the truce Na$r regained Merw, and Abu Muslim 
on the advice of Sulayman al-IChuza *i presumably in order to avoid a clash 
with Na§r, wi thdrew to Hakhwan on 9th Dhu *1-Qi‘da 129/july 747. Sulayman 
al-Khaza‘i, a master of strategy and tactics, made at once a move to save
the situation. By reminding ‘All b. ol-Karmani of the longing of his
father for* the day when Al Muhammad would be able to rise in revolt against
the Umayyads, and by instilling in him a feeling of revenge for his father,
Sulayman was able to persuade him to break the truce. And so Hapr's warnings
3that "Abu Muslim would wipe all of usn proved of no avail. Na$r, now, 
attempted to persuade Shayban the Kharijtte, who had, apparently,re selected 
the terms of the truce, to attack ‘All b. al-ICarmani and Abu Muslim, but
A «
failed for lack of trust between them. Shayban1s followers, in fact,
suspected Nagr of foul play by engaging them in warfare in order to exhaust
5their strength and then attack them from the rear. It is significant to 
note that Shayban and his followers did not take root in Khurasan as they 
were rebel refugees from Iraj^ :. Shayban found himself now in a precarious 
position: he was not allied himself to Abu Muslim, neither could he trust
a loyal Umayyad governor like Na^r. The only alternative left to him was
hat)., II, pp. 1967-8; Akhbar, fol. 135a.
2 - «
Ibid. Abu Muslim also appealed to Ibn al-Karmani stating *
J \jj3 \ J b & S j  y*
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see Akhbar, fol. 148a. \ ^  - f ^  * -
•^Alchbar. fol. 147a? Hubdha , fol. 266b.
4
. Akhbar, fols. 146a-146b.
^Idild.. fol. 146a.
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4All b. al-Karmani who, indeed, played an important r61e in preventing 
him from joining Hagr and advised Abu Muslim to make a friendly gesture 
towards him to enable him to maintain his neutrality at that crucial 
juncture. Presumably, in order to make him feel that he was sharing in 
the re spoil s ihil i ty, *Ali b. al-Karmani assigned to Shayban the task of 
collecting the tribute of the whole district between Nlshabur and Herat 
with headquarters at Sarakhs in Rabi* II, 13o/Dec. 747. ^  Shayban * s with­
drawal strengthened the position of Abu Muslim as compared with Nagr, 
as J3hayban z'epresented a leather unpredictable element in the political 
scene.
Not to lose time, Abu Muslim took the initiative and recognised
*Ali b. al-Karmani as governor of Khurasan. He aligned himself with *Aii
2
and used to pray behind him and salute him as governor. This was a 
brilliant move by Abu Muslim as *Ali b. al-Karmani hungered for power 
and it would have been dangerous for Abu Muslim to contend with him 
at this moment. Abu Muslim had, in fact, only 7,000 followers whose names 
and that of their villages were taken down into the register. This was 
a tactical move by the *Abbasids to eliminate tribal antagonism within the 
partisans and to weld their partisans whether Yamanites, Rabi'ite, Mu$ar~ 
ites or *Ajam into, a uniform body. They were all transferred to 'Alin,
aattMrtu-..............
1
Akhbar, fols. 151a, 152a; cf. Tab., II, p.1990.
2 i ~  ~
Tab.j, II, p. 1967 citing Mada ini; Imama, 2, p.222; Ya qubi, II, p.399; 
Akhbar, fol. 155b; Nubdha, fol. 269a; Duwwal, fol. 101a.
^Tab., II, p.1969 citing Abu al-Khafttab.
As 2,000 had already deserted his camp probably influenced by the news 
of the truce. (See Akhbar, fol. 146b). See also S .1.^ ' (Daftar).
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a village of Abu Mansur fal^a b. Zurayq al-Khuza61 in 6th Dhu *l-p.jja 
129/August 747, as Malchwan proved to be dangerous from the strategic 
point of view and water supplies
Receiving no help from the central government, Nagr wrote to
-  2Harwan II again, the foilowing pathetic letter:
"I am writing to the Commander of the Faithful and I 
have used every 'thing that I had in man, money and
tricks to face his enemy. Had you sent mo 1,000 Syrian
troops they wouldhave be on enough to face the oppressors
I am writing to the Commander of the
Faithful as I have been thrown out of my authority and
standing on the doorstep of my house; and if no help
arrives and I am ordered to depend on Ibn Hubayra I shall
be removed even from my doorstep and I will never return 
to it till the day of judgment.1
While desperately waiting for help, Nagr decided to play his trump card
with Abu Muslim. He thought he might succeed to create discord between
Abu Muslim and Ibn al-Karmani, Ha$r, therefore, sought for a meeting
which was attended by the delegates representing the three dominant
figures,‘All b. al-Karmani, Hagr b, Sayyar and Abu Muslim. But this
move of Nagr was defeated as sulayman al-Khusa*1. Jal^a al-Khuza*1 and
Masid b. Shaqiq al-Sulami decided in favour of ‘Ali b. al-Karmani and
Ills followers as against Ilagr and his followers. It was only now that
the /Vbbasid movement got hold of the levers of power, namely the Arab
tribesmen of Xli b. al-Karmani.
*4?ab., II, p*1969- oiting Abu al-Khaffab.
^Akhbar, fol. 152b.1 Him 9
^fab., II, p.1986 citing Abu al-Khattab.
Now the ma^or target of both Abu Muslim and Ibn al-ICarmani was
to get hold of the administrative capital of Khurasan, Merw. As related
in Tabari, the circumstances in which Merw had fallen to the ‘Abbasids are
1rather confusing. According to ono account, the allied forces of Ibn al—
_  _  2  
Karmani and Abu Muslim made a two-pronged attack on Merw. Another account
states that Abu Muslim was still suspicious of Ibn al-Karmani and asked
him to attack. However, when seen in its true perspective, there is no
i
vagueness at all about Abu Buslines attitude, it was plainly equivocal. 
Despite his alliance with *Ali b. al-Karmani, he avoided all possibilities 
of a conflict with Nagr b. Sayyar; he tried not to figure as a major 
party in the conflict, as he had recognised *Ali b, al-Karmani as Amir 
of Khurasan; but it was he himself who, after the end of the tribal con­
ference, sant a convoy led by the Arab al-Qasim b. Mujashi* al-Tamimi
3 t -to escort Na$r*s delegation to a place of safety. Abbasid partisans were
A
able to do their shopping in Merw at certain times unmolested.' All this 
shows that Abu Muslim was presumably still hoping to win over Naur’s 
followers to his side, or pexdiaps thought that it would be expedient 
not to sever all coxitacts with Ha§r and leave him some hope and expectation. 
However, since the whole situation was dominated by tribal jealousies,
^Op.eft., p.1984.
o_____________________________ _
Op.cit., p.1937, citing Abu al-Khati^b; IChalifa, Tarlkh, fols. 268-9.
^Tab., II, p.1986, citing Abu al-KIiattab. 
hldibar, fol. 154b.
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tribal feuds were bound to break out at the slightest excuse. It seems
that a fight broke out in the market of Merw between a tribesman of Baler
b. Wa'il and another-of Muftar, and that this fighting spread as Hagr .
helped the Mu$arites while Xbn al-Karmani supported his allies, the
Rabi'ites. ‘Ali b. al-Karmani then appealed to Abu Muslim to join in
the attack at Mew, but the latter delayed it until he was sure that
Ibn al-Karmani ’ s followers were engaged in a fierce battle against
Na^'s troops. On the 9th Jumada II, 150/5*ebruary 14, 748, Abu Muslim
entered Merw with an army led by Arab commanders, the vanguard by As id al-
Khiiza*1, the right wing by Malik al-Khuza‘i and the left wing by al- 
- ?
Qasim al-Tamimi,“ and stopped the fighting. Subsequently, hesent a 
delegation to Uagr, inviting him to a meeting and promising him an 
amnesty* Hagr tried to delay it and eventually succeeded in escaping
to Nishabur. It is said that La^iz b. Quraya, one of the Abbasid
,E x 1  ^ ^
// j j i j-j ^   ^ i t j
delegates, warned Hagr by reciting the verse;  ^ ^ u s
Magr managed to escape thanks to the warning, for which L&friz was executed 
as a traitor,^* Abu Muslim imposed martial law in Merw installing military 
posts round the city preventing people from entering and leaving it 
without permission.^ Mow the real face of the Abbasid movement began 
to reveal itself. The oath of allegiance sworn by the partisans, especially
1Akhbar, fol. 154b.
^Tab., II, p.1987 citing Abu al-Khaljab.
^Khalifa, Tarllch, fol. 269»^Imama. 2, p.222; Akhbar, fol. 157a; Zubayri, p.442 
Tab. II, p.1991# citing Abu al-Khafiab.
^Ibn al-ICalbi, fol. 85b; Ya*qUbJ, II, p.409; Tab., II, p.1990.
^Akhbar, fol. 157a.
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the Hashimiyyai indicates that what mattered to Abu I-Iuslim was the real 
*Abbasid doctrinaires and not the masses that had been utilised by the 
revolution.
Merw al-Shalljan and its surrounding villages, Merw al-Rudh, and 
gerat, were all now under iVbbasid control. So was Abiward after the Arab
t -  4- 2
Asid b. Abdallah al-Khuza i had occupied it by force of arms. * As for
Balkh, it was first occupied by the Arab Naqib Khalifl b. Ibralixm al- 
- 3Dhuhali. But it is significant to note that Balkh changed hands thx-ee
times between Nagr and Abu Muslim. Balkh resisted the ‘Abbasids for
three reasons, Eirst the Arab Muga'tila* stationed therehad been unified.
Tabari tells us that when *Asad b. *Abdallah ol-Qasri stationed the
Arabs in Balkh in 107/725-26 he was advised not to divide them into
fifths, as had been the custom in Herw and Ba§ra, for'fear of stirring
tribal factionalism among them. He, therefore, stationed the different
4
tribal elements together,' 'This move 3.ed eventually to a reduction in 
tribal frictions and resulted in creating a united anti-iAbbasid force
led by the Umayyad governor of the city. Secondly, the Syrian troops
5stationed at Balkh ,numbered about 2,500 men, were apparently pro-Nagr, 
Thirdly, the native Iranian population in Balkh and its surrounding 
district co-operated with the Umayyad governor of Balkh. Even the local
*^ Tab., II, p. 1989# citing Abu al-Khajtab.
2 —
Op.cit.. p.1969 citing Mada’ini.
30p.clt.. pp. 1997f.
4-Tab., II, p.1490; cf. Al-tAll.'lAl-‘Arnb fi KharaaonV B.C.A.. 1959, pp. '73f 
Op.olt.. II, p.1590.
princes in ^ukharistan and other districts of Hawara’ al-nahar offered
1 -their support to the TJmayyad governor, Tabari states that !TIu£arites,
n 2 
Yamaniteo, Rabi‘ites‘and the ^ a m  agreed to fight the Husawicia1'.
This is a significant event insofar as it reveals that tribal factionalism
was greatly in favour of the ‘Abbasid movement, and on the other hand
shows clearly, probably for the first time, that the ‘Abbasid movement
was not a Persian non-Arab revoltition against the Arabs as the native
Iranians, prinoes and popuMion, sided with the Umayyads. Non-Arabs fought
shoulder to shoulder with the Arabs to regain Balkh from the ‘Abbasids.
There is, in fact, no strong historical evidence in support of the
assumption that thei’e was any sense of deep dissatisfaction with the
Dmayyad rule, which wouldhave led to a complete upheaval against them
in the cities of Khurasan and I-Iawra1 al-hahar.
The Xraj^ i phase of the: daSm
The order had by now come from Ibrahim the Imam appointing the 
Arab Naqib Qafctaba b, Shabib al-'JbS/i the commander in chief of the *Abbasid 
army whose main object it was to march westwards towards Irajj: and Syria,
The mainstay of the army were Arab tribesmen of Kbu £*asan led by their 
chieftains. The author of al-Imama wa*l Siyas assesses their number at 
30,000 men, and adds !,They were Yamanites and £* Abbasid/ Shi * a and cavalrymen. 
^0p.cit., II, p.1997*
^Qp.cit., II, p.1998.
^Ha*d, fol, 40a; Tab.., II, p.2000; Akhbar, fol. 157b; Ya^ubi, II, p.410; 
Dina, p.362; ff.K.n., p.193.
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from Khurasan". Before setting out, the ‘Abbasid army had to do 
away with their rivals in IChurasan in order to safeguard their rear.
Shayban the Khari.jite who refused to take the oath of allegiance to 
Abu Muslim and demanded that Abu Muslim should pay homage to him was 
suddenly attacked and killed together vrith his followers of Bakr b.
If a* 11. It is said that when the ‘Abbasid army reached Shayban1 s 
headquarters in Sarakhs, the latter reminded them of Abu Muslim's 
pledge not to attack him. Khaslm b. Khugayma al-Tomimi and Bassam b.
Xbraliim replied that they were heading for Herat. However, they suddenly 
launched an attack on Sarakhs. A great number of Khari.jites were killed, 
and the massacre was unusually cruel due to Bassam's factional feelings, 
when Abu Muslim.learned of this he immediately replaced Bassam. Sarakhs, 
the strong anti-‘Abbasid city, was now under ‘Abbasid control. On its 
march westwards the ‘Abbasid army occupied £u s, having first crushed 
the resistance of the Arab Khurasani* followers of ITagr and a contingent 
from the people of Mishabur led by Hapr's son, Tarnim, who was killed in 
the battle.'5 Hagr himself fled from Nishabur to Qumus.^  There was 
no co-operation whatsoever between the approaching Umayyad army led by 
Nubata b. ganjala al-Kallabi and I\Tajr b. Sayyar. Mubata had been instructed
I mama, ed. Cairo 1904, p. 225.
Tab., II, p.1996; Khalifa, Tarikh, fol* 269; Akhbar, fol. 157b; Hubdha, 
fol. 271b. — —
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by Ibn gubayra ,the governor of Iralf, to islee over the command in Khurasan
and to appeal to the remnants of Naur's army as well as the native princes
- 1 — of Abiward, Has a and Sarakhs to join him. I-Iarwan II at last decided not
to leave Khurasan in the hands of tribal chiefs but to put it under the
control of a military commander backed by Syrian troops. He, therefore,
— 2aslced Nagr.to step down and accept Nubata's command. . This was a terrible 
blow to Hagr who, broken-hearted, gave up resistance. The pro-tfmayyad- 
especially Mu$arites? tribesmen, asked ITagr to stay but he refused and 
headed to Iiamadan where he fell ill and died shortly afterwards at Sawa on
*7 «» M.
12th Rabi* I 13l/0ct. 748. When Nishabur was occupied an amnesty was 
declared by the ‘Abbasids except for those who had witnessed the murder 
of Ya£tya b. Zayd, but even those were pardoned later.^ This was yet 
1 another political propaganda move on thepart of the ‘Abbasids.
The important confrontation between the two rival armies occurred
5 « .
at Jurjan. The Syrian array was led by Rabat a b. JJan#ala and numbered
about 10,000. The commander in chief of the ‘Abbasid army, Qa^faba,
declining Abu Muslim's suggestion to march towards Hagsr at Qumus, wisely
*
advanced to meet Hubata. The insult was a terrible defeat of Hubata, who 
■was slain in the battle, on the 3rd of JDhu ’l-Hij ja 130/ July 748, but the
^Akhbar, fols. 158b, 161a.
20p.cit., fol . 1 59b.
^Khalifa, Tarikh, fol. 274; Ma‘arif, p.370; Tab., Ill, p.2; Akhbar, fol. 165b; 
Bina, p.562.
^'Akhbar, fol. 160b.
5 ICha3jfa, Tarikh, fol. 273; Tab., II, p.2004 citing Mada'ini; W a r i f ,  P*370; 
Ya^qubi, II, p.410; Akhbar, fols. 161a ff.
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Jurjanis resisted the .‘Abbasid occupation and threw the garrison out. 
Qabtabahad to reoceupy it inflicting a terrible massacre on the Jurjanis’ 
as a punishment for their loyalty to the Umayynds."** Due to the inter­
vention of Khalid b. Barmak who was with the ‘Abbasid army the native
- < - . 2
ruler of Jabaristan paid homage to the Abbasids.
Nothing succeeds like success, or as Abu Muslim puts it "People are
3the bravest at the beginning of their power", with only a minor set back, 
the ‘AbbasidQ reached al-Rayy where Qa&£aba stayed for five months imposing 
martial law on the city.^ Having received a severe reprimand from Marwan 
II, Ibn Hubayra ordered ‘Amir b. pubara, who had an army of 50,000 men 
mainly from Ira£ and Khurasan, to march against QaJ^aba and abandon his 
previous plan of invading Khurasan, through Sistan. ‘Amir had never 
suffered a defeat in his campaigns against the Kharijites and ‘Abdallah b. 
Muafiyya. Furthermore he was now reinforced by Da’ud b. yassid h. Eubayra with 
more Syrian and Jasirite troops. His huge army was rightly called ‘Askar al- 
*Asalcir. The decisivo battle took place at Jablaq 'near Ipbalian.-3 Before 
the battle the Umayysck appealed to the ‘Abbasid partisans saying "Oh Muslims 
fear God and join the Jama‘a. You trill be granted amnesty for your misdeed 
f11 '&ie ^itna. ‘ Ata1 will bo increased and payment will be made to you. 
1,iab., II, p.2016.
Akhbar, fol. 163b; I-Iubdha. fol. 274a.
3 ■Duwwal, fol. 109a,
4
Akhbai*, fol. 164a.
^Ha*arif. p.370; Tab,,J[I, p.2004; Ya*qubi, II, p.408ff; Akhbar, fol. 166a, 
Ibn Asakir says that Amir called upon the Syrian army saying;
(Vol. 7, p.153 citing ‘trtbi)
/* '
Khalifa, tarikh, fol. 273; Akhbar, fol. 166b.
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However, on the 24rd Rajar 131 A.H. both armies engaged in a fierce 
battle in which the Umayyads were defeated and *Amir was killed. This was 
the beginning of the end of the Umayyads, The backbone of their army 
in Iran was broken. The author of Akhbar * 1-*Abbas^ calls the battle 
al-gaygal , i.e. the decisive battle, adding that "It was the opinion
Utif
of the people of Irajf that, if Ibn pubara were victorious, the power 
would remain the Umayyads, but if Qagjaba prevailed, it would fall to 
Band Hashim,",
The *Abbasid revolution was now in its full swing in the eastern
provinces. When Abu Muslim heard of Qapjaba’s victory he realised that
»
the right moment had come in order to do away with the last obstacle 
in the wayof the revolution, namely, ‘All b. al-Karmani and his brother 
<Uthman* Both were easily and treacherously murdered,^ *Ali when 
marching with Abu Muslim to Hishbur and *U-Woman in Herat where he was 
governor of the city. Many of Ibn al-ICarmani1s intimate associates were killed 
with him too. This is another aspect of the political nature of the *Abbasid. 
revolution, as Ibn gazra puts it, "After *Ali and ‘uthman supported Abu 
Muslim and distorted the unity of the Arabs, he killed them and annihilated - 
the family of al-ICarmani." This conspiracy seems to have been prepared 
beforehand because Qagjaba was not surprised at all at the news of it/r 
Akhbar, fols, 171b-172a.
Asma*al-Mughtalin, p.191; Imama, vol. 2, p.222; Ansab, fol, 778b; Tab., II, 
pp* 1999-2000; Akhbar, fol. 165b; Hubdha, fol. 2?6a; F.H.A. ,p,192;
Duwwal, fol, 10Tb.
Asma* al-Hughtalin, p. 191? Jaigiarat, p.359,
J^Udobar, fol, 174b.
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During the seige of Hahawand QaVr£abn secretly offered an aman
to the Khurasanis who joined the Umayyad army stationed at the city,
but they flatly refused it and remained loyal to the Umayyads. After
losing all hope to win them he got in touch with the Palestinian division
of the Syrian army and played on their tribal sympathies until they accepted
the aman and evacuated the city. Qa^Jiaba then occupied the city and
massacred all the 5,000 Khurasanis in it to the last man. In a swift
move as there was no force to face it, the ‘Abbasid army was actually
inside Irajj:. Abu Salama gaf,j b, Sulayman al-Khallal, the chief da * i
and the Waair of -Muhammad took part in the activities which prepared■
the ground for the approaching ‘Abbasid army from his hideout in Kufa.
This brilliant practitioner of secret propaganda 1ried to create a state 
-<  2of chaos in Irak to divert the attention of the Umayyads. He sent' erai- w \
ssaries to instigate the bedouins of Kufa, Ba^ra and Mosul. Musa al­
ii amdan’i rebelled at galwan. The lower Euphrates was ravaged by the Rabi‘ites. 
Abu rUmayya al-Taghlubi rose in arms in Tikrit. Their motive, however, was 
plunder mid robbery and not loyalty to the ‘Abbasid cause. In the Jasira 
the bedouins began to join the‘Abbasid army too. ‘Afaf b. Sa‘id of Ban!
’l«Harith joined them with 100 men, so did a number of the people of 
Mogul, l,al-Mausul:tyya,t.^ Abu *Awan ‘Abd al-Malik b. Yaaid al~Azdi was
'''Khalifa, Tarikh. fol. 274; Ma*arif. p.370; Tab., II, p.2005, III, p.7; 
Akhbar, fols. 173a-174a; ff.H.A., p*194.
2 ■
Akhbar, fols. 174b, 175a. ■
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advised to occupy Mogul whose people, ill-treated by Harwan IX, were 
willing to join them, but Abu 4Aim hearing of Marwan1s advance entrenched 
himself at Shahraaur, where he stayed till Mufcarram 132/Aug. '749.
Enraged by the swift victory of the *Abbasids, Marwan with an army com­
posed of Syrians and Jasirites immediately marched towards Jaaira to
meet the 4Abbasids, and meanwhile he wrote a letter reprimanding Ibn 
Hubayra as follows:
"Tho Comraander of the Faithful had appointed you 
governor of Ira)£ expecting you to be equal to the task 
/tip 'to it/, but you disappointed him in many respects 
such as in delaying help to his loyal citizens in Khura­
san j their strength had weakened, and their enemy over­
came them; ... and your failing to unsheath the sword 
against discordant Muhallabites, and your neglect of 
soldiers without being severe with the suspects among 
them. And your negligence to cut out the tongues of the 
Syrians who spoke what the Commander of the Faithful 
hates /to hear/# and your appropriation of the money of
the Muslims. X@t this is 1he best youcan do in face of 
the enemy? ... If the remnants of Ibn J^ubara's and Da*ud 
flocked back to you, pull yourself together and face the 
enemy,...“2
Ibn Hubayra, replied:
,f I have understood the letter of the Commander of 
the Faithful. I have not spared an effort advising him 
and not deviated from the right /path/... As to the:
Commander of the Faithful's mention of my delay in
[jj. tetf mm
helping /those/who are in Khurasan, he knows that, when 
I arrived in Irajp it was a blase with war, so I had to 
remedy what was close to me. I havoused the Syrian army 
once against the Khar i jit os, then against Ibn I-lu 4awiyya 
and^then against Sulayman b. gabib (the X’Cbel of al- 
Ahwas). I could not use the people of IraJp /in the
*|
Akhbar. fols. 176b-177a; Tab., III, pp. 9, citing Mada*ini. 
^Akhbar, fols. 177a f.
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army7for, Commander of the Faithful knows,
they deooive him and his state. Had X used them to 
help our people in Khurasan they might have joined 
the enemy and I should he blamed. As to the Banu 
al-Huhallab (ibn Abi gofra), X have noticed that they 
are in an influential position among the Yamanites and 
I, therefore, hated to invoke them as that would provoke 
the Yamanite Irakis and even the ^amanite Syrians who 
are with me. "I
Yasid Ibn Hubayra advanced at once to Jalula*, but Qa^aba took
the advice of Abu Salama and was reluctant to engage ini a battle there.
Instead he mai^ched towards Kufa followed by Yaaid b. Hubayra, and on
August 27th, 740 the battle took place there in the region called 
- 2Upper Faluja. Qafctjaba crossed the river Euphrates from the west bank
to the east bank .and the two armies clashed there. In the course of
the battle both adversaries suffered setbacks andultimately the ‘Abbasid
army defeated the Umayyads who had no morale left. Meanwhile Kufa
had already been taken, not by the Khurasan!s but by tribal chiefs, Muhammad
b. Khalid al«Qa$ri and fal^a b. Is^a*! Muhammad b. al-Ash‘ath al-Kindi,
with the help cf Yamanites and tribal groups of Bajila and 33a j dal who were
deserters from the Umayyad camp. The victorious army, which had lost
its veteran commander Qa^ rjiaba in the battle of Upper Faluja, entered
Kufa among celebrations and festivities.
^Akhbar, fols. 178a-179a.
2 — — — — 
Khalifa, Tarikh, fol. 276, Tab., HI, pp,.12ff, 16 citing Mada*ini; Akhbar,
fol. 179a; of. Ansab, fol. 782b; —
Khalifa, Tarikh, fol. 281; Tab., Ill, p.18, citing Abu Uukhnaf; Akhbar,
fols. 181a f. :
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Qa^Jaba al-^a 'i's death is one of many events of this period
historical nooounts on which are contradictory to such an extent that
reasoning becomes futile* It is a mystery which leads to speculation or
doubts which can be historically dangerous. It may have beencne of a
series of murders of prominent ‘Abbasid propagandists which makes one
think whether it was committed for reason of policy by conrpising groups,
1 ~ -
or individuals. Qa^Jaba alleged knowledge of Ibrahim's Uagjyya to
his brother* *Abdallah b. Muhammad (later caliph Abu *1~*Abbas) may have
had something to' do with his death. Khalifa b. Khayyat* Bal&dhuri nnd
Tabari followed by other chroniclers and biographers transmit several
2
conflicting accounts.
After Qa^Jaba's death many such as Ha‘an b, Za’ida, Afcilam b. Ibrahim
b. Bassam, YaJjya b. Jagin and $arb b. Salm b. A^waz are said to have
claimed the credit of his death. At any rate, an account on the authority
of Salm, a mawla of Qa^Jaba, states that after crossing the river they
had engaged with the Umayyads in a night battle when suddenly Qa^aba * o
3horse was seen riderles, It seemed as though Qafctjaba had been probably
fatally wounded or drowned* He was succeeded as commander in chief by
his son al-gasan. But through concern for the morale of the troops the
bad news was concealed until the battle was over.^' However, the battle
~h?.H.A., p,190*. It is worth mentioning that the same man who relates 
Qa^JajJa's death is involved in a conspiracy to murder ai-Saffa& by order 
of Abu Salam'a (see Ansab* fol. 782b).
2 -  -  -
Khalifa^, TarikhT fol. 276; Ansab, fol. 781b; T&b., III, pp. 12f, 16 citing 
Hada*ini; AJchbarfols. 182a-IS2b ; v/afayat, vol. 3, p.288., F.H.A., 
p. 195; DhahereTTTol. 4b.
Ansab, fol. 781b citing Salm Mawla Qabjaba.
bkhbar, fol. 183b; F.H.A .f p.195.
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of Upper Faluja was by no means decisive for despite the fierceness 
of the fighting both sides seem to have Icept their strength, the only 
difference being that the morale of Ibn Hubayra'0 troops had suffered 
badly. Many Ynnanlto tribal chiefs in Ibn Hubayx^a's army deserted him 
aft ex* hearing of Mufc'ammdd al-Qasxfs rising in Kufa,, while the Syrians
who no longer seem to have any faith in their state failed to respond
1 wto Ibn Hubayra1s call and fled. However, Ibn H bayra, who entrenched
himself in tfagij, was still in oontx^ol of a great army. On the 10th 
of MukaxTa.ni 132/August 749 Abu Salama wa3 escox'ted by the Arab army* 
commandex’S gumayd al-'fa1!, Khaaim al-Tamiml and Muqatil al~‘Akki to 
the mosque where ho addx*essed the jQxux’asani soldiex^s praising their 
sei’vices, warning them not to lend their ears to the demagogues, i.e. 
suf alia * , and promising to increase their pay to 80 dirhams a month with 
offers and gifts to the offioex*s and commanders. It is significant to 
state that Abu Salama avoided any mention of the name of the new Imam 
or the family to which be belonged. The maintrend of his addx^ess was 
materialistic andxot religious or spiritual, a fact which throws full 
light on the political nature of the ‘Abbasid revolution.
As to Bagra it is important to note that its political tendencies 
were changeable owing to the gx^ eat majority of Tamimite inhabitants whose 
resentment of a centi*al government of any kind was well-known. The last
^Alchbar, fol. 184a; 3T.H.A., pp. 195f; $awthara b, Suhayl al-Bahili tried 
To regain Kufa but M s  Syrian army which had no morale left dispersed.
He had to take itefuge in Wasit.
2 ~
Ansab i fol_. 732a; Aklibar, fol. 184b; Tab., Ill, p.20, citing Abu Mukhnaf 
and I-Iada * ini. —
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Al- All, Tansimat.., p.41; Pellat, op.oi t., p.53.
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Umayyad governor Salm b. Qutayba al-Bahili, was a good administrator
*1 ^  
and a popular tribal chief. When Abu Salama got hold of Kufa he
invoked .Sofyan h. Ku‘awiya al~Muhallabi to take over Bapra in the
name of the ‘Abbasids. Sofyan did not wish to oust Salm, as the
latter had conferred many favours on the Kuhalabites when they under-
2
went a difficult period under Marwan II. He, therefore, asked him to 
give up the governorship. Salm al-Bahili refused and wrote to him "Let 
us make a truce and wait to see what will become of Ibn Hubayra _^ in 
Uasij^. If he was killed or forced toleave I will evacuate Bax* 11-Imara. 
/As for nojsp^ you know that neither Marwan nor Ibn Hubayra are killed or 
defeated.” Reluctantly they came to terms. How Abu Salama persuaded
other tribal chiefs to rebel and promised them the governorship of
■3 ~ w
Bapra. This move made Sofyan al-Muhallabi act swiftly, he decided to
ovex’throw Salm al-Bahilj. Tornlm, Qays, Bani Hasraa* of Rabi*a, as well
as Ahl al-‘Aliya and a number of Quraysh and Thaqif all sided with the
Umayyad governor Salm al-Bahili. The latter was also supported by the
4
Syrian troops and the Umayyads of Bagx^ a. As for Sofyan, ,hc was joined 
by Azd and their allies Baler b. V/a’il as well as *Abd al-Qays. He was 
also joined by the commander of 2,000 Kalbites who had original^ been
^Ansab, fol. 804a, citing Ma&a’ini. '
2 ™
Op.cit., fol. 803a; see also Khalifa, Tarikh, fol. 279. Akhbar, fols.
177a, 178a;. *
Ansab, fols. 803a, 804b, 806a; Tab., Ill, pp. 21-23.
4Ansab, fol. 804bj Tab., Ill, p.22, Mada’ini.
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— 1sent to Salm but had defected to Sofyan. The battle was a defeat 
for Sofyan who fled to Kaslcar and Misan. Salm remained in Ba$ra 
until the news of the murder of Ibn Hubayra reached him. He decided 
to flee to the $ijas, after appointing a new governor in the person 
of the Hashimite Muhammad b. Ja*far. The new caliph Abu *1-‘Abbas 
replaced him by Sofyan b. Mu‘awiya al-Huhallabl who retaliated on
3
a number of Mujarites by dismantling their houses in Bagra.
It was by this time that the *Abbasid da‘wa suffered a heavy blow 
by the arrest and death of its head Ibrahim the Imam. This poses 
the question how the Umayyad authorities were able to discover who was 
the head of this secret movement, and whether Ibrahim himself had, in 
fact, nominated his brother Abu ’l-*Abbas Ills successor.
The historical accounts are conflicting. According to Tabari,^ 
the name of Bani *1-‘Abbas was proclaimed when the da ‘is unfurled the 
banners at the very beginning of the revolt; but the name of the Imam 
was not mentioned. However, Tabari does not say whether the proclamation
■k-V J £ IKM
of the name of Bani I- Abbas took place in public or merely among 
the inner circles of the da * is. In his somewhat brief vex*sion of the 
‘Abbasid x*evolt, ICufi confirms Tabari *s ideas and foxvaulates them more
Tab., HI, p.22.
2 - It is said that Salm al-Bahili appointed a Hashimite to succeed him
in the governorship, as a friendly gestux-e whioh would plead fox’ him
with the ‘Abbasids. In fact, it was the practice of the Umayyads to
nominate a Hashimite ox* a Qurayahito as governor of Ba^ra in time of
cxklsis. See Pellat, op.cit., p.258.
3 - ,  -
Ansab, fol. 806, citing Mada ini.
Tab., II, p.1952, citing Mada ini, p. 1954 citing Abu al-KhafJab.
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cleai’ly, saying "Abu Muslim. called upon the people £  to swear alle- 
glance^ ^1Q sons el-*Abbas".*** In another place, Kufi quotes 
a letter from Nagr b. Sayyar to al-Karmani in which the latter warns 
al-Karmani that "Abu Muslim is working fox* Bani Hashim and not for you 
Ijxl-KaxTiianl/»"^ without mentioning which branch of Bani Hashim. he 
has in mind* Thus it sooms reasonable to assume that the name of 
the ‘Abbasid Imam was only known to the inner circles of the movement*
As to the arrest of Ibrahim the Imam, the chroniclers also differ*
According to Balaflhuri, the author of Akhbar *1-‘Abbas and Tabari, 
it was through Nagr's efforts that Harwan came to know that Ibrehira 
b* Mu&ammad the Abbasid was the loader of the Khurasani revolt. . 
Nevertheless, other versions attribute the disclosure of the Imam's 
name to different personalities. The gasanid ‘xlbdallah b. al-ftasan^ 
is said to have informed Harwan on the occasion of a visit to jjarran 
of Ibrahim1s activities in Khurasan out of jealousy. According to 
another account Harwan was Informed through a messenger of Abu Muslim 
who, after visiting Ibrahim and receiving a message for Abu Muslim, 
defected to Harwan and betrayed to hun the secret of who were the pro- . 
minent figures in the KImrasani conspiracy.^ Since no other authoritative
I Ifcw
Kufi, fols. 220a-221a.
, fol • 222a* ^ j  h" j " sJ£  (Jb jv£\) hi ,JJjj
In the correspondence which took place between Shayban the Kharijite and 
al-Karmani in Khurasan, the same of Bani al- Abbas also occurs, (see 
Akhbar, fol. 147a).
*
^Ansab, fol. 772b; Akhbar , fol. 193a.
^Akhbar, fols. 192a-192b, 194aj Nubdha, fols. 284a-285b,
5Tab,, II, p. 1974; £ubdha, fol. 285; Akhbar, fol. ^95aA ,who gives the 
name of the messenger as ‘Abd * 1 -KgiuhT b. *Ahi 1— Awja .
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accounts concur with them on that, there is obviously a pro-‘Abbasid
tendency in the last two versions. Moreover, those named as instigators
of Marwan’s treatment of Ibrahim were, in fact, victims of ‘Abbasid.
policy, and were put to death by the ‘Abbasids for dynastic or political
reasons. Ya‘qubi, followed by Ibn ‘Asakir, states simply that Marwan
was informed of the name of Ibrahim without mentioning the source of 
’ 1that information.
It should be remembered, however, that the Umayyads had known of
‘Abbasid1s subversive activities since the reigns of ‘Abd al-Malik
and ¥alid I, It is, therefore, not surprising that Ibrahim the 3tnam
should have been the number one suspect in Marwan13 eyes. Once Marxian
is said to have been warned of I-iuhammad Dhu *l~¥af$ al-Zakiyya* s
activities, but heiemarked: "It is not Muhammad we e xpect to revolt 
2
against us". Moreover it seems unbelievable that the name of the 
Imam could still have remained secret after the series of victo3?ies of 
the early summer of 749/lpl. Accoi’ding to Akhbar *1-‘Abbas it was 
Qahfaba b, Shabib al-Ja’i, the commander of the Khurasani army x/ho
was prevailed upon to have Ibrahim1 s name proclaimed by an Umayyad
■* 3agent after the victory of Juran in the early summer of 749. v
Ya‘qubi, II, pp. 393, 409; *Asakir, vol. 2, p.288 citing Isma‘il al- 
Khajbl.
2
Ansab, fol, 608; Haciat 11, p. 179.
^Akhbax*, fol, 193a; Hubdha, fol. 285a; see ‘Asakir, vol. 2, p,288.
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According to l^bahani the name of Ibrahim was current and associated 
xiith the revolt as early as the days of Abdailah b, Kujawiya (Agh., 
vol. II/74). During the pilgrimage season of 131 Ibrahim's name was 
widespread in association with the revolt in Khurasan. See Duxrual» 
fol. 101b; Bad9, vol. 6, p.65.
Ikf •
On the identity of the leader of the movement being discovered,
Marwan II immediately ordered al-Walid b. Ku‘awiya, the governor of
Damascus,to have Ibrahim arrested. He was taken from al~gumayma to garran,
and there ensued a strongly vocal meeting between him aid the caliph.
Harwan is reported to have said "Do you imagine that a man such as
yourself should become oaliph?" Whereupon Ibrahim replied "You are
the snn of jarid end La‘in, i.e. those who were expelled and accursed by
tho Prophet, and despite that you sought after and gained it, Why
-  1should I not seek it as 1 am the cousin of the Prophet and his wali?'r
Ibrahim tus imprisoned with other prominent Umayyad personalities at
garran where he met his death in Mugarram 132/Aug. 749. The ‘Abbasid
point of view, expressed by many ‘Abbasid perspnalities, as well as ‘Abbasid
poets, alleged naturally that Ibrahim had been either murdered or poisoned 
*<* p
by Marwan' s orders." This could well have been'true as is borne out 
by many authorities; none the loss, it is possible that Ibrahim fell 
victim to the plague which spread in Syria in that very year 13l/l32.^
Although Ibrahim the Imam was taken by surprise at al-^umayma, he did • ■
have the time to nominate one of his brothers a legatee* Ibrahim was 
accompanied on his way from gumayma to al-Sham for quite a longdistance
^Ansab, fol. 772b.
^Ansab, fols, 772a~772b, citing Ha^tham b. ‘Adi, fol. 773a; Akhbar, fols. 
193a, 195a-b; Hubdha, fol, 284; Kufi, fol. 227a; Tab., I l l p ‘.44'.’
^Sa‘d, vol. VIII, p.60; Tab., Ill, pp. 42-4» citing Alynad b. Zuhayr.
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by a number of his relatives including his brother ‘Abdallah b.
Muhammad (Abu *1-‘Abbas), When it was time for the relatives to 
go back, Ibrahim is eaid to have nominated Abu al-‘Abbas his successor.'1' 
According to Baladhuri, Abu *1-‘Abbas was the first of Muliammad b.
‘All's sons to leave for Kufa, as the bequest of the Imamate to him
P  pu» an j m  m ,
made him fear for his life. According to Kufi and Ya qubi, the nomina­
tion of Abu 'l-*Abbas had already taken place in the time of his father 
Hu&ammad b. ‘All."* Abu ’l~‘Abbas seemed to be the right person to 
choose as he was most acceptable to? the ‘Abbasids who did not object
to this choice, probably because ‘Abu 'l-*Abbas was :of pure Arab origin
4
since his mother was Rija al-garithiyya.
Ibrahim confirmed his Wagiyya to Abu *1-‘Abbas shortly before his 
death. According to Baladhuri on the authority of the Qadi Da*ud
£ f^W fly -«• -
b. Abd al-gamid, Sabiq al-Khwarazmi, a Mawla of Ibrahim's, brought 
the latter's message after his death to Abu *1-‘Abbas confirming him
5 -
as an heir. Ibrahim is also said to have written letters concerning 
wasiyya to‘ Abu Salama in Kufa, Abu Muslim in Khurasan and .the 
commander of the Khurasani troops, Qa^Jaba b, Shabib al-Ta1i.^ In
■A A* — f7
the Ititab al- ‘tJyun wa’l gada’iq the imprisonment of Ibrahim is re- 
hldibar, fols. 197b, 193a.
' ' /  ^  ^ j
2Ansabt fol. 776b.
■^ Kufl, fol, 220a; Ya‘qubi, II, p.398.
^At that time there was also prevalent the legend of the son of al-Harithi 
coraing to spread justice and ox-der. See Akhbar, fol. 82a; Van Vloten, 
Recherches..., pp. 54ff.
5
Ansab, fol. 774a; Akhbar, fol. 198ab; Nubdha., fol. 287a; Muruj, VI,p.89. 
^AJdibar, fol. 194a.
A.H.a. , p. 190.   ■__________________•
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presented as a sudden blow to the da *is in Khurasan. Consequently,
they sent Qa^^aba al-'pa*! in a merchant’s disguise to garran where
he learned from Ibrahim that he had appointed Abu ’l-^bbas his legatee.
When Ibrahim was arrested, he urged ‘Abu *1-‘Abbas to flee with
his relatives to Kufa which he did in Muharram or §afar 132/Aug. or Sept.
749.^ The score of men who fled with him included Abu Ja‘far, the sons
of *Ali b. ‘Abdallah: Sulayman, ‘isa, §aliji( lsma‘il, ‘Abdallah, ‘Abd
~ 2
al-gammad, Musa and his son Isa and others. They seem to Imve reached
-  -  3
Kufa prior to the arrival of the Khurasanis.
After a delay of more than one month which was due to Abu Salama*s
change of mind, Abu *1-‘Abbas was proclaimed caliph in Rabi‘ I 132/
s 4Oct. 749* However his accession cannot be equated with the practical
downfall of the Umayyads. Although th© ‘Abbasid army had gained a number
of decisive battles on its way to Ira}<:, many other obstacles vrere yet
to come. The battle’of Upper Faluja was by no means decisive as both
parties claimed victory. It is significant, however, in that it
demonstrated to what extent the Syrian army was demoralised.
Once he had begun to operate the levers of power himself, Abu *1-
‘Abbas nominated a new list of governors dismissing some of those
'5appointed by Abu Salama as suspects, and filled the vital posts with
^Ansab, fol. 785a; Tab., Ill, pp. 27t 34; Ya*qubi, II, p.413. See also 
Akhbar, fol. 202b; Nubdha, fol* 289b,
2A n s a b fols. 785a, 776b; Akhbar, fols. 202a-202b; Nubdha, fol. 289b; 
Dina, p. 357; Ya‘qubl, Il7"p."'?l9; Tab., Ill, pp.“ 27, 33-34; H u m  j,
VI, p.91.
Ansab, fol. 773a. Dinawari puts it as if Abu 1- Abbas was in Kufa long 
before the revolt (p.36c). ‘ - .
^Ansab, fo^, 784a; Y a ‘qubi, II, p.418; Tab., Ill, p.23# Kufi, fol. 226b. 
^Ansab, fols. 785b, 806a citing Mada ini; T^b., Ill, pp. 72—73*
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prominent 4Abbasids as well as men with a good record in the daSra.
Abu Ja*far (later al-Mangur) was sent to lead the attack on wasit.
It was -also thought appropriate to send an 4Abbasid to face Marwan II
who was hurriedly advancing to meet the bulk of the Khurasanis led by
Abu 4Aim al-Aadif a task for which 1Abdullah b, *Ali the uncle of
the caliph volunteered. Marwan had entrenched himself between the
Tigris and the great Zab river, whilo ‘AbdalJah b, 4Ali faced him on
the left side of the Zab. Marwan*s army was composed of tribal units
' —  2such as al~£>abgahiyya» al-Rashldiyya, al-Mubamirra. and eCL-Dukaniyya. 
Those divisions were loyal to their tribal chiefs who were, presumably, 
maintained and well-paid by Marwan. The relationship between Marwan and 
those tribal chiefs is not explained by our sources but their loyalty 
.to Marwan was presumably due not to reasons of faith in the Umayyad 
caliphate, but to mercenary considerations. To these units one must 
add also the Bedouins and other irregular tribal elements who joined 
Marwan in the ^aaira. As to the number of Marwan*s army, several 
accounts give the obviously exaggerated figure of more than 100,000 men 
Mas 4udi merely states that it was "huge".^ However Ta,bari maintains
Ansab, fol. 786a; Tab., Ill, p.38 citing Kada’ini.
2Tab., XXI, pp. 40 ff.
'’Khalifa, X’arikh. fol. 279; Ansab, fol. 760a; l'ab.,_III, p.46 citing 
Mada*ini; ICufi, fol. 228a; Muru.j, VI, p.85; Bal*ami, XV, p.337; 
Dinawari gives the figure of 30,000 men (p.363).
^Tanbih. p.327.
that Marwan himself estimated his own army at 12,000 men. Thus it
seems that originally the *Abbasid army numbered less than Marwan*s,
but having been (specially reinforced when ‘Abdallah b, *Ali took; -
2over the command, it numbered between 20,000 and 24,000 men. As 
a result both armies seem to have been of approximately the same sise, 
but by no means the same morale. The Khurasanis and the Irakis were 
fighting for a promising new cause , while the Syrian allegiance was 
at a low ebb, as they had lost faith in the cause of their dynasty.
In addition to that, the Syrian Qaysite tribes formed a great part of 
his army. This, in fact, was its chief weakness, especially as it 
was torn by tribal jealousies by which Marwan*s great military ability 
was seriously impaired. Feuds raged even on the battlefield between 
Qu£a*a, Bani Sulaym, Bani *A mir, al-Sukun, Ghatafan, The active 
military confrontation lasted ten days (2-11 of Jum&da II 132/l6~25 
January 750 A.B.), Marwan committed the grave tactical error of 
leaving his well-prepared strategic position to cross the Zab, To 
give his army courage, Marwan is reported to have described the
Khurasan! partisans of the * Abbas ids as "a mob from Shahraaur among who
— •? 3 —there were only very few Khurasanis”. VJlien the morale of Marwan*s
army was at its lowest ebb, he tried to mise it by distributing money
1Tab., -III, pp. 46-47.
2 - ~
Tab., Ill, p.38; ICufi, fol. 228a.
- W i ,  foi. u o .  y  f w
tfa
among the soldiers, who actually threw themselves upon it and grabbed 
it. He sent his son to prevent further pillage, but the latter was 
accompanied by his banner which made soldiers think that he was talcing 
flight. They fled in such disarray that the number of the drowned 
exceeded that of those actually killed.1 Even at that desperate moment
an Umayyad jeered at Marwan because he had been defeated. "The oppressor
. „  2 
is now the oppressed /one/j his only desire is to flee".
When Marwan withdrew towards Mogul, Ilisham al-Taghlubl refused to
open its gates. Marwan, therefore, proceeded to his headquarters in garran
•2 ^
where his son-in-1 aw, Aban b, Yazid, was governor. Meanwhile, Abu ,1- ‘Abbas
j
ordered every one who participated in the battle to be given 500 dirhams
and increased their salaries to 80 dirhams a month.^ As a reward for their
services in pursuing Marwan II Abu *1-‘Abbas allotted cultivable lands to
tribal chiefs of Mosul, such as V/a’il al-Azdi and his brothers. On his
5
accession aL-Mansur increased the allotted land.
‘Abdallah b. ‘All received from the caliph orders to pursue Marwan.
Mogul opened its gates to the ‘Abbas id army* Harran, evacuated by 
Marwan, surrendered and its governor paid homage to ‘Abdallah, who
destroyed the house where Ibrahim the Imam had met his death. On his
1Tab., Ill, pp. 40-42. , ,
2Tab., m,_p.41, citing itoda’ini. ^
See also Itufl, fols. 228b f; Azdi, foie. 112’ ff. It is significant to 
note that Azdi often uses the term Aghab /followers/ when referring 
to the armies on both sides which indicates the non-racialist aspect of 
the conflict, (fol. 112)*
^Tab., III, p.45j Muruj, VI, p.74.
4 *
Tab., III, p.41. After tho Abbasid accession the salary of the soldier
was increased to 80 dirhams a month. But in 135 A.H. Abu Vl-‘Abbas
decreased it to 60. However, al-I-langur incxreasod. it again to 80 when
ha sent the army to fight ‘Abdallah b. ‘All. See Ansab. citing Madia'in"
fols.763a-763b -----
(cont.)
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Way to Damascus Marwan passed through Qinnlarin, Hums and many other
cities, but the Syrians whom he tried to persuade to join him, turned
1 ■ -  ■ their backs on him. Syrian tribes such as fayy and Tanukh attacked
2his rear and plundered his supplies and money. Marwan was in a 
precarious position. He was now reaping the fruits of his tribal policy.
It seems that he was deceived in the trust he had put in the Qaysites;
The Yaraanite Syrians took the opportunity to revenge themselves on 
him. ¥hien he reached Damascus, the capital whioh he had deserted for 
yarran, its governor al-Walid b.- Mu *awiya b. Marwan b, *Abd *1-Malik, 
another son-in-law of Marwan, welcomed him, but Marwan could not remain
in a city torn by inter-tribal strife between Qaysites, and Yamanites;
4 - bbesides, some factions were frankly hostile to him. According to Azdi
Marwan was harassed by Yamanites and at Damascus he was faced with the
rebellion of al-garith al-garsi who called upon the people to swear allegiance
to Bani Hashim. Thus Marwan headed for Palestine and Egypt, pursued by
§ali& b. ‘All, who was sent as a reinforoement with 10,000 men by Abu *1-
‘Abbas, and Abu 4Awn who led the Khurasanis with ‘Amir b. Isma‘il al~
Masalli in the vanguard.^ Damascus, however, did not surrender to ‘Abdallah
^(oontTj ~  "*** " ~ ~ ~
Azdi, fols. 136, 141-
(5
Aufi, fol. 228b; Muruj, VI, p.75.
1Dina,' fol. 364. Os-'
Kufi, fol. 228b; Ya‘qubi, II, pp. 413 ff; ‘iqd, citing an eye witness Mu? ‘ab
al-Khath‘ami, vol. 4, p.473.
Imama quotes Marwan saying: 0 ,  ^ 1c ^ ’
Tp.224) U  I V'K t+f <S^aA »
Ya'qubi, II, p.414; Tab., Ill, p.45 citing A£imad b. Zuhayr.
■'’Azdi, fol. 118.
^Kufi. fo3s. 228b, 229a. It is related that.Marwan intended to take refuge
(cont.)
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b. ‘All. Its governor held the city with 50,000 troops. ' But soon
*Agabiyya tampered with the people of Damascus and fighting broke out
- ~2
between‘Qaysito and Yamanite. According to Kufi before the capitulation 
of the city, the population was divided into pro-Umayyad and pro-‘Abbasid 
sections who fought each other. Ultimately, the pro-^bbasid group emerged 
victorious. They killed the1 governor- of the city and opened its doors 
to the Khurasanis. Azdi states that the Yamanite population of the city 
sided with the ‘Abbasids, killed its governor and delivered the city 
to ‘Abdallah b. *Ali. Ya‘qubi^ states that a section of the population 
asked Ya£iya b* Ba^r to negotiate for surrender. While the negotiations 
were in progress, they relaxed in vigilance, and the Khurasanis entered 
Damascus on the 14th of Ramadan 132/26th of April 750 by force. The 
walls of the city were destroyed and it was pillaged for throe hours. 
V/hatevex* may have been the reasons which led Marwan to Egypt, he 
certainly could not have expected to find a force which would deliver 
him from the Khurasanis. as Egypt itself was in a state of chaos.
Moreover, at that very moment the Qopts revolted against Marwan, He 
entered Egypt on the 8th of Shawwal 132j May 750,
when a number of districts such as al-gawf al-Sharqr, Alexandria, fa id
in Byzantium”/ but he ~abandl^ the advice of his
cou nsellor. This sounds highly improbable as the caliph of Islam, 
however desperate, he was, would never have dared, at that time, to 
look for shelter in the camp of the "unbelievers”.
^Ansab, fol,^760b; Kufi, fol. 228; Tab., Ill, pp. 45-46 citing Atynad B. 
Zuhayr; Muru.j, VI, p.94.
^Cufi, fol. 228b.
5A2di, fol. 124, also fols. 112,113, 116.
4Y a ‘qubx, II, pp. 426-7; Khalifa, Tarikh, fol. 230; Kuq. . fol. ,239a;
*Ayni, fols. 9b~10a.
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and Aswan had already declaimed themselves for the ii-bbasids. It is
- 2 therefore probable that Marwan had the idea of proceeding to Ifriqiyya.
However, Marwan was trapped at night by ‘Amir b. Isma‘il and Sha*ba b.
ICathlr al-Mazini with the cavalry of Mosul, at a church of Bu^ir and
was killed fighting on Dh~*1 gijja in 132/July 750.J His head was
sent to Abu *1 ‘Abbas with a message which stated frWe have followed
Marwan al-Ja*di to the residence of Pharaoh the enemy of God. He was
killed in the city of his counterpart Pharaoh Dhu *1-Awtad. ^od
has freed the people and the country from him."^ Later on, several
prominent men who helped him were also arrested and executed. Others
<** j
were sent to Ira.^ , but were killed on their way in Palestine. As to
the fate of Marwan* s two sons, ‘Abdallah and ‘tfbaydallah, the accounts
6 ■ « 
are contradictoxy. They seem to have fled southward to Nuba with
several Umayyads^ and a number of partisans. Only ‘Abdallah survived
the hardships of the journey and crossed again'to Arabia where he was
arrested either in the reign of al-Man$ur or al-Mahdi. He was imprisoned
8
at al~Mu$baq in Baghdad.
^Wulat, pp. 95ff; Severuo, p.156; Khi^at, vol. I, p.128, vol. 4, p.29.
A legendary tradition related that the ‘Abbasid control would not exceed ■ 
beyond the Zab which was not, as Marwan mistakenly thought, the Zab 
of the Jasira but that of Ifriqiyya. (s g g  Imama, ed. Cairo 1904,p.228).
«7
^Khalifa, Tarikh, fol. 280; Tab., Ill, p.51, citing Mada*ini; Azdi, fol.136 
On Bugir see M.E. Amelineau, "La'mort du caliph...", J .A . •, 1914, pp. 421- 
49.
Kufi, fol. 229b.
5 - 'V/ulat, pp. 97 ff. It is worth noting that the execution took place at 
Nahr Abi Futrus which suggests that those Egyptian captives were part 
of the victims of the massacre ordered by ‘Abdallah b, *Ali.»
_ Meanwhile, Yasid b. *Umar b. Hubayra al-Fasari, the Umayyad 
governor of Irajf:, decided to entrench himself in the Umayyad head­
quarters at WasiJ. He rejected the advice that he should attack 
- 1Kufa, evidently because he thought'that he needed more time building 
up the fighting spirit of his army which was dangerously low. He 
also refused to join Marwan*s troops in the Jasira for fear of providing 
Marwan with a possible opportunity to punish him, as the latter was 
not satisfied with his conduct of past affairs. By entrenching himself 
at WasiJ he rendered inactive a considerable section of Marwan *s 
supporters, his only choice in the circumstances.
When Abu Salama al-Khallal took over at Kufa, he sent al-$asan b. 
Qatyjaba with the Khurasanis to UasiJ, These troops were reinforced by 
Malik b. sl-Hayt^am al-Khusa‘i. another Khurasan! commander. However, 
when Abu *1-‘Abbas was proclaimed caliph, he decided to send his 
brother ^bu Ja‘far ‘Abdallah to load the attack against Ibn Hubayra 
because he recognised the rivalry among the military commanders of the 
Khurasani troops and the resentment of some of them against al-gassan* s
1Jamharat, p.84*
^Tab., III, p.485; ‘Asalrir, vol. ,4, p.47; ‘iqd, vol. 4, pp. 471-472. 
^Tab.,111, p.62, citing Mada‘ini.
1 £ ***. 
command. Moreover, the mere dispatch of a member of the Abbasid.
family was lilcely to raise the morale of the army. To conciliate al~gasan,
the caliph wrote "The army is yours ^l-£[asan7 and its commanders are
under your control. I only sent my brother to rally the people and
inspire their confidence and to give a guarantee to Ibn I^bayra should
*“ 2he wish for an aman.u
i
Ibn Hybayra still had a formidable army :under his command, composed 
of the remainder pf the pro-Umayyad Khurasanis as well as the Syrian
mm ‘ am m* A
army of Iralp and Irakis, Yamanites and Qaysites, under veteran commanders 
and tribal chiefs such as Ma‘an b. 2a*Ida ai-Shaybani, gaw.th.ara b. Suhayl, 
Muhammad b. Nab at a, Ya^ya b. guoayn and Ziyad b. Salij^  al-Harithi, It 
numbered about 20,000.  ^ Ibn Hubayra was well prepared for a long siege
A
with huge supplies and provisions. The great weaicness of .this army 
was evidently the tribal sympathies of its troops. The Yamanites who had 
been ill-treated by Marwan x-rere determined not to help his cause. The 
Qaysites, who seem to have lost, faith in the crumbling Umayyad regime, 
decided not to fight unless the Yamanites did. Thus in the words of 
Tabari u0nly the ga ‘alik and the ffltyan fought with Ibn Hubayra1*. ^
Ansab, fol. 786b; Tab., 111, pp. 65-64; Khalifa, Tarikh, fol, 277.
2AngSb, fol. 786b.j Tab., Ill, p.71.
5 M  j  b .
Tab., Ill, p.62, citing I-Iada ini; Dina., p.571.
^Imama, p. 241; Tab., Ill, p.66.
^Ya‘qubi, 11, p.425; cf. Dina, p.570 (50,000).
f
Kufi, fol. 235a; Dina, p.370; Ya‘qubi, II, p.423*
ry
'Tab., Ill, p.66. The term ga‘allk denotes either "poor" or ‘'robbers*' while
the Fityan means "chivalrous" oj- (see al-Mu ‘jam al-tfasifr,
vol, i, pp. 517# 680), This probably means that his support consip^d of 
tribes bound to him by ties of loyalty (Fltyan) or advantage (ga alik).
The latter were mercenaries.
Furthermore, Abu *1-*Abbas and Abu Ja‘far were able to contact certain
Yamanite figures in Ibn Hubayra’s camp, such as Yizad ,al-yarithi,who
defected to the ‘Abbasids taking others with them,"*' According to' the
author of al~Imama wa. ’l-Siyaea, Abu Ja‘far (later al~M am/ur) wrote to
the Yamanites who.were with Ibn Hubayra nAl~Sulj?anugultanukum wa * 1
2
dawlata dawlatukum”* The paramount importance of the tribal chiefs 
and commanders. on whose loyalty the fat© of the two camps, the Umayyads 
and the ‘Abbasids, was.very greatly dependant can simply not be over­
rated* In faot, the allegiance of those tribal chiefs could tip the 
balance either way. Their importance has already been exemplified during 
the series of battles between ‘Abbasid and Umayyad troops. On this 
occasion, the tribal chiefs largely favoured the promising new dynasty 
of the Family of the Prophet as they had had their fill of the old Umayyad 
regime* There is no better evidence of this state of things than the 
words of two veteran Umayyad Commanders and tribal chiefs, Istyaq b*
Muslim al-(Uqayli and Ziyad b* galifc al-Uarithl, The fohmer told Abu 
Ja‘far after the fall of Uasit "God has saved JyonJ You were not 
sufficiently strong yourself and there were around you the Qaysites and 
others who obey Ibn Hubayx^a aid lay down their lives for him... But your
Ansab, fol. 787b citing Haythan b, cAdi; Dina, pp. 368-9; Tab., Ill, 
pp. 66, 67, 64.
2~
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Imama, p.241. W
affair ^ statp is new and people are either hoping £  to benefit from
it/ or el so they fear you.'1 The latter is reported to have said "I
am mo3t grateful to Ibn Hubayra, but I do not see why 1 should stay
/Eo defend/ a weak and crumbling realm/I.e. the Umayyad state/."
3The siege lasted for about eleven months, and it was only when 
Ibn Hubayra heard of Marwan*s death that he began to think of surx’ender.^  
According to Kufi Ibn Hubayra* s commanders asked him Why and for what 
/pause/ do we fight, and kill ourselves when Marwan is dead... wo 
should come to terms with them /the ‘Abbasidja/." Bor forty days, Ibn 
Hubayra prepared a very careful Aman which was accepted by the Abbasids. 
But once he had surrendered the ‘Abbasids could not tolerate him. He was 
a typical Arab ti’ibal chief,proud with a large following. He treated 
Abu Ja‘far as an equal? He was, therefore, oonsidex’ed a firebrand and 
a potential danger to the existing regime and it was thought best to do 
away with hinn Here ono is confronted with conflicting historical accounts 
Ibn IJabib, Baladhuri, Tabari and Ya *qubi state that Ibn Hubayra contacted 
the gasanid Muhammad X)hu ’l-Hafs al~Zakiyya and promised him support if he. 
claimed the caliphate, while Kufi with his (Alid sympathies confined him­
self to stating that Yazld /ibn Hubayra/ had "violated the aman because 
Ansab, fol. 791, citing Mada ini,
^Dina, p.369.
^Tab., III, p.66 citing Mada*ini? Ansab, fol. 786b; Abu Ja4far led the 
siege for the last nine months (Ansab, fol. 781b)„
^ Ansab, fol. 786a.
Kufi, fol.' 233a.
g
. The text of the aman is preserved in al-Kufi (fol, 233a). See also Jmama 
pp. 24-2-246; Khalifa, Tarikh, fol. 278.
hnsab, fol. 792a~7?2b, citing Mada*ini; Khalifa, Tarikh, fol. 273.
If 3 •
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he called for the abdication of the 1Abbasids in secret”. He does not
reveal Ibn Hubayra’s secret contacts with the ‘Alids, At any rate, the 
important question is were these contacts made before or after the aman? 
Baladhuri and Kufi say after, obviously in violation of the aman, while
Ya^ubi's statement implies the contrary. It is .important to note that
^  2 
Abu Ja‘far, at first, objected to the caliph's orders to execute Ibn
Hubayra and his commanders. Now had the latter contacted Muhammad Dhu
'l-Nafs al-Zakiyya after the aman and violated its terms, -&bu Ja*far
would not have hesitated to execute him. It is interesting to point out
that, according to a version in Baladhuri and Tabari, it was Abu Muslim
3who was the chief instigator of Ibn Hubayra's execution. However, Ibn
Hubayra was not so much a real as a potential danger, 'and Abu Muslim
seems to have recognized that; thus Ibn Hubayra had to be removed for 
reasons of policy. Shren though he may really have contacted Muhammad
the $asanid during the siege, as a ground for his murder, it was only a
pretext,
Abu. Ja*far tried to delay the execution and urged h. is brother the
•» A.
caliph to disregard Abu Muslim's advice, but to .respect the aman.
The determined caliph ordered him again to execute Ibn Hubayra immediately, 
or else he would send one ’’who will take him JVon Hubayra7 out of your
^gab'ib, pp. 189-190; Ansab, fol. 792a; Tab, III, p.66; Ya'qubi, II, p.424, 
Kufi, fol. 233a.
^Ansab, fol. 792a; Tab., Ill, p.68; Kufi, fol. 234a*
0Ansab, fol. 737a; Tab., Ill, p.67; see also Imama, p.247.
^Ansab, fol. 787a.
!f<).
1 iroom and kill him," Abu Ja*far was advised to send men of Ibn Hubayra*s
own tribe to execute the order. He chose Khazim b.: Klinzayma, al~Hay_tham.
*“ 2 
b. Sha*ba and al-Aghlab b, Salim with others. Here again it is
i
important to note how tribal affiliations and loyalties were still
taken into consideration during the early *Abbasid epoch. The choice of
Mu^Larite partisans of the ‘Abbasids seemed opportune, because if
Yamanites had been chosen to perform the execution it would have resulted
in a tribal feud and consequently a split within the ‘Abbasid ranks.
Khagjia al-Tamimi is reported to have said "By God I have volunteered
to kill Ibn Hubayra in case a Yamanite were givon the order to execute
3him, and this Yamanite then boasted of killing Ibn Hubayra". Both his :
son and his secretary were killed with Ibn Hubayra. His more prominent 
commanders were arrested and many of them executed. Their numbers are 
given as 30 by Baladhuri and Kitab al-Imama, and as 40 by Kufi, while
Tabari mentions no number and only calls them "the chiefs among the .
4 'Qaysites and Mu^arites". Then orders were issued to the Syrian, army
in Ira^ c to disperse and leave for home (Syria).^ This measure indicates
that the ‘Abbasids were deeply suspicious of the Syrians on the one hand,
'^Tab., Ill, p. 68; see also $ubib, p.190.
p •- K „
Khalifa, Tarikh, p.276; Imama, p.249; Ansab , fol. 787b~788a, citing Haytham 
' b, ‘Adi; see also Dina., pp. 371~372, Ya‘qubi, IX, p.424. ^
i
?Ansab. fols. 789a~789b.
Ansab, fol. 788a citing Haytham b, ‘Acli; Khalifa, Tarikh, fol. 278?. Iiaama,' 
p.251; Kufi, fol, 234a; Tab., Ill, p.69. "  ,
^  * V  „  ;
Ansab, fol. 788a-citing Haytham b. *Adi.
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and on the other hand the end of the Syrian Iral^ i struggle for 
supremacy in the Muslim empire with the victory of Ira|f.
C onclusion
In conclusion, it can he said that the Hashimiyyn movement under 
the leadership of Muhammad b. *Ali the <Abbasid wisely directed its 
activities to Khurasan where tribal factionalism was very acute. Under, 
Ibrahim the Imam the movement became militant. Although it was natural 
for the ‘Abbasid da ‘is to concentrate their efforts on the Yamanites 
who had been deprived of power and authority by the Umayyad s in favour 
of the Ku$arites,‘L they welcomed every Mujarite who joined them.
The tribal conflict in Khurasan gave momentum to the ‘Abbasid da fwa, 
the first recruits to which were Arabs from Khusa *:a in whose villages 
around Marx? Abu Muslim took refuge. Nagr b. Sayyar could not crush 
the movement at its birth, as any attack on its partisans wovild be 
considered an attack on the KhuKa‘a, their protectors,and would drag 
Nagr into a bittex* conflict with the Yamanites and their allies,Rabi‘a, 
something which he tried to avoid at first. Still more important, dis- 
appointed Arab settlers of any tribal affiliation, deprived of their 
‘Aja* and jealous of their privileged kin (the Huqatila) were hoping 
for a change in the ruling stratum. This accounts for the fact that not 
only Yamanites and their allies, Rabi‘ites, were ultimately won by the
^On the Mu^ariteo who joined Abu Muslim's ranks see: Akhbar, fols. 138b, 
139a, 141a, 150a,151a. There were also many Kujarites in . the committoc 
of the twelve Haftihs, as well as many in the seventy da ‘is. (Tab., II, 
p. 1988,* Akhbar, fols. 103a-103b).
Abbasid da vra, but even tlie frustrated Mu^arites. It also accounts
for the continuous appeals and counter-appeals by both sides to the
11
Arabs promising them ‘Afa if they joined their ranks, as not all
Arabs were enlisted in the Diwan as Muqatila.
The Hashimjyya partisans who were initiated into the secret dogma
of the da *wa seem to have formed a relatively small proportion of
the ‘Abbasid following. It is doubtful whether the majority of Khuza ‘ a,
Tamim or Baler knew anything about the dogmatic foundation of the movement
Those tribes were noted foi* their unruly nature and resentment of the
central regime. Khuza * a had a long record of Hashimite sympathies and
2opposition to the Umayyads. It is significant that Arabs sent to
Khurasan vie re sometimes selected from among troublesome elements,^
‘Ali b. al-Karinani the Aadite tribal chief was not so much for the
‘Abbasids as against the Umayyad policy which deprived him of power and
authority, and Ha$r b. Sayyar personally. Until his murder at the hands
of Abu Muslim, he probably never knew that Abu Muslim was working for
an ‘Abbasid claimant.
The task of extending the ‘Abbasid sphere of influence from the
villages of’Merw to a number of cities in Khurasan was undertaken by
Arab commanders. Merw *1 Rudh, Balkh, Herat, Sarkh and Merw *1 Shahjan
were fallen to Arab commanders, who sometimes led their own tribal groups
The mainstay of Qa^aba's army were Arabs and so were, in their majority,
^Akhbar, f°ls* 166b, 168a, 184b, 125a; Ansab, fol. 780a; Tab., Ill, pp. 3 
citing Mada ini, p.30, II, p.1856 citing Mada’ini,
0 ■*» m*
Tab., 1, pp. 1086ff; Diwan Pl‘bil (ed. Duja5rli), p.33.
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the leadei’s of its divisions. The ‘Abbasid revolution vas thus almost 
entirely an Arab affair. Hon-Arab Muslims and Iranian natives did parti­
cipate in the movement but their rOle was neither decisive nor inspired 
by national feeling. They fought as loyal I-Iawali of the Arabs, i.e. 
freedmen who owed allegiance to their masters. They are, therefore, 
seen fighting on both sides. Their rd e  was less outstanding than that of 
the Arabs and they were only mentioned last in the lists.Throughout 
the struggle in Irajf and Syria tribal chiefs played a vital rOle 
the importance of which cannot te exaggerated. It was because of 
the support they gave to the new and promising daula that Iraljii and 
Syrian cities had to capitulate, Marwan XI was defeated and victory 
was finally achieved.
Abu Muslim* s rOle In the da.Sra has been exaggerated, as it was a 
well-known tendency of classical chroniclers to identify the state with 
the monarch and the development of a movement or a sect with the 
career of its leader, as in this case the do/wa with its leader Abu 
Muslim. That is why accounts attribute most crucial decisions during 
^ ie and the revolution to Abu Muslim or simply to the "agents
^  p
of Abu Muslim", without mentioning their names or the rg le they 
played in the movement. Consequently the full light is focused on the 
person of Abu Muslim. It is significant that the work in the da*wa 
was collective, a kind of committee work, and there was no preference 
for one man against another in the committee of twelve liaqibs. Many
h a b . , II, pi*- 1993, 1994,' 1993.
TaU,II, pp. 1966-1967; anonymous, fols. 10b-12b. The accounts x.
of the I-Iss. Aldibar 1- Abbas are more precise and coherent than 
Tabari in this~~respectl
mplayed decisive rOles throughout the da wa, some of them, long before 
Abu Muslim’s appear mice. There were men like Sulayman al-Khnza*1 who 
was often behind every important decision taken by Abu Muslim. To 
mention but a feu: It was Sulayman who declared the start of the
revolution and led the first prayer in the name of the new daSra.
It was Sulayman who advised Abu Muslim to take the initiative and 
approach both al-Karmani and Na$r b. Sayyar in order to satisfy both 
the Yamanites and Kudarites in his camp. It was Sulayman who 
successfully undertook the task of terminating the truce between Na§r, 
Ibn *1-Karmani and Shahyban the Kkarij ite, and often stood beside 
Abu Muslim, who is described as taciturn by nature, at meetings with 
Hapr’s delegates or at tribal conferences. As has already been mentioned 
Sulayman al-Khuaa‘i played an outstanding rOle at the conference which 
was attended by Hagr's partisans, eAli Ibn al-ICarmSni's partisans and a 
delegation from the ‘Abbasid camp, and expressed the opinion that the 
‘Abbasid partisans should side with ‘All b. ICamiani's followers. Finally 
it was Sulayman who took the Bay ‘a of Abu Muslim and the ‘Abbasid parti­
sans shortly before the fall of Merw, a tactical move made by the 
da‘is to counter the Umayyad propaganda. The tendency to exalt Abu 
Muslim increased after his murder by al-Mangur when he became a symbol 
of the Iranian insurrections, as well as the embodiment of the principle 
of the disappointed extreme branch of the ‘Abbasid daSra.
Trying to analyse the nature of ^bu Muslim's doctrines V/estern
1scholars have expressed two different opinions. Some maintain that he
1 1 —
Barthold, E.I. (Abu Muslim); Turkestan..., p.194; Welhausen, op * clt.,
p.506;. E« 1.^ ( ‘Abbasids).
if.,
preached the doctrine of metempsychosis and re-incarnation of God current 
among the extreme Muslim and non-Muslim sects; others^ see nothing ' 
in his activities which would put his loyalty to Islam in doubt. Though ; 
this thesis is not concerned with the religious aspect of the ‘Abbasid 
propaganda, it must be stated that Abu Muslim was a loyal ‘Abbasid 
propagandist who aimed at winning, for the ‘Abbasids, groups of various 
orientations and had, probably, used a variety of arguments to suit 
every case. But no sooner were the ‘Abbasid in power than they adopted/
Orhtodoxy and abandoned all extremist ideas, and Abu Muslim followed suit.
£ 2 *»
He crushed an Alid rising at Bukhara and a Hawandiyya rising at ,
- - 3Tarmidh and falqan, In his deeds, Abu Muslim typifies the opportunist 
.nature’of the ‘Abbasid movement. That he exploited the memory of cAlid 
martyrs, fix’st helped and then murdered ‘Abdallah b. Mu ‘awiya the 
Ja‘farite, conspired against the Kha.j irite Shay ban b. Salama and the sons
‘ • I' - '■ »•
of al-Karmani*Is vividly reminiscent of ‘Abbasid methods.
1
Frye, op.pit., p.37; Moscati, Abu Muslim, II, op.cit., pp. llff; 
Calien, op.cit., pp. 328, 331.
2
. Harshakhi, pp. 60-61; Tab., Ill, p.80.
3Tab., XII, p.82.
Chapter III
THIS * ABBASID REGIME AND ITS DA ‘iS
"We have not followed A1 Muhammad to 
shed blood and do injustice."
Sharik hl-Mahri
7F.H.A., p.21l7
_"We have taken the Oath /for the 
‘Abbasids/ in order to establish^justice 
and revive the Sunan .*., and Abu Muslim 
is nothing but oppressor and tyrant..."
Ziyad b. galijji al-Khuza‘ 
/Ansab, fol. 800b/
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Once the ‘Abbasids had got a firm hold of the government and 
began manipulating power, they abandoned, as it has already been 
mentioned, all revolutionary and extremist ideas and suppressed every 
group or revolutionary individual% who rose in arms protesting against 
the new political or religious policies they had adopted. Further­
more, the ‘Abbasid caliphs tried to rid themselves of those prominent 
‘Abbasid partisans who had had their share in bringing about the re­
volution, because they considered them as being a danger to their own 
authority* It has been mentioned above that it was the method of the 
‘Abbasid da‘is not only to welcome new and even different ideas and 
adherents of various kinds but also to stir up trouble against the 
Umayyad authorities as well and wherever they could, thus they en­
couraged the extremist 'Jalibite ‘Abdallah b. Mu*awiya, the Khari.jite 
Shay ban b. Salama, the Yemenite tribal chief Jadi ‘ al-Karmani and 
even the Persian rebel Bihafarid who, in fact, voiced his protect in 
the late Umayyad period*1 But once victory was achieved, the loyal 
‘Abbasid governor Abu Muslim got rid of them one by one. However, 
these latent tendencies and affiliations surely did not disappear 
overnight. It is striking how soon those revolutionary groups and 
individuals asserted themselves by staging revolts in many parts of 
the empire especially in its eastern part. These were by no means
1§adighi, op,cit,, pp. 117-118; M. Houtsma, Bih'afrid, V/.Z.K.K., 3* 
1889, p.30.
I(,7.
purely political revolts of the kind usually led by rebellious 
generals or ambitious governors but mostly risings led by da‘is 
who could look back on a splendid record in the ‘Abbasid da*wa such 
as Bassam b. Ibrahim, Ziyad b. $alifc, *Abd al-Jabbar ,b. *Abd al-RaJjman 
al~*Azdi, Jahwar b. Murrar al-*ijli, Khalid b. Ibrahim al-Dhuhli.
The revolts of the pro~‘Alid elements in Bukhara and the extreme 
Rawandites in Balkh and Tirmadh reveal the disappointment of these 
sections of the revolutionaries with the policy of the regime they 
had helped to put in power.
To start from the beginning. It is a commonplace that a re­
volution eats its revolutionaries; it could not be more time of 
the ‘Abbasid revolution. There were almost immediate rivalries among 
the ‘Abbasid revolutionaries as to who was to manipulate the levers
of power. The chief da‘i of Kufa and the Wazir of A1-Muhammad Abu
■■ ■• 1 —Sal am a gaf§ b. Sulayman al-Khallal a mawla of the tribe of Sabi ‘
and a veteran partisan who had spent about thirty years conducting 
the da*wa from Kufa and providing the contact between Ibrahim the 
Imam and the da‘is of Khurasan was the first to seize power in Kufa
v/
in 132/749-50. It was he who distributed administrative and military
o ■
offices among the partisans ofthe new regime. Meanwhile Abu *1
‘Abbas ‘Abdallah b. Muhammad had already been nominated successor
m m  m m  m m  m m  ^  V^.
of his brother Ibrahim the Imam, who uiged him to flee to Kufa* He ,
1Ansab, fols. 770a, 782b ff; Akhbar, fol. 118b; Tab., II, 1916, 1949; 
Jah.,_p,83; Muru.i, VI, p.133; <MAsakir, 4, p.377; Fakhri, pp. 136-7; 
Wafayat, 5, 113 ff;tr.English, 1, 467 ff.
2 -
Akhbar, fols. 184a, 185b; Ansab, fol. 785b; Tab., III. p.20.
^Ansab, fols. 772a-774a; Akhbar, fol. 191a ; Nubdha, fol. 289b; T a ‘qubi, 
11^419-20; Tab., ill, p.27, pp. 33-34; Muru.i, VI, p.89, pp. 91-92; 
Asakir, 3, 36.
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arrived at Kufa in §afar 132 accompanied by his relatives. Abu 
Salama had served Ibrahim the Imam, but seemed, after the latter*s 
death, to have had second thoughts on the desirability of Abu 'l 
*Abbas as a caliph and indeed of the whole ‘Abbasid family. Accord­
ing to Baladhuri "when AbU ’l-^Abbas and his relatives arrived at 
Kufa Abu Salama hid them in a house in Bani Awd and whenever Abu *1- 
* Abbas asked him &out the time of their appearance in public he used
to tell him not yet... and he intended to take the Imamate from them
-  1 -  -2and give it to the sons of Fatima." Jahshiyari states that when
Abu Salama took over Kufa he proclaimed the Hashimite Imamate without 
mentioning the name of the Caliph. As for Tabari,^ Abu Salama hid 
Abu *1 *Abbas in the house of al-Walid b. Sa‘ad, a mawla of Bani 
Hashim in: the quarter of Bani Awd and kept the news of their arrival 
v secret for forty days from the Quwwad and the Shi *a. Tabari also 
stresses that he obviously planned to transfer the caliphate from 
the ‘Abbasids to the family of Abu Jalib after he had heard of the 
death of Ibrahim the Imam* It is. significant that,according to the 
author of Akhbar al-‘Abbas, delivering his khutba on the 10th of 
Mufcarrara 1^2, Abu Salama promised the Khurasanis a raise in pay and 
added "And you can imagine that, a little later, when your Imam is 
among you, you will get from him more than you expect".^- He did not
^ An sab, fol. 783a;^Ibn gabib states also uVi
(Asirra1 al-Mughtalin, p.187) r
2
Jah., p.84.
3Tab.f III, pp. 27, 34.
Akhbar. fol. 185a.
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mention the name or the descent of the Imam and his tone seemed to 
have indicated that the Imam he had in mind was not among them as Abu *1
‘Abbas was but would come from outside Kufa. This is plain proof that
— * 1
he had decided not to acknowledge Abu *1 ‘Abbas. Another account
shows Abu Salama in the throes of doubt and suspicion after the death 
■of Ibrahim the Imam; he Is said to have been inventing letters from
the Imam and reading them to the people of IChurasan in order to satisfy
■their curiosity. But unfortunately the available manuscript ends at
2 ■*this point; however the Nubdha relates that Abu Salama concealed
the arrival of the ‘Abbasids at Kufa and wanted the desired decision 
. to be arrived at by consultation ^ between ‘Abbasids and ‘Alids,
then he performed a complete volte face . in favour of the *Alids. Other 
historians also agree that Abu Salama had *Alid sympathies. The author 
of the Imama wa*l siyasa states that "Abu Salama intended to bestow 
the caliphate onlhe sons of ‘All b. Abi ^alib, and prevented the appear­
ance of Abu *1 ‘Abbas under the pretext that the matter had not matured 
yet, as the Umayyad Hawaii were still fighting and the affair was
^ f  mm  m
harder than ever." Also Has udi relates that Abu Salama had the 
‘Abbasids kept among Bani Awd and had them watched by an agent. After 
he relates that Abu Salama changed his mind in favour of the ‘Alids,
^Op.cit.. fol. 199&, '
2Hubdha, fol. 290a; F.H.A.. p.196.
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Imama, p.226.
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Mas ‘udi adds "Abu Salama thought, at the news of 'Ibrahim* s death that
everything would go to pieces and be ruined*" crP liu-A
- - 2
It was not Masudi only but Ibn al-TiQ.ta(la also
who tried to give the impression that Abu Salama* s decision was due
to the lack among the ‘Abbasids of a man to match the hour. Kufi
never touches the subject of Abu Salama*s conspiracy* After describing
the tense political sfcmosphere in Kufa on the eve of the ‘Abbasid victory,
Kufi states that opinions differed on whether homage would be paid to
the sons of Abu Jalib or the sons of al-‘Abbas, Abu Salama ascended
^  the pulpit and addressed the people saying
"Oh people are you satisfied with what /i am going to do?7 
They replied: *tfe are satisfied /pith your decision/**
Abu Salama then said;
"The Amin of Jl Muhammad Abu Muslim*rote ordering me to 
install a HashimTter Imam. ”
Then Abu Salama is said to have gone on praising the ‘Abbasids, and
to have finally said;
”1 have chosen for you ‘Abdullah b. Muhammad b. ‘All 
/Abu *1 ‘Abbas/ Do you agree?"
and the people shouted;
3"Yes we agree*"
4Ma arif Ibn Qutayba also does not mention it and simply states
1Muru.i. VI, p.92.
2FakhrI. p.137. ^
ICufi, fols. 226a-b.
4Ma*arif, p.372.
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that Abu Salama paid homage to Abu *1 *Abbas and led him to the Mosque*
Xt is not clear what rdle Abu Muslim played in the matter of Abu *1
‘Abbas's succession; nor have the possible implications of the rivalry
between Abu Salama and Abu Muslim on who would hold the reins of power
yet been sufficiently investigated. It is interesting to note in this
1
respect that several accounts attribute the accusations of conspiracy,
enmity and bad faith towards the new regime raised against Abu Salama
to Abu Muslim who informed the caliph of his treasonable intention and
either is said to have suggested to the caliph that he should be killed
or decided to kill him himself after failing to persuade the caliph*
However, at the moment, it would suffice to say that most historians
maintain that it was Abu Salama who after striving for many years for
‘Abbasid succession finally made the attempt to deprive them of it
2
when it seems already won* Professor C. Cahen says "It is related that 
having a premonition of his death, Ibrahim had sent word to his brother 
making him heir. Is the fact exact? In any case it is doubtful whether 
Abu Salama was informed***," but this argument is not convincing as Abu 
Salama did know that Abu *1 ‘Abbas was Ibrahim's nominated successor 
whether by his last will or by ‘Abbasid consent* As little convincing 
are the accounts of Kufi and Ibn Qutayba. The former's pro~*Alid senti­
ments which render his account superficial can not be ignored, while
1Dina, p.368; Y a ‘qubi, II, p.422; «uru.i. VI, pp. 133-135.
2
Cahen, op.cit*, p.330.
^Akhbar. fol, 113b; Hubdha, fol. 255b.
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the latter's account is too brief and vague to be sufficiently informa- 
tive. Interesting in this respect is the account of Akhbar al- Abbas 
that when QaiLjaba was advancing towards Irak he received a letter from 
Abu Salama informing him of the imprisonment of Ibrahim the Imam and 
urging him to hasten to take Kufa, this indicates that prominent Khura­
sanis had knowledge of Ibrahim’s arrest and might have contemplated 
the question of his successor. On hearing of his death after their 
occupation of Kufa they insisted that Abu Salama should proclaim the 
succession of his legatee,but Abu Salama though fully cognizant of the 
identity of the latter hedged and prevaricated with the. intention of 
transferring it to the ‘Alids. While trying to keep Abu *1 ‘Abbas 
under his thumb, Abu Salama sent a messenger called Muhammad b. *Abd
t 2 tal-Rafctnan b. Aslam to three prominent Alids: Ja far b. Muhammad
(al-§adiq), ‘Abdallah b. al-gasan al-Mafc4 &&d *Umar b. *Ali b. al-
gasan. He ordered him to see them in that order and not to go to the
next until his predecessor had refusdd. On the attitude of the ‘Alids
towards the offer of Abu Salama the accounts vary in detail while
-3agreeing on their hesitant attitude. Tabiri is brief and mentions 
neither the names of the ‘Alids in question nor the spirit in which 
they received it. Neither does the part of Ansab 'l-Ashraf at our
1
Akhbar, fols. 179a~179b; see also Tab. Ill, p.35.
2Jah., p.86; Nubdha, fol. 29oa f; Ya‘qubi, II, 418-9; Murai, VI, 
pp. 93-6. FakhrT7~pp. 137-8.
disposal mention their names, although it confirms Abu Salami1a *Alid 
sympathies.
According to the consensus of Ya^ubi, Jahshiyari, Mus*udi and
Nubdha. al-§adiqfs reply was a blunt refusal. He said ”1 am not your
leader, X have nothing to do with Abu Salama he is the Shi *a of others
not mine". Then he burned the letter and said to the messenger "What
you have seen is the answer".'*' As for the old but ambitious ‘Abdallah
b. al-gasan he rejoiced, but was hesitant to claim it for himself.
He wanted his son, Muhammad to be the future Imam, a matter which Abu
Salama had not proposed. As to the last ‘Alid candidate ‘Umar b.
2Muhammad, the accounts differ. According to one he could not be 
found. According to another he refused to a ccept the offer under the 
pretext that h e could not reply to Abu Salama as he did not know him. 
However, ‘Abdallah al-Ka^ jjl having accepted the offer willingly there 
was no need for the messenger to go :to the,third candidate. As a matter 
of course the *Alids immediately began to quarrel. Ja‘far al-§adiq warned 
‘Abdallah not to accept, the offer saying "And when were the people of 
Khurasan your Shi *a? Did you send Abu Muslim to Khurasan? Did you 
order him to wear the Sawad? Were you the /sender/of those /troops/ 
who came to Irak... did you know anyone among them?" ‘Abdallah al-Hafc$ 
replied that "the /revolutionaries/want my son Muhammad who is the Mahdl.."
, VI, p.94.
S ’.H.A.. p.196; Pakhri, p.138.
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Jah., p.86; Huruj, VI, pp. 95-6; Pakhrl, pp. 137-8.
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It is obvious that the ‘Alids were either suspicious or hesitant. 
Moreover Abu Salama*s offer had taken them by surprise and they had 
neither a candidate nor a plan of action. Even at this crucial moment
i
each of them seems to have suspected the other of being envious.
Meanwhile the ‘Abbasid partisans were kept waiting for Abu Salama
to proclaim the Imam. M^sa b. Ka‘b and Abu, al Jalm-: b. *AJ;iyya al~
Bahili prominent Khurasani -- who had come with the army used to urge
Abu Salama to proclaim the ‘Abbasid Imam but Abu Salama declined time
and again using excuses such as: "He has not come yet" or "This is
1
not the right time for him to appear". All that time Abu Salama was 
consolidating his position in Kufa by seising the treasury, collecting 
the Kharaj, sending troops to deal with TJmayyad pockets of resistance 
at Bagra, Wasij? and Ahwaa, and nominating governors for provinces 
and cities. Abu Salama*s antagonism towards the ‘Abbasids manifested 
itself first when he tried to keep them out of*. Kufa at Qasrv Muqatil and 
it was only after Abu*l ‘Abbas appealed to him,he unwillingly let. them 
take up residence in Kufa. If Baladhuri * s account is to be believed,
Abu Salama even made an attempt to assassinate Abu *1 ‘Abbas when the
latter -called on him to ui’ge him not to postpone the proclamation of
2 •»
his caliphate any longer. In fact, Abu Salama had concealed the 
presence of Abu *1 ‘Abbas for about two months,^ When-it was finally
An sab, fol. 782b; Tab. Ill, 23, 35 f£; P.II. A., pp. 198-9.
2
Ansab, fol*782b; Muq., fol. 71;. see appendix in Van Vloten's
*Zur Abbasiden...*, Z.D.H.G., 1898.
Jah., p.87; Y a ‘qubl, II, p.413; Huruj, VI, p.97. Other sources say 
it was forty days (see Nubaha, fol. 219a; Tab, III, 27, 54 ff.)
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xproclaimed it was due more to an accident than to design. One of •
the Abbasid veterans Abu gumayd Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Jimyari
accidentally met Sabiq al-Khwarazml a mawla of the ‘Abbasids whom he
had known since the days of Ibrahim the Imam. Sabiq told him of the
presence of the ‘Abbasids at ICufa and the treatment Abu Salama had
meted out to them which had been harsh to. the extent that even withheld
from them one hundred dinars they needed to give the camel drivers
their wages. Abu gumayd communicated these facts to Abu 'l-Jahm who,
in his turn, informed Musa b. K a ‘b al-Tamini their chief. It was
only a swift move made by those -pro-‘Abbasid veterans that saved the
caliphate for the ‘Abbasids. A number of the Khurasanis paid a visit
to Abu *1 ‘Abbas without Abu Salama* s consent and swore allegiance to 
*■ < 2him in Rabi ‘ I 132. Obviously the internal strife between different 
political groupings of the Khurasani movement especially between the
 ^ (09 40, 0|0 >
two veterans of the Abbasid revolution Abu Salama and Abu Muslim who
had already rid himself of several revolutionary rivals of equal record, 
intensified as the revolution was approaching success* Both Abu 
Salama and Abu Muslim were men with great gifts for organisation and 
leadership and inspired great loyalty. At ICufa, significantly it was 
figures who were associated with Abu Muslim such as Abu *1 Jahm and 
Abu §umayd who proclaimed the caliphate of Abu *1 ‘Abbas* Abu Salama
Ansab, fol. 783a;_ Hubdha, fol. 291a; Jah. p.87; Ya qubi, II, 413; 
F.H.A.. p.197; I'lurGjTIT 97-99.
TCufl, -fol. 226b£ Imama, 2, 226; Ma‘ruf, 372; Ya ‘qubi,, II, 417;
Tab. Ill, 23 Abu Mi^shar; IChatib, 10, 47; comgare Ansab, fol.;784a, 
Tab.Ill, 23 tfSqidi, 37; Nubdha, fol. 292a, Murujt VI, 52. Diiiawari 
states that al-gasan b. QabJaba got Abu *1 ‘Abbas out, a statement 
not confirmed by other sources (p.367).
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may have feared the situation which arose after Ibi'ahim*s death.
He may have been apprehensive that the latter*s successor might not
recognize him and deprive him of his authority or he might alternatively
have thought that it was preferable to choose another, even an *Alid
Caliph who would be a puppet in his hands. However, once the caliph
had been proclaimed Abu Salama was n ot slow in recognising the
fait accompli. He is reported tohave said to those who proclaimed
the ‘Abbasid caliphate "You have rushed, but I hope it will be of good
augury”. He tactfully remarked on another occasion: **I was only
1trying to get matters straight”.
Abu Salama, in fact, showed arbitrary and autocratic tendencies
already at these early stages of the victory. According to the Imama 
"* 2wa*l slyasa he used to show off his abilities and assert his authority
- -3over the Commander of the Faithful. Kufi too, speaking on the murder 
of Abu Salama, assumes that it was a retribution for his haughtiness 
and excessive influence, Abu Ja‘far (al-Mangur) told Abu Muslim when 
he- visited him in Khurasan "We complain to you about Abu Salama who was 
arrogant to the Commander of the Faithful. He does not consider the 
caliphate as anything. He objects to us in an undesirable way....”. 
According to Dinawari, he was directing affairs single handed. More­
over al-Falchri^ indicates that Abu *1 ‘Abbas in those days had to bestow
1Ya*qubi, XI, 413, 419; Tab., Ill, p.28.
Imama. p .231•
Kufi, fol. 235b citing Mada’ini. He never mentions Abu Salama*s *Alid 
sympathies.
^Fakhrl, p.138; E.I.^ (Abu Salama).
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all authority to him though he, was aware that there were in the latter 
many things he could not but condemn.
However, Abu *1 ‘Abbas refrained from any attempt to assassinate 
Abu Salama at a time when it was clearly inopportune as the dust had 
not settled yet on the ‘Abbasid revolution. The new caliph still needed
1 ** i
time to consolidate himself. In his khutba on the 12th of Rabl‘ I he 
revealed the trends of policy of the new regime. Historical accounts 
differ to some extent on the exact text of the khutba, however the main 
theme is the same. He declared that the revolution had been embarked 
upon for the sake of Islam and in defence of its principles which the 
Umayyads had failed to apply. He emphasized that the ‘Abbasids were close 
relatives of the Prophet from whom they descended through the maildline.
Thus they were the real Ahl al-Bayt and had the right to claim the in­
heritance of the Prophet as if the office of the caliphate was one of the 
Prophet*s possessions. He consequently attacked the extremist ‘Alids 
(the Saba’iyya) as well as the pro-Umayyads (the Marwaniyya). Quoting 
a verse of the Qur1 an favoured by the revolutionaries
he stressed that the ‘Abbasid leadership would mean justice for the 
oppressed people. He reminded the people of Kufa that their (the ‘Abbasidte)
Ansab, fols. 784a-785a; Kubdha, fols. 292a-293a; Kufi, fol. 226b; Dina, 
p.367; 1 Tab., Ill, 29 ff; Tmama , 2, 226; F.HJU, p.200: Muru;j, VI,
98-99.
legitimate right, i.e. the caliphate, has returned to them and it would 
remain in "their hands until the end of the world. He also presented 
the victory as the victory of the people of Irajf over the people of al~ 
Sham, and praised their stubborn resistance and endurance of the Umayyad 
oppression. He promised them an increase in their *Ata* to 100 Dirhams, 
but with their *Alid sympathies in mind he did not forget to remind them 
that he is not only al-Saffab al-Hubib1 but al-tha*ir al-Mublr (the 
destructive rebel).
Prevented by an attack of illness from finishing M s  speech Abu 
al-*Abbas was replaced by his uncle Da*ud b, *Ali who was famous for 
his eloquence. He reiterated the same assertions of the Abbasid right 
to the cali phate but in more impressive manner. Though he reminded the 
people of Kufa that it was the Kliurasanis who had brought the ‘Abbasids 
to power, he described the victory as ■ theirs (the Kufis) adding mJ?he 
Sulfan is yours... therefore give us your allegiance and do not deceive 
yours elves'*. These two speeches prove that the ‘Abbasids were deter-
1 —The assumption of the title "al-Saffafc" was a gesture of generosity
rather than of : enmity on the p art of the caliph. It had also some 
Messianic connotations. But the title of "al~Saffa&" in the sense of 
bloodshedder was also ascribed to Abu *1 - Abbas.' However it is generally 
ascribed in the latter sense to the notoriously caruel ‘Abdallah b. *Ali . 
the uncle of Abu *1 Abbas whom it suits better than the caliph himself.
It must have been used first for Abu *1 ‘Abbas by some later-, historians 
who were at a loss for an epithet for the first ‘Abbasid caliph. (Zubayri, 
Imaaa Cairo ed., p.232; Alchbar, fol. 66a; Muru.j, VI, pp. 181, 182; 
Fakhri, p420; Bad*, 6, p.73.
^Haywan, vol. l,p.301; Tab., Ill, pp. 32-33; ‘Asakir, vol. 5, pp. 203-205.
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rained not to give *Alid sympathizers any opportunity to fish in 
troubled waters. After establishing their claims and attacking other 
claims their speeches consisted of friendly gestures, promises and 
warnings. Another important point stressed by the khufba was ‘At a* 
which has been increased to 100 dirhams. This seems, to have been the 
crux of the speech. It must be pointed out here that the Umayyads de­
creased and sometimes denied the *Ata* to the people of Kufa. They 
also used to rob the Khurasanis of their ghan^ma won in the battlefield, 
a matter which was at the root of bitter resentment in Khurasan on the 
part' of the Arab Muqatila. Abu Salama increased the ‘Ata* to 80 
dirhams. Abu *1 ‘Abbas put it up to 100 dirhams. Historical accounts
3 *■* i f
stress this issue. According to the author of Imama wa'l siyasa Abu 1
*Abbas promised them to dstribute the gay* as f,It ought to be". In
another speech several days later the same caliph declared "he promise
you the ‘AJa* and §adaqa and M a ‘ruf, we are not going to send you to
war and /force/ you to stay there no?.
4expose you to danger". These were, in fact, the very issues in which 
the Umayyad policy so keenly disappointed the IQiurasanls and consequently 
those Irakis. '
Abu Muslim vis-a-vis Abu Salama .
Once Abu *1. ‘Abbas had held-power, he was faced by the problem
•i
. See Chapter I. See also Shavian, op.cit.t pp. 60 f , 140,
2 - ---
Ansab, fol. 785a. See also Kufi, 227b.
3 - ^Imama , 2, 226.
A —
Ansab, fols. 784a-784b.
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of how to get rid of Abu Salama* Initially, however, he wanted Abu
Salama to feel safe* He, therefore, accepted his apologies ostensibly
X *■
with regard to his services in the da*wa. Thus Abu Salama continued 
to exercise full authority which overlapped with the authority of the 
caliph* During those early days one notices that there were two men of 
great influence namely Abu Salama in Irafc and Abu Muslim in IChurasan,
The struggle for greater sphere of influence between the two veterans 
was inevitable* However it is not easy to trace this rivalry especially 
as Muslim M s  t orians try to focus everything round the ruling caliph.
One, therefore, must read between the lines of the sources to recon­
struct the conflict between the political groupings whioh represented 
the two leaders. To trace the rivalry to its origins it is necessary 
to go back to the days of the da*wa. Strikingly important is the account 
of Akhbar al~*Abbas to the effect that Ibrahim the Imam promised Abu 
Muslim and Abu Salama to give the former the governorates of Khurasan,
Sistan, lurjan, Qumus, Roy, Isbahan and Hamadan and the latter the 
provinces beyond Hamadan including Ira£, al-Sham and Jasira if the 
revolution succeeded* Whether this account is authentic or not- and it seems 
a later projection - it refleots accurately the real situation on the 
advent of the victory. As the account puts it, the empire was divided 
into two spheres of influence . It obviously became the point at issue 
where the authority of the one ceased and that of the other started.
1Imama. 2, 226j Tab., Ill, pp. 36-37.
p.865 Dina, p.368; Kufi, fols. 235a-b.
3 -
Akhbar, fol. 130a.
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Each supposedly felt the growing influence of the other, hhen Abu 
Salama appointed a governoi’ to Ears Abu Muslim felt that Abu Salama
i £ •* . ( i .
had exceeded his authority and sent Muhammad b. al-Ash ath al-Khnza i
-  ?
as governor of Ears with orders to kill Abu Salama*s appointee, which
3L mm * V* I m » mm
he did. The new governor Of Kirman Tamim b. ‘Umar al»Tamimi was
dix’ectly appointed by Abu Muslim. On arrival he killed the Umayyad ^
2
governor and seised the province. Othex’ accounts reveal that Abu Muslim 
was jealous and appi’ehensive of his rival*s influence in Ira^ :. According 
to Ya*qubi it was Abu Muslim who suggested to the new caliph that Abu Salama 
should be eliminated because of "His deceitfxil inimical nature". Dinawari 
states that Abu Muslim took it upon himself to murder Abu Salama without 
consulting others because of "his great authority'* Also Mas‘udi agrees 
that the first suggestion to murder Abu Salama was put forward by Abu Mus- 
lim. He goes on "But despite Abu Muslim*s insistence Abu *1 ‘Abbas refused. 
Finally Abu Muslim feared that Abu Salama might inflict bad things on him 
so he sent men who assassinated him." The account of the Imama wa 1 slyasa 
is not irrelevant to this issue. It attributes the proclamation of Abu *1 
‘Abbas to Abu Muslim who by swift action, surprised Abu Salama and
g
frustrated his plans. Although the caliph might have consulted
Akhbar, fol. 186a; Tab., Ill, 72.
2 Akhbar, fol. 170b. .
5Ya‘qubi, II, p.422. I
4 ~Dxna, p.368; see also anonymoxxs, fol. 13a.
r
Huru.i. VI, pp. 133-136.
c
Imama, p.223.
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Abu Muslim on this issue, these accounts no doubt exaggerate the rfile 
of Abu Muslim in the murder of Abu Salama. There is little likelihood 
that he asked the caliph to kill Abu Salama or sent assassins to kill 
him without consulting the caliph. However all these accounts are 
illustrative of the hostility between the two rivals.
The assassination of Abu Salama
The caliph's authority seems to have grown slowly. He gradually
1appointed new governors mostly consisting of his own relatives.
However, the turning point in his relationship with Abu Salama was
the caliph's decision to move from the camp of gammam k ‘yon to Hashimiyya.
According to Baladhuri Abu *1 Abbas was advised by Abu Muslim to leave
Kufa which with its pro-‘Alid sympathies was a dangerous ground for an
a ‘Abbasid caliph, thus the caliph left ICufa. The enmity between Abu
*1 ‘Abbas and Abu Salama became open, but still the caliph was not
sure how to deal with Abu Salama. Historical accounts differ oh the
murder of Abu Salama. Some, as mentioned above, attribute the idea as
well as the execution to Abu Muslim who sent out Marar al-gabbi with
the consent of the caliph. Others maintain that it was Abu Muslim who,
having failed to induce the caliph to have Abu Salama killed, took the
initiative and sent one of his men to kill Abu Salama without the actual
4permission of the caliph. Still other accounts ascribe the decision to
1Ansab. fol. 785b; Tab. Ill, p.37.
Q
Ansab, fol. 789b citing Mada’ini.
3Dina, p.368; Y a ‘q.ubi, II, 422.
^Muru.j. VI, pp. 134-136; 'Asakir, 4, 377.
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the caliph himself.1 It is the accounts of 12ie third category that 
seem to correspond to the truth. Abu Salama*s great authority and ex­
tensive influence were cogent enough reasons for the caliph to want to
be rid of him, and thus it must be assumed that the resolution was his.
— 2
However, he was advised by his relatives to consult Abu Muslim. This 
move was expedient in that it would first compel Abu Muslim to disclose 
his real views, which could not be known to Abu 1 Abbas with absolute 
certainty as. men used to change their allegiance in those days with 
some rapidity, and secondly because it was as likely to allay Abu Muslim* 
suspicions as disregard of his advice was likely to arouse them. The 
caliph finally decided to send his brother Abu J a‘far with a thirty 
men delegation to Khurasan to take the oath of allegiance from Abu
Muslim and thank him for his good services and inform him of Abu
- -3Salama*s disloyalty. According to Baladhuri the caliph*s letter handed 
to Abu Muslim by Abu J a‘far contained not only information of Abu 
Salama*s treason, leaving ft to Abu Muslim to punish the crime according 
to his 'own lights, but also veiled hints which indicated that the 
caliph wished Abu Salama to die. Thus apparently empowered to act as 
he thought fit, Abu Muslim was in fact only to execute the caliph*s . 
order.
Abu Muslim could not have been more pleased to take this opportunity
to rid himself of his powerful rival. He agreed to send Murar b. Anas 
• /
p.90; Imama, 2, 231-2; Ansab, fol. 792b; Kufi, fol. 235b. Tab. Ill, 
59; F.H.A.. pp. 212-213* See also late historians: *Ibar, 3# 376;
Bad*, 6, 71; Biday a, 10, 56. The^ author of Aklibar al-Duval al-MunhaJi ‘a 
relates that the caliph killed Abu Salama then 'sent Abu Ja^fax' to apolo­
gize to Abu Muslim (fol. 101b); E.I.2 (Abu *1 ‘Abbas).
2 — «" «■
Ansab,-fols. 792b-793a citing Isfcaq b. All; Jab., p.90; Imama, 2, 231-2;
Ya qubi, II, 422; Tab. Ill, 59; F.H.A.. p.212f., Hug., fol.' 76b. (oont )
tik-
ai-pabbl to assassinate him. Evidently to confuse the issue Abu 'l
*Abbas who had already given directives veiled as they were to Abu 
Salama*s executioner, made a show of his friendship for Abu Salama,
bestowing on him various favours the latter was not likely to enjoy
killed at the peak of his power by the very dynasty lie had served.
the likes of him. Why should we regret his death." As fox* Abu Muslim 
he declared in front of the Q.uwwad "§afg /Abu Salama/ was full of de-
Once Abu Salama was out of the ray, the caliph's influence and
Z(cont.)
Ansab, fol.^792b-793b, citing al-Muffa$al al-Dabbl; ffakhri, p.138. 
Of. Jahshiyari and F.H.A. where they state that the correspondence 
took place before Abu Ja far's visit to Khurasan (Jah.f 1926 ed., 91* 
F.K.A., p.212). _______
^Ansab, fol. 793b; Jah,, p.90; Tab.,Ill, p.60.
2Tab., Ill, p.60.
^F.H.A.. p.213.
Anaab. fol. 793a.
■’Tab. Ill, 59; Tanbib, p.339; Huru.i. VI, p. 136; ‘Asalcir, 4, 377-
On ihcae and other comments see Ansab 793a~b, 794a; Muruj , VI, 136;
. Bidaya. 10,56. “™ T 3 ----------   — ------ -----
any more, thus when the murder became a fait accompli in Rajab 1'32 A.H
3 - -
it was publicQyascribed to the Kharijitea. Abu Salama al-ghallal was
Tliis stirred the imagination of contemporary poets, one of whom said 4
<u) \ >v&
V1 1.“^
5• anothei’ recited:
Abu *1 *Abbas is reported to have said: "Let him go to Hell, him and
ceit towards ^od, his prophet and the Imam, curse him."
Abu Muslim and the struggle for power in Khurasan
authority were enhanced and consolidated* He made extensive changes 
in. the governorships of the provinces dismissing those who had been 
appointed by Abu Salama and mostly appointing
prominent members of his own family and those who had supported him 
in the affair of Abu Salama. But it was not long before his authority 
clashed with that of Abu Muslim. The first symptoms of this conflict 
can be observed when Abu *1 *Abbas appointed his uncle /isa b. *Ali 
governor of Pars where Abu Muslim had already appointed Muhammad b. al- 
Ash*ath who had killed Abu Salama* s appointee to the same post and 
seised the governorship. Muhammad *>b. al-Ash*ath was reluctant to 
accept 4Isa b, *Ali, but prepared relying on Abu Muslim’s ordeis to 
kill anyone who claimed the position* In the last moment, however, he 
refrained from killing *Xsa b* *Ali and was content to take his oath 
that hewould not undertake from then on any governmental function except 
the Jihad.2
The events preceding Abu Muslim's murder are of a complex nature 
and involve others of the same order such as the clash between da*is 
of different orientation on thecne hand, and these da *10 and the *Abbasid 
caliphs on the other. Abu Muslim had become the most powerful man in
This was the term used by the caliph to^indicate the appointees of 
Abu Salama (Ansab, fol. 806a citing Mada^ini).
2Tab., Ill, p.72; Imama, p.239; Dina, pp.^373-4* Very interesting is 
the remark of the late historian ibn Adhari, which aptly illustrates 
the chaos which developed in the aftermath of the revolution (131-132): 
There,were four amirs, each of whom appointed governors to the provinces ; 
in this year.JThey were Marwaiv b. Muhammad, Abu Salama al-Khalial, Abu 
^ Muslim and Abu *1 ‘Abbas. As for Abu Muslim he was al-SulJan- al-A^am.
Mo orders of his went unheeded, (ibn ‘Adhari, p.64) ~ ” "
Khurasan, hut his influence made itself also felt at the court of the
caliph. Many accounts'1* describe Abu *1 Jahm b, ‘Afiyya al-Bahili as Abu
Muslim’s deputy or eye at the court.'The caliph’s astute tactics in
ascertaining Abu Muslim’s attitude in the affair of Abu Salama have
already been pointed out. It was in connection with Abu Salama*s affair
that Abu Ja‘far the brother of the caliph made his journey to Khurasan,
but the journey had more than one purpose* Certain points of Abu Ja‘far*s
journey will have to be elucidated in more detail* ' ",
The historical accounts contradict each other on the purpose and
2the timing of this visit. Those accounts which put the visit after 
the murder of Abu Salama limit its purpose to securing the Bay‘a of Abu
Muslim for the new caliph and his heir Abu Ja far. It is true that this
was the professed objective of the visit, but earlier and more authentic = 
accounts reveal that its main aim was to sound Abu Muslim’s opinion 
on Abu Salama* s fate and to assess the situation in Khurasan. These 
accounts emphasise that the visit took place before the murder of Abu 
Salama. The account of Kufi^ is unique among early historians* Al­
though he places the visit before the murder of Abu Salama, he does not 
speak of his conspiracy or *Alid tendencies. On the contrary he states 
that Abu Ja‘far accused Abu Salama of conceit and authoritarian leanings,
T  7~ ™ — ~ _ ■—   ■'
Jali., p.93; Imama, Cairo, ed. 1904, p.247.
2Tab., Ill, 61; Jah., p.89; Dina, p.372; Y a ‘qubl, II, 420,
^Ansab, fols, 792b~793a; Tab., Ill, pp^ 58-59* citing Kadafini;
Kufi, fol. 235a; ff.H.A., p.212; Fakhri, p.138; Mug., fol. 87b,
Tufi, fol.. 235b.
!% 7*
Abu Muslim did not seem to have welcomed the visit of Abu Ja‘far from 
the very beginning and Abu Ja‘far felt the tension throughout his 
journey. What is most important in this context is that Abu Ja far 
was able on that occasion to assess closely the extent of Abu Muslim’s 
influence in Khurasan. During his stay there a serious event occurred 
which is characteristic of the arbitrary rule of Abu Muslim, namely the 
execution of Sulayman b. Kathir al-Khusa*!, the chief Haqib of the 
Abbasid da *wa in Khurasan and his son Muhammad who was one of the 
deputy Waqibs in the movement. Abu Muslim had put them to death with­
out. consulting the caliph or even Abu Ja*far who' was present. According 
to fabari and the author of Imama wafl slyasa,^ Sulayman al-Khaza *i 
got in touch with the *Alid *Ubaydallah b* al-^ussayn al~A*raj, who 
was in the entourage of Abu Ja*far, and said to lrlm: "We hoped that 
your /the *AlidE^/ affair would be. accomplished. If you wish call upon 
us for what you desire." The *Alid al-A*raj suspected that this move 
was inspired by Abu Muslim. He, therefore, communicated to the latter 
what he had been told. Abu Muslim then immediately killed Sulayman on
the pretext that Ibrahim the Imam had emp owe red Abu Muslim to "kill who-
— — ’5s —
ever you suspect". Baladhuri, on the contrary, relates that Sulayman
got in touch with Abu Ja £far and said "We hoped that your affair w ould be 
accomplished and so it did, thanks to God. If you so wish we shall turn
1  ^ ---
Tab.,- Ill, p.59; compare ICufi, fol. 255a.
2 -
Imama. PP- 2J8-40; Tab., Ill, p.61.
Ansab, fol. 800a.
l i t -
against him £k\m Muslim/." Whether the chief Naqib of the‘Abbasid da‘wa 
had contacted al-A‘raj or Abu Ja'far is not certain, but it is certain 
that the suspicion and rivalry between Suleyman and Abu Muslim were
deeprooted. They went back to the time of the da*wa and once victory 
was achieved it was natural that those two veterans would contest the 
authority in Khurasan. A unique and interesting account preserved in 
Akhbar al-‘Abbas confirms this view. It is reported that Abu *1 
Mughira Khalid b. ICathir the Tamimite was chosen ffaqib but Sulayman al- 
Khuza‘i replaced him by his son-in-law Lafciz b. Qurayza which enraged 
KHalid. It is in this situation that the political motives of the exe­
cution of Sulayman al-Khuga*i should be sought as Khalid was one of the
witnesses at the arraignment of Sulayman. The accusations, probably
« . *
fabricated by Abu Muslim’s partisans, served to provide the opportunity
for him to get rid of a dangerous and influential rival. Muhammad b.
Sulayman al-Khuga‘i was put to death at the same time as his father on
the accusation of being Khidashite, i.e. expressing heterodox and ex-
2
tremist opinions. Now this is significant as it was the first time that 
this accusation was raised in public to remove a prominent figure from 
the political scene.The news of the execution of the two veteran da‘is 
must have shocked Abu Ja*far, however he had to keep quiet. It is said 
that when he returned to Irafc he told' his brother the caliph "you are 
no caliph and your affair is nothing if you leave Abu Muslim /where nv-
1Akhbar, fol. 104a.
2 — «. „ ■
Ansab, fol. 800b$ I-Iuq., fol. 79b. According to Ibn Khaldun Sulayman
al-Khuga i was killed because he protested against the murder of Abu 
Salama (3/376).
m -
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he is7 and do not kill him" and "He only does what he wants".
The ‘Abbasids were worried by Abu Muslim’s growing influence not 
only in Khurasan but also in the whole eastern part of the empire.
His effect was even spread to the court of Abu *1 ‘Abbas. It is true that 
his influence was potentially dangerous but did he, in fact, entertain 
plans to overthrow the ‘Abbasid regime? Abu Muslim had given numerous 
proofs of his loyalty to the ‘Abbasids during the da‘wa. He had com­
plied with the wishes of the ‘Abbasids for whom he lad won as many 
followers as he could. But once victory was achieved many groups fell 
out with the new regime. Khurasan became, in fact, the scene of anti- 
‘Abbasid activities. He proved his loyalty by crushing the malcontents. 
Although it could be argued that in so doing Abu Muslim was fighting 
to preserve his governorship, but it is obvious that he could have 
attempted a compromise with the Rawandiyya rebels of Balkh or the Alid 
rebels of Bukhara or the Persian rebel Bahafarid.
In order to assess Abu Muslim’s loyalty to the ‘Abbasid*s it Is 
necessary to examine his record in Khurasan.
Sharik al-Mahri*s revolt
f  M  M
Not long after the Abbasid victory, Sharik b. Shaykh al-Mahri 
rebelled in Bukhara protesting against ‘Abbasid policies and declaring 
"lie have not followed the family of Muhammad to shed blood and do
•j
‘Asma* al-Mughtalin, p.193; Tab., Ill, 61. See also Imama, 240;
Dina, p.373; Kufi, fol. 235b.
2 ' m m  m .  * .  «
On his rising see Narshakhi, pp. -62 ff; Imama, 2,^265; Y a ‘qubi, II,
425; P.HaA. , p^ .211; Tab.^ , Ill, p.74. See also Nu.jum, p.360 where he 
is called Sharik al-Ma^ri.
injustice." Historical accounts do not speak much of his aims hut 
it seems that he was not only one of the early *Abbasid partisans, but 
also one of the first to be disappointed with their policies. His move­
ment seems to have been popular and gained force. It had a clear 4Alid
{
colour. Sharik al-Mahri. had expected the *Alids to be chosen caliphs, ■ 
He declared when he addressed his pai’tisans "We are now free from the 
affliction of the Marwanids. The plague of the house of ‘ Abbas does 
not necessarily affect us,. The children of the Prophet must be the 
successors of the Prophet."'1' The Arab governors of Bukhara, Khwarizm 
and Bazm paid him allegiance. The Abbasids were faced for the first 
time by the very same political forces which they had brought to bear 
on the Umayyads.The revolt of Bukhara is significant ±i so much as it 
reveals pro-*Alid sentiments among a section of the revolutionaries in 
Khurasan on the cne hand and the loyalty of Abu Muslim to the new 
*Abbasid regime on the other hand. Abu Muslim immediately sent Ziyad 
b. §ali£ al-IChuza*i who, at first, faced major difficulties, but when 
Qutayba b. Tughshada Bukhar IChudah intervened on the side, of Ziyad 
the balance was tipped in the letter’s favour. Ziyad was able to crush 
the rising. As to the treatment of the rebels we.: possess conflicting
MH £ M  ^
accounts. According to Imama wa*l siyasa they were treated mildly as
the prisoners were neither killed nor made slaves but freed and warned
—3not to repeat it again. While Narshaichi gives rather exaggerated picture
1 - ~ 1 —  - * ■
Narshakhi, p ,62.
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Imama, 1904 ed., p.265.
3 « ,
Narshakhi, pp. 64-65.
of bloodbath. He states that the city was set on fire for three days.
and nights, many prominent men were hanged and a genei'al massacre ensued;:
Ziyad then marched towards Soraarqand where he crushed other hotbeds
of dissatisfaction. It is not irrelevant to the tactics of Abu Muslim
to note that the prince of Bukhara who played a leading rSle in crushing
the *Alid rebellion was killed later by Abu Muslim on the grounds that
- 1
he had conspired with Sharik.
The rising of Ziyad b. Salih al~Khuza‘i
Meanwhile Abu Muslim pursued the policy of Jihad, that is the same
2 V:.
policy as the Umayyads in Transoxania, The main commanders involved in
the conquest were Khalid al-Dhuhll, Ziyad b. ^aliji al-Khuza *i and
‘isa b, Mahan. Khuttal, Kish and £5ughd were invaded, however what is
important in this context is that Transoxania was at the time in the grip
of internal'antagonisms between the heads of single small principalities
who turned for help to China or to the Arabs and the policy of conquest
would almost have drawn Abu Muslim irto dreary conflict with these
principalities and with China, had it not been for fresh troubles in
Khurasan, namely the rebellion of Ziyad b. §alih the governor of §u§hd y.
and Bukhara which diverted his attention at the operative moment. The
causes of Ziyad*s rising are not clearlyindicated by the sources.
According to Baladhuri he h ad insulted Abu Muslim d eclarlng ”V/e have
^Sadighi, op.pit., p.43 (footnote 5).
2Tab., III, 80-81, 73; Barthold, Turkistan... pp. 193 ff; Gibb, op.c 
pp. 94 f.
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taken the oath in order to establish justice and revive the Sunna K
— -M , and Abu Muslim is nothing but oppressor and tyrant,
he behaves like a tyrant and dissident. He is corrupting the people 
— — >* 1
of Khurasan . This sounds as if he was fomenting a rising rather
—2than engaging in it, but Tabari followed by other late sources state 
that Ziyad, in fact, openly rebelled in Balkh, and Abu Muslim immediately 
advanced to quell the rising supported by his right hand man, Abu Da/ud
Khalid aj-Dhuhli. What is significant about both the accounts is that
they permit the inference of the existence of a conflict between the 
authority ofihe caliph and that of Abu Muslim, The latter had already 
appointed Ziyad governor of Sughd and Bukhara but the caliph sent him 
the nomination by Sabi* b, al-ITa‘man al-Azdi, with instructions to
i
J aw ,0  ^ >
Sabi to kill Abu Muslim if helnd the opportunity, Sabi accompanied
Abu Muslim on his campaign against Ziyad but before he could execute 
his orders some of Ziyad1s commanders defected to Abu Muslim and disclosed 
to him the existence of contacts between Sabx* and their leader. It 
even seems that the very Sabi* had been the go-between between the 
caliph and Ziyad before the latter revolted against Abu Muslim and 
promised him the governorship of Khurasan, thus indirectly promoting 
the rebellion against Abu Muslim^ authority. Tabari is rather vague 
about it only stating "Ziyad used *Ahd from Abu *1 *Abbas for being 
governor". He does not say whether this *Ahd was for Sughd or Khurasan,
1 “ - - -Ansab, fol. 800b citing Abu al~§alt al-Khurasani.
2Tab., Ill, p.81f; Bad'. 6, 75; ‘lt>ar, vol. 3, 382
however this is indicated clearly in Ansab which confirms that . Ziyad
claimed the governorship of Khurasan hy virtue of the caliph*s nomination*
After the defection of part of his commanders, Ziyad*s rising was easily
crushed* He himself fled to the Dihqan of Bukhara who killed him and
delivered his head to Abu Muslim*
With the death of Ziyad al-Khusa *1 another da * 1 had perished. It
is symptomatic of the caliph*s outlook that on hearing of Ziyad*s
death, he congratulated Abu Muslim on his success and expressed.his
- 1
approval of the killing of Ziyad.
\ ' ' r •
The execution of *Xsa b* Mahan
^  , ■,
Abu Muslim had yet to face another mutiny, that led by *Isa b,
Mahan* Isa was an early Abbasid partisan* He had served after
the victory with Abu Muslim in quelling the risings in Khurasan.* Accord-
ing to Tabari he fell out with Abu Muslim and Khalid al-Dhuhli on matters
of policy* He accused the latter in particular of partiality and
< 3Agabiyya for the Arabs and particularly of his own tribe. However, .
BaladMri states clearly that 4Isa was a close friend of Ziyad and shared 
his opinions in many points and plans. He declared that the caliph had , 
blamed Abu Muslim and detested his treatment of Ziyad who had done 
great deeds in establishing the new regime. He also claimed that he :
Mt
was the caliph*s nominee for the governorship of Khurasan. Both account
* Tl . , ■ • ■ _ *    I, i „ _____ _ - | i -
^Ansab, fol. 800b,
^Akhbar, fols, 103a* 104a.
5Tab., III, 83.
^Ansab, fol. 800b,
agree that Abu Muslim ordered Khalid to kill ‘isa who was -tricked into - 
visiting Khalid*a camp and killed by his soldiers, It cannot be 
established with certainty whether ‘isa was acting with the approval 
of the caliph, however when the caliph heard of his murder he wrote a 
letter violently condemning the murder of ‘isa and asking Abu Muslim to v : 
retaliate on Khalid by killing him. But Abu Muslim, unable to dispense vl 
'with the services of his loyal commander, wrote to the caliph trying to 
justify Khalid* s conduct and reminding the caliph somewhat ironically 
that "had ‘isa been left alone ho would have done the same, as Ziyad 
in inciting the people to mutiny and dissension".
The rising of Mansur b. Jamhur
Another revolutionary who had been previously an Umayyad governor 
of Ira^ then defected and joined several revolts, the last of which was I 
the ‘Abbasid one* He was confirmed as governor of Sind in 132/749-50 by
a |  |  *■ !L
>  Abu 1 Abbas, but it was not long when he rose in arms. Historical ;
accounts usually deal rather summarily with such minor events which
* 2 -
occur in the fringes of the empire; but Baladhuri's and Ibn gabib*s 
’accounts though brief are revelatory of the friction between Abu 
Muslim and the caliph's authority. Abu Muslim took the initiative in 
appointing Mufalias b* al-‘Abdi? governor of Sind and Tukharistan.
Thevcaliph's governor Mangur opposed the appointment and killed ;.l- 
Mufalias. This was developed into an armed rising staged by the indignant'
^Khalifa, Tarikh, fols. 232, 251, 252; Asma * al al-Mu^ht al.vin * p. 184; ;
Tab., ill, 72.
^Futufr, vol. 3, P«343; Asma‘al Hughtalyin, p.184; compare Khalifa's account 
where he states that Mufalias was sent byt he caliph (Tarikh* fol. 288); 
see also Dina, p.374* , V ■
tribal chief Mangur b. Jamhur, Musa b. Ka‘b was sent out to crush it, 
1-langur fled mid died of thirst • in the desert. The only difficulty here 
is yrho sent Musa b. K a V t o  crush the rebellion. According to Baladhuri 
it was Abu Muslim, while Khalifa b. Khayyafr, Jabarl and Kitab al-*Uyun
■ «* 1 mm
Wa,*I bada*ik: maintain that it was the caliph himself who sent Musa 
with 3,000 Arabs and Hawaii from Bagra especially 1,000 Taminites.
One is inclined to believe Baladhuri but even if it was the caliph who 
sent Musa it is not inconsistent with hispoiicy as exemplified before.
He had to act against Mangur in order not to arouse Abu Muslim1 s 
distrust and especially as the revolt was against the ‘Abbasid authority. 
Furthermore several aspects of Mangur* a controversial and-very incon­
sistent personality deserve attention and might help to elucidate the
2 ■ ■■
nature of his rising. One of the prominent Syrian Kalbite leaders,
<('T
he was instrumental in bringing Yazid inland was consequently appointed 
governor of Ira£ in 125 A.H, lie immediately sent his brother Mansur to, 
Khurasan where he, was defied by Nagr b, Sayyar. However when Man/an IX 
came to the throne Mangur figured among the forces of opposition. He 
swore allegiance to ‘Abdallah b. M u ‘awiya but when the latter was driven ; 
out of Ira£ Mansur joined the Kharijitos and fought Marwan*s governor 
of Ira^ : Ibn Hubayra. Later on Manpur again joined ‘Abdallah b. Mu ‘awiya 
in ^ars and finally fled with his brother to Sind. With the accession 
of the ‘Abbasids, Kangur was rewarded with the governorship of Sind in 132
1Khalifa, Tarikh, fol. 228; Tab., Ill, p.80; F.H.A., p.211.
‘TPab., III, 1767, 1778 citing A^imad b. Zuhayr.
On the revolts which Abu Muslim had to face in Khurasan, the author of 
F.-H*A., p.211, makes this comment;
The appointment of a new governor by Abu Muslim seems to have injured 
the pride of this old Kalbite leader who spent most of his life defying the
central Umayyad regime. He defied not only Abu Muslim but also the
,  « . o
central Abbasid authority.-
Abu Muslim at his -prime ■
Abu Muslim faced many dangerous revolts in Khurasan, Those revolts ; '
were led by ‘Abbasid da‘is, *Aiid sympathizers, Rawandiyya sectarians 
and the 2oroastrian reformist Bihafarid. He emerged from the turmoil 
the undisputed leader of Khurasan.
How in view of the growing authority of Abu Muslim the caliph 
could no longei* stand idly by. The caliph often tried to test Abu V
Muslim’s loyalty. Thus he ordered Ahu *1 Jahm to suggest to him to .
visit the court and when Abu Muslim requested a permission to do so the 
caliph’s reply was "Your stay in Khurasan is vital /to keep the province 
under c o n t r o l / A s  fear of the visit would have been indicative of 
Abu Muslim's guilty conscience or bad intentions this request served, 
for a time, to assure the caliph of his loyalty. While the caliph was 
looking for the opportunity to present itself he tried many times to 
undermine Abu Muslim's authority and even attempts to assassinate him 
were made at regular intervals. The first of these attempts was sug- 
^  gested by Khalid b, Bamiak.^ H© advised the caliph to order Abu Muslim k
■'■Jah., pp. 93-94. ' ^
2Ibid.
in-
to dismiss from his army those whow ere not from i\hl Khurasan> But 
Abu Muslim soon realized the ulterior motive behind the order, namely 
to create tension among his troops, and refrained from implementing 
it. It is worth noting that Abu Muslim himself was not a Khurasanite 
but probably an Igbahanite. The second attempt was made by Sabi* al™
MW1 wit BVM
Azdi on Ills visit to IOiurasan. However, he was killed by Abu Muslim ' = 
instead of killing him. Attempts on Abu--Muslim's life continued, as 
will be seen in due course, until the long awaited opportunity presented 
itself in a rather strange circumstance in al-Ilada4in.
To start from the beginning, however, it is worth noting that on 
Abu Muslim’s life and death one is confronted with accounts of a 
diyerse and contradictory nature, i/hat complicates the matter is that, 
despite their conflicting nature, these accounts can be traced to 
authentic narrators and sometimes the same main authority or transmitter* 
One also must be aware of the fact that Abu Muslim's rdle has fre­
quently been exaggei'ated, especially when he became a myth after his 
death. In the year 136 Abu Muslim requested the caliph to permit
p
him to perform the pilgrimage and visit the court. On hearingof 
Abu Muslim's intended journey, Abu Ja‘far (al-Mangur) the brother of
i
the caliph and the governor of the Jazira, Armenia and Adharbay.jan
— — d 4
suddenly appeared at the court. According to ICufi Abu Ja far, the 
sti’ong man behind the caliph, did not want to leave Abu Muslim alone
^See above p.
^a'qubi, IX, 433; Tab., Ill, 86. 
Kufi, fol. 236a.
with the caliph in Ira£ while he was in a far away province. As for 
Tabari1 he implies that it was Abu *1 ‘Abbas who called upon Abu Ja‘far 
and asked him to demand the task of leading the pilgrimage which mini­
mised considerably the influence of Abu Muslim who wanted himself to 
lead the pilgrimage caravan. Despite the orders of thecaliph to bring 
only lp000 soldiers and limited provisions on the ground that he was 
in his own country and among his own people, and the road to Mecca did 
not admit heavy armies, Abu Muslim took 8,000 soldiers whom he
m m  m u  2  —  —
stationed between I'lishapur and Ray, According to Imama wa1! siyasa
they were ”10,000 soldiers of Ahl Khurasan eligible for ‘AJa* in addition 
frhe A ‘ajim”.^ It was now that Abu Ja‘far suggested to the caliph 
to take the oppox’tunity to kill Abu Muslim saying ,f0h Commander of 
the faithful,, obey me and kill Abu Muslim by God he has treason in 
mind.'^ The caliph first agreed but then ordered Abu Ja‘far to refrain 
,from executing his plan. Abu Muslim*s caravan proceeded that of the 
caliph*s brother and his journey to Mecca was characterized by an 
extravagant display of generosity which was bound to enrage Abu Ja‘far 
as it vras bound to over-shadow him.
But on the way back to Ivalf when the tension between Abu Ja‘far 
and Abu Muslim had reached its climax, Abu Ja‘far took up the idea, to 
assassinate Abu Muslim again. According to Ibn 'al-A‘rabi citing Sa‘d b,
1Tab„, III, 87'.
Op. pit..86.
Imama, 2, 252-3* The interesting point about this, somehow, vague account 
is the differentiation between Ahl Khurasan and the ‘Ajam which if authen­
tic supplies yet another evidence oiTthe non-racial nature of the ‘Abbasid 
revolution and the importance of the Arab element in it.
^Tab., HI, p.85, citing Madaeini; Imama* 2, pp. 252f.
; - 79?.
al-gasan it was when Abu Ja ‘far was about to order ‘AJiyya b. *Abd :
al~Ra^aan to kill him. However he was dissuaded from doing so by V
Is^aq al« ‘Ugayli and Yassid b. Asia* In trying to see what has really y v - 
happened on this journey one is met with numerous conflicting acOQtmts*; 
These contradictions are due in part to the fact that the assassination 
of Aim Muslim actually took place soon afterwards. Trying to trace the 
causes of his murder' historians have in one way or another maintained 
that Abu Muslim committed mischievous deeds during this journey.
~ 2
Tabari quotes two trustworthy accounts of the journey. The first 
speaking of the Bay* a of Abu Ja ‘far relates that on the way back to 
Irak Abu Ja *far overtook Abu Muslim, He met Muhammad b, al-gusayn ‘ 
al~*Abdi who brought the news of the caliph’s death together with a 
letter from ^fsa b. Musa concerning the Bay *a to himself as a new 
caliph. Then Abu Ja*far wrote to Abu Muslim prompting him to hurry.
He “came condoled with him and joined him to ICufaf', Under the heading ; 
“the death of Abu Muslim” Tabari relates the second version'* of the 
journey. He states that as Abu Muslim was ahead of Abu Ja*far on the 
way back from Mecca, he learned of the caliph’s death earlier than Abu 
Ja*far, He wrote him, therefore, a letter of condolence but did not 
congratulate him on his accession to caliphate; nor did he send his Bay *a*
^Ansab, fol* 505; Mug., fol. 88a,
?Tab., Ill, p.87.- ’
OP.olt., pp.99-100, citing Moda’ini.
»
He even did not stop so that Abu Ja‘far might oatch up with him, 
nor did he return to him. The second version of Tabari is confirmed 
by Baladhuri1 who asserts that Abu Muslim was ahead of Abu Ja*far 
and he neither stopped nor congratulated him. It is worth noting 
that in the last conversation between Abu Ja‘far and Abu Muslim,
the latter was blamed and you did not stop so that we could catch
2 3
up with you neither did you return to us”. Other historians
guote one or the other account, but according to Y a ‘qubi^ there was
nothing unusual in the behaviour of Abu Muslim throughout the journey.
The author of the Irnarna wa*l slyasa states that when he wrote to Abu
Ja ‘far he put his own name first instead of beginning accoi'ding to
custom with Abu Ja*far*s name. Then he wrote to Abu Ja‘far privately .
“Do not be shocked by what is at the beginning of the letter. I am
/loyalj to you, but I want the Khurasanjs to know that I have j/Tixghf
status with the Commandei’ of the Faithful”.^ ICitab al-*Uytm wa*l
bada’lq, agrees that Abu Muslim preceded Abu J a ‘far on the journey
back but states that he returned to condole with him and promised
6
him help in face of possible dangers. Whatever1 the case it seems that
^Ansab, fol, 504*
^Tab., III, p.113.
. fol. 87b «-*> , ‘Aynl, fol. 22b-23a;
Bad*. 76; Bidaya. 10, 57-8; ‘ibar. 3, 38.,. 
4Taqubl, II, 436-7. 
5Imama, 2, 253.
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they did not meet on the road and when the news of the caliph*s death : : \
arrived Abu Muslim delayed the Bay‘a for a few days which is indicative' 
of a certain reluctance to take this step. But the new caliph, though 
enraged, had to be patient at this crucial juncture of the history of 
the ‘Abbasid caliphate when widespread disturbances could be expected y:
on the parto f ambitious pretenders of both *Abbasids and *Alid sides.
He, therefore, refrained from any venture and ordered Abu Muslim to
' -  2 
proceed to al-Anbar and keep it under control.
It was at this critical moment that Abu Muslim revealed for the
first time his enmity towards Abu Ja*far. According to Baladhurj, Kufi
and Tabari, Abu Muslim instigated the heir apparent ‘isa b* Musa to
*» t ■ 3
supplant Abu Ja far before he established himself firmly on the throne.;
If the account of Baladhuri is to be believed Abu Muslim said to ‘isa
“You are the hagi of the Imam and you had a better claim than Abu
Ja^ar,” while Kufi*s version is "Oh Abu Musa b. Musa/ why did
not you /demand/ this matter after Abu *1 ‘Abbas and you are fit for
it." He even offex^ed his help saying "If you want I shall dethrone
him and take the oath to you", ‘isa, however, declined the offer with , .
determination.
At any rate, the time was not propitious fox’ quarrels as Abu Ja*far 
was almost immediately faced with the x^ebellion of his uncle ‘Abdailah - 
b. *Ali in Syria. Considering the tension and smouldering enmity between A
1 . | ■* mt
Tab., Ill, p.90, citing Mada ini. ^Abu Muslim already knew that the only 
candidate for the caliphate was Abu Ja‘far (see Tab., HI, p. 90; D i n a ,  
368, citing al-^aytham b. ‘Adi; Ansab, fol. 505, 508).
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Dinawari attributes to Abu Muslim another unconfirmed action. He states;
that Isa b, Ali, the uncle of al~Man$ur rebelled and proclaimed-him*-.'■.-'■-.A 
self caliph at Kufa but when Abu Muslim arrived in the vanguard of al- 
Mansur * s caravan from Mecca he surrendered to him and the mutiny was . :
. .. ( c o n i , A
Abu Ja*far and Abu Muslim it is surprising that the former trusted 
Abu Muslim in the war against a rebel claimant# This, in fact, vras a 
shrewd move by the Caliph to deflect Abu Muslim from his intention 
of proceeding to Khurasan* Furthermore it is obvious that Abu Ja‘far
would have benefited whoever was killed in the conflict. It is inter- .....
esting to note that though Abu Ja*far gave Abu Muslim command of his
troops he did not give him absolute authority over all the forces
marched towards Syria. Al-^asan b, Qa^aba vras ordered to leave Arminya 
with an army for Syria and keep an eye on Abu Muslim*s activities.
$alih b. ‘All the other uncle of Abu Ja‘far and the then governor of ; :  ^■
Palestine and Balqa* was also ordered to join in the march against the
2 ' ; • •. • - 
rebels. As a result Abu Muslim was by no means single handed in tack-if : A
ling the rebels. As to Abu Muslim he was initially none too eager to 
tinder t ake the task because by that time he must have already had sus­
picions of the caliph*s intentions. He tried to go to Khurasan under A - ’a 
the pretext of sending troops to the new caliph to quell the rebellion r
and that controlling Ithurasan is more important than this minor in- v
3
cident. But he is reported to have sard to his secretary ”1 have ,
(cont.)" crushed. This allegation is not confirmed by other early
accounts* Ironically enough ‘isa b. Ali was the most loyal and least A 
ambitious uncle of the caliph (An sab, 590, Dina, 379, Ya^ubr, II, 437).
He is depicted as "of good character and not greedy for power"
(ghatib, II, p. 14?)* That is why he remained
a close friend of al-Mansur who had-no f e ars whatsoever about him. i:
^Ansab, fol,5^5; Kufiz fol. 236b; Tab., Ill, p. 100 citing Ea&a * * ini; *• . A; a
Muq*, fol. 87b; fAyni, fol, 23a. V
T - A; _
Ansab, fol. 763b; Tab., Ill, 95, citing al-Haytham b, ‘Adi,
Tab., III, p.84. He was, afterwards, rewarded with the governorship of 
Aleppo Qinnisrin and gim§ (Hubda 1, 58). S. al-Dalihan depending on the 
'ms• Bughya al-Talab relates that he was appointed governor of all : 
Syria (ibid.)  ^ ^
.^Ansab, fol, 763a. • • ■ "r: ;A;
nothing to do with those two men. The idea is to go to Khurasan and 
leave those two rams /quarrellii^ with each other, whoever is victorious A
he will write to us and we shall take the oath to him. So he m i l  see
f 3Lthat we havev done him a favour." However, in the long run Abu Muslim 
must have realised that to undertake the task was the only way to 
escape the caliph in whose hands he was. The result of the Syrian cam- : 
paign, which will be discussed later on, was a total defeat for 
*Abdallah b, *Ali. What concerns us at the moment, however, is Abu > 
Muslim1b relations with the caliph. According to Tabari,al-gasan b,
Qa]yJ;aba once voiced, in a report to the caliph, his suspicions of Abu 
Muslim who "mocked and despised the letters of the caliph: ". Commenting 
on the report al-I4uiyani the waslr of Abu Ja *far said "We accuse Abu 
Muslim more than *Abdallah b. *Ali but we hope for one thing. We
know that Ahl Khurasan have no liking for *Abdallah who killed 17,000 ’
2 - *»
of them.M Baladhuri states that al-Manpur once commented "W© fear
Abu Muslim more than we had feared Abu Salama". According to Kufi, 
al**JJasan b. Qaitfaba once sent a report to the caliph stating "Oh Command-: 
er of the Paithful I tell you that the Satan who used to prompt *Abdallah
£ ^  KN zl.
b. Ali has shifted to the head of Abu Muslim".
M *
The trouble really started when al-Mansur sent a delegation to
1Y a ‘q.ul?i, II, p.438.
2Tab., III, p.101.
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Huq,, fol. 93a, citing Baladhuri.
^Kufi, fol. 239a,
count the money and assess the value of the property taken from ;
*Abdallah. This gesture met with resentment on the part of Abu 
Muslim and the military Commanders. Abu Muslim took up a harsh and 
v threatening posture calling the caliph "Ibn Sallama" by name of his 
Berber mother."1 This was, if true, the s econd time that Abu Muslim , 
revealed publicly his hatred of the caliph. It is worth noting 
that Abu Muslim gave.vent to his temper at a moment when one could 
not help admiring the dignity with which the caliph .controlled his. 
This supports the assertion made earlier in this thesis that Abu
Muslim's rSle as played throughout the da‘wa has been exaggerated. /
** 2
Discussing the, personality of Abu Muslim, Moscati rightly observes •
that the traditional conception of Abu Muslim must be modified, and 
that he was in reality both less calculating and less capable than 
has hitherto been assumed.
The caliph acted quickly; according to Kufi he ordered his 
secretary to write Abu Muslim a polite letter saying "I have forgiven 
him and left all the money to him and I shall double it..." He also : 
appointed Abu Muslim governor of Syria and Egypt ordering him to stay
A JH 41,
in Syria but Abu Muslim refused the offer considering that Khurasan
5 -
vras his. All early sources agree that Abu Muslim decided to go back
lOp.cit. , f°l. 238bj Anaab, fol. 520; lmamat 2, 256; ‘llyun. 1, 26; 
YaquSi, ll._p.439; Tab., Ill, pp.103-104; Bina, p.375; F.H.A., 
P*219; Fakhri, p.150,
Moscati, Studi Sur Abu Muslim, III, on,cit.. ,1950, p.97.
^Kufi, fol. 259a,
^Ansab, fol, 520 citing Mada*ini; Tab., Ill, p.103*
5Kufi, fol. 239a -15*<i1 Uf ; Tab. Ill, pp. 103
105^ ; Imam a, 2, 250;
: Murnj * VI, p*179; Ibn Xsfandiyar, p.112. .
to Khurasan and he liad .no intention of meeting the caliph again.
Among the late historians Ibn al-*Adim gives a rather unique account ! :
as he relates that Abu Muslim was on his way to meet Abu Ja*far but
the arrival of the caliph's messenger infuriated him and made him
change his mind. While he was heading for palwan Abu Muslim received
another letter from the caliph summoning him for a meeting as he wanted
to consult him "on a matter which could not be settled by corespondence",
Abu Muslim's reply is indicative of his fears of the caliph's plans. -
He wx’ote: "There is no enemy left to the Commander of the Faithful and
we used to relate of the Sasanid kings that if the mob is quiet the wasir
are frightened. We do not intend to stay away from you but we shall be
faithful to your oath of allegiance if you are. We shall be loyal and
2
obedient but from far away where there is safety...." The caliph's
answer was cautious, he referred with praise to Abu Muslim's great
services and concluded by saying "I beg Cod to protect you from the
3 *Devil and his thoughts..."
Abu Muslim was not convinced of the caliph's intention, he per* a . 
sisted in his plan of going to Khurasan as soon as possible. This 
moment marks the beginningof a second series of letters between them  ^
which would be quite improbable were it not .confirmed by early trust-.
^"Zubda, 1, 58 J l f i ? { j J ,  0.\&'
It is not known with certainty what this famed and contentious treasure, 
actually consisted of. Muslim historians are vague and only use the 
words Amwal and Khaza * in (Ansab, fols, 564, 764b; Kufi, fol. 238a;
Tab., Ill, pp.. 87, 114, 102JI /
Tab., Ill, p.104. A  A
^Jah., p.Ill; Tab., Ill, 104, citing Mada*ini; Fakhri, p.151.
woz’thy narrators. Historians quote a notoi’ious letter which is said
to have been sent by Abu Muslim to the caliph. He wrotes
1 have chosen a man (your brother) as the Imam and guide 
in all that God has ordained to his creatures* He was /l 
thought/ a man of knowledge due to his kinship with the 
Prophet* He found me uninstructed in the Qor an so he 
perverted the sense of the holy book hoping to gain some worldly 
aims.*. Then he led me into error /indicating to me the wrong 
path as the right one/. Ha ordered me to unsheath my sword* v:
- .nevervhaye"pity oroaccept excuses, and not to forgive those 
who committed mistakes. I acted In this way in order to 
establish your rule until God has made you known to those who 
once ignored yoii. Then God has saved me by means of repent­
ance* Whether he forgives - as he is known to have done - 
or punishes me for the deeds of my hands, it will be an act 
of justice. ”3*
Early sources except Kufi agree, more or less, on the text of the 
letter. The version of ICufi does not differ considerably except in 
one important point where he adds to the text "I have suppressed others r 
of the family of the I^rophet /obviously referring to the ‘Alids/ whose 
status and claim were better than yours" if one considers the *Alid 
sympathies of Kufi, and the lack of confirmation by other versions,
■ 2 "this additional note cannot be credited as authentic. Scholars differ 
in their attitude towards the letter, Weil accepts it as "a highly 
important document", while Barthold expresses his doubts about it. : V:
As for Moscati he1 states "It is thus highly probable that the letter, 
was authentic", it is very difficult to see how Abu Muslim could Have 
written this letter and then allowed himself to meet Abu Ja‘far. But
^  ^  ^    -  - .............. . M L , , ' "  ,11 T L ..T -T —-U IIU -- , .
Tab., Ill, 105 citing^Mada’inr; Ansab, fol..522^ Xmama, 2, 253; Kufi, ; 
fol, 239b~240a; Khafib citing ‘Ali b. al-Ha*afi, 10, 208; Muq., fol.
94a; al-(Ayni citing guli fol. 26b; Bidayat 10, 68-69. This letter - 
also throws a light on the manner the Abbasid daSra was conducted, 
and confirms the idea that the ‘Abbasids exploited all concepts even non- 
Islamic ones for their benefit. :
%eil, Geschichte der Ohalifen, II, pp. 28-29; S.1.1 (Abu Muslim); Moscati 
op.oit... Y l l r 1^ 7937— —
2.©.7>
if this letter is authentic it shows Abu Muslim in a rather disturbed 
psychological condition* His pride and dignity were deeply hurt by 
the attitude .of the new caliph. He gave vent to his feeling in an 
angry moment and the letter was the result. This interpretation is
probable as he had been until that moment suspicious of the caliph
- * ■ - 1 
and determined to proceed to Khurasan where he would be safe. The
caliph, who displayed a great self control, cunningly refrained from
cutting the thin thread which joined him to Abu Muslim who stumbled
from disillusionment to disillusionment.
Judging by the-development of the events one sees that Abu la*far
had determined on practical steps in preference to correspondence. He
requested several Hashimites among tb^m *Isa b. Musa who was a close
friond of Abu Muslim to invite Abu Muslim to the court and assure him
2
of the caliph*a good intention. The invitation was in a form of a ' 
message delivered by a delegation led by men like Jarir al-Bajli and 
Abu gamayd al-Harwu2 i who after using persuasive methods warned f . 
Abu Muslim in solemn terms that a refusal would have dire consequences. . 
Bespit© the warnings of his trustees^ Abu Muslim 1 et himself be deceived 
into thinking that there was a way back open to him. He sent, there­
fore, his confidant Abu Is^aq Malik b. al-Haythem al-Khasa‘± to as- ; 
certain whether the conditions in the caliph* s camp were favourable.
1 ___
It was probably this which led ICufi to^suggest that he wrote the letter
after he had arrived at Merv in KHurasan (fol. 239b), an allegation
not confirmed ly any other early sources. .
Ansab. fol. 520, citing Mada*ini, Tab., III, 105 citing Hoda’ini.
^Tab*, III, p.104; Irnarna, 2, 257* His first reply to al^Bajli was
^  fajdii-i, p.151.
4B§xln. 2, 96; ‘iJynn, 1, 30; g -H.A., p.221; Muruji, VI, 178f. ;
%0% *
Abu Ja*far promised Abu Ie£s.ag. the governorship of . Khurasan for life
if lie succeeded ill bringing Abu Muslim to him; and meanwhile
appointed a new vgovernor of Khurasan# Khalld b. Ibrahim al-bhuhli,^
and of Syria# Hisham al-‘tTqayll. ^  It is worth noting that, contrary
to some accounts, by now Abu Muslim1 s position was underrained and
he was not absolutely sure of the loyalty of his commanders. Tabari ...
transmits a letter from the new governor of Khurasan to Abu Muslim
in which he warns him not to come to Khurasan in defiance of the
caliph's order. He states "We had not revolted Referring to the
*Abbasi& revolution7 to disobey the caliph's of God and the Prophet's 
3 - -family11. §uli points out to. the disagreement between him and some
4 - - «
of his commanders.' Kufi relates that when Abu Muslim reached Mosul
on his way to Khurasan a group of his companions who favoured Abu 
Ja* far asked him for permission to perform the pilgrimage. Abu
Muslim replied "It is not the time for pilgrimage but who wants to
5 ■leave let him leave." Moreover al-gasan b. Qajyjiaba had already held
back his army on the pretext of illness.
1Tab. Ill, 107-8; F.H.A. .ft221.
.‘T a <qubi, II, p.440.
3Tab., III,p,107.
^ ‘iiyni, fol. 26b.
5 - ~ 1
Kufi, fol. 239b.
6
Op.cit., fol. 239a.
The execution of Abu Muslim
Abu Muslim was deluded into believing that there was a way of
regaining the caliph's favour by a show of loyalty. For that purpose
it was necessary to meet the caliph in person. . In brief, the caliph's
ruse had misled him into thinking that the way of escape and safety
led through al-I-Iada'in and not through Khurasan. When he reached the
caliph's camp with a body of his army, he was met by *Isa b. I-Iusa
1
who assured him that he was safe. The first meeting with the caliph
was indeed friendly, but at the second meeting the caliph raised
against him accusations of an interesting and significant nature. As
to the accusations themselves they are quoted by most early and late
2
historians and are by no means always the same. Though it must be 
borne in mind that otir sources abound in interpolations and fabrication 
and although some of the accusations may never have been raised by al- 
Manpur, most of them are historically motivated. It seems as though 
the historians had collected them all together and made them the sub­
ject of the conversation between the caliph and Abu Muslim especially 
as Arab narrators and historians are inclined by nature to indulge in 
polemics and repartees. The words of Abu Ja*far are, however, sig­
nificant in that they indicate that his fears were old and deep-rooted 
and not merely aroused by the act of recent disobedience. It also 
corresponds to the caliph's real attitude throughout all these years.
3 *" •» • *m
'Ansab, 522, Azhar b. Zuhayr;. Tab., Ill, 112; <Ayni, citing Abu *1
Yaqaan, fol, 28a,
2 _ „
Ansab,_foIg.523-524; Jvufi, 240hz241a; Tab., Ill, pp^ . 113-115;
Ya qubi II, p.441; Imama, 259; Bina, pp. 377-8; _ I-Iu.ruj, VI, 180; 
g.H.A., p.223; anonymous, fols, 13a, 16a; Aynx,”T6T7 30a.
The enmity between them went back to the days of the first caliph Abu f 
*1 *Abbas and Abu Muslim did not certainly wish for a caliph like Abu :
Ja*far who could not tolerate unlimited power on the part of a governor 
like Abu Muslim who desired to be the only repository of power. In
short the accusations indicate that the dispute was political in nature,
/ ' ' * ' ■ '
A . . .  ^ j
it was a struggle for power. ^
/' ■" . '■■A-.
* / /  .
It would not however be ami/is to deal with some of these changes 'A. ;
/' ' ■ ■ ’ - ■ ■ • ’ ■ 
made by the caliph with referf/hce to the historicity, if any, of them,
so that an idea could be formed on the course of the conversation,
Al-Mansur rebuked Abu Muslim for failing to greet him at the court of
— «  ■ 1 A  '
Abu *1 ‘Abbas when he visited it on his way to Mecca, jfhis incident A
seeras to be true as it had been related by several sources. He also 
reminded him that it was he who had instigated ‘isi b, Musa to rebel 
against him. Then he blamed him for preceding him on the pilgrimage.- 
Ho repudiated him for having called him on certain occasions by his 
proper name, *Abdallah, "was there no other title I am called by?" .
Abu Ja*far asked. Abu Muslim’s alleged reply is interesting as the 
argument he adduces to justify his action is contrary to the usual 
Arab practice to show respect by the us© of the kimya. He said "X have ; A 
found that God, referring to his prophet sayss Muhammad, while he says 
referring to his ©nemy: Abu Lahab. Thus he called his prophet
by his name while he gave his
"4cuf i, fol. 240b.
P . »
0-p.olt., 240b; ‘Ayni, fol. 25a. This is historically confirmed.
Tab., III, p.113; Kufi, fol. 240b; ‘Ayni, fol. 30 a, This is historically 
confirmed too. ^
enemy a kunya.1,1 Histoi^ians relate several of these polemics between 
the caliph and Abu Muslim, most of them, however, insignificant. ■.
However what al-Mansur seems to have x^egarded as the most serious 
charge of all was that Abu Muslim had collected money and property and , , 
distributed part of it as ghanima after the defeat of ‘Abdnllah b.
*Ali in Syria, a matter about which there is surely nothing wrong 
as the ghanlma should be* after taking the fifth of the state, dis*~ -A; 
tributed among the conquering troops. However, the question of ^hanlma 
seems to have vexed Abu Ja ‘far on more than one occasion. Towards 
the end of the meeting Abu Ja‘far brought two grave charges against 
Abu Muslim asking him; "Why did you kill Sulayman b, ICathir al«
Khusa ‘i after all his great services and he was our Naqib before we V
permitted you to do so," and "why did you decide to return to
 • 4
Khurasan without our permission?" Abu Muslim became apologetic; he
reminded the caliph of his services in creating aid consolidating the ;
dynasty to which the caliph replied that if they had sent a slave : 
girl in his place to Khumsan she would have triumphed in the sms way,'*
1 ‘Ayni citing^Baladhuri fol, 30a; see also Ansab, fol. 523? fab., III,
59. The ‘Abbasids, unlike the Umay^ads^ adopted titles and courtly ' 
ceremonies (al-Taj» pp. 37ff; Tali‘alibi, Lata‘if, p.19) * The historian ; 
Xbn *Adharl describes the Umayyad dynasty as follows: f )
if ^  ?
( ‘ Adhari, p*63)
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Tab., Ill, 114, Mada ini.
^Tab,, III, 114; F.H.A., p.223. According to Baladhuri (Ansab, fol. 526, 
Mada ini) al-Mansur also reproached him for killing Af 1 al-Fazari, one 
of_the prominent Arabs in Khurasan. Significant is the reason given by 
Abu Muslim for al-faaari* s execution. He replied "He was a man of in-^  
tegrity and pride; 1 feared.he might create txxmbles" (Ansab,fol.526# 
4-Tab., III, 113. Mada*ini)
5Tab., III. 115; Ansab, fol. 523; Kufi, fol. 240b*»241a; Xniama, p.258; , 
Blna, 0.376; MuruJT^X, 182f; Fakhrr, p.153. ;
C&t mu.'oi-
Re added "The merit lay with ue /the ‘Abbasids/ and with our stale
If it had been for you alone you could not have cut a string”* The '
caliph was determined to kill him. He clapped and# as already had
been planned, ‘Uthrcian b. Nahlk with other soldiers appeared. While ;
Abu Muslim was being hit he begged for pardon and asked the caliph
to spare his life for his enemies. The latter replied "What greater
1enemy have I other than you?" He was slain and his body was thrown 
in the Tigris.
Whatever might be thought of the picture presented to us by Muslim' 
histories 011 the murder of Abu Muslim, it is obvious’that he had set 
himself up as the sole authority not only of Khurasan but of the easterns 
provinces. H© had reserved for himself the right of appointing governors 
to the provinces as fai" as Mars and Sind. lie even had a say in the ; 
affairs of the court. To recall some: The assassination of Sulayman
b. Hisham, of Ibn Hubayra and of Abu Salama al-Khallal, prove how 
powerful he was. Judging by the nature of Abu Ja‘far he could not tol­
erate such power beside him. According to some accounts Abu Ja‘far said > 
to Abu Muslim W y "
According to another account he said to him 
(you are considered the greatest but in reality you are not). Jaj^is * 
relates that Abu Ja*far quoted two verses before killing Abu Muslim; >
1
Asma* al-Mughtalin
■ 10*
these verses admirably illustrate the fears of th© caliph: "Abu
Muslim you have three qualities which render you liable to die:
1  ‘ V ' " '
disobediences, vainglory, and demagogy." It is in this perspective . 
that the murder of. Abu Muslim must be viewed^ There is no proof of 
heterodox or ‘Alid accusations alleged by early or modern writers.
It is significant that among, the mass of charges allegedly raised 
by the caliph there is not a single one of pro-*Alid or Zandaqa ten- i 
denotes. He may have been potentially dangerous but not "heterdox" : 
or an *Alid partisan. H© himself allowed nothing to indicate that '
ho favoux’Od any faith other than Xglamand the ‘Abbasid cause. As
to the extremist ideas attx^Lbuted to him, it has already been men­
tioned that it was ‘Abbasid policy to compromise with evexy possible 1 ;
group in order to win followers. If Abu Muslim himself pursued "this 
policy, he did so as a loyal ‘Abbasid px’actitioner. Thus the first 
to be accused of this extremist tendency should be the ‘Abbas id Imara ’ 
mid not a mei’e ‘Abbasid propagandist like Abu Muslim.
As to the *Alid tendency attributed to him by some lat© Muslim 
histoi’ians and modern scholax^s, it is true that Abu Muslim spent part 
of his life in ‘Alid circles especially in his youth in Kufa when he 
associated with the tribe of *Ijl and with Abu Musa al-Sarraj. He 
even participated in the pro~*Alid rising of al-Mughlra in Kuf a. But 7 
once won over by the *AbbasIds he-piwed loyal to the new daS-m, and 
there is no shred of evidence to prove his *Alid tendency. It is worth ■ 
mentioning that only late authors accused him of this tendency. According
these remarks see Bayan, 5# 367; Kufi, p.241a; Tab., Ill, 195;
Ya qubi, II, p.441. * Other comments on the assassination o f  A b u  M u s l i m  A 
x'eveal clearly the political nature of the struggle. One of the caliph1© 
close associates said to him "If there were other gods beside Cod it woult
(cohti)
Dhahabi Abu Muslim decided, after crushing ‘Abdallal^s revolt, to
go to Khurasan and install an *Alid caliph. Shallristani calls
Abu Muslim a caliph maker and relates that having thrown the Umayyad,
h© contacted Ja*far al~$adiq. the Husaynid and offered him the caliphate
but the latter refused the offer so Abu Muslim turned to Abu *1 ‘Abbas
2
and conferred on him the caliphate. Others associate his name with 
those who outwardly professed Islam, gained the favour of the Shi‘a 
by pretending to love the propheth family and protesting against the k 
injustice done to *Ali.^ Unfounded ad they are those accounts are not 
to be credited. Moreover they are contradictory with early accounts 
on the anti- *Alid attitude of Abu Muslim, In a letter written by Abu 
Muslim to Abu *1 ‘Abbas he advised him to shift from Kuf a saying ’?fhe 
people of Kufa- are the Shi *a of the Commander of the Faithful only 
by name not by -action. Their feelings are with the f amily of ‘All,*,
So do not elevate them to the rank of your neighbours for their house 
is not y o u r s . T h i s  account as well as his policy in Khurasan after 
the *Abbasid accession to power are ample evidences of Abu Muslim1s 
loyalty to the new regime.
r i i w r m n  ii n  ml ■ 11 limn i I W ^iiih i lipn.i up, i p i h'Hii]■ n—  umiiiim n m  i H i h ■ i i i ■' q n H n i w r i i i f i  Ti'^ ii ulrti fniji ini y i i  mi n i> ilgiTpnf in-pii ■iin, ni M w ^  nftil ii ,i l|,i| , i 11 ip ■ v  .mi iiii i him h Hi Wi i ■■wiiibiii ■cont.) be the ruin of the world" ( Uyun, 1,93; Jah,, p.Ill; Bina, 
p.373; Huru.j, VI, p. 175; ‘iqi, vol. 1, p.93* vol. 2, p. 130); another 
commented _ (Tab., III* 116)i :
See also Imama, 260; Ansab, fol. 526; Hug.,, fol, 95a. Interesting 
in this^respect^is Ja&is who put Abu Muslim in the same category of ' 
al-$ajjaj (Baywan, 4, p.429).
Blochet, he messianisme..., pp. 42-43; Vfeil, op.oit., II,^p.l9; 
Zaydan, Abu Muslim, pp, 373 ff; Al-Mudawar, Ua&arat al-Islam, p.32.
Dhahabi» Duwal, vol. 1, p. 70. According^to al-‘A^ni# Abu lafciaq said 
to Abu Muslim who was on his way to Khurasan, "Abu Ja‘far blames you
(cont.)
Undeniably is the existence and.rdl© of court intrigues and 
political groupings which aggravated the tension between the caliph 
and Abu Muslim. This is reflected in the reply of Abu Muslim to a \ '
question by the caliph. "They /referring to his enemies/ have lied 
to you." Iftirthermore, when for reasons unknown to us, Abu Muslim 
asked the caliph, before marching towards ‘Abdallah to arrest and 
punish eAbd al-Jabbar al~Azdi, gal it b. al-Haythm and Khalid b. Ba*»aki?-> 
Uor can it be denied that al-ffuryani played a decisive rdle in all 
the proceedings which led to the murder of Abu Muslim* The caliph 
bribed Abu Muslim1 s army and offered to incorporate them in his army : J
after he had murdered their leader to avoid a possible revolt oh
4 itheir part. According to one account sums of 1,000 dirhams A$a to
some of them and 500 to others were offered and they were left free
to choose whether to stay with the caliph or return to Khurasan. Some
5
of them commented "W© sold our master for dirhams". They refrained
(cont.) for old matters If you had installed
a Talibite caliph you would have taken the right measure. If you had 
accepted the governorship of Syria al~Jazira and Sawa*if you would have 
had the opportunity to choose a man from the sons of kafima and instal 
him as an Imam, which would win over people to your side and oppose to 
Abu J a‘far a rival of equal status.u ( ‘Ayni citing guli, fol. 26b). 
This is another account which is not to be founcl anywhere else^and even 
if it were authentic it would be only a suggestion to which Abu Muslim 
did not respond, (see also Shah., pp. 114-115; anonymous, fol. 15b
-saJbX? X & i s ^ ' I  '
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Shall., pp. 114-115.
■^ ga sra, - I, 90, II, 114; ■ Bagh., p.225; Bid ay a, vol. 10, 71.
^Ansab, fols. 783b-790a. _
Ayni, citing Baladhuri, fol. 30a.
I^Cufi,. fol, 237a.
, ^Tab., m ,  101-3; Jah., 111-112. ( n t : :
— 1from causing trouble because, as Jajds puts it, "They were far
away from their country /fdiurasan7 and were surrounded by enemies
^Ehe caliph’ & army7« They, therefore, gave in and capitulated.11 It
is interesting to conclude this episode of Abu Muslim’s career by-
quoting Abu Ja ‘far who is said to have been asked about Abu Muslim’s
affair when he commented ”If your enemy stretches out his hand to
you cut it if you can, mid if you cannot then Iciss it*11
Abu Muslim’s life ended, but his memory survived especially in
the eastern provinces of the empire. Many Persian rebels adopted
his name as an excuse to justify their risings. He became a myth
3around which many exaggerated stories were woven* Ho became r.
(cont.)
^Imama, p.260.
5Tab., Ill, 117j Y a ‘quM, II, 441; Dina, p.379; Faldirl, 153.
Wit
^ Bay ail, 3, 368,
Ansab, fol, 510, Mada*ini; Hug., fol. 90a. ^
lA r J ■3/^ jvt ^  \
The manner in which histox’ians compare the ‘Abbasid caliphs with 
the Umayyads is interesting. This trend is noticeable in the writings 
of Ja^is as-well as in scattered historical accounts. In so far as ^
the episode of Abu Muslim is concerned, al-Haytham b. ‘Adi compares .
Abd a],-Malik b, Marwan with al-Hangur and isolates that *Abd al-Malik . 
was the most competent of the Umayyads while Abu Ja ‘far was the most :
competent of the ‘Abb as ids and adds, ’’But can not you see that ‘Abd al- 
Malik killed Amr b^ Sa‘id in his castle with the doors closed while ; 
al-Mansur killed Abu Muslim underbills tent and there were only sheets 
between him and Ahl Khurasan11, Ira am a, 2, 262; Jah.,p k122.
Melikoff, ^ Abu Muslim*.., idem. La Qeste de Melik... pp. 49-51, see also 
index; HenageT~B.~s\ 0. A .S ., 1962, p. 172, 1964, pp. 361-363. ■' -Ay:'.
Even Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was an admirer of Abu Muslim. He 
writes; nIn order to find a means of delivery from these terrible diffi­
culties I have studied the condition of former peoples and states (milal 
va duval) and the cause of their ascent and decline and t heir rising , , 
and s etting, aid I have considered the great deeds that have emanated ‘
A/7;
a Persian martyr whose death had to he avenged* The symbol of deliverance 
for the disappointed masses who claimed that he would come back himself 
or send a prophet to save them from the ‘Abbasid rule* However this does 
not necessarily imply that Abu Muslim believed in their doctrines or 
had ever been in close personal contact with these subversive groups.
Each of these revolts was based on a complex of extreme Iranian and 
Islamic doctrines against which Abu Muslim, after the ‘Abbasid accession 
to power, had acted many a time in his character of ‘Abbasid governor.
The rising of Bassam b. Ibrahim in 133/750-751*
mra ni W i — i wiif» « i«— * I ■ W  * <•> I* I.wt'—  j. niirmil *  r*' nT-|fTjrL-M„,i^-ou-n r- ' i anrr
Bassam, first associated with the Uraayyad governor of Khurasan 
Hagr b* Sayyar then defected to Abu Muslim, was one of the early 
‘Abbasid partisans. He vras one of the commanders in Qa^aba1 s army 
which invaded Ira^, then he vras stationed in Syria with the IQiurasanjs
4 4 Xunder the command of Abdallah b. All.
(cont.) from individual men which are worthy of strong wonder and 
awe until my attention fell in passing on the life of Abu Muslim 
of Khurasanian stock, who with high purpose and skill extirpated, 
root and. branch a government like the government of Ban! TTmayya, at 
the peak of. power and the height of fortune, and who scraped their 
proud face into the■dust of baseness.... The flame of revolution 
vras lit in my heart, and the devotion and skill of the Khurasanian made 
life and ease forbidden (baram) for rao. I knew that to consider deeds 
difficult is nothing but meanness of spirit.and baseness and vileness 
of nature and that every difficult thing is simpler to possessors of 
resolution and every trouble is acc©X)ted by those with seal.” See 
N.R.ICeddie ^ ?he pan-Islamic appeal',’ M.E.S.. ’ vol. 3, 1966. , ’
AMibar, fol. 157b; Tab., II, pp. 1959, 1996; III, pp. 18, 81, 48.
v'
It should be remembered that after the abortive rising of Abu
< - 
Mugammad al-Sofyani in northern Syria, the latter retreated and took ,
refuge in Tadmur. Presumably BaeiSm was sent to Tadmur, first to crush
the resistance of this Kalbite city which had hitherto, due to its
isolated geographical situation far in the desert, been defying the
*Abbasid authority, and secondly to arrest Abu Muhammad al-Sofyani. f
After occupying Tadmur B an samrob el led against ‘Abdallah b. cAli with
whom he had some differences* However Bassam does not seem to have
been trusted by the Kalbites of Tadmur with whom he had a few skirmishes.-
His Khurasan! troops also bogan to abandon him and he was defeated by
Khaaim b* Khuzayma al-Taraimi at al-Mada in* But Bassam, having escaped, > •
** « 2
wandered, adcording to Baladhuri, from pla£© to place until he contacted 
the gusaynid Ja‘far al-gadiq to whom he proposed collaboration with 
the establishment of a gusaynid caliphate in view* Al-gadiq. fearing 
the ‘AbbasIds, suspected that Bassac^s move was a trick on the part
of the authorities, and immediately informed the latter who seised
— « r 3
Bassam at gira and executed him* Azdifs account is brief and confirms^
Baladhuri ♦ s in that it asserts that Bassam worked for an*Alid caliphate- 
but was deceived by the gusaynids who handed him over to the ‘Abbasids.
If true this account substantiates the assumption that the ‘Abbasid-
i
Ansjb. fol.. 802a; Tab., Ill, pp. 75-77.
Ansab. fol. 802a-802b; cf. Tab., Ill, p.75.
^As&i, fol* 121. ’
A M  • . ^  ;. V
gusaynid relations were. cox^dial; if fabricated it may have been 
intended to stress the piety and peaceful inclination of al~§adiq.* : 
Be it as it may, Bassam1s rising represents ‘anotherepisode in the 
series of revolts byfdisappointed partisans who turned against the 
*Abbaside and used *Alid or other anti-*Abbasid slogans to express 
their resentment*
The revolt of ‘Abdallah b* *All 
Vbdallah1s revolt had three important characteristics. It was 
the revolt of a prominent *Abbasid who claimed the succession to: the 
throne as a rival to his nephew Abu Ja‘far; the revolt of an ^Ahbasid 
partisan whose activity in promoting the cause of da *wa was well 
recognized;^ the revolt of Syrians against the new Iraki-IChurasani 
regime* The desperate Syrians paid no attention to the fact that the 
leader: was an *Abbasid figure, they were happy to use him as al-Amin 
later on to try and avenge their own humiliation on the IChurasanis who 
had brought their supremacy down*
‘AbdaUhhb. *Ali was an ambitious and capable *Abbasid, He vras 
chosen to lead the Khurasani-Ir aki troops in the fight against liar wan 
II. After the latter* s death he vras appointed govexmor of Syria and 
put in charge of the Thnghur too* Befox*e the death of Abu *1 Abbas, : 
*Abdallah is said to have visited him at al-Anbar in 136/7:55 A,33. a n d 1
^Ansabt fols* 760a ff.
^ It is also reported that he vras arrested after the failure of Ibn 
Mu awiya*s revolt for his participation In it-then released by Ilarwan : 
(Ansab, fol. 767b). '
Tab.Ill, p.84.
was instructed to lead the first Jihad against the Byzantines in the 
‘Ahbasid period,1 He was well on his way to the frontiers when the- 
news of the caliph’s death was broken to him by two messengers from . .
‘isa b. Musa declaring that the new.caliph was Abu J a ‘far ‘Abdallah • 
the brother of Abu *1 ‘Abbas. ‘Abdallah b. ‘All then proclaimed himself 
caliph claiming that Abu *1 ‘Abbas had already promised him the suc­
cession to the caliphate when he undertook to lead the ‘Abbasid force
m, ’ 2 i
against Harwan XI. Abdallah*s claim to the caliphate is difficult,
m m  •
to establish. To judge by the fears expressed by the new caliph Abu 
Ja‘far and his companions on their way back from Mecca as well as by 
the important delegation sent to ‘Abdallah to inform him of the caliph’s 
death,^ ‘Abdallah*s opposition had been expected by the ‘Abbasids.
This is confirmed by the fact that §alik b. ‘All had been ordered 
before ‘Abdallah* s revolt to march to Syria and take the oath fx*om
£ mm ^3 mm j
Abdallah. How it is significant that according to Baladhuri Abu 1
{ m m  £ £ ***
Abbas had in fact promised Abdallah b. Ali the succession to the . 
caliphate after him, but Sa‘id b. ‘Amr al-Makhziimx advised him not 
to take the caliphate from the line of Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah >
£ £ mm
b. Al“ Abbas and he accepted his advice. If it had actually been made,
1 m m  mm
Ansab, fol. 762a citing Mada*ini; Y a ‘qubi, II, 455; Tab., Ill, 91; 
Azdi, fol. 15.8; gubda, vol. 1, p.57*
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Ansab, fol. 762a; Tab., Ill, pp. 91-92; see also Khalifa, Tarikh, fol, •
289. '
*7.
Ansab, fol, 509; Tab., Ill, p.90 citing al-Mada‘ini*
^Ansab, fol* 76lb; Tab., Ill, 91,
^a'tiubl, II, 437.
Ansab, fol, 808b citing Abdallah b. galit*’
this promise may have been given privately and have been known to 
the inner eirel© of the ‘Abbasids and would indeed explain their fears 
of ‘Abdallah after Abu *1 ‘Abbas' death,
‘Abdullah b. ‘ill is said to have . sought the advice of 
his foster brother Yasid who told him "You had a batter claim to this 
matter j/the caliphate/ beoduse you are an uncle and the uncle is like 
the father"# If this account is true ‘Abdallah's adviser seems to 
have suggested to him to use the same argument on which the ‘Abbasids 
based their claim in general# However, ‘Abdallah did not raise this f 
argument publicly; in the khujba he said " Abu *1 ‘Abbas summoned 
his x^elativee and offox,ed the succession to the one who undertook 
the task of fighting Marwan, It was on that condition I did what I 
did#"^ It is true that the commanders of the Khurasani troops under
M s  control paid homage to him, ^ but from the very beginning the en- .
thusiastic support came from the Syrian pro-Umayyad tribal leaders#
t ' 4-One of them said in reply to Abdallah* s appeal "I am your spear", ;
Worth noting is the hostile relations between the Kliurasanis and the
‘ i,.a
£ 4*IPr Am
Syrians.and Jasirites In Abdallah*s very army. According to Mada ini 
‘Abdallah first summoned the IOinrasani leaders who took the oath to 
- him without enthusiasm, Then ho summoned the Syrian end Jasirito 
leaders who supported him in their majority though some of them made ;
XICufi, fol# 237a,
Ansab, fol# 76lb~762a; Tab#, HI* 92; Asdi, fol, 14I| Y a ‘q.ubl, II, 
437-8J g#H.A,, pp# 211-212; Mnru.i, VI, p. 176; ffalthrl, p. 150# 
Compare KufT'fol, 237a.
Ansab. fol. 762a; Tali, III, 92; Azdi, fol. 141.
Ansab, fol. 762a citing Hada’ini; Hug., fol. 240a.
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cautious remarks. This can also be Inferred from the lists of the
new governors and commanders who were Syrians in their majority* ;
‘bthnan b, Sar-a^a al-Asdi was appointed governor of Damascus, Zafr b.
‘l^ ira al-Muhallabi of Qimsrin, al-gakkam b, pab ‘an of Palestine a
and Mansur b, da ‘una al-Kalbi chief of the police. Furthermore
"mm 'I
KhurasanI commanders in Arminya, Adhurbayjan, Samos at a and garran^ 
who wei’e not subject to his control refused to pay allegiance to Mli. ■
‘Abdallah ©v6n tried to kill gumayd b, Qagjaba , but the latter knew :
of tho conspiracy and defected to the caliph, ‘Abdallah*s suspicions 
of the Khurasan is wex^ e aggravated by the news of the advance of the 
Khui’asani army under Abu Muslim, and he killed many thousands of thorn 
In cold blood.^ Mada1!!*! and Kufi state that in the ranks of ‘Abdallah/
the people of al-Sham formed the majority of the troops and cavalry, : 1
All the mosques of al-^ -Sham' proclaimed him as caliph. The support
/*
for ‘Abdallah was therefor© mainly derived from Syrians and Jasirites
and the conflict was clearly one between IChurasanls and Irakis on
tho one hand mid Syrians and Jazirites on the other,
‘Abdallali headed south and besieged garran where Muqafil al- :yi
i *“ 7 —  ^ * ■.
Akki resisted him with 4,000 soldiers, Abu Ja far sent an army on which.
XAnsab. fol. 762b.
2m a . . Tab., Ill, p.93. . • . 
Tab., Ill, 94; T a ‘qub:i, u f p.439; Aadl, p.142; Ztibfla, 1, 57. 
kab., Ill, 94; laama. 2. 255-6.
 ^Ayni, citing Mada‘ini, fol, 24a; Kufi, fol. 237a.
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Imama, p.237, J ^  (but *le wrongly places the rising
in the reign of Abu *1 ‘Abbas); Tab., Ill, 96; Huruj, VI, 176;
Ayni, fol. 24a. 1
7Tab., Ill, 94; Asdi, fol. 142. ■. y . Ay./A',
he spent between 12 million and 18 million d i r h a m s . H e  also
p
increased their pay from 60 dirhams a month to 80 dirhams. Estab- = , 
lishing his headquarters in a monastery on the Tigris called Dayr al- 
Jathllq, the caliph ordered al-gasan b. Qatiaba to join Abu Muslim 
and also stationed troops in many strategic positions on the way 
between Syria and Irafc: such as Qarqisiya, Hit, Balad and Tikrit, for­
bidding them to leave theix* positions, even if they heard of the defeat 
of (Abdallah b. *Ali.^ He was obviously afraid that Vbdallah might 
make a swift attack and surprise him in his imperial province of ‘ira^. 
Initially Abu Ja‘far resorted.to his old conspiratory methods. He 
ordered Muhammad b* §awl an early ‘Abbasid partisan to join , the ranks ' 
of *Abdallah pretending to offer support to his claim. But this failedV
4 ' %
to deceive ‘Abdallah who killed the spy immediately. * *Abdallah entrenches 
himself in a strong position at Nigxbin. -^bu Muslim with al-gasah bi 
Qa^ijaba in the vanguard, gumayd b, Qo^Jaba in the right wing and. Khaslm 
al~Tamimi on the loft wing cleverly deceived the Syrians by declaring 
that he had no intention of fighting them and had only come to take up 
his appointment as governor of Syria. Hearing of his approach the 
Syrians defied *Abdallah* s efforts to warn them against the obvious * 
stratagem and decided to turn back to defend their cities where they 
had their property and their families, Then, in a swift swoop, .1’
^Yasqubl, II, 438; Tab., Ill, 94 > 90 citing Mada1ini; Muruj, VI,pp. 176f.
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Ansab, fol. ?63a-b. Commenting on that Baladhuri says that it was Abu *1 
Abbas who decreased the soldiers* pay to 60 dirhams per month. How; - 
Abu Ja far raised-it again to secure their loyalty to his cause.
Abu Muslim occupied ‘Abdallah*s previous strategic position. The
war lasted for about four months in the course of which Abu Muslim
was able to contact the rest of the Khurasanis in Abdallah Is camp who
had already started to defect. In a fierce battle at Higibin, the
Syrians were utterly defeated and began to retreat, ‘Abdallah did
3 -
not wait, but fled with a number of his close associates. Abu Muslim
p
ordered ‘Abdallah'not to be pursued," thus giving him the opportunity 
to escape, which must have enraged A]^ Ja‘far. *Abdullah1$ brother
and hair *Abd al«§amad b. ‘All who had been appointed by him governor
- — 3
of-Jaalra. flod to Raqqa and then to Ra^afa where he was arrasted.
Once again, the IQiurasanls defeated the Syrians but this time
-  4
Abu Muslim proclaimed the aman and no atrocities were committed.
It is Interesting to note that it was discussed in the presence of Abu
Muslim who was braver, tho Khurasanis or the Syrians. Significantly
** S * \ h ^ ^
enough the comment of Abu Muslim was: IaP
A Syx^ian delegate; , who came to apologize to the caliph, describod
‘Abdallali's revolt a3 ffltna and admitted their full involvement in it.
The caliph accepted the apology and returned to some of them the property
he had confiscated. The revolt of ‘Abdallah b, ‘All was significant
^Ansab, fol, 764a; Tab., Ill, pp. 95-96; Kufi, fol. 237b; Aadl, fol. 148
Jah,, j).103.
Aa'qubi, II, 440.
->Ansab, fol. 764a; Tab., Ill, 98-99.
in that it revealed, as has been stated before, ui any discinctive 
characteristics of the structure of the j^uraoanx army, the very 
army who brought the ‘Abbasids to power. M&iy ghurasoni,leaders 
on both sides bore Arab names. The enlistment of th© Khurasanis ;
by ‘Abdallah b. ‘All together with the Tamanites is also significant
in so far as it indicates their connection mainly with the tribal
1 « •* --i
confederation of Yaman. According to the author of Imama wa*l aiyasa,*
‘Abdallah appealed to Ahl ICiurasan and listed them together with the
Syrian Y©mites and showered them with extravagant gifts, but then
returned and killed them. Still more important is that the Khur^sani
commanders who were on the side of the caliph resented his decision
to appropriate the possessions of * Abdallah. Abu Muslim and his army
commanders protested declaring that ‘Abdallah* s property was ghanima and
p:
the caliph was only entitled to one fifth, adding "The rest is ours".| e
* « f* ' -
As Abu Ja‘far feared the consequences, he wrote & letter giving all 
the money to them with a promise to double it fox1 them,. The extent 
and significance of this disagreement between the caliph and the 
ghurasani commanders can only be assessed if one goos back to the 
Khurasan of the late Umayyad period where disagreement about the ghanima 
was one of the causes of the conflict between the Umayyad caliph, who • 
tried to acquire as much of it as possible, and the Huqatila, who
__          i _ . ' 1= / "■
Imama, v*ol. 2, pp.
considered that they had the .right to share it. It was this very v
« ■* «• 1
issue which was utilised by the 4Abbasid propagandists in Khurasan/'
In their speeches in Kufa both Abu Salama and Abu *1 ‘ Abbas condemned
the Umayyads for their greed and promised the people *Aj5/ and a right
to the fihanlma. ■ However, all sources agree that Abu I-luslira rejected
the demands of Abu J&‘far and distributed part of the possessions as
booty among the troops. In their last meeting Abu Ja‘far asked Abu 
» (
Muslim to account for Abdallah’s property, he replied "I distributed
2
it among the army in order to strengthen your cause". This episode 
provides additional evidence of the mainly Arab composition of the 
Khurasani troops. The Khurasan! troops of the ‘Abbaeid era voiced the 
same complaint, and adopted the some attitude in respect of the ghanima 
as the Arab Iluqattla of Khurasan in the late Umayyad period.
As for the f ate of ‘Abdallah b. *Ali, he was able to take refuge
«  t  *  3
with his brother Sulayman b. Ali in Bagra. Having got rid of Abu 
Muslim in 137/754r5/-theoaliph pressed Sulayman b* ‘All to bring ‘Abdallah 
to the court but Sulayman ignored the order, whereupon he was dismissed 
from his post and replaced by Sufyan b. Ilu awiya al-4Iuhallabi, Fearing 
a new move by ‘Abdallah, Abu Ja‘far reshuffled the whole administration 
of Bagra appointing a dependable .jafrib al-Barid and stationing a detach­
ment 4,000 strong led by Rawft b. IJatirn al-Huhollabi. Then ho sent Abu 
al-Asad with reinforcements until 12,000 IGiur&sanis wore stationed at
h a b . , III, 110.
Tab., ITJ, 114.
Ansab. fol. 764a; Tab., Ill, 98; *Aadl, fol. 142.
Bagr a* ^ Heavy pressure .was exerted on Sulayman b* *Ali who having
lost liia influence, found it more difficult to resist. The sons of :/
‘All the ‘Abbasid (the uncles of the caliph) then gave in and demanded
an ajiian for their brother. Yaqubi, Tabari and the author of -al~ *Uyun
wa * 1 bad a * :tq are brief and vague on that and maintain that the apian A '
was written by Abu Ja‘far himself, giving the impression that the caliph
«. 2 — -»
took the initiative and suggested the offer of an aman. Binawari, who
generally has several confusing remarks on this period, alleges that 
it was Abu Muslim who pardoned Abdallah b. Ali, However, according ?
•*£» « w A  feEl { K* W  £ ^
to Kufi it was Sulayman b, Ali who askOd Abu «Xa far for an anian,
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and whon the latter agreed Isa b, Ali Abdallah’s other brother asked 
his secretary I bn al-Muqaffa ‘ to write the oaan which was strict to the . 
extent that, when Abu Ja‘far road it, he enquired who had composed it, 
and when he knew that it was Ibn al-Muqaffa* he commented *Have not 1 
we got anybody who would rid us of him?" That the initiative for the 
aman was taken by Sulayman b, *Ali is confiimied by Baladhurl, Jalishiyarl 
and Azdr.p The aman was so carefully composed that it did not leave 
a single loophole for Abu Ja£far. According to Baladhurl the caliph 
was angered by the sentence "If the Commander of the Faithful does not 
fulfil the commitments to him £*AbdallahJ may he be deprived /of his . 
rightsj and the Muslims will be f roe of their oath to him.,f According 
to Jahshiyari the clause which was most irritating to Abu Ja‘far was 
^Ansab, fol, 766b,
that ha was asked to add with his own hand a few lines at the bottom : 
of tlie aaans "If, secretly or in public or by any manoeuvre directly 
or indirectly or by any x^ uee whatsoever, I malts Abdallah or one of 
those he brings with him, any injury small or great or if.X eauso them 
any harm may X be x’spudiated by Muhammad b. 4All b. Abdallah and may ; 
the whole community of the Muslims consider itself free to deny the 
oath of allegiance to me, to fight me and to emancipate itself from 
my protection,.• Hay it be their duty not to obey me any mope but to ; 
give their help to any, who resist me,,, I have written this promise 5jx 
my own hand and without intentions to the contrary* Hay God except it 
from me and watch oyer its execution,” It is important to point out that 
the whole text of the auian is preserved in Tarikh al~Hougil which al­
though different in' wording from the extract of Jahshiyar! confirms . 
that Xbn al-Huctaffa* took extra precaution in order not to leave for 
Abu Ja far a room for a trick, The caliph, whose main preoccupation it 
was to get hold of ‘‘Abdallah, accepted this aman on the condition that ' 
he saw eAbdallah with his own eyes. But when *Abdallah was brought, to 
him he ordered Abu al-Aahar his pa jib not to produce him but to have ; . A 
him immediately arrested. J‘ Later, in 147, Abu Ja‘far tried to use ‘isa 
b# Musa to kill ‘Abdallah. .Befox'e going on the pilgrimage he gave ‘lea • ■ 
the secret order to kill him, but the latter was advised by hie own
(conl.) ‘La Biographie d’Ibn al-Muc^affa\  Arabica, 1954, pp. 519 ff.
1 "»
Ansab, fol. 767a? Tab., Ill, pp. 528-50? Jah., 150; F.II.A,, pp. 257-8
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secretary not to obey the order. On his return from Mecca Abu Ja far 
confident that. ‘Abdullah had been-killed believed that the -time had 
come to rid himself of ‘isa b. Musa who was a potential danger to 
his son al-Mahdi - even though he had already conceded his rights 
to him, incited ‘Abdullah’s brothers to ask for his release, and ordered 
*Xsa to produce him. One cun imagine Abu J a ‘far’s surprise and dis­
appointment when ‘isa actually brought ‘Abdallah. However the caliph 
failed to release him on the pretext that uThe people of Khurasan would
■j
kill him because of what he has inflicted upon them /in Syria/, M ‘
‘Abdallah was finally killed in obscure circumstances in 147 A.XT./,
2
764^5,A.D. There are many accounts on the way he was murdorcd, the
bios i; popular among thorn states that the house in which he wan restricted
collapsed over him, A Qa<}i was sent to testify that he h ad died a
natural death and not by force. It was not only ‘Abdallah was killed
but a], so the unfortunate secretary I bn al~Mu'qaf f a ‘ who had written the
amain in question and who cried out on his death "Oh tools of tyrants.."
- 3
The Rawandiyya Sectarians 
It has already been pointed out that, although the ‘Abbasid propa­
gandists wero mainly aiming at the Arabs of Khurasan, they mado common / 
cause with the Alids and the Kharijites of Khurasan and actually excluded
hnaab. fol. 767b? Tab., Ill,-p.320.
2  m .  m m  m m  —
~Aneab. fols. 767a™768a; Xab.2 XII» p.551; Imqwa, 2, 265; Ya*cjubi,
11» 445; F.H.A... 255-9; Kuru.1./VI, 218; A£dT, fol. 148.
^Ansab, fol. 555 citing M&da*ini; Kufi,^fols. 258a-b citing Hada*ini;
Jah., £>p, 105-4; Jotiis, Alchlaq, al«4Cuttab, p.47 (ed. Finlcel); Sourdel,
La-Biographic, op.clt.f p.315. "
' ' . ■ . . 2 So- v  ■ "■ ;; - .
• ■ ' v ■ i iv..
no group or body of any kind from the Anti-Umayyad movement. Hor did
they even condemn the subversive activities of Bihafarid when it started. . ;
at Nishaxrhr.as long as it was directed against the Umayyad rule*
While the Hashiralyya propaganda movement concentrated on items
like Umayyad tyranny, the revenge for Ahl al-Bayt who had the best
claim to the Imaiiiate, and the call' for the Book of God and the Sunna
of the Prophet, it also admitted groups of Muslim or non-Muslim extremist;
tendencies and made use of their ideas. The episode of Khldash? the Rawandiy-
ya>risings in the reign of Abu *1 ‘Abbas and al-Mangur and the Persiani;
insurrections are all proofs of that. 1
Thus the Hashimiyya represented a complex of doctrines .which -rorm-M. At A
c-
fleets the real nature of the Abbasid propaganda. The Hashimiyya was 
also c ailed Rawandiyya, however the Rawandiyya was a section within the / .
Hashimiyya which after the Abbasid victory split into several sub- 
sects. Its name Rawandiyya is after the village Rawand neax* Hiehapux’,'
It Is highly significant that ‘Abdallah al-Rawandi was among the early - 
pax’tisans of the ‘Abbasid movement. According to Akhbar al~ ‘Abbas,
‘Abdallah al-Rawandi’s name appears in a list of the ‘Abbasid partisans 
side by side with. Abu IQiuaayma Musa b, ‘AJiyya, a brother of Abu ol- 
Jahm, and Abu Turab mid others, If this list is authentic it indicates , 
contrary to Professor Cohen*s view, that tho Rawandiyya chiefs wore part ,
^Flraq, p.28, Sa*d al-Ash.fa.ri, pp. 59, 65; Xgfar, p.19; Haqalat, p.21,•.. 
^Sadighi, op,pit., p,210.
Afchbar, fol. iOSTo. ' .
of the inner initiated circle of the ‘Abbasid movement. They shared
the view of other Hashimiyya • p artis mis that the *Abbasids had a better
1 **claim to the caliphate than any other branch.* However, the Rawandiyya
may have expressed ideas not necessarily shared by other sectors of 
the movement* As the ‘Abbasid propagandists had already had the ex­
perience of Khidash they must have been extremely cautious in addressing 
each group and in expressing only ideas which suited it.
As £hr as the doctrines of the Rawandiyya are concerned, Iiusliin 
2historians attribute to them extreme ideas which are usually associated 
with sects such as Kaysqnlyya and Khuramiyya. They are said to have 
believed in the transmigration of souls (metempsychosis). They claimed 
that the divine soul had passed from the prophets to ‘All b. Abi 'falib 
and thon to the Iraamfe one after the other till Ibrahim the Imam. They 
also professed the doctrine of the incarnation of the divine being: 
one Rawandite sub-sect regarded the ‘Abbasid Caliphs as God' and Abu 
Muslim as his prophet; another considered Abu Muslim as the incarnation
i
of the deity. Historical accounts also accuse them of Istijilal al-Vioronmt 
(declaring permissible what is forbidden) such as the communal sharing \ 
of women which probably goos back to the Khuramiyya belief, and also 
the belief that knowing the identity of the Imam is faith in itself 
and exempts from religious obligations. The Rawandiyya existed in 
Khurasan among the, ‘Abbasid propagandists well before the appearance
PP. 41 f, 46-47; Sa d al-Ashari, pp. 69f; Igfara, p.19;
Huqalat. p.21; 3agh., p.540; Jfas m, p.90. ' .
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Tab., XXI, 129, 418; Ansab, fol. 548; Firaq. p.42; Shah., pp. 115,156.
HR* 23,2^fx; Cahen, pp. 522, >51; ,
.I.2 ( Abbasids), •
3adighi, op.pit 
(Khuramiyya); E
23X.
of Abu Hu blira there. Tabari1 states that the Umayyad governor of Khurasan
Aead al-Qasri killed a number of Rawandites who professed ghtiluww
declaring that the Imams were Gods and they were libertine in their
ideas. The da*wa made use of them until victory was achieved.
Howeverf only one wing of these extremists remained loyal to the , r
*Abbasid regime. They were the *Ahbasiyya who believed that the prophet
had bequeathed the Imamate to his uncle al-‘Abbas and to the latter* s - \'V.
2
descendants after him. Others fell out with them after they had seised 
power presumably because they were disappointed with their new policies,.. 
Others still rejoined the Alids after the death of Ibrahim the Imam. \ 
Abu Muslim remained faithful to the *Abbasids. According to Tabari, the
' #■>* *P* pitt p
Kawahdiyya led by Abu isl^ aq revolted at firmidh and ^aliqan and killed 
Abu Ihi9limf s commander Nasr b. Rashid in 155; IQialid al-Dhuhli and *Iea
*  * »,) tmium
b. hah&n pursued the Rawandiyya and destroyed the hot beds of 'their 
resistance.4 The author of Akhbar al-*Abbas^ confirms the conflict 
within the revolutionaxues. Accox*ding to him "Tho followers of Khldash, 
that is to say the extremist group of the 4Abbasid movement lod by Abu - 
Khalid revolted against Abu Muslim in Khurasan11. Abu Muslim tried in 
vain to arrest their leader who fled to Hawara * al-Hahr» A new device 
Abu Muslim tried out to get hold of him is not without Interest. He 
sent women p artisans of the da *wa ^  disguised
^Tab., III, pp. 418-419» citing Hada*ini.
^Sa*d al-Ash/ari, pp. 39* 69-70; Firaq. p. 42; Khi$a$, vol. 4, 173. 
^Akhbar, fol, 199.
4Tah,, III, p.85.
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>Akhbar fol. 199. This is,the first -time in the history of the Abbasid
( . - , (oont*)
■as beggars to .spy for M m* However he was not successful in that 
as Abu Khalid was arrested and killed later in the reign of al-Mangur* . 
According to Ja^is; these extremists tried at one time to. poison Abu 
Muslim.
Thus one rebellious wing of the Rawandiyya rebelledand was ruth­
lessly crushed by Abu Muslim. But this does not mean however that the 
whole Rawandiyya sect fell out with the ‘Abbasids or Abu Muslim. In 
156/755-4 when Abu Muslim went on the pilgrimage to Mecca he is said 
to have started with 8,000 troops; it is probable that they included 
a group of Rawandiyya fanatics. Sonbadh, al~Muqanna‘, Hay sale and
i
2Banawayyah were commanders in his army and ardent supporters of him.
It is likely_ that those and others were among the figures' whom Abu 
Muslim favoured since the advent of the ‘Abbasids. They formed the 
nucleus of the later sects such as the Abu Huslimiyya and the Razmiyya. 
After Abu Muslim*s death al-Mangur refrained from doing any harm to 
his army, part of which accepted the offer of al-Manpur and stayed in 
the capital. It was probably those who stayed at al-Hashimiyya who 
revolted in 141 A.H./758 A.D. against al-Manpur.^ ¥hat confirms the
(cont.) daSra that the rdle of the women is mentioned. Although the 
account of Akhbar al-‘Abbas is vague and somewhat incoherent, still 
It is clear Hfch’at women were employed in the da‘wa. Abu Muslim tried - 
to utilise them even after the victory, this time against a mutiny 
within the revolutionary movement, it is the first time that the 
Abbasid da wa is said to have utilizedwomen in their subversive ■ 
activities long before the Fajimids who were not original in that, 
as has been assumed, but only imitators.
^gaywan, vol. 7, p.83.
^Ansab. fol. 557; Tab., Ill, p.100; Bad*, 6, 82; Sadighi, op.cit., 
pp. 135 ff.
^Qne. therefore should distinguish between the early Rawandiyya and its 
later sub-divisions - see Mui'ui, VI, pp. 54 f» 58.
~  (cont.)
nit- '
assumption that the Rawandiyya were part of the army of al-Mangur
is the account of Tabari which states that when the Rawandiyya mutinied 
against Abu Ja‘far and fought him, he consulted Qathm b» al-‘Abbas 
the ‘Abbasid who was an elderly man, saying "Do not you see what 
/trouble/ we are in as these troops have mutinied against us. I fear 
they will all unite against us and the affair will slip from our hands*
¥hat do you think?" This indicates that there were Rawandites among 
his troops* After he had disposed of Abu Muslim al-Mangur showed no 
great zeal in suppressing them and their ideas. What is more indicative
that he tolerated their existence and condoned their heresies while they
-2 -  ■remained his loyal servants is the account of Tabari that when Abu
Baler al-Eudhali drew the attention of al-Man pur to their ideas which 
deified the caliph, al-Manpur replied after a pause "I prefer them to
i
be loyal to us and be sent to Hell by God than to be disobedient to 
us and be sent to paradise.," But when things reached the limit the
3caliph had two hundred of them arrested, presumably to restrain them.
The Rawandiyya protested against the imprisonment of their leaders 
and succeeded in liberating them by force. When al-Mansur heard of 
this sudden Bute tiny in his own capital he was taken by surprise and 
his ‘position was precarious. He even did not have a horse ready to ride. 
However, there were only six hundred of them and the people of the city
. ( c o n t . ) '
Ansab, fol. 548; Tab., XII, 129ff* According to Ibn al-*Adim the 
Rawandiyya riots of 141 were not limited to al-IIaghimiy^a. He states 
that some of them created disturbances in galb and Harran (Zubda, 
vol. 1, p.59)*
hah., Ill, p.365. ' .
2
Op.cit., p.132.
\ ’ab., III* 29, 132 citing Hada’ini; Ansab, fol. 548; Dina, p.380; (cont.)
were1 called upon to join in the fighting against them. The critical 
situation was rescued by the efforts of veteran Arabs such as the previous; 
Umayyad commander Ma‘an b. Za'ida al-Shaybani who was consequently
«*# PM*
shown favours by al-Manpur, Abu Napr Malik b. al-Haytham al-ghuza i
who until recently had been a supporter of Abu Muslim, Khazim b,
Khuaayma al-Tamimi and ‘tlthman b. Nablk. Ma‘an al-Shaybanx pleaded
with the caliph not to expose himselfbut to distribute money to per-
» * 
suade the people to join in the fighting, but the caliph preferred to
rely on his personal influence rather than money. He went out and
supervised the fighting, although later he regretted having exposed
himself saying; "A stray arrow could have killed me".
The caliph*s leniency or probably lack of sincerity towards the
Rawandiyya is also evident after their mutiny was crushed. He did
not, for instance, object when a Rawandife called Razza»ttook refuge
with Jafar b. al-Manpur,1 The son of ‘Abdallah al-Rawandi,2 garb
was given an estate in Baghdad called al-Harbiyya. Hewas also stationed .
|<||. I iiwR m .  111. 1.1 I I I IWu V  j
with a Rabija of 2,000 troops in Mogul in 147. Although the accounts
- i
at our disposal are vague it covtld be said that those extremist fanatical
partisans seem to have exercised renewed activity whenever the question
of succession arose. Tabari^ had preserved a number of names of military
‘cont. yi-luruj , VI ,' p p 168-70; Fakhri/ ^ 7  ]~42-l43; Dhahabl, Duwal, 
vol. 1, p.72. — :.kv
1Tab., Ill, p.132.
See T^b., Ill, pp. 328, 296, 353; Buldan, 232; Iftatib, I, p.85.
3,fab., III, p.341.
figures among them significantly Hapr b* $arb b. ‘Abdallah ,al-Rawandi 
who were fanatical partisans of al-Manpur* s son, al-Kahdi, They pro­
tested against the fact that ‘isa b. Musa had been appointed heir 
of al-Manpur to al-Mahdi*s detriment. Mow this account becomes signi- ; 
ficant when we remember that a wing of the Rawandiyya insisted that 
the caliphate passes from al-Kanpur to al-Mahdi (father to son).
They used to threaten ‘isa b, Musa identifying him with the sacrificial 
vcow in.the Qor *an. Those fanatics appeared again when al-Mahdi ascended 
the throne. Tabari1 states that when al-Manpur died in the gijaz and ' 
he pilgrimage caravan was on its way back to Baghdad Musa b. al~Hahdi 
(later caliph al-Hadl) was among them. When they learned, that the 
new heir apparent was ‘isa b. Musa sounds of resentment were heard. 
Tabari adds " ‘Ali b. ‘isa b. .Mahan (who was one of Musa b. al-Mahdi*s 
guards) attacked ‘isa b. Musa because'of what he had done to the 
Rawandiyya.** Among those who joined him was Abu Khalid al-Karwudhi who 
was one of their chiefs in this mutiny* But Mufcammad b. Sulayman was 
able to restore order in the caravan.
The Rawandiyya were thus among the early ‘Abbasid partisans
2 They were even called Abna* al-dawla^ a remark 
which whatever it referred to it points out to their close ties with / 
the regime. After the advent of the ‘Abbasids to power, they fell out
with’ their own extremist wing which rebelled in Khurasan and Irafc. ;
1 “ : ' —  ■ — ■ — -—    — — ■— -—  -----------
Qp.cit., pp. 455-456..
^Fihrist, II, p.204*.
% n  . ;
Al-Mangur, though he hoped to reach a compromise with them, found it 
very difficult to permit them to circulate their ideas publicly because 
he did not wish to face the hostility of the religious traditionists :
and Faqihs. Despite the "day of the Rawandiyya*' when about six hundred ; h /; 
extremists were hilled al-Mangur refrained from dealing harshly with 
them, and many remained. In Khurasan Abu Muslim seems to have increased 
his popularity and influence. He seems to have made close associates 
among the nativesMus 1 iins and non-Muslims, presumably outof political 
expediency rather than rebellious intentions. Ho doubt this made him 
more influential and ix>tentially dangerous in the eyes of the caliph. :
There were figures in his entourage such as Sonb^dh and al-Muqamma* who 
were fanatical in their worship of Abu Muslim. Some of these figures V
- 2 t
were p artisans of a sub-sect of al-Rawandiyya. Al-Muqamraa , for
example, was a follower of the Rassamiyya. However although some of 
this; fanatical Rawandiyya branch which deified Abu Muslim^ rebelled to 
avenge his death, he can hardly be blamed for any of them. This series f;' 
of outbreaks was merely a protest by disappointed ‘Abbasid partisans 
as well as the native population against the unfulfilled promises of 
the new regime.
^Dnly when one knows of the existence of extreme *Alid circles which 
deified their Imams, can one understand why al-Mansur was lenient with 
the Rawandiyya who believed in the divinity of the ‘Abbasid caliphs.
In a way he tried^toput tho Rawandiyya fanaticism to use for the do- i 
fence of the ‘Abbasid.
2 ' ; On t he origins, development, sub-divisions and doctrinal character of the
Rawandiyya see the detailed study of Sadighi, op.clt., pp. 187-228, ^
especially pp. 208-214 with references to heresiographies. See also E.l.
(Hashimiyya).
'-’Tab., III, pp. 85, 108, 101. .
i n *
The murder of Abu *1 Jahm b. ‘Ajiyya al~Bahili
He was one of the deputy da*is (Hu^ara* al-Uuqaba*) ^ . in XChurasan
during the revolution, he was a close associate of Abu Muslim and. seems
to have played a role in recruiting partisans to the nascent movement?
p
among them;was his brother. By Abu Muslim*s orders he joined Qa^aba 
on his way to I raff. He was Qa^aba’s secretary on the affairs of 
the t r o o p s I n  the battle of Nahrawan in 131 A.h . he was a leader 
of a detachment of TOO troops,^- On Qa^Jaba’s death after the battle 
of Upper Faluja, Abu *1 Jahra seems to have played an influential rSle 
in choosing al~§asan b. Qafjaba as the new commander in chief. In 
ICufa he played a leading r61e in the move which resulted in proclaiming 
the caliphate of Abu ’l^Abbas,^
However Abu *1 Jahm maintained the close relationship with Abu 
Muslim which was not impaired by distance and long absence. According 
to Tabari he was Abu Muslim’s spy and informed him of the affairs at
mm *7
the *Abbasid court. He also exerted a considerable influence on the. 
caliph himself which, however, seems exaggerated though he was called
-  t -  8
Wazir of the first Abbasid caliph by some historians. The rOle he
Aldihar, fol, 104b,
^0p,clt», fol, 105b,
3Tab., Ill, p.2001, II, 1953, I960.
Op.cit., III, pp. 3-4, citing Mate’ini.
5
OpiCit., p.15.
6 - ( - ~
Ansab, fol, 510, citing Abdallah b. §ali£ al~Maqarri; Tab., Ill, pp,
1 27-28, 35-36, : ;
^Tab*, III, p.67;. Imama, p,247*
played was, in fact, contradictory and even two-faced. Under al~Han§ur 
he apparently i>layed a part in the preparations for Abu Muslim’s death. 
However, he expressed his regret at Abu Muslim’s death, but soon re­
tracted that and even ousted Abu Muslim’s soldiers ordering them to 
retreat on the pretext that Abu Muslim was staying with the caliph for 
the day. He then interceded with the caliph in favour of Abu Muslim’s 
prominent companions: such as Malik al-IChusa r and obtained a pardon 
for them.^ Abu Ja*far was not prepared to tolerate a man known for - 
his Sympathies towards Abu Muslim and for his opportunist nature. 
According to Baladhurl the main a causation against him was that he
had written a letter to Abu Muslim expressing dissatisfaction with the 
new regime,
The caliph had him poisoned soon after Abu Muslim’s death. It is 
commenting on his death that a poet said:
’’Beware of drinking Suwaylg al-bawo because it was the 
cause of Abu *1 Jahm’s death.”3
An *‘Abbasid partisan and a commander who conquered.Abiward for 
the new regime. He then joined Qafrfcaba’s army which was heading for ^
^Tabi, III, pp, 110,111^0.6; Jah,, p,112.
Ansab, fol. 510 citing ‘Abdallah b. gali^ al-Maqarri.
^Ibid.; Jah.j p.156, ed. 1904; Fakhri, pp. 138-9.
' j;
Irafc.1 When Aim Muslim was murdered, his enraged hut frightened troops ;
remained outwardly quiet* Some stayed with a!—Mansur, others preferred.
to return to Khurasan. Trouble soon started among those-who returned
to Khurasan as m il as other loyal partisans of Abu Muslim who had
been stationed in several cities by him on his way to Mecca in 136 A.II./;
753A.B, Sonbadh was one of their leaders, he rose in 137 in Wish a pur /
to revenge Abu Muslim’s death. In a rapid move he seized Kishlpur. Qumus
- 2
and Rayy where he seised the treasuries of Abu Muslim* Then he advanced
to Ramadan to fight the caliph himself* He also contacted the I^pah-
badh o f Tabaris tan, Khorshld. and presented him with money and gifts
Abu Ja*far sent Jahwar al.-<ljlr with 10,000 troops and he was able to :
put down the revolt in little more than two months.4 Sonbadh fled to
^pabaristan but the Xspahbadh. presumably, did not want to create trouble
with the *Abbasids or to get rid of a potentially dangerous rebel
had him killed and possessed his possessions.^
However this was by no means the end of the troubles, according 
■»£) (
to Tabari Jahwar al~ Ijli and his army captured part of the treasures 
of Abu Muslim which had been in the possession of Sonbadh and did not
^Tab.,11, pp. 2000, 2001. * v /
^Ansab, fol, 357; Tab., Ill, pp. 119f; Ta'qubi, IiB p.442; Huru.i,
VI, pp. 188-9*
3SSadighi, op.cit., p.137.
4Tab., Ill* pp. 119-120; Ta*qubi, II, p.442; ff.H.A., p.223; see also 
Kalifa, Tarlkh, p. 289, Mnnta. Kliab, fol s. 123a-123b, ;
r ■  ^ • 
Ansab. fol. 557? Ibn Ijfandiyar, p. 117? Tab. p.120; Balmi. IV,
p. 367. . Compare Ya"qubi (ll, p.442) and.Mas'udi (VI, pp. 183-89) who
allege that he was killed in the battle. y :
6Tab., III, p.122.
send them to the caliph, Baladhurl^ also relates that Jahwar was 
brave and generous, and distributed all the booty among the soldiers.
t . ‘A
i
The matter of Abu Muslim’s treasure seems to recur as the bone of .
contention in several revolts, as the commander who obtains possession
of it is never willing to hand it over to the caliph, but considers
it his and his army’s rightful booty. The troops seem to have insisted
that it should be shared among them, while the caliph tried to grab as
much as he could of it. However i t was an ‘Abbasid promise that what
the troops h ad gained by war, the ffhanjma would be shared out among
them. V/hen he h eard of the distribution of money among the soldiers of
Jahwar, al-Mangur was greatly incensed. He sent a letter reproaching
2
him and dismissing him as governor of al-Rayy . But before risking 
any conflict with him al-Mangur sent V/a^afe b. gabib to test Jahwar* s 
loyalty, The messenger confirmed his mutinous intentions.^ Then al~ 
Mansur sent a new governor of al-Rayy Mujashi ‘ b. Yasid al-pabbi but 
Jahwar killed him and proclaimed the revolt.4 The caliph then sent an 
army led by Hazamard ‘Umar b. £[afs al-Muliallabi, after him another de­
tachment led by Muhammad b. al-Ash‘ath. The rebels were also threatened 
by another army from Khurasan. Jahwar al-'ljli was defeated after a 
fierce battle and fled heading for Adhurbayjan to take refuge with its
T  1“  ; _  —  - —  —  — ‘ --- ■
Ansab, fol. 558.
2ibia.
3
^Imama. vol. 1, p.209.
4,Ayni, fol. 32b.
governor Xazid b* gatim al-Muhal!abir a Yamanite, whom, he hoped
wuuld intercede for him'with Abu Ja‘far* However, he was killed
* 1by his own partisans before reaching Adhurbayjan* The caliph 
got hold at last of part of Abu Muslim* s treasux*es which were sent 
to him after Jahwar* s defeat. Significant here is the support given
by the Persian natives to Jahwar. Tabari cites names of Persian
% . ..
cavalrymen who joined Jahwar. This ia indicative of the dissatisfaction 
of the Persian natives with the new regime. It also shows how it i s 
still premature to speak of a Persian “national” struggle against the , 
Ai’&b rule. In the rising of Sonbadh, the Igpahbadh of Tabaristan 
sided with the ‘Abbasids, while in the revolt of Jahwar the Persian ■ A
natives raised their arms in his support.
The conspiracy against Khalid b. Ibrahim al-Dhuhli
-»  MM
Contrary to Kufi*s account Khurasan was not pacified after Abu 
Muslim*s death. Apart from a long series of mainly Iranian risings 
connected with the memory of Abu Muslim and manifesting the disappointment 
of the natives with the political and economic policy of the new regime, ' 
the central government had to face a number of revolts by the Arab 
governox's of the province who had been, in fact, the very authors 
of the ‘Abbasid revolution.
1
Ansab, fol. 558; Tab., Ill, p.122; Hujum,’ pp. 382-4*
2 ‘ - 
Tab., HI, p. 122, This shows that the lower order of the society i 11 Iran,'
to express their dissatisfaction, were willing to loin any rebel
whether an Iranian or an Arab.
atufi, fol. 241b.
Abu Da*ud Khalid b. Ibrahirn al-Dhuhli was appointed governor 
of Khurasan shortly before Abu Muslim’s death and then confirmed 
in office in 137/754-55* He had been the right hand of Abu Muslim 
throughout the revolutionary period and afterwards, and trusted with
mm
many important tasks especially the quelling of the Rawandiyya and 
the expansion, fcfi Trahsoxonia. During the crisis of Abu Muslim and /. ■ i;-,
in order to : sow the seeds of discord between Abu Muslim and Khalid 
al-Dhuhli, Abu Ja‘far thought it therefore expedient to put Khalid 
in charge of the province. Khalid, having been appointed governor 
of Khurasan, wrote to Abu Muslim requesting him to obey the caliph 
and not to return to Khurasan without his permission.^
About three years after the d oath of Abu Muslim in 140 A.H./757-8
— 2
A.D. part of the troops suddenly revolted against Khalid. Tabari’s 
vague a ccomit states no reason for the rebellion, and only mention^ :!; 
that the mutineers marched towards the governor1s house. Hearing 
of the noise of the approaching crowd, Khalid stepped on to the balcony 
to ascertain the cause of the trouble and f ell to his d eath. His chief , 
of police took over as deputy governor until the new governor arrived. "
Baladhurl^ followed by Maqrizi is both more explicit and coherent 
in his account. He relates that Khalid was deeply shocked by the news 
of Abu Muslim* s death and condemned Abu Ja*far*s treachery* Abu Ja*far
Ansab. fol. 539; Tab., Ill, pp. 107-8, 119.
2Tab., Ill, 128. .. • ' rv
Ansab,_fol. 559; Huq., fol. 99a-99b. According to Guardizi the followersA 
of Is^aq, tlie rebel of Transoxonia killed Khalid al-Dhuhli (see 
Sadlghl, op.olt., p.144). ■ . ~~
later aslced him to come to Irak, but he refrained from it saying 
"He /the caliph/ wants to ask me about the affairs and money of Abu 
Muslim.and kill me aftexurards”. He added "Let Abu Ja*far deceive 
others not me,"' Al-Kangur then tempted the Safoib al-Shurfra of Khurasan
Abu u$am Abd al-Ra^man b., Salim with the offer of governorship of 
IChurasan to undertake the murder of Khalid* Abu ‘Usam, in turn, incited 
the people of the quarter of KushQjaln Khalid’s residence to create a 
disturbance so that he could kill Khalid when he came out. Trying 
to find the cause of the trouble Khalid, who had weak eyesight, vent 
to the balcony to look and fell to his death. The people took the oath 1
of allegiance to al-Mansur before the deputy governor Abu
Thus the vagueness of Tabari’s account makes one suspect the exist­
ence of a conspiracy conducted by al-Mangur against Khalid al-bhuhlx who 
once trusted by Abu Muslim and was# to all.intents and purposes, his 
creature. This conspiracy is confirmed by Baladhurl, although Khalid*s 
death was not caused by the conspirators. It is significant to mentlba 
here that Khalid had already been condemned to death by the previous V 
caliph Abu fl * Abbas for obeying Abu Muslim’s ox’ders to kill Isa t. if 
Malian, one of the early Abbasid partisans. On the whole Khalid al-Dhohj 
had become a suspect whose services were no longer wanted.
hnsab. fol. 801a.
, U * " \  '
The revolt of 'Abd al~Jabbar b. *Abd al-Rabman al-Asdi
One of the *Abbasid veterans, he was a da‘i and an officer in 
the Khurasan! army.'*' He participated at the seige of wagit and then
t
was appointed gajtib al-Shurfa for Abu *1 * Abbas and then Abu Ja*far 
which shows that he had had their trust." According to Kufi and 
Tabari"5 his relations with Abu Muslim do not seem to have been cordial 
before the expedition against 4Abdallah b. ‘Ali Abu Muslim asked
al-Mangur to kill or imprison *Abd al-Jabbar among others for no
c
known reason but the caliph refused. His brothers *Abd al-Asiz and
1 f ** 4.
Umar were also favoured by the Abbasids,
In 140 A..H./757 A.D. *Aba al-Jabbar was appointed governor of 
« - 5Khurasan. Initially his conduct of the affairs and taxations seems 
to have been regarded as efficient. Then he is said to have exerted 
a heavy pressure on ‘the officers of the previous governors to extoi* t a 
certain amount of money from them. His harsh measures and persecution 
included both the local aristocracy and the Khurasan! figures who were 
accused of *Alid sympathies. The root to the new disturbances is to 
be sought In the policy of the caliph. According to Bal‘ami al-Mansur 
had ordered *Abd al-Jabbar to kill all the *Alid partisans in Khurasan
IAkhbar, fol. 104b; Tab., Ill, p.2003.
2
Ansab, fol. 540; Tab* III, p.67.
\ufi, fol. 237a; Tab., Ill, p. 100.
t i. ife* /
Ansab, fols. 540, 543; Ya qubi, II, 445; Tab., III, 122, 459-
F
JAnsab, fol. 542; Tab., Ill, 136; Ya(qubi, II, 445..
Bal ‘asii, IV, pp. 378 f t .
Baladhurl1 presents cAbd al-Jabbar himself as an *Alid sympathizer,
and relates that his downfall was due to court intrigues by the
chief of othe police al-Kusayyab b. Zuhayr al-pabbi who instigated the
caliph against him telling him of the large amount of money he had
collected and of his rebellious intentions, Al-Mangur-demanded that
a certain amount of the revenue should be sent to the central treasury.
Once again the old thorny matter was raised whether revenue should
remain in the province or be sent to the central government. Al-Mnagur‘
acted exactly like the Umayyad Caliphs in demanding that a share of
2the revenue be sent to the central treasury. All accounts agree 
that *Abd al-Jabbar killed several Khurasani pro-‘Abbasid commanders. 
Baladhurl calls them , Ya qubi gives them the name
 ^ while Tabari mentions some of their names such
as flujashi* b, al-JJarith al-Angari the governor of Bukhara, Khalid b, 
Kathir the governor of Quhistan and garish b. Mugammad al-Bhuhll. They 
were all killed or persecuted under the pretext of *Alid sympathies.
The caliph was cautious not to drive him to open revolt. On the advice 
of his wasir Abu Ayyub al-Muryani he decided to deprive him of the 
greater part of his army, to crush him the more easily. He, therefore, 
sent a letter ordering him to send Khurasan! .troops for the war against 
the Byzantines. *Abd al-Jabbar cleverly ' replied that the Turks were 
restive and scattering the IGiurasani troops might mean the loss of Khurasa
Ansab, fol. 541; al-Musayab*s name is also connected with another revolt 
in Sind (Tab., Ill, 138-140).
2 -*
Ansab, fol. 342; Yaq‘ubi, II, p.445; Tab., Ill, 128.
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Al-Mangur then wrote a new letter expressing his deep concern about
the danger threatening Khurasan on the part of the Turks, and indicating
that troops from IraJj: were going to be sent to Khurasan to reinforce
the garrison. *Abd al-Jabbar replied that the economic conditions in
Khurasan were bad in that year and the prices of commodities very
high assuring him that the existing garrison was sufficient for the
defence purposes and that if further troops were to arrive supplies
1
would be insufficient. Al-Mangur considex^ed this as. a rebellion 
by *Abd al-Jabbar who indeed declared that "Abu Ja‘far called upon
i t v
me to worship him > VtX \ i > \ £ j y£  and raised
\  -*t **
in arms.
How &bd al-Jabbar appeared as a staunch ‘Alid supporter, whether 
this loyalty was new and pretentious or old and sincere it is not 
quite certain. However according to Ansab, which is the only source 
that deals in detail with the revolt, *Abd al-Jabbar*s *Alid sympathies 
were old but suppressed, but when he fell out with the caliph he 
gave vent to his feelings calling upon the people to swear allegiance 
to A1 Abi ffalib. He is also said to have asked either Ibrahim or 
Muhammad the £!&sanid to join him, ineanwhilo trying to pass off a man 
called Yasid for Ibi’ahim and put on white cloth. He also had made "a
common cause with the followers of Ishaq /the Turk 7who were led by.
3 *<*
Baras". He also found some support from the governor of Bukhara.
On the correspondence ■ between al-Mangur and *Abd al-Jabber see Angab, 
fol. 541, Tab., HI,.pp.l34f.
2 | _
Ansab, fols, 540-541, citing I-Iada ini.
3 ■
Sadighi, op.cit., p.153.
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The caliph immediately sent troops led by his son al-Mahdi 
accompanied by the commander Khazim b. Khuzayma al-Tamimi. Al-Mahdl 
then only in his teens stayed at al-Rayy and later advanced to Nishapur
- i i
while Khazim marched against the rebels. Abd al-Jabbar*s revolt 
had no future as he eliminated the Khurasani commanders by his arbi­
trary policy and eliminated the local aristocracy by his fiscal policy.
The people of Marwal-Rudh rose against him and were joined by others 
in different parts of Khurasan. Moreover discord ensued within his 
ranks and several leaders broke away from him and declared their 
allegiance to Abu Ja*far. Among them was ^abib b. Ziyad al-Jaliqani 
due to whose efforts gather than to the imperial army, 4 Abd al-Jabbaj^s 
rising was quelled. The governor of Bukhara as well as Yazid, the
false Ibrahim, were killed in the fighting while *Abd al-Jabbar fled
>
but was caught and sent to al-Mangur. The latter extracted as much
money from him and his family and associates as he could. 4Abd ai-Jablmr
pleaded for mercy, recalling his services in the da *wa but al-Kangur
said to him "You have killed men equal to Qafcifaba b. Shabib..." Then
he begged for a "respectable death", al-Mangur replied: "You have left it
_  2
behind you £in Khurasan7". . He was executed in 142 and his relatives were 
exiled to the island of Dahlak of the coast of the Yemen.Eventually some of
1Ansab. fol. 540ff Tab., Ill, p.134.
2 ~ -
Ansab. fol. 542; Bayan,2,p.lll.
Ansab, fol. 545; Ya‘qubi II, -446; Buldan, p.250; Tab., Ill, p.155.
them managed to escape and even regained favour with the ^Abbasi&e. \ 
They also seem to have held influential positions in Egypt in the second 
half of the second century of the Hijra,
It was after the defeat of ‘Abd al-Jabbar that al-Mansur ordered 
the conquest of ^aharis^an which was in a state of rebellion, and in 142/p
759-60 Jabariafari for the first time became a province within the Muslim
. 2 ' J'- empire, v ; p
The mutiny of ‘Uyayna b. Husa al-Tamimi
Both ‘Uyayna and his father Musa b. Ka*b al-Tamimi were early 
4Abbasid partisans. In the early days of the revolution, ‘Uyayna was 
active as a da‘j and was entrusted with a special mission in Nishapur.
In 133/750-51, unrest broke out in the Arab garrison of al-Sind, led 
by Manpur b. Jamhur whose rising was soon crushed by Musa al-Tamimi p 
at the head of 20,000 troops.^ The latter was consequently appointed
governor of the province, but was soon recalled and nominated head of
r , > 
the caliphal police.J It was now that ‘Uyayna replaced his father
as governor of Sind,
1 *“
Wulat, 165? R. Guest, delation between Persia and Egypt1, Browne 
Festschrift, 1922, pp. 168-9.
2
See chapter VI, pp.S92ff
y *
^Akhbar, fol, 132a, 186b.
^Khalifa, Tarikh, fol* 288; A sma *' al-Mugh tally a, pp. 184-5; Tab., Ill,
p. 80.
"^ Khalifa, Tarikh, fol. 300,
VjJ
In 142/759-60 he suddenly mutinied for reasons which the sources do
not indicate with any clarity. Khalifa b. IChayyaJ* s^* brief account
attributes his rising to M s  dismissal from the governorship. He 
states that ‘byayna defied al-Konsur1s order replacing him by 4Umar b, 
gafg, and held out for eleven months. According to Tabari, however, 
the rising was caused by court intrigues and ‘Uyayna’s rivalry with 
al-Hncuyab b. Zuhayr al-Dhabhi the man who had succeeded *UyaynaVs
father as head of the police, and lived in constant fear of losing it to
*Uyayna. Ya*qubi^ on the other hand, states that ‘Uyayna*s arrival at
3
al-Sind was followed by a tribal conflict, and that *Uyayna ordered a
massacre of the Yamanites and then rebelled himself. These accounts are
not conflicting, and may be complementary to each other.
As Ba^ra was still the centre of military operations especially
4 *
in the eastern provinces, al-Hangur went there to prepare an army for
al-Sind. Ho nominated 4Umar b. gafg al~*Atki governor of Sind and
5 '
commander of the expedition against the rebels. Deserted by most of 
his followers, *Uyayna had to suirender. He was sent to the caliph, ■ 
fled on his way to Sis tan, but was trapped by the Yamanites who killed 
him in retaliation for the massacre,6
^Op.cit., fols. 300-301.
2Tab., III, p.138.
^Ya‘qubi, II, p.448.
O n . o x , p.480•
5Tab., Ill, p.138.
6l(halifa, Tarlkh , f ol. 301; Ia *qubi, IX, p. 448.
' It was thus that those veteran partisans who had participated in 
the daVa and put the ■ 4Abbasids in power fell out with them. Some were
disappointed with the regime’s new policies which religiously adopted
■ • , ■; /  ; / / p r £ ** ** JS*ti
"Orthodoxy" and respected the Ulama and Ag^iab al-ffadith* Besides 
‘Abbasid administxvitive and fiscal policy in its early d ays did not y: 
differ much from that of the Umayyads. Their promises that the 
soldiers have the right to share the booty and the provinces have the 
right.to spond their revenue and the citizens have the right to get the 
were largely unfulfilled. Court Intrigues, rivalries, conflict 1 
of interests between the revolutionaries themselves also played their 
part in the .struggle for authority and influence. It was not long \ 
before the men who had worked for the realisation of the new regime were 
all banished and figures who had no record in the da *wa got hold of 
the power, A little later figures litre al-Mahdi and his son Harun al- 
Rashid became caliphs and delegated thoir authority wholly to wasirs
or Hawaii, This situation inspired a poet to says "Oh Ban! Un&yya\wake
€ — *" !“•* 1 
up, you have slept too long. The caliph is Ya qub b, Da ud.n
3  ^ ^
'Agh., vol. 3, p.70; Pi wan Ba^tishar, ed. B. al-sAlawi 1963, p.91*
*Chapter IV
*ABBASID-*ALID. RELATIONS DURING 
THE EARLY ‘ABBA3ID PERIOD
"People of Khurasan, you are our followers, 
our supporters and the missionaries of our cause. 
If your oath had been given to others it would 
not have been addressed to better sovereigns than 
we are. By God, we have let the sons of All b. 
Abi Jalib wrest the caliphate from the Umayyads.,. 
but their efforts proved ineffective,.. The 
Umayyads exiled us /?he ‘Abbasi&s/ once at 'fa*if 
then at Syria then at al-Shurat until God finally 
roused you /ihe KhurasanisZ our followers and 
allies and through you he has revived our glory 
and fortified our power. God has made your truth 
triumph against the partisans of error, and has 
manifested our legitimate rights and has given 
back to us our power and the heritage of the 
prophet."
Abu Ja‘far al-Mangur
/Tab.Ill, p.4307
11 We were incensed against the Umayyads as we 
were, but the ‘Abbasids are less God fearing than 
thenu And there is more justice in accusing the 
‘Abbasids than the Bmayya&S. They </^ he Umayyads7 
had morals, virtues and favours which Abu J a ‘far 
lacks." * t
Hu^ammad b, ‘Abdallah al-Ha^$ 
/Aghani. X, p.1067
The claim of Alil-al-Bayt
The decline of the Umayyad dynasty began in the first half of 
the 8th century A,D,/the first half of the 2nd century A #H, Already 
at that early time, Several Hashimite personalities developed in­
dependently of each other similar political ambitions, and embarked 
on a persistent endeavour to wrest the power from the Umayyads, It 
is not the concern of this study to trace the development of the 
Hashimite opposition movement in Umayyad times. It will suffice to 
state that Muhammad1o legitimate successor was not necessarily expected 
to be a descendant of a specific branch of Ahl al-Bayt. Consequently, 
the opposition movement manifested itself in different trends attached 
to different representatives of Ban! Hashim; the extremists who sided 
with the non-Pa^imid *Alid Muhammad b. al-ganafiyya and his son Abu 
Hashim whose claims were taken over by Muhammad b. *Ali the ‘Abbasid; 
the extremists supporting the rising of the Ja*farite ‘Abdallah b.
Mu ‘awiya; the moderate followers of Zayd b. *Ali who adopted militant 
active attitude towards the Umayyads; the passlvist followers of 
J a ‘far al-gadiq the most prominent $usaynid of that time who x*as known 
for his peaceful policy, '
It is true that there were people who believed in the sacredness 
of Bani Hashim and their claim to authority over the Umnia, in other 
words that the prophet should be succeeded by a Hashimite, but con­
siderable dissension existed, at that early time, as to which branch
of the Hashimites were the real Ahl al-Bayt,^ Baal Hashim*s prestige , .
2
can be traced back as far as Qugayy. It should be stressed, however, 
that in the Jahiliyya, certain clans of each tribe acted as guardians
of the sanctuaries, a task handed down in one clan which thus ac^ui^©<i
*2 - ■ " 
a hereditary sanctity, This guardianship of a sanctuary, 1 Bayt1,
was connected with a rather highly esteemed Arab conception, * sharaf*,
i.e. nobility of descent* That these two qualities were inseparable
is evident from the fact that the guardians of sanctuaries were ’simultaneous*
4
ly tribal chiefs- Now, about the end of the 5th century A,D
Qu$ayy was able, to oust Khftza a from Mecca and establish
5
his authority. His efforts in gathering together different clans in
*i
The term Ahl al-Bayt in that early period was interpreted in many ways 
according to different factions* The^FaJimids considered themselves as 
the only Ahl al-Bayt excluding non-Fafimids, Talibids and 4Abbasids. 
Furthermore the gusaynids claimed the title for themselves only, ex­
cluding the gasanids. This latter^interpretation was not accepted by 
all gusaynids because 2ayd b, 4All recognised the equal status of both 
branches. The 4Abbasids also claimed this title on the ground of their 
priestly.status and close paternal relationship with the Prophet (Tab.,
Ill, pp. 29f)•_ They called their Hashimite opponents falibids as often; 
as 4Alids (Ansab, fol* 620b).
2Sira, I, pp. 80-84? Tab., 1,pp. 1092 ff; Azraqi, I, p.66.
Ibn Durayd, p.237s see also Tyan, Institutions.... pp. 104f£;Sefrgeant» :Har- 
a m ' .and Hawtah.., H.T.H.. 1963, pp. 53ff. ;*
40p.oit.. pp. 175, 283; Tab., I, p.1028. !
Ibn Durayd, pp. 13ff; Tab., I, p,1092ff.
■ ■ , i :
Mecca proved successful and the new tribe became known as Quraysh.
As he introduced the emblems of many tribal deities of Arabia to the |
rt = ;'- .
Ka‘ba, he is also to be credited with the reputation that the foaram
vC ■ i
of Mecca acquired as a place for pilgrimage. Henceforward,.the functions 
connected with the sanctuary of Ka‘ba as well as with political leader­
ship remained in the-hands of Qugayy* s descendants. After the advent 
of Islam, Bani Hashim continued to be considered a family with religious
and political prestige, and all its branches enjoyed this status of
4 -
sacredness. After the Prophet1s death, the Hashimites supported the
,  -  »  « . 5
claims of All b. Abi falib to the caliphate, but they did not remain \
united against their opponentsi each branch of them claimed the caliphate :
* 1
for itself, and the claim of one branch was completely illegitimate in 
the eyes of others.
When Mugamraad b. 4All the ‘Abbasid initiated his da *wa he was cautious' A 
and based his claim on the ground that Abu Hashim had bequeathed his 
rights to him, and conducted it in the name of al-Rida min Ahl al-Bayt.
h b n  Sa‘cL, I, 1, p.41; Tab., I, p.1094} Ya'qubi, I, p.277; Ibn Durayd, I,p> 1094*
2Slra. I, pp. 126ff; Ibn Sa‘d, I, 1, p.40j Ibn Durayd, p.152; Ya‘qubi, I, 
pp.. 296ff*
^  m m
^The functions were: al-gi.jaba, al-Wllaya. al-Siqaya, al-Hifada, al-Riyasa, 
al-hiwa*. See Sira, Ig?85; II, p.821; Ibn Sa‘d, l/l, p,44, Simt 1 Nujum,
Vol. I, p.205; al-Muhabbar, p.164. -
^Sergeant, Harara and Hawtah... M.T.H., 1965, p.44.
JAnsab. V, p.21; Tab., I, p.2773, B.I.^ (al-‘Abbas).
See above, Chapter II.
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Once the ‘Abbasida had established themselves in power, they began to
look upon the ‘Alids as a potential danger. The latter, in their turn,
considered the ‘Abbasids usurpers. The struggle for the caliphate entered
on a new phase, in which it became the strife between two Hashimite
factions; The ‘Abbasids and the *Alids. However, the ‘Alids themselves
#
by no means concurred-in one common cause or leadership. Most of the 
gusaynids denied the gaaanids a share in the Imaraate and claimed that 
only al-gusayn#s descendants were entitled to the heritage of the Prophet, 
since al~gasan, al-gusayn’s eldest brother had renounced the caliphate 
and transferred all his rights to al-gusayn.^ Some maintained that only 
the descendants of ‘All through Fatima had a right to the leadership, 
while others extended it to all descendants of <Ali such as Muhammad b, 
al-ganafiyya and even one Ja*farite ‘Abdallah b. Ilu‘awiya whose temporary ■ 
success ended suddenly shortly before the ‘Abbasid victory* This also 
proves that the loyalties of ‘Alid partisans at that time were not un­
equivocally orientated towards a particular ‘Alid branch. They transferred
their allegiance from one prominent ‘Alid to another with the greatest
f , * 
ease. .
After the death of Zayd b. ‘All in 122/740 and his son Yafeya in 
125/743, only two contenders to the leadership were left among the ‘Alids; 
the gusaynid Ja‘far al-gadiq and the gasanid ‘Abdallah al-Ma^d. Al-§adiq
V.
1 ‘
Tab., Ill, p.213f? anonymous, fol. 4b.
2E.I.1, (Zaid b. ‘All), (Ya&ya b. Zaid).
a*T7.
i
made no. military bid for power • which gave hl-Ma^d and his son Mufcammad
the opportunity to strike, as he could rightly expect that the more
activist and militant partisans would rally around him, ‘Abdallah
al-Mafcd was proud of his descent from Pajirna 011 both his father*s and 
2mother* s side* But what put the 5asanI&s at a disadvantage was the 
charge that their ancestor al-5asan had renounced his claims on behalf
r
of Mu‘aWiya for money and a life of ease, while the $usaynids as 
descendants of the martyr of Karbala enjoyed a high prestige, further 
enhanced by the rising of Zayd b. ‘All and his son Yafctya.
As early as in Hicham*si reign (105/724-125/742) al-Ma^d started to 
spread the idea that his son Hu&ammad was j^ie messianic
claim attracted to him, as we shall see, increasing numbers of partisans
c
among whom were extremists and even disgruntled elements with no ‘Alid 
sympathies ■> at all* When the TJmayyad caliphate was crumbling after 
the murder of al-Ualld b. Yazid in 744/126 , al«I-la^ d, in his endeavour
to consolidate the movement behind his son al~Makdi, allegedly called 
upon the Hashimites to assemble in secret at al-Abwa* in order to discuss
1As we are only concerned with the political and practical, but not: with 
the ideological and theoretical aspect of the ‘Alids* activities, we cannot 
devote much space to the ^usaynids who, after the death of al-$usayn at 
Karbala, pursued a rather quiescent policy. See B. Lewis, The Origins**., 
pp. 23ff; Hodgson, ttHow the Shi‘aM, J.A.Q.S., pp. 1-13; Jafri, The early 
development*., Ph.D. Thesis, S.O.A.S., 1966.
^Ansab, fol* 668b.
^Tab., III,pp.213 f. The ‘Abbasids even tried to benefit from this prestige 
during the revolution posing as avengers of Husaynid martyrs. See Tab., II, 
1963, III, 214, 434, 366f; F.H.A.. p.206.
^ ilubdha, fol. 256a.
iJl-Hughira b. Sa‘Id al-Bajli and Bayan b. Sam‘an attempted a rising in
(cont.)
2 s*  ■ ■ ...
the prospects of Ahl, al-Bayt where they swore allegiance to Muhammad 
b. al-Ma&d. Historians differ on the circumstances surrounding the
m  mm mm  <*. 1
meeting* Baladhuri, Igbahani, Azdi and Tabari agree that it actually 
. took place without agreeing, however, on the persons of the participants 
or their attitudes and opinions, nevertheless the survival of the Umayyads 
was so doubtful that the hopes of the Hashimids were justified and it may 
be that this meeting actually took place and that al-Mafcd urged the 
participants to swear allegiance to al-Hahdi, a suggestion which resulted
in a rift so that the meeting was adjourned without a decision. It is
2
' more probable, however, that the account is a gasanid invention, the
t - 3more so as the Abbasids countered it with the tradition that al-Ka^ji
himself directed a Khurasan! delegation, which had come to him, to
W1MIIM* r-| w »
Muhammad the ‘Abbasid, describing him as the beat man among Ahl al-Bayt. 
There is another * Abbas id fabrication^ to the effect that the ‘Abbasids 
attending the meeting walked out on receiving the news of the good prospects
(cont.) Kufa in 119/737 in the name of Kufcammad b. ‘Abdallah (see 
Nawbakhti, p.32, Sa^d al~Ash‘ari, pp. 72, 33~4; Rijal, p.,146; Tab., IX',v.;; 
p.1619; B.I*^, Bayan b. Sam‘an). Later on a section of al-Mughiriyya
participated in Mu^^mmad^ revolt in 143/ (Uawbatditi, p.32; Bagh., 
pp.36 f).    " V
^ Ansab, fol. 608a, qalu; Haqatil, pp. 143, 176, 17B, citing ‘Umar b. Shabba, 
Kada‘ini; Azdi, fol* 165 citing Muhammad b. ‘Urwa; Tab., XII, p.144, qlla.
2The account intended to discredit not only al-Mangur but also Ja'far al- 
gadiq who was represented as favouring the ‘Abbasids to Muhammad. (Ansab, 
foXs. 607b-608a, qalu; Haqatil, p.176),
^p.n.A.. pp. I69f. ' :
^Maqatll, p.178.
of their own da'wa in Khurasan* Furthermore it should be pointed-out 
that had such an oath been taken, would not have failed to
mention it in his letter to the caliph Abu Ja‘far which was a master- ;
piece of political propaganda. Marwan XI was not unaware of al-I-Ia^* $ 
political activities* He had been warned against him, but he did not 
pay much heed to the warnings, as he was pre-occupied with events in V 
Syria, Jasira and IraV.
Once in power, the ‘Abbasids tried to avoid any connection with 
the ‘Alid extremists, and found it therefore expedient to establish 
their rights on a basis different from Abu Hashim * s VJagiyya which. con­
veniently fell into oblivion* This early breach with the extremist wing 
of the movement resulted in a series of risings as early as the reign 
of Abu *1 * Abbas (132-136/749**75) * However, to reconcile in himself 
the claims of the whole Ahl al-Bayt. Abu *1 ‘Abbas tried to create a
cordial atmosphere. Although he realised that there were pro-‘Alid elements
in Irafc and Khurasan,^ and knew of th© correspondence between Abu Salama 
and the ‘Alids, and between Yasxd b. Hubayra and the gasani&s, he en­
deavoured to appease the ‘Alids in order to give th© new dawla time to 
take root. After th© revolution the ‘Alid themselves frustrated, re- 
mained frightened and passive for a while. V
1 "" ' ~~ ” *"L" ■ ■ — — —  — *.,,
Ansab, fol. 608a; Haqatil, p. 179* It is worth noting that current
traditions at the time had it that the dangers threatening th© Umayyads
would come frorfc the East, i.e. from Khurasan*
^Ansab. fol. 680a; F.H.A., p.233? Tab., II, p.1713$ III, pp. 146, 178; 
Maqatil. p.127, citing Hup ab b. ‘Abdallah.
Agh ., X, p.105*
It is significant that Abu *1 *Abbas made it clear at the outset 
1in his khufba’ that the caliphate would remain in the hands of the
1 Abbasids to whom he applied the term Ahl al-Bay t* He denied that
the 4Alids were more worthy of the caliphate in a new tactical move.
to discredit them and identified them with the Saba* iyya* This view
was emphasised by his uncle Da*ud b. *Ali in two of his speeches which
were characteristic of the reconciliatory policy* One held at Kufa 
2 **stated that the 4Abbasids were the legal inheritors of the righto to. 
the caliphate which would remain with them until they passed on to
£ writ Mb £ MM
Isa b* Maryam, but described All b. Abi T&lib as one of the only two
legal caliphs in Islam, the other being his cousin Abu *1 ‘Abbas* The 
3second khufcba , held at Mecca, was also a mixture of threats and 
smoothness, after asserting that the caliphate had now returned to 
the hands of its rightful inheritors, i.e* Ahl al-Bayt, he warned the
* wfcjKfimiu1 i ' i M11 111 ■. ,.i murJtf. <
‘Alids and their partisans that unless they obeyed the authority the 
‘Abbasids were ready to press them and take away their livelihood, ha'u&’s 
speech was followed by Sudayf b. Maymun, a Mawla of Ban! Hashim. who declared 
that the whole community agreed to be put in the charge of the gar am 
of Ka‘ba, al- ‘Abbas, who was considered the father of the Prophet after 
his father's death. Tills is on© of the earliest occasions on which the
1Ansab. fola. 784b-785a; Tab., Ill, pp. 29f.
Ansab. fol. 783b., 785a; Tab., Ill, p.39; Huru.l, VI, p.116.
Ya‘qubif II, p*422j ‘led, 4, p.101* See also Ansab, fol. 751a*
Abbasids stressed that their claim to the caliphate was based on both 
priestly status (gaqq al-Hurma) and relationship with the Prophet
'  i W i i  i n i i | M ^  T l -  i ■  i i i i  m  | H  i i H |  i i ) . h i  i [ i n ,  *  J .  *
(al-Qaraba).
‘Abdallah al-Magg’s attitude throughout the reign of Abu *1 * Abbas 
indicates that he was determined to continue the struggle to the end- : , 
In fact* he seized every opportunity to show his dissatisfaction with
t i
the Abbasids. Since his two sons Kugammad and Ibrahim, themselves, 
aspirants to the caliphate, had gone into hiding, the caliph attempted
2
to elicit in vain information about their whereabouts from their father.
Abu *1 ‘Abbas's attitude towards the ‘Alids is aptly subsumed 
in his reply to his brother Abu Ja‘far, who urged him-b use force 
against them* "Generous people disregard /the misdeeds of others/ ^
though they know /of them/". ^ However this attitude was certainly 
not that of Abu Ja ‘far who assumed the caliphate in 156/754. He had 
never concealed his suspicions of the ‘Alids. Furthermore, he was en­
raged by the refusal of Mufeammad and Ibrahim to come out of hiding and 
swear allegiance to him. It was his aim to secure the power for himself 
and his descendants. Healizing that the ‘Alids had become one of the 
rallying points of the opposition*^ he was determined to remove the menace
1 <■» —
Ansab* fols. 60Sb; Maqatll, p^.126 citing ‘Umar b* Shabba; Agh. * X7III,
p.206; ‘lq&, 5, pp. 74-5; ‘Asakir, VII, pp. 561-2; Muq., fol. 79b. / \
2 — — —
Ansab, fol. 608a* q&lu; Maqatil. p-125* citing Muhammad b. Ta^ya*
3 . - ■
Duwal, fol• 106a* sec al3o Hup., fola. 79b-80a.
^Ansab, fol- 610a, qalu, fol. 620a *an ashyakliina*; F.H.A., p.246;
Mturaj, .5, p-221; Iqd* 3, p.202.
After the fAbbasid accession to power the loner strata of society 
were still not satisfied/ as their needs were not really met* For them 
the ‘Abb as id rule merely represented another form of tyranny* his-, 
satisfaction had manifested itself right from the *Abbasid advent. It 
was only natural that all these divergent hopes rally around a figure 
who would unite them. Muhammad hhu *1 Hafs al-Zakiyya^ messianic claim 
to bo the Ha&dl attracted numerous disappointed groups, both ‘Alids and 
non-‘Alid partisans. This was, to a certain extent, natural because when 
a quasi-messianic movement, i.e. the ‘Abbasid da‘wa, achieves power, some 
of its followers, disappointed at its inevitable failure to fulfil their 
expectations, will break away in quest of new messiahs. With the ‘Abbasid 
victory, messianic expectation could no longer centre on th© Ban! Hashim 
as such, because they had become the party of power. The obvious, alter­
native were the ‘Alids. it is this rather than any feeling that their 
uright" to the caliphate had been usurped that caused the new wave of ; 
pi*o-*Alid sentiments and movements.
i '■ .*
Abu J a ‘far did, in feet, visit the gijaz twice, in 136 A.II. and
1140 A.H., to perform a pilgrimage and to test the political atmosphere. 
He demanded from al-Hagg that he produce his sons, but neither al-Magg 
nor other Hashimites gave him any clue as to their whereabouts. The 
Hashimites maintained that Muhammad feared him because he had previously 
claimed the caliphate, but he had no intention of disobeying him. Only 
gasan b. Zayd b. gasan warned the Caliph of Muhammad•s intentions to
1Ansab, fol. 609b, qalu; Ya‘qubi, II, p.444; F.H.A., p.227.
X ' 4revolt against him. Abu Ja‘far seems to have been obsessed with
2
Muhammad*s challenge and "had no other worries than to seek for him".
*X "•
Now in order to "lure the fox from his lair", Abu Ja‘far realised
that new and vigorous measures must bo adopted. Spies were sent in
( — —4
the guise of merchants or Alid partisans to look for Muhammad, Baladhuri
states that Abu J a ‘far sent ‘iTqba b. Salm disguised as a seller 'of ‘itr and 
*Uqba employed slaves to sell it and listen to the news about Muhammad. i 
However, the situation in the 0iias favoured the eAlids. Ziyad b.
‘ubaydallah al-0ar±thif the governor of Madina, the last representative i; 
of Abu . *1 ‘Abbas cordial policy, was lenient in his tx^eatment of the
r
*Alids which cost him hie office. (He was replaced in Jumadi XI 141 /75Q 
by Muhammad b. Khalid al**Qagri who certainly had enough money at his 
disposal to continue the hunt. But neither the reward nor measures such 
as the search of Madina and its outskirts succeeded in tracking them down. 
Abu Ja‘far dismissed the governor for inefficiency and replaced him by 
Riyafc b. ‘UQiman al-Murri on 23rd of Ramadan 144/761-2^ Th© appointment 
of Riyah al-Hurri marks the beginning of the end of the first 4Alid
^Tab., III, pp. 144, 151, 152, citing ‘Umar b. Shabba and Abu ‘iJbayda; 
Ya'qubi, II, p.444? Agh., XVIII, p.207. ~
2Tab., III, p.144.
%
Op.oit., p.206, citing ‘tTmar b. Shabba.
a  - •* -
Ansab, fol. 610a, qalu, see also Khajib, III, p.!71i
5 - c
Tab., Ill, p.,60, citing Hraar b. Shabba; Jah., p.123. On hia dismissal
Zayad said "I do not know of any crime that I have committed, but I suppose
that /Abu Ja‘far7... found that the Fajimid blood is dear to me";
Shafa al-gharam. p.181.
Jali,, p.123; Maqatil, p.150; Tab., pp. I6lf citing Ibn S&abba.
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challenge to the ‘Abbasids. His appointment was determined by the hard
circumstances in Madina where Muhammad’s da‘wa actively propagated,
spread to other provinces especially Khurasan. A tradition in Baladhuri
shows in what a difficult position' the Caliph found himself* He relates
that Abu Ja‘far while consulting *Isa b. Musa about the worsening situation
voiced the opinion that it would be safer for him to imprison all close
relatives of Mugamraad who were looking for an opportunity to attack him*
It was obvious that the caliph had determined to apply harsher measures,
This led’ ultimately to the choice of Riyag al-Murri as governor of Madina.
He had throe qualities which made him appear eligible for the post. He
3 -**as a Syrian, a Qaysite and of humble origin* As a Syrian Riyag was
likely to prove more maliciously disposed towards the ‘Alids. As a Qaysite,^
he belonged to the same tribe as Muslim b* *XJqba the commander of the Syrian
army which had ruthlesafy- suppressed the rising of Madina in 64/683. Moreover
the Qaysites were then at a disadvantage as they were regarded as Umayyad* s
supporters. The Yamanites, generally speaking, were preferred to them for 
5
governorships. As, due to his humble origin, his appointment would have 
been inconceivable in ordinary circumstances, Riyag was bound to remain 
subservient to the wishes of the* caliph. When he arrived at Madtna he warned
1 «* **. M  M.
Ansab, fol, 620; Ya qubi, II, p.450; Wuru.i. VI, p.192; Tab., Ill, p.183
citing Ibn Shabba.
2 —  —  —
Ansab, fol. 620a, gadathani ba*gu ashy^hina. The term Ahl al-Bayt from
Abu Ja far*s point' of view means tlie ‘Abbasids only.
3Baladhuri gives this:: reason as the main reason for his appointment 
(Ansab, fol. 620b). i
^Tab., .'III, 165 ^ citing Ibn jjhabba, 'gala *1 Mangurs Ama tadulani‘ala fat an
mln Qays Ughnlhi wa Usharrifahu; Jah., pp. 122-124.
5A e d V f o l .  190.
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‘Abdallah al-Ila£>£ saying "You cannot fool me as you did my predecessors”.
To the people of Madina he declared ”1 will humiliate and kill the
( 2 v lVh\V:
descendants of those who were humiliated and killed by Uqba”. Conse- I
quently he imprisoned many gasanid and 'J'alibid suspects. Accounts .differ- ::
on theix* number which is generally said to have been thirteen. In , v,;v.
144/761-2 when Abu Ja*far performed his pilgrimage, he decided to take 't
them with him to al-Hashimiyya where they were imprisoned. Concerning
their fate, history and legend are inseparably interwoven. It seems
certain, though, that Abu Ja‘far had Mugammad b. Ibrahim b. al-gasan,
Mugammad b. ‘Abdallah al-‘uthmani and ‘Abdallah b. al-gasan killed.^
Others perished In dungeons because of the adverse conditions therej
■ ' 5
only some who were not considered politically dangerous were set free
after the failure of Hu^ammad1s rising.
In order to justify his policy towards the *Alids and to appease
the Khurasanie who, as Abu Ja‘far admitted^, felt a deep affection
for Ahl al-Bavt, i.e. ‘Alids and ‘Abbasids alike, the caliph addressed
«  7
the Khurasanls reminding them, in a long speech, that they were the j
partisans of the ‘Abbasid cause and that the ‘Abbasid struggle against i
^MaQQ-tll, p.151, citing Ibn Shabba; Tab., IXI^.164, citing Ibn Shabba.
2 - - ■ ’ : 
Ansab., fol. 620b.
■ i ' )  'I'll II II
3«a‘arif, p.213; HOqatil, pp. 128-141; F.H.A., p.237; Ya‘qubi, II, p.450;
Tab., Ill, p. 171; Muru.i. VI. p p . 198-202.
^Futuj^, p.24; Hflqatll. pp. 140, 157,_158; Tab., Ill jp. 182, 185, 188;
Khajib, 71, p.54; IX, p.431; Phahabi, fols. 8a~8b; A ‘yan al-ghi*a, 5, p.141. ;
^Maqatil, p.134; Tab., Ill, p.186.
6 »
Ansab, fol. 620. The caliph is reported to have said "The sympathy for 
STaBL Talib in Khurasan is mixed with the Khurasan!* & sympathy for us 
^/the ‘Abbasids/. •. ** •
7Tab., Ill, pp. 430-432, citing HaytUamb. *Adi; of. ga«a3, VI, pp. 203-7.
the * Umayyads had been crowned with success whereas analogous ‘Alid
efforts had been ineffective. YJhat this khujba stated was, In fact,
the ‘Abbasid case against the ‘Alids, Both were Hashimites and Ahl al— B®Z±* I
had the same rights and enjoyed the same prestige. However, as the
‘ Abbasids had confirmed their fights by success, the stress in this and
other statements by the ‘Abbasids is on victory mid success* Granted that;
all Hashimites lad equal rights, it was success alone that could give them
priority, This is the essence of the ‘Abbasid case. To counter it,the
‘Alids swiftly put forward a new claim, namely that to an inherently
superior status within the Hashimites as direct descendants of. the Prophet 
1
through Pajima. This new attitude is reflected, as wo shall see, in
i v. |
the letter of Muhammad SHiu *1 Nafs al-Zakiyya which shows that the cla3.u1 
had not yet crystallised in its final form, but was etill in the process 
of formation. Muhammad’s case was aristocratic rather than religious 
or legitimist. ■ :A
Hubammad b. * Abdallah1 a • revelt ;
Muhammad*s revolt in Madina, followed by his brother’s revolt in :
Bapra, form the climax of the ‘Alid struggle against the early ‘Abbasids,
Muhammad had been brought up by his father as the Kahdi of Ahl al^Bayt
* 2 
and given the nickname of jDhu 1 Nafs al-Zakiyya, i.e. the pure soul.
He wandered in several provinces and fled from one place to another in :
the Jijas itself, to evade the ealiph’e painstaking search. He contacted
■*■860 Cahen, "Points de vue", R.TI., 1963, pp. 314, 318-19.
2g.H.A.. p.230; Hoqatil. p.166; E.I.2 (‘Alids): Traini, AIYOM. ^
1364, pp, 776 ff. Traditions that al-Mah&i would come from the house 
of the prophet, and that his name would be Muhammad and his father’s name ; 
‘Abdallah were invented and ascribed to the prophet* To stress that ?
'■ .... (oont,) ,;V.ddv
U 7 ‘
his imprisoned father, asking his advice and expressing his will to
give up the struggle in order to save his relative’s life. But contrary, 
to other IJasanida who expressed anxiety, the ambitious al-Ha^jL remained
Historians are by no means unanimous on Muhammad’s motives in timing 
his rising at that date, and differ in their opinions on whether it was
of Muhammad*s relatives, and the circulated news of his father’s death v 
in prison were the immediate causes of its outbreak, while 'Tabari and;
for his failure to find his two brothers as the cause of the premature ; 
id sing. But whatever the real reason, Muhammad seems to have considered 
the time opportune. He was erroneously convinced that most provinces were
the open, had precipitated the outbreak by ordering provincial governors/ 
and army officex^s to promise him their support. Even he himself foi?ged letter:
(cont.) al-Kahd! would be Hu^fmmad b. al-Mafe# and not Muhammad b, al- 
Hangur anothei- tradition was^fabricated, *al—Mahdi would be from the 
descendant of Fatima" (Abu Da’ud, Sunan, II, 135). To counter this 
propaganda^al-Hangsur circulated a spurious tradition that the mother 
of al-Mahdi was not from the Prophet’s house, (Agh,# XII, p.85 citing 
al«Fa$l b. lyas al-Hudhall).
^Haqatll, p. 161; Tab., Ill, p.187* ‘Smlli, 5, p.313.
detexnained and asked his son to pex-sist.^ Consequently Muhammad carried
on his propaganda until the 1st of Rajab 145/September 762 when he declared 
2his revolt.
*7
premature or not. Baladhuri and Has‘udx state that the imprisonment
Igbahani point to the arrest of his brother Musa b. *Abdallah by Riya£t
5
on his side. In fact the caliph in his eagerness to force him into
Bayant 2, p.174; Magatil, p.150; Ya*qubl, II, p.445-
Ansab, fols. 610b, 613a; Khalifa, fol, 293; Maqatil, p.181; Ya*qubi, II 
p,452; Muruj t 71, pp. 189, 194
. ^ Ansab, fol. 612a; Muruj, VI, p.189
in the name of certain provinces expressing their sympathies for
1 ' - - ; ~ ■ ' ■ * : 
Muhammad. Moreover Riyaj^’s harsh measures in Madina and his persevering
hunt for Muhammad caused great anxiety among the people of Madina who
were tired of the prokracted situation and urged Muhammad to come out / ,
into the open anyway,
Muhammad made his first appearance with 250 followers in the quarter
of Bapi Salm the An^ar^ Having freed the prisoners and got hold of
Bayt al-Hal# he arrested Elya^t al-Murfi and delivered a khujba accusing
the caliph of being a taghlya and declaring that "The Mub’ajirun and
the Angar have a better claim to be custodians of this religion /i.e.
to be caliphs/*** Oh people I did not rise amongst you because you
are strong but I have chosen you for myself. I did not come here until
all the provinces had sworn allegiance to me"*^ It is important to
notice that Muhammad did not claim the caliphate for himself in his
first speech. This move on his part was probably motivated by his wish
to win over all discontented elements. However he aftex’wards took the
5 ’ :oath as caliph.
(cont.)
^Tab.2 XII, p.198, citing ‘Umar b. Rashid; Haqatil, pp. 180-181.
Wa kana Sababu ‘a.jalatiki bi *1 Khuru.1.
5Tab., III, p.197, citing ‘Umar b. Rashid.
Tab., Ill, p.156, citing ‘Umar b. S&abbaj Haqatil. p.186, Traini,
"La 0orrespondenaa1*, A .I.U-.O.H*, 1964, p*776.
2 - , 
Maqatll, ^.181, citing al-Fa^l b. Dakin. Faqalii lahu raatantafliru bi 1
idiuruj wa llahl matajldu hadhihi’l umma a^ad as amu min lea alayha.
^Ansab, fol. 612b;
4Tab., XII^i.197 citing ‘bmarb. Rashid.
Xtf.
Having obtained contx^ol of Madina, Muhammad began looking for
1support from the provinces and took Mecca by force. The city was not 
pro-*Alid in its political attitude* The tribe of Banu Makhzum which 
played an influential rOle in the political scene of Mecca had no
4Alid tendency, nevertheless pro-*Alid moderate traditionists such as
„  2
Abu Bakr b. Sabra sympathized with the rising. Muhammad also sent ;
3
missionaries to the Yemen, Syria and Egypt.
To gain time and put the responsibility on Muhammad's shoulders,
the caliph entered into a long correspondence with Mufeammad. He wrote
to him after citing a threatening verse from the Our*an, UI thereby
.give, you the pledge of Allah and his Prophet.... if you repent before
I am able .to crush you, I will give safety to you, your brothers,
relatives and partisans.1^' To this Muhammad sent the following reply: 
»
U1 offer you the same amnesty that yoxi have offered me.
The right to the power /the caliphate/ is ours, and it 
is through us you have claimed if. It is with the help 
of our Shi*a /partisan^/ that you havejjained our pre- 
rogative7 /6ur father *Ali was the Wagi /vicegerent/ 
and the Imam, how is it then that you appropriate his 
inheritance while we are still alive. You know that no 
one who claimed this matter had the same descent and 
honour and status as we have. We are not the sons of 
al-hn*ana> or al—Toiradar or al^Tulaq? *. 5 You know 
that there is none amongst the Hashimites who has the
^Q p . c i t . p.219, citing *tfmar b. Shabba; Shafa* al~ghar&in, p.182.
Ibn Asakir, Tarikh Dlmashq, Ms. B.H., fols. 82a~82b. He gave Muhammad
24,000 dinars from governmental money (op.cit., fol. 83a citing al- 
Zubayr b. Mus*ab al-Ztibayri).
^Tab., 111, pp., 200, 216, citing *Umar b. Shabba.
^Tab.f III, p.209, Qalu; Kamil, v, p. 115; Azdi, fol. 158; Ghur&r, 
fol. 182a; F^H.4,, pp. 240f.
:%ee below, vt.Z73 . .
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same points of excellence and prides himself on the 
like of our descent, our past, and our honour. We are 
the children of Pajima hint Amr at the time of Jahiliyya, 
where you are not; and the children of the Prophet’s 
daughter Pafima in the time of Islam, whei*eas you are 
not...** and I am the very centre of descent amongst Banu 
Hashim and the best of them all as regards parentage.
No Persian did 1 have for mother and no slave-girls were 
my maternal ancestors.... I was twice born from the loins 
of the Prophet... 'amongst my grandfathers I have the 
highly esteemed ill paradise and the least tormented in 
hell; b o  I am the son of the best of the good and the 
best of the bad... As for the amnesty you have given me, 
may I ask what kind of amnesty it is? is it the same 
that you gave to Ibn Hubayra or to your unci© Abdallah ■ 
or the on© that was given to *Abu Muslim?’*!
To this Abu Ja far replied*
.. 1 have received your letter..* But most of your 
pride is on the.women’s side which could only deceive the 
©ob and the common*Cod has not made mothers like .uncles, 
fathers and the responsible relatives. ... God sent Hufram- 
mad /as his Prophet/ who had four uncles, two of them turned 
Muslims, on© of whom was my father; th© other two, on© of 
whom was your father /i.e. Atm. Yulih/ remained infidols.,*
As for what you mentioned about the fact that*..• *Ali was 
born twice from th© loins of Hashim, and gasan was born 
twice from the loins of cAbd al—HuJjalib, and that you were 
born twice from the loins of the Prophet fio all this, I can 
only say/ that the best of all, Muhammad, m &  born but once 
from the loins of Hashim, and once from the loins of *Abd al 
MuJJalib. •. As for your claim that you are the son of the 
Prophet, God has rejected such a claim when he said ’Muham­
mad is not the jhther of any of your men, but he is th© Apostle 
of God and the seal of the prophets*. But you are the 
children of his daughter. It is, in fact, a close relation­
ship, but she is a woman who cannot inherit the wilaya and 
cannot bo an Imam, how is it possible then that the Imamate 
could be inherited through her? Your father £*All/ tried 
all means to attain the Imamate through her, and sent her 
to fight his battle out for him. But people insisted on 
holding the two sheikhs in preference to him. •.11
Tab., XXI, pp. 209-10, qalu; Kamil. 4, pp. 115-118} Aadi, fols. 159-160.
See also tho quotation in Ansab, fol. 614, qalu; ‘Aynl, fol. 44a; Ghuraxv 
fols. 182a-*183a. ' ’ ■ ~ " ‘~*r
^Tab., III, p.219; Kamil, 4, p. 118; Asdi, fols. 161-163; Ghurar, fol. 
103a. See also Ansab. fol. 615a,. where the letter is briefly cited.
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The caliph then went on to enumerate the ‘Alid failures to seize the
caliphate for themselves and defied Muhammad with this caustic comment:
"You know that our greatest honour in the times of 
Jahiliyya, namely the dispensing of water to the pil­
grims and the guardianship of the well of Zamzam,* 
became *Abbas*a privilege alone among hie brothers.
Your father litigated with us for this privilege, but 
‘Umar gave judgment in our favour. Thus we have never 
ceased to be in possession of this honour in the times 
of Jahiliyya as well as of Islam. And when the people 
of Hediria were threatened with drought, Umar sought 
the favour of his God and appealed to him through our 
ancestor/^Abbas/until God comforted them and quenched 
their thirst with heavy rain. Your ancestor ‘All was 
there, yet ‘Umar did not seek his intercession. You 
know that after the death of the Prophet no other son of 
‘ Abd al-Mu^talib remained alive, and that ‘Abbas in­
herited his rights as the uncle /of the ProphejE7.-*- 
Then more than one of the Bani Hashim sought the Caliph- 
ate,^but none attained^it, except the descendants of 
‘Abbas, and so the Siqaya^ and the Inheritance of the 
prophet as well as W e  Caliphate belong to him and hie 
descendants and will remain in their possession. For 
‘Abbes was heir and legatee to every honour and virtue 
that ever existed in the times of the Jahiliyya and 
Islam..."
The letters exchanged between Abu Ja‘far and Muhammad are perhaps 
the most interesting and authentic documents of the whole ‘Alid- 
‘Abbasid relationship. They are invaluable as they reflected the 
opinions of the two prominent contenders on the controversial issue of 
the succession to the caliphate. They were also a masterpiece of political 
propaganda on both the ‘Abbasid and the ‘Alid side, and, as it were, 
equivalent to a declaration of war and a justification of the armed
r
.     .  ( ' .
1 1 
This in fact anticipates al-Mahdifs argument on the ‘Abbasid claim .
to the caliphate (see Hawbakhti, p.43j Akhar, fol. 74b).
2 *»
This privilege cannot be considered a solid claim by the ‘Abbasids,
as all Bani Abd al-Muttallb had inherited the sacred privileges from
Qupayy. Even the Umayyads who had shared some of these privileges in
the Jahiliyya for some time could have claimed the caliphate on these
grounds
conflict* It was clear from the very beginning that neither the caliph
nor Muhammad expected the other to surrender in consequence of a letter
sent tohim by his opponent* In fact, the caliph's first letter is
characterised by the tone of strain which precedes war. Though it
proposes reconciliation it renders it impossible since it threatens
before it promises. This fact is referred to by Muhammad's words to
‘isa b. Musa the commander of the ‘Abbasid army: "You would not have
/lavished pledges on me7 and asked me to renounce if you had known that
1I would accept it.” Muhammad's reply may be considered a summary of 
the whole moderate 'Alid doctrine on their rights to the caliphate* 
Writing to Abu Ja‘far, Muhammad based his claim not only on his descent 
from ‘All, but also from Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet. The ‘Alids 
had to develop this new conception because al~‘Abbas, the ‘Abbasid*s 
ancestor, was the Prophet's uncle, a status more closely associated 
with the Prophet than ‘All. Muhammad also prides himself on being 
the son of a free Arab woman, a remark which must have angered Abu 
ja*far who was the son of a Berber slave girl. It tallies with the 
aristocratic conception of the Umayyads who excluded the Sons of slave 
girls such as Maslama b. ‘Abd al-Malik from the succession* This 
point in Muhammad's argument cannot have been very popular with the
1 - 
Agh.. Ill, p.29; Maqatil, p.161* The manuscript of Ghurar al-Siyar
contains a fourth letter which includes the reply of Muhammad to al-
Mangur's second letter. Both van Arendonk and Train! justly refute any
authenticity of the letter in question which was most probably the
work of ‘Alid partisans. (See Les debuts del'imamat. p*55; Traini,
”La Correspondenza... 11, p. 7737 footno~te 2TJ
Hawaii followers of his cause.* Nor could Muhammad's claim that ‘All 
had become the "ffagi" and the "Imam" after the Prophet's death, have 
been popular with the Arabs of the hijass* Muhammad also reminds the 
caliph that his ancestor al— * Abbas was one of the Turada* (those who were
expelled), fgulaqa* (those who surrendered and manumitted) and Lu‘ana*
1 . 
(those who were accursed), terms applied to those who resisted the
Prophet and fought against him and had been converted to Islam only-
after the conquest of Mecca in 630 A*D* Al— * Abbas, in fact, had been
taken captive in the battle of Badr. Finally, it is interesting to
note that Muhammad does not use in his letter the title Amir al-Mu’minln
but calls himself al-Mahdi, stressing the very idea which attracted the
masses more than anything else*
In his reply, the caliph takes up the polntB raised by Muhammad
one by one* First, he refutes Muhammad's claim as it is based on Qarabat
al-Nisa*, i.e* Fatima and confirms the priority of Qarabat al-‘Umuma, I.e,
al-*Abbas. It was a brilliant attempt by Abu Ja*far to get his case
justified on legal, religious and customary grounds* The uncle's title
to the inheritance of the Prophet was better as it was based not only
on Shari*a law of inheritance but also Arab custom, which lets the
paternal uncle take the deceased,father's position* Abu Ja*far also
reminded Muhammad that al- ‘Abbas held the religious function of Siqaya
ia the JahillVya and Islam* It is also noteworthy that the caliph
deliberately exposed *Umar I’s ruling in favour of al-‘Abbas at the
^Traini, "ha CorriSpohdensa* * *", kdM.OAf, 1964# p* 778# footnote 28.
time of the drought, thus aligning himself with the group of tradi-^ 
tionists known as Agbab al-ffadiih. Interesting is how Abu Ja‘far*s 
argument presented the §usaynids as virtuous and thus disqualified 
the gasanids: ‘All b.‘ al-gusayn (Zayn al-‘lbidin) overcame ‘Abdallah
v * . „ ' '
b. al-gasan (al-Magd), and Ja‘far al-gadiq Muhammad Phu *1 Nafs al-
Zaqiyya. As the former were sons of slave girls and the latter of
1pure Arab blood, Muhammad1 s ffakhr of pure descent is valueless.
It is when the facts speak that Abu Ja‘far, the practical realist, 
strikes his heaviest blows against Mugammad, the idealist dreamer. It
is the contrast between the inefficiency of the ‘Alids and their re-
\ ,
peated failures to obtain the caliphate for themselves when compared 
with the triumph of the ‘Abbasids that Is in fact the tenor of Abu 
Ja‘far#s letter. It is the ‘Abbasid victory that justifies the ‘Abbasid ; 
claim to represent the house of the Prophet and hold power. The caliph 
proves at the end of his letter that he can be as haughty and proud 
as- Muhammad when he stresses that al-‘Abbas protected, fed and ransomed 
the *Alids on many occasions! ’’Had it not been for al-‘Abbas, the 
‘Alids would have nourished themselves on the left-overs from the Umayya&s, 
... we /the * Abbas ids/gave you to inherit their /the Umayyads^J Hands 
and homes, we honoured your ancestors and recognized their superior 
merits.1’ He finally reminded him that the ‘Abbasids avenged the martyrs
i ' -
of the ‘Alids who proved incapable of avenging their own dead.
T^rairi, op.cit.. pp. 796-798.
ll*> *
1
The letters can hardly be accused of being spurious* Closer 
scrutiny of the correspondence reveals that the s tructure of both 
letters is parallel. The very gradation with which the caliph counters 
Muhammad’s arguments point by point is powerful internal evidence of
i
their authenticity. Internal proof of this is furnished by the mention 
of the letter in early sources such as Baladhuri, Tabari, Assdi and al- 
Mubarrad. Obviously Ya‘qubi and Igbahanl were reluctant to quote 
them due to their ‘Alid sympathies.
As to the nature of the support that Mubajmaad found in Madina, it 
is difficult to form an accurate idea as the accounts are not clear and 
sometimes contradictory. Tabari states that the notables of Madina, with 
few exceptions, supported the revolt while Ipbahani maintains that
all the people of Madina, except a few, voluntarily swore allegiance to
2 •« 3
him. According to MasSIdi the ‘Alids, Ja‘farids, ‘Uqaylids, the
sons‘of ‘Umar b. al-Khattab and al-Zubayr b. al- ‘Awam, the whole
Quraysh and the Anpar supported Muhammad. According to Baladhuri
the people of Madina hurried to support him, singing "This is /the
astonishing event/ which we expected between Jamadi and Rajab.
On the authenticity of the letters see Traini, op.cit., pp. 785-793. 
However Traini assumes that part of Muhammad* s letter was eliminated 
by transmitters through regard for the ‘Abbasids. The purged paragraph, 
says Traini, deals with the Bay*a of the Hashimites^ among them Abu 
Ja‘far, to Muhammad* "The passage relating to Badr /in Abudja‘far* s 
letteay cannot at best be only a pathetic quotation by Abu Ja‘far with­
out a corresponding passage in Muhammad* s letter." He suggests that 
Muhammad had mentioned the Bay‘a at al-Abwa* and therefore -^ bu Ja ‘far 
reminded him of al-‘Abbas feeding Quraysh, among them some ‘Alids, at al 
Abwa on the way to Badr and ransoming them soon after the battle of 
Badr - a speculative assumption which is hardly acceptable especially 
if we bear in mind that Muhammad did refer to Badr in his letter when 
he accused Abu Ja‘far of being the son of Taliq and La‘in. (see Traini, 
op.cit, p. 797). On the other hand it slight be significant to point
(cont.)
. n(>- ::
The tribes of Juhayna# Mussayna# Sulaym# Banu Bakr# Aslam and Ghifar 
supported him,2. Most ‘Alids# especially the sons of Zayd b. ‘All,
the sons of Mu^wiya b* *Abdallah# the sons of al-gasan b. Zayd b. al-
—• 2
gasan and fAli b. Zayd# joined him. As for the gusaynids Ja‘far al-
gadiq did not participate in political activities during the revolt.
He continued warning his relations and partisans against a premature
rising. He. was outwardly opposed to the gasanid political plans and
considered them hfe rivals in spiritual leadership. During the revolt he
refused to swear the bay*a to Mugamaad, spreading: the tradition that
3
Mugammad would be killed and that his revolt would fail. Though 
at first glance the support Kugaramad found in Madina seems to have been 
considerable, the impression of whole tribes hurrying to Mugammadfs support 
is deceptive. It may have been true of certain groups among the tribes 
but not of whole tribes* Furthermore# the gijas which had already lost 
its importance as the centre of the empire to Syria and then Irafe was, 
generally speaking# opposed to the government. Thus many joined Mugammad 
not because of their pro-‘Alid sympathies but of their anti- ‘Abbaeid
(cont.) out that speaking on the letters As&I remarks;
b  </£ i /  J r  ^  t> J j£  l i  b~ U »
foi. 158. *>• jf 8>
2  , ” ' " * ^
Tab., Ill# p.200, citing Ashar b. Sa‘id; Majatil# p.183, citing Azhar b.
Sa id.
VI, p.189.
4Ansab. fol. 613b, qalu, also Tab.# Ill# pp. 227-8; Tanbih. p.341.
^Ansab, fol., 613b; Tab.# Ill, p.228# citing Ibn Shabba.
2 «
Maqatil# p.192; Tab.# Ill# p.200. Hearing of the Zaydid’s support to
Mugammad# Abu Ja*far exclaimed ”ls it not surprising that the sons of Zayd
should support Mugammad as we had killed those who killed their father.”
^Ri.lal, pp. 179, 186-7, citing gamdawayh, pp. 553-354, citing .
attitude. The messianic propaganda of Hufcammad al-Hahdi'1* had, as
V ' * ' ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ . ■  V- a"
" " -
already mentioned, a deep effect on the people of Madina, especially 
the lower classes who had genuine grievances against the ‘Abbasids.
The support given to the rising by some prominent traditionists 
enhanced its religious character and increased its following. Kalilc 
b. Anas declared that the oath sworn to the ‘Abbasids was not binding
as it had been given under compulsion. Others such as Abu ganifa,
% ' • ' - , ■ ^ 
Muhammad b. Hurtmiz, Muhammad b. ‘ A jlan and*Abu Bakr b. Abi Sabra, also
sympathized with Muhammad. This body of traditionists (Agfr&b al-
gadith) was moderately pro- ‘Alia in its leanings in this early Islamic
period. They must have realized that the ‘Abbasid outlook was not less
worldly than that of the Bmayyads. The Zaydiyya of Kufa and the
Mu^azila of Bapra also sympathised with or supported Muhammad.^
Muhammad himself tried to present the ‘Abbasids as impious tyrants
and usurpers, oblivious of duty and pleasure-loving. He is quoted
as saying **1 see a fire blazing on the heights and lighting up the
country around. Ths sons of al-‘Abbas mind it not, but pass their
night in false security and enjoyment. They slumber as the TJmayyads did*
■   r- T , ■ - tt..- - ___—n ■ t || ■ , , ■  -| - [ L L ■ ,■ _................................................' 1 ' '  \ ' ^
(eont.) b. Has‘ud; Maqatll. p.192; Tab., Ill, p.254. luma'll b. *Abdallah
the Je farid and al-gasan b# Zayd the gasanid also declined to . support 
Muhammad (Maqatil. p.192; Tab., Ill, p.20o).
^Ansab. fol. 6ljbs Mqqatil. p.142 citing Ibn Shabbaj Tab, III, p»159,
- citing Ibn ghabba. nThe people of Madina erieds al-Mahdl al-Kahdl 
when Muhammad showed himself among them.”
Tab., Ill, p.200, citing *TJmar b. Rashid.
3AsdI, fols.163. 168.
Maqatil, pp. 249# 270f; Tab., Ill, pp. 282ff{ van Arendonlc. Lea debuts..., 
PP. 58f. ^
and like them they will awaken to avert the danger when it is too 
late*”1 Sudayf, a mawla of Banl Haghlm, who joined the rising, used 
to say tlAllahuma gad gara fay’una d&ta ha4da *1 qisaa wa Imaratuna
% ■» ' ' M ' ' 2 '
ghalaba ha*da *1 masbura wa *Ahduna mjratb ba*da *1 khtiyar li *1 Umaa.«"
Although Kufa was the centre of the pro-4Alid movement, its political 
leanings were in fact more extremist than moderate. In fact, iAbdallah 
al~Ma£d did not value their support*5 Ya*quhl states that Ibrahim b.
,  -  4
Abdallah went to Kufa but did not find much support there* It is
important to differentiate here between real support and mere sympathy; 
accounts w^ich state that 100,000 pro~‘Alid partisans5 were ready to
join Ibrahim in Kufa are in fact greatly exaggerated* Nevertheless,
— 6
he was joined by a group of extremists called al-Hughiriyya, probably 
attracted by his claim to be the Mahdi.
Tempted by the alleged pro»4Alid loyalty of gumayd b* Qafc$aba,the
7 * *=»
governor of Egypt, Hufcammad sent his son All to propagate his cause,
with Khalid b. $a4Id al-Sadafi as a chief da4i* The caliph soon
afterwards appointed a new governor Yasid b. gatia al~HuhallabI by name.
•Hfafayat, p. 109 note 6*
^*TJyun* II, p.115; a l - S h i p*419; Agh*, XIV, p.162; ‘Asakir, 6, p.68,*
Txjd* III, p*32.
5Ansab* fol* 673b.
^Ya*qubi, II, p*453»
R
^Tab., Ill, p*230, citing Hufcammad b* Yafcya.
£ ; 
ja2m, IV, p.141; Bagh., pp. 147-148.
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Hums yd was a veteran *Abbasid partisan. His effective^rdle in crushing the 
Alid revolt is a clear evidence of his loyalty to Abu ja*far* However it 
might be suggested here that, in accordance with Abu Ja*far's plan to get 
Muhammad out of his hiding place he ordered Humayd to write to MuhMm&d
He pursued a harsh policy towards the ‘Alids who were forced to hide v ■; 
for a while. Many suspects were arrbsted. finally, on the 10th of Shawwal, 
Khalid al-Sadafl proclaimed the rising in the great Mosque of Fusjlt};*
They immediately ravaged Bayt al-Mal, hut the rising does not seem to 
have found much support. Most of the influential figures stayed away. It 
was, therefore, easily suppressed after a few skirmishes at which about 
thirteen ‘Alid partisans were killed* The excitement finally subsided 
when the head of Ibrah3m was brought by Abu *1 Makarim to Egypt in Dhu *1  ^
?ijja 14$/ Feb. 763 As to the fate of ‘All, it seems that he was
arrested and sent to Baghdad where he was imprisoned with the rest of
2 ' ; - 
his family. But Muhammad’s overtures seem to have found more response
in Khurasan where great unrest had followed the ‘Abbasid victory. In
14/^757-58 Abu Ja‘far appointed ‘Ahd al-jabbar al-Aad! governor and
ordered him to witch ‘Alid activities. But the relations between the
caliph and the governor deteriorated and ‘Ahd al-Jabber turned pro-‘Alid.
Although the latter was, caught and killed in 142 A.H.,5 Khurasan remained
unstable which the new governor ascribed to Muhammad’s activities.^
To deter the people, Abu Ja‘far had Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah al-‘Uthmanl5
(cont.) promising to help him. See Tab., Ill, p.230 citing Ibn’Shabba, 
pp. 244,247; Ansab, fol. 617a-617b, citing the sons of gumayd.
1Wulat. pp. 111-114, citing Ibn Qudeyd; Maqatil, p. 14O5 Tab., Ill, p.171; 
Khifrat,2, p.93? Nujum, pp. 386, 390; Muhallabi, al-Masalik, ed. al-Munajjid,
Tab., Ill, p. 171; Kindi, p. 115* of. another account alleges that ‘All 
was hidden in a village until his death (itfulat, p.115).
3 ' , . ’
See above, p.
' ' ' .;i Aj
^Tab., Ill, p.183, citing ‘Umar. "Inna ahl Khurasan qad taqa‘asu anni 1
wafr&la ‘alaihim amr Muhammad. ”
5Mut*a»acl al- ‘ytlimanl was suspeoted by the caliph from the very beginning.
.“7" (cent.)
•» *L
killed and sent his head to Khurasan,. The cdiph hoped that the two
Mu^ammads, i.e. al-Uthmanl and Dhu #1 Hafs al-Zakiyya would be confused
due to tho accidental similarity of their names, and that the alleged
death of the latter would be accepted as a fact*
Though much desired, Muhammad’s appearance must have surprised
2 •» ,
the caliph* However, he remained undisturbed. Abu Ja far was at 
that moment near al—Ma&a * in looking for a suitable site for his new 
capital. Realising the pro-‘Alid sympathies of Kufa, Abu Ja‘far immediately 
imposed a strict military control on it.^ He also chose hie heir, ‘isa b. ' 
$usa to lead the ‘Abbasid army for many reasons, First, *Isa was well ^
A
known for his fighting ability. Secondly, it seemed expedient in a 
crisis of this nature to send a member of the Sashimite family to defy 
Muhammad, another Hashimite. This was likely to neutralize the effect 
of the superiority of the Hashimite claim as represented by Muhammad ;
(cont.) He was flogged by Abu J a ‘far*s orders. Many reasons were 
given for his arrest and execution* The obvious one is that his daughter 
was the wife of Ibrahim b. ‘Abdallah. The caliph asked him for information 
on Ibrahim’s hide out, but al-^t^manl declined to give any information. 
Another reason is that al~‘uthmani was^the son of ‘Abdallah b* ‘imr b. 
‘tfitoan b* ‘Affan and his mother was Fatima bint al^fusayru He, there- : 
fore, had ^  .‘Alid and ‘uthmanid blood in his veins. Furthermore his ve®y}:'kt 
name, al-‘uthmani, could give so much inspiration to the people who were 
influenced by the current messianic traditions. Last but not least his 
close intimate association with his step brother ‘Abdallah al-MaM all 
combined to make of him a dangerous^aaa in the eyes of the caliph (see 
An sab. VI, pp. 110-111 citing Ka&a*ini, Ma*arif. p.199? Maqatil. pp. 129» 
141-142 citing al-Zubayr b, Bafckar* Tab., Ill, p.178; Murui. VI. pp. 198- 
202.  .
Hab., Ill, p,183j see also Agh., IV, p.94.
2Anaab. foie. 612a-612b; Tab., Ill, pp. 204, 207.
3Mai.*, fol. 621ajJab., III? pp. 204, 293-294} MurSj. 71, p.195, «il« ’l 
Manpur: Ati 1 Kufa fa a$a u ayaukhatahum wa akunu aakbabatan lahum. !
^jrahis, Fadl ban? Hashim, ed. Sandubl, p*XI7.
HSi. ' ' ; : . ' !
thirdly, the revolt seemed to he a good opportunity for Abu Ja‘far to
get rid of ‘Isa b* Musa who was the only potentially dangerous rival 
to his son al-Kahdi in the line of succession to the caliphate* The .:'t 
support for ^litammad dwindled at the news of the approach of the 4Abbasid; 
army which, though consisting of only 4,000 soldiers, was experienced 
ana well-trained and led by able generals such as Sumayd b. Qajtfaba 
and Kuthayr b* gusayru
Although courageous, Bfo&ammad lacked the foresight and tactical 
Imowledge* He sent a strong group of his supporters to control Mecca 
thus separating from them at a time when he needed them most* Furthermore, V 
the khu£ba -he delivered at Madina depressed the morale of his supporters 
ahd they began to disperse. Besides Madina was the wrong place to launch 
a rising from. Not self-sufficient economically, it depended on Egypt ; } 
and Syria and Abu Ja*far immediately ordered a sea and land blockade of 
it. Muhammad’s partisans realised it and advised him to escape to
Egypt, Mecca or Bagra, but‘the c’aliph succeeded by skilful manoeuvres
1Anaab, fol. 615b; Maqatil. p.185; Tab.,_III, p.223. Ya‘qubi (II, p.452)
describes it as Jayah ^aflia while Mas*udi put the number as 4,000 cavalry 
and 2,000 infantry* Muruj, VI, p*122*
2 • '\V‘’
Tab*, III, p.229. According to another account (op.cit** p.23C0 where;’the |
word Bada occurs in Muhammad\g speech* He says: Vfaqad bada li an adhana |
lakua wa afru.ja ‘ankum al-Manaqib* "It has occurred to me Ti^ the divine I
sense of the term/ to excuse you from your obligation.* This idea was |
accepted as a convenient explanation of the failures of Muhammad ' (see |
E*X.^ Badaf). This indicates that Muhammad expected failure before
confronting the ‘Abbasid army and tried to justify it. It might also i
indicate that the account is an invention to justify the defeat of Muhammad.1
3Putub. I, p.253; Tab., 111,-.pp. 28Q, 224, 217, 201; Mug.. fol. 107b;
Tab., I l l ,  pp. 201, 228, 241
in leading him to believe that once he declared hie revolt, many 
provinces would join him*'*' Obsessed by his religious idealism and 
influenced by a group of zealous followers who "cared more for the safety 
of their lives than to confront the terrible ‘Abbasid army", Muhammad 
aggravated the effects of the economic blockade of Madina by digging 
the ditch (al-Khandaq) round the city*
On Ramadan 12th 145 A.H./November 762, ‘Isa b* Musa camped at al- 
Jurf, where he entered into secret correspondence with many notables 
of Madina including some ‘Alids. Many of them left the city with their
families and some even joined ‘isa, a move which created a sense of in-
3security and led to a large scale evacuation of Madina. When the 
actual fighting took place, Muhammad was left with only a small number 
of his followers, mainly drawn from the tribe of luhayna and Banu Shu ja. 
Although they fought very bravely, there.was no question of Muhammad1s 
triumph over a well-trained army at least several times larger in number* 
In Madina itself there were pro-‘Abbasid elements working against Muhammad 
The tribe of Banu Ghaffar facilitated the entry of the ‘Abbasid army into 
the city* Meanwhile a black banner was installed on the minaret of the 
mosque which created the false impression that Madina had fallen to the
^Ansab, fols. 6l6bA 619b. Kana Muhammad Yaqul: Inni lam akhruj hatta 
bay a 1 ani ahl al-Kuf a wa fXTBa§ra wa wasit wa *± jaeira wd *1 M&lStll 
(Tab *, III, p *251 citing ibn Shabba*} : ; ' ; ’
2Xab., Ill, p.229, citing Ibn Shabba*
An sab* fols. 6l7b-618a; Tab., Ill, p. 226, citing Ibn Shabba.
^Tab., III, pp. 240 , 244: some accounts give the number of Muhammad’s
followers as 300* This should be treated cautiously because, according 
to Zay.diyya principle it^is the minimum number of followers for an ‘Alid 
to be recognized as an Imam (see Tab., Ill, p.237; Maqatll* p*196).
Abbasids* Some of Muhammad1 a followers took to flight, and he
«* *> 
himself was killed fighting on the 14th of Ramadan 145/a4?V.7<$2
The caliph had his head circulated in the provinces. The property of ' -
the rebels was confiscated.
After the rising Madina was reduced to a state of utter confusion
owing to the caliph’s economic and political measures. It was obvious
that the lower classes, including a large proportion of black slaves,
and the fairly prosperous group of merchants and traders, were most
A
affected by these measures.* The situation became intolerable when 
the new governor of Madina, ‘Abdalleh b. al-Rabi ‘ al-^arithl, arrived 
on the 5th of Shawwal 145/Nov. 762 with the ‘Abbasid army. The 
soldiers behaved badly in the markets, refusing to pay for what they bought, 
an act which the governor did not condemn. ^  The notables who no doubt 
considered the ‘Abbasid army an army of occupation, felt indignant,
They encouraged their may all and slaves to resist the abuses. The
disturbances started when the butchers killed a soldier who did not pay
g . .■ i
for his purchase* The trduble resulting from the sense of dissatisfaction I  .: , »
felt by the Arab notables eventually developed into an outburst of black : | 
slaves and the mob of Madina. * The black slaves, hard-pressed economically j
■“■Tab., Ill, p.244.
2Ma<arif. p.378; Tab., Ill, p.249l Maqatil. pp. 190-191.
5Tab., Ill, pp. 253 f.
Ansab. fol. 615b, qaiu; Tab., Ill, p.266, citing Ibn Shabba.
■Tab., Ill, p.266 citing ibn Shabba.
6Ibld.
7 - t .
Msab, fol. 623a-624a, citing Mup ab b. Abdallah, describes them as Sudan " ;
Waru a ‘: Tab.* Ill, pp. 265-271 calls them Sudan; Ibn Asakir statesi  -'-A. v:
■ •   t oont. )---_____— ■
fcnd despised socially longed for "revenge for themselves and their 
m a s t e r s " T h e y  killed a number of soldiers and ousted the new governor 
from the city* They also plundered the governmental stores where pro­
visions, for the army were stored. Fearing Abu Ja^far^ ruthlessness, ; 
the Arab notables endeavoured to quieten the outburst. Al-Apbagh b. Sufyan
and al-gakam b. ‘Abdallah, together with the Qagi Mugammad b. Abi Sabra
2. '
played an outstanding rOle in restoring the order. Ibn Abi Sabra, an
‘Alid sympathizer, was in prison at that time? he was freed by black
slaves and talcen to the mosque to lead the prayer. He,, however, advised
the people to keep order and obey the caliph. The governor of Madina,
asked to return to the city, had the hands of four of the black
4
ringleaders chopped off for stealing. Rather than political in 
character, the outburst seems to have been motivated by economic and
c
social factors as well as the sense of passion and loyalty, (Bamiyya) 
felt by the slaves for their indignant masters.
The revolt of Ibrahim■ i ..rrxT-TirTT.iT.->i-'m-Ttr-:r-r.ir.T-xviw.Tmjm.imnr.iLii }
Like his brother Mu&ammad, Ibrahim spent years wandering from 
Kudina to Aden, Syria, al-Sind, Mogul, Anbar and Wasit until he finallyy
s • . ' - . ■
,(cont.) Thara ‘ala ‘Abdallah b. al-Rabl‘ Sudan al-Hadina wa ’l ru‘a ‘ 
wa *1 glbyan (0!araai Maaahq.,MS. fols. B5a-83b, citfngHus'ab b,‘Abd&Ilafa.)
Tab.* Ill, pp. 268-269.
623b, oiting Hisham b. al-Ealbi, Tab., Ill, p.270, citing
Umar b. Rashid, Tarikh Dimashq, Ms. fols. 83a* 8£b.
3 « —
Tab., Ill, p.265 citing Omar b. Shabba; Tarikh Dimashq. fol. 84a.
4An^b, fol. 623a citing Mug‘ab b. ‘Abdallah; Tab., Ill, p.271.
5Tab., Ill, p.268.
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settled in Bagra in 143/760-1 to propagate for M s  ‘brother*1 Ibrahim
found in,Bagra a safe place of refuge* He changed residence, occasion-
2
ally,from one loyal tribe to another* Bsgra was, in fact, suitable
for a revolt* Its economic and strategic position was advantageous*
In its political attitude Bagra was neither *Alid nor ‘Abbasid. In
< 3
fact, it was described as Htjnnahite which does not necessarily imply 
a pro-Umayyad or anti-‘Alid tendency, but meant, as one of the notables 
of Bagra put it in his answer to Ibrahim's call to join his revolt, 
that **I do not believe in fighting and I do not consider it the right 
thing to db".^
Ibrahim did not rebel until two months after his brother's revolt.'* 
Accounts differ on the causes of the delay. According to one, Ibrahim 
had smallpox; according to another he simply was not ready. fhere is
Op.cit* * pp. 282-286; AtMr, V, 430. Another account gives the date 
of his final settlement in Ba$ra as 143/762-63 (fab* III, p.298); Van 
Arendonk, op.cit* * pp. 57f-
2 *• *»
"Iab_* f p.287, citing Ibn Shabba^ qala Abu Ja‘far: ghamada ‘alaya ’amr
Ibrihim Lama Ishtamalat ‘alayhl Tu£u£„al^Basra. See also Jafciz, Bukhala , 
pp. 183*183; Ansab, fol. 623b. Baladhuri states that^Ibrahim first1"^” 
settled with a section of Taming then shifted to Ban! Rasib when he soon 
had to change it again, while Jahiz speaks of Ibrahim's secretary who hid 
himself in the tribe of *Abd al-Qays then moved on to Tamim.
■^Hamad., p.315; Sa‘d, VI, p.232; Wafayat. II, pp. 123-127.
4Tab., Ill, p.289, citing ‘Umar b. Shabba.
' Ansab. fol. 633b, 626b; Khalifa, fol. 293; Tab., Ill, p.298.
6Tab., III, pp. 189, 290.
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no doubt that he was worried "and regarded revolutionary gestures 
as premature at that time*'This could be understandable if it is con­
sidered in the light of fickleness of the people of Bagra. In any 
case, Ibsihim realised further delay was dangerous as Abu J a ‘far who 
already knew of Ibrahim's activities through spies,began to reinforce 
his army there*3* On Ramadan 145/Nov. 762, Ibrahim rose with about twenty 
followers, but was soon joined by several Arab chiefs and their tribal 
groups, until his diwan listed 4,000 by the time he proclaimed the
' 2  ^  4Wl
revolt. The governor of Bagra, Sufyan b. Mu‘awiya al-Muhallabi, had 
an understanding with Ibrahim and Ibrahim easily took over dar al-Imara 
and Bayt al-Mal where he found 600,000 dirhams which he distributed
3
among his followers, fifty dirhams each* He easily seised control of 
Bapra and drove out Muba*nma& and Ja‘far, the sons of Sulayman b. ‘Ali 
who became the rallying point of the ‘Abbasid counter-movement. ^
With the sources at our disposal it is not easy to assess the
- f , •'  :
nature of the support that Ibrahimderived from Bagra which had no specific 
political colour. ; Its attitude was more changeable. The most in­
fluential tribe Bani Tamim was not pro-‘Alid in its leanings* In fact,
1Ansab. fol. 623b} Tab., Ill, p.291.
Ansab. fol. 624aj_Tab., ill, p.290. Different accounts were given for :
the number of Ibrahim's followers. Some state 100,000 (Tab., Ill, p.209) 
or 10,000 (Xa‘q,ubi, II, p.454) or 50,000 (Bad*. 6, p.86).
^Ansab. fol. 625a citing Aim ‘Uba^da; Tab., Ill,pp.297, 300* If these 
figures are to be credited Ibrahim's followers should have numbered about
12,000 men. '
^Ibrahim was closely related to Kufcemmad and Ja'far who had Umm al-Jasan 
bint ja‘far b. al-fasan as mother. He invited them to join him, calling 
himself as their uncle (Anaab. fol. 627b*).
^Ch* Fellat, Le Milieu Basrien.... p. 281. (Arabic transi)
they refused to submit to any authority whatever. Ahl al-‘Iliya and 
especially Bahila tribes were also anti-‘Alid. It was, therefore,
*Abd al-Qays, the smallest and most turbulent tribe in Bapra, and the 
‘Azd tribe that could be considered pro-‘Alid tribes.*** Anyhow, this 
definition is by no means clear. The political orientation of these 
tribes was changeable. Personal tendencies and political circumstances 
drove part of the tribes and population to side with the ‘Alids.
Statements like Y/abayy aflat al—Qaba1il (i.e. all the tribes have accepted
~  ' ■ 2
the white colour and joined Ibrahim) should be treated very cautiously.
Ibrahim, in fact, derived considerable support from the lower olasses 
of Ba^ra and the whole Sawad, a fact which Abu Ja‘far himself admitted.
The lower classes, Arabs' and non-Arabs, were depressed economically, dis­
contented socially and ready to join any opposition against the government 
The people were also attracted by the religious character of the revolt, 
still enhanced by the great number of traditionists who joined or sym­
pathized with Ibrahim such as Abu ganifa, Sufyan al-Thawri, al-A‘mash, 
al-Mufaflflal al-gabbl, *Abbad b. Mangur, Basfir al-Raggal and Majar al-
***Ch.. Pellet, op.cit.» pp. 51 , 265 (Arabic trans.)
^Ansab, fol. 624a.
^ffaywan, 4, p*24; Bukhalaf,p.!39? Tab., Ill, p.507. Bagra and its neigh­
bourhood was inhabited by divergent elements such as Persians, Aramians 
(NibJ;), 2uJ and Slaves, (see Anoab, 4, p.112; gaywan, 4# p.35; Pakhr 
al-Sudan, ed. SasI, p. 75; Bui dan, I, p. 522. al- Ali, Tanzimat,'”ppT^66 ff 
Peliat,"op.cit., pp. 66ff.
— 1 "War.ai|* However there were other traditionists and jurists who sided
6 *** *™* ** "*** i2with the Abbasids or were at least neutral. According to Baladhuri>
Suwar al«Qa^i used to dissuade people from joining Muhammad and his
brother, Sa‘id b. * Aruba advised people to keep to their homes and
Hisham b. ‘Abdullah did not express his opinion on Ibrahim's rising.'*
Ibrahim also enjoyed the sympathy and support of the Zaydiyya and the Mu ‘ta~
zila who showed great concern for him and his prospects and "closely
associated with him and helped him to conduct his affairs”.^ The Umayyads
found Bagra a good place of refuge. Their number was growing and they *
5- ___
were prosperous and popular. They and their Mawali probably helped 
Ibrahim, as he was' connected with them by marriage, being the husband 
of Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah al-‘uthmani1 s daughter.
Maqatil, pp. 239, 247-261; Azdi, fol. 165; ghatib, XIII, pp. 280f;
Asakir, II* p.255; Mart., p.41; Bhliabl, SSrlEh, fol. 8b. Heresiographers 
regarded Abu ?anifa as a Murjite Tsee girab#‘^ P*7; Bassnr, III. p. 106; 
Haqalat, i, p.138; Shah., I, pp. 147, 157; Khitat. II, p.350). According 
to another account he was considered, probably' by the extremist ‘Alids 
of Kufa, as Zaydite (Shah*, II, p.24) due to his moderate ‘Alid leanings. 
Hutjism, in fact, opposed tyranny and injustice long before the *Abbaaid 
accession to power (van Vloten, op.cit., pp. 31-2_). They believed tha\
It was their duty to oppose^ tyranny by force (Moqalit, II, p*452; Khatib, 
XIII,Ip.380 f). Whether Abu ganifa^was a murjite or not he certainly 
sympathized with Muhammad and Ibrahim^and was imprisoned until his death. 
Bagh., I, p.422; Shah., I, p.163; Haqatil. p. 248, of. 33.1.2 Abu hanlfs.
2Ansab, fol. 567.
I - lfT“
5Azdi,.fol. 165. .
4 • . 4
Opdex, Iieiden, 1974, cited by van Vloten in ,(Zur Abbasidengeschichte”, . 
Z.D.M.Cr., 52, 1898, p.216, footnote 2; van Arendonk, op.cit., p.58.
^Ansab, fol. 754b, citing ‘Umar b. Shabba; Tab., Ill, p.419.
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Having taken Bagsra, Ibrahim sent to neighbouring provinces
missionaries who were followed by armed forces* Ahwaz, ^ars, Kirman,
- 1 - -
Kaskar and Wasit were taken by force. Ibrahim thought that by con­
trolling these provinces he would strengthen his position and enlist new 
supporters for his cause. Even in Kufa,^ secret propaganda was made 
for Ibrahim by the Asadite Ibn Ma*iz and the ‘ijlite Ibn al-Faraf§a 
who was preparing an uprising in Ibrahim*s'name but was unable, to 
stage it, prevented by the measures adoptedty Abu Ja‘far. The latter 
declared a curfew and.divided his 1,300 men into three parts patrolling
the city.. He used to have fires lit in many places of his camp so that
3 -the Kufites would assume that he had a great army in readiness. Abu 
Ja‘far*s army was actually very small.^ When Ibrahim's reluctance to 
advance to Kufa gave him the opportunity to rally his scattered army 
he acted swiftly. He ordered‘isa b. Musa, who had already subdued 
Muhammad's revolt and was on his way to Mecca, to hurry back to Irafc.
He also sent Salm b. Qutayba al-Bahili from al-Ray to reinforce Ja‘far
5 *
b. Sulayman. Salm al-Bahili an influential figure in Bagra succeeded
in winning the tribe of Bahila over to the ‘Abbasids.^ Khazim b. Khuzayma
^Ansab, fol. 624b; Tab., Ill, pp. 300-301.
2 - 
Tab., IIIj^  pp. 293-5, citing Salm al-Khagi. In the words of the caliph's
adviser Kufa was "a boiling kettle whose lid is you /Abuja faj^ **.
^Tab., Ill, pp. 293, 304 citing ‘Abdallah b. Rashid; Bhahabx, fol. 7a.
^The ‘Abbasid army was scattered in the gijaz, Rayy and Ifriqtiyya 
(Tab., Ill, p.304; Bhahabi, fol.7a.).
5Agh., XII, p.107; Tab., Ill, pp. 305; Dhahabi, Tarildi, fol. 7a.
6Tab., Ill, p.305.
with 4,000 soldiers recaptured al-Ahwaz from al~Mugh_ira b, al-Kar‘
I braliim1 s gove rno r • ^
When Ibrahim heard of his bi'other's death he proclaimed himself 
Aralr al-Mu’minin and decided to move to Kufa. Only 10,000 followed 
him to ICufa.^ Ibrahim,influenced by certain pious elements among his 
followers, turned down many beneficial suggestions by experienced men 
of war who knew well the topography of the ax*ea and advised him to 
follow an unknown route to Kufa in oi’der to surprise Abu Ja‘far because, 
on the advice of Bashir al-Rab]?.al, such an act would cause much harm 
to children and women of Kufa. To this, one of Ibrahim's partisans 
replied "You rose against Abu Ja‘fnr and yet you care for the safety
of children and w o m e n . . . A t  Bakhamra, Ibrahim met ‘isa b. Musa who
5 «  —
was with 15,000 soldiers. V/hen the fighting took place, Ibrahim's
army was, at first, victorious, but ‘isa b. Musa held his position with
a small unit. At this moment, Ja‘far and Muhammad, sons of Sulayman,
surprised Ibrahim's army from the rear. They retreated to fight the
ambush. This gave the ‘Abbasid army an opportunity to organise itself.
Ibrahim now lad to fight on two fronts. His followers started to desert
him except for about 500, most of them were Zaydiyya. He was finally
killed by an arrow on Monday, the 25th of Dhu 'l Qa‘da 145 A.H./763, and
his head was sent to Abu Ja‘far who had it exhibited in Kufa and then
1Tab., Ill, pp. 305-6, biting Sa‘!d b. Salm.
Ansab, fol. 225b; Tab;, III, pp.312, 309.
3 — ♦ — —Tab., p.309 citing Abu Ubayda and an eye witness; Ya‘qubi, II, p.454;
Baladhuri states that they wex*e 11,000. Seven hundred of them were cavalry
(Ansab, fol. 225b).
4Tab., Ill, p.311; Bhahabi, fols. 7a~7b.
^M a ‘arif. p.378; Tab., Ill, p.310.
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sent it to the provinces. ‘isa immediately declared an amnesty, but; 
it was not observed, as some of Ibrahim*s supporters who had given 
themselves up were killed*^
The revolt had been dangerous. It is related that Abu Ja‘far was 
ready tg abandon Kufa and join his son in al-Ray where there was a con-
|  to*
siderable Abbasid army. The reasons for Ibrahim *s .failure lie in the 
very nature of the divergent elements which supported him. Bapra was 
inhabited by different Arab tribes and non-Arab elements. Although 
Ibrahim rallied a considerable support he could not act swiftly, probably 
because he was hindered by difference of opinion among his supporters 
in Bapra.^ The people of Bagra were politically opportunistic and
s
changeable for two reasons; First, most of its tribes were turbulent, 
and those which joined Ibrahimbad no real ‘Alid leanings, but opposed
*i
Ma ‘arif, p.378; Anseb, fols. 225b-226b; Agh.. XVII, p.109; Tab., Ill, 
pp. 310-315? Dhahabi. fols. 7b-&a citing al-Fajll b. Dakin.
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Ansab. fols. 225b—226a. Some traditionists and religious figures were 
pardoned (Ansab, fol. 627a)#
^Ansab, fol. 626b citing ‘Abdallah b. §alih al~Jfa<prij, Agb. XVII, p.109.
Tab., Ill, p.308-, 317; Maqdisl, 6, p.86. Baladhuri relates a khutba 
delivered by the^caliph in Kufa soon after the failure of the revolt 
in which Al-Mangur expressed his astonishment as "Why the Umayyads did 
not kill all the Kufan warriors and ravaged its people” (Ansab, fol. 226a),
^Ibrahim might have even thought of shifting to Wapit to get away from 
the whole frictional atmosphere (this view is related by Ya‘qubi and 
substantiated by an account in Ansab which states: /'Ghayra *anna
Ibrahim Khafa ghadr Ahl al-Bagra wa Ikhtilafahum wa ‘ agabiyyatahum 
fa1 eq-bal"a~nabwa wasit#^ (Ansab, fol/'528a t Ya^ubl. II. p.215).
Hamad*., p*X3^T HaqdisI, p. 129. Kanat taqa‘u fi*l Bapra ‘agabiyyat 
wabigba.
the ‘Abbasid central government; secondly Bagra was becoming a com­
mercial centre and its inhabitants especially the merchants preferred 
stability to the vicissitudes of politics, and were unwilling to risk 
participation in a revolt unless its prospects were exceptionally good. 
Ibrahim’s revolt must have had initially good prospects since many 
peopio were attracted to join it. However, when the rising of Medina 
was crushed, and ‘isa wa3 advancing towards Bagra, Ibrahim was left
i , -
with only 10,000 followers most of whom deserted him during the battle 
of Bakhamra. To punish the ‘Alid partisans in Bapra, Abu Ja*far ordered
i •
Salm al—Bahili to destroy the rebel’s houses and cut down their trees. 
Salm failed to comply with the orders and was dismissed by Abu Ja*far.
But the new governor contented himself with destroying the houses of some
4 1
pro- *Alid notables. The relative leniency of the punishment of the 
participants of this dangerous rebellion is significant, as it proves 
once again that Bagra was not so much pro-‘Alid as anti-‘Abbasid in its 
leanings. Having prevailed Abu Ja‘far was, finally, able to consolidate 
the power in the house of al-‘Abbas and took the title al-Mangur (i.e. 
the victorious) and was rightfully considered the founder of the dynasty.
Muhammad’s and Ibrahim’s defeat marked the complete collapse of 
‘Alid endeavour to seise the caliphate. Risings like that of ffakhkh, 
though tragic in their nature and effect, never had the same impact again.
1Ansab. fol. 626b; Tab.,_III, pp. 319, 326-327. The author of T.H.A.
(p*262) relates al-^Man^ur’s statement that ”The people of Ba§r& had no 
excuse. Their quraf cursed us..*., their jurists gave the people the 
ffatva to fight us and their youths fought us.”
2ffanbih. p.341.
The death of more active and militant Fafimids enhanced Ja*far al- 
gadiq*s opportunity to attain the leadership of the ‘Alids and their 
sympathisers. However, as has already been mentioned, his acquiescent 
policy and lack of interest in politics made him refuse Abu Salama*s 
offer to proclaim him caliph. Men such as Abu *1 Khattab, having failed
to persuade Ja‘far al-§adiq to rise in arms against Abu Ja*far found
— — 1 
his son Isma‘il more inclined to listen to their militant plans.
It was this peaceful disposition of al-gadiq and his disinclination to
bid for political leadership that enabled him to live on comparatively
good terms with Abu Ja‘far. The caliph was pleased to have him in Madina
as a deterrent to militant ‘Alids. Al-gadiq devoted himself to religious
studies, and the caliph seems to have been right in regarding him as
2
merely a prominent traditionist. As Professor Gibb puts it,
MThere is, in fact, little evidence that at this period any 
major dogmatic schism had developed between Sunnism and 
•moderate1 i.e. Imama Shiism or that any kind of heterodoxy 
attached to the followers of the Ithna4ashari Imams* Ho- 
body seems to have been concerned to discourage it, or to 
have been penalized because of it, provided that it remained 
on a platonic or non-political plane.”
*5Hodgson, on his part, observes that
"This was the time of the rise of gadith and the attempt 
to construct total systems of the pious life - which eventu­
ally issued in the full Shari‘a law. It was the time of
^Ri.jal. ed£ Karbala 1965, pp. 249, 267-501; Firaq.pp.55 ff; Sa‘d 
al-As^ari, pp. 80, 81-85; B. Lewis, The Origins...* pp. 50 ff.
2
Gibb, Government and Islam. L*Elaboration de 1♦Islam. Paris, 1961, 
p*118; see also M. Watt, The Rafiflites, Oriens. XVII, pp. 112-5.
^Hodgson,"How did the Siij*a", J.A.O.S., p. 11*
Mu-.
Abu ganifa and Malik, the Imam. Ja*far was evidently 
looked on as Imam like them concerned with working out 
the proper details of how the pious should solve the 
various- cases in conscience that might arise.”
Within his circle Ja*far al-gadiq claimed the spiritual leader­
ship of the community. Being a Pafiraid, he considered himself the only 
rightful religious Imam divinely appointed according to the doctrine 
of Nagg, i.e. clear designation by the previous Imams. This idea was
complementary to the claim of ‘llm, i.e. the inheritance of special 
1knowledge. Thus his authority was merely religious and spiritual.
However he promised his devoted partisans a gusaynid caliphate after the 
advent of al-Qa’im^i.e. the Seventh Imam, thus avoiding the responsibility 
of leading the revolt against the ‘Abbasids, According to his way of 
thinking it was not necessary to rebel in order to' become a ruler. He 
therefore disapproved of Ismael's association with the militant ex­
tremists, and deprived him of his right to succession. Instead, he 
nominated as his successor his younger son, MUsa al-Kazim, mainly 
because of his quiet character and peaceful disposition. Politically, 
the gusaynids did not score any record and even if later fabrications 
represent al-gadiq and al-Kazim as bold and courageous in the presence
Rijal, pp. 319, 356, 358-362; Hodgson, op«oit., pp, llff; E.I,
(53a far al-gadig).The ‘Abbasids who opposed all Alid as##rti6na 
claim by claim, insisted on the possession of a special knowledge pre­
served in the Sabifat *1 gafra* which had been handed down by Abu 
Hashim to Muhammad the Abbasid (Akhbar, fol. 84b). Furthermore,_al- 
Mangur significantly refers, in his'lTagiyya, to his son al-Mahdi, 
to the '’Secret Knowledge” contained in a book which belonged to his 
‘Abbasid ancestors (Tab., Ill, p*443)* This was evidently directed 
against the ‘Alids especially the gusaynids who claimed the possession 
of ‘ilm transmitted to them from the Prophet which made them infallible 
(Ma gum).
Bilal, pp. 140-141,* al-Mufid, al-Irahad. ed. 1962, pp. 288ff.
of ‘Abbasid caliphs, the relations between the ‘Abbasids and the
1
gusaynids were, on the whole, good,
A period of reconoiliation
The reign of al-Hahdi (156/775-169/785) was, in general, a
period of reconoiliation* He tried to satisfy all the discontented
elements and especially the ‘Alids. Perhaps it is appropriate to
mention here that al-Mahdi’s character was different from that of
2
his father who had himself foreseen that he would not follow his 
policy. Xn his wagiyya to al-Mahdi, al-Mangur said 111 have left 
you three categories of people: the poor who expect you to enrich them,
the frightenecl who expect you to protect them and the imprisoned who
expect you to liberate them. When you become caliph let them taste
3 • -happiness but not to excess.11 He also urged al-Mahdi to spare no
means in searching for the hidden ‘Alid rebel, ‘isa b. Zayd^ who
together with the Zaydiyya participated in Muhammad's revolt. After
Muhammad's death ‘isa b. Zayd joined Ibrahim in Bjisra and became his
heir (wagi) and banner bearer. According to Igbahani, al-Mangur tried
■^Nevertheless al-Mangur was watchful# Having^leamed of pro-gusaynid sub­
versive activities, the caliph summoned al~gadiq and his son Xsma‘il to 
Ira^. However their lives were spared and only one of the conspirators 
Bassam b* ‘Abdallah al-gayrafi was executed (Rijal, p.159; Najashi, pp. 
81-2). Al-Man$ur also seemed to have been worried about the Khums which 
used to be paid to al-gadiq by hisjpartisans as a token of their loyalty. 
He is said to have questioned al-gadiq on the matter when he visited 
Madina to perform his pilgrimage in 147/764 (al-Kafi, I, pp. 159, 555; 
gifat al-gafwa. II, p.96).
2Tab., Ill, p.445, citing Haytham b. *Adi; Dietrich, Das politische, Per 
Islam. 1952, pp. 143ff.
^Ya*qubi, II, p.475.
^Tab. Ill, p.448, citing ‘Uraar b. Shabba.
5Magatil. pp. 227-228, 243.
to exploit a misunderstanding between ‘isa and Ibrahim and incited 
v the latter to desert Ibrahim. But the deep,cause of the deterioration 
of the relationship between Ibrahim and ‘Is a  seems to have been the 
Imamate* In fact *Isa claimed the Imamate after Muhammad's death, while 
Ibrahim had already taken the title of Amir *1 Mu’minin. However al- 
Manpur failed in his effort to utilize this rivalry when both Ibrahim 
and i. agreed to postpone their differences and unite their forces
against Abu Ja‘far al-M&npur. *Isa participated in the battle of
-  « -  -  1
Bakhamra and sfter Ibrahim's death he escaped to Kufa.
Al-Mahdi was willing to maintain cordial relations with the ‘Alids.
On his pilgrimage in 160/777 he astonished the people of Mecca and
Madina by giving them generous gifts. He also ordered the governor of
Egypt to resume the supplies of grain and other provlsiohs for the ?ijaz
which had been cut off by al-Mangur after Muhammad's revolt, returned
the confiscated properties to ‘Alid participants in the latter and
2released political prisoners.
It was also in accordance with this conciliatory policy that. al- 
Mahdi appointed Ya‘qub b. Da’ud his Wazir. Ya‘qub had associated him­
self with the gasanid rebels and had been imprisoned by al-Mangur after 
the failure of their revolt. In al-Mahdi*s reign, a general amnesty 
was granted in 159/775, and Ya‘qub was released.^ He succeeded in gaining
^Op.cit., pp. 232, 271f citing Ibn Shabba, 281, citing al-Nawfall.
2Tab.t III, pp. 257, 280, citing gammad al-Turki. On al-MahdiJ^s friendly 
gestures see furthers Agh.» Ill, p.!5i Kaqatil, p.263; Ya^ubi, II, 
p.476; Tab., Ill, p.482; gafadi, al-Wafi, 4, p.105; al-I‘lam, pp. 99,109.
Jah., p.155; Tab., Ill, p.507 citing‘Ali al-Nawfali.
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the favour of al-Mahdi by disclosing to him the plan of escape of
his fellow-prisoner the ‘Alid al-gasan b. Ibrahim so that the plan 
1 -was foiled. Al-Mahdi was only too eager to avail himself of the
services of a man of Ya‘qub's abilities, whose early connections
with the ‘Alide could help to trace the active ones amongst them, and to
establish cordial relations with the others. Obviously the oaliph .
chose Y a‘qub for political reasons. Now the search was intensified
for ‘isa b. Zayd who had fled from the battle of Bakhamra. and al~®asan
b. Ibrahim who had finally managed to escape from his prison with the
2 * -help of the Zaydiyya. Ya qub promised al-Mahdi to do his best to 
find them, and when he accompanied him on his pilgrimage to Mecca in 
160/777, he produced al-gasan b. Ibrahim."^ Al-Mahdi subsequently per­
mitted Ya‘qub#s authority to grow and appointed him Wazxr in 163/779,
referring to him as "brother in &odrT.^ Al-Mahdi1 seems to have taken ■
these steps with the explicit purpose of showing the ‘Alids what generosity 
he was capable of towards those who were willing to ally themselves with 
the ‘Abbasid regime. The ‘Alids were, however, unwilling to compromise 
with the ‘Abbasids. Moreover, they did not, in fact, trust Y a ^ b ' s
^Jah*, p.181; Tab., Ill, pp. 462-463; E. Kooher, Ya‘qub b. Da*ud. M.I.O..
Ill, 1955, p.382.
2Jah.t p.181; Tab., Ill, p*508, citing ‘Ali al-Nawfali, p.461; Muntakhab. j
fol. 131a* — — - .
I
, Ana at), fol. 607a; Jah., p.156; Tab., Ill, p. 482.. 1
I
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Jah., p. 155; Tab., Ill, p.464; Muraj. VI, p.232. Besides its honorary
implications, this declaration of fraternity, which is probably inspired 
by the Qur’anic verse ^  »must be considered against j
the reconciliatory policy of al-Mahdi. It signified a declaration of amnesty 
for all enemies of the regime, and was particularly intended as^a tactical 
move to win the^‘Alids. See Sourdel, La Vizarat.... p.107; al-Basha, 
al-Alqab al-Islamiyya. pp. 60, 135.
^Sourdel, op.cit.. p.108.
*opportunist nature, as he had utilised the *Alid question to promote 
his own career. Despite the presents and assurances of al-Mahdl which 
he had obtained through Yaiqub> ‘isa b. Zayd did not give himself up*
As Ya^qub’s efforts failed to achieve their object, al-Mahdi*s re­
lations with him grew Oooler and cooler and it is said that he decided 
to put him to the test. He entrusted him with an *Alid prisoner and 
promised to reward him if he killed the prisoner. But Ya*qub took pity 
on the prisoner and facilitated his escape. This brought about his down­
fall. He was imprisoned and all the governors who had been nominated
2by him were dismissed.
The dismissal of Ta*qub was a turning point in al-HahdI*s policy
towards the *Alids. His measures became harsher and harsher."5 His
suspicion even fell on Musa al-Kazim, who seems to have kept totally
out of politics, probably regarding him as potentially dangerous. Al-
Mahdi had him arrested and imprisoned in Baghdad until he was suddenly
- 4
released and permitted to return to the gijas* Several suspects 
among them *Ali b. al-*Abbae the gasanid were put under strict watch.
The latter was subsequently arrested and al-gusayn b. ‘All, the
eldest among the ‘Alids, went to Baghdad and interceded with al-Mahdi
i ~ 5
in favour of Ali who was released with gusayn as his guarantor.
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1Maqatil. p.274; ‘Amili, X, p.57.
Jah., p.165; Tab.,XXI, p.516; Ifaru.i. VI, p.232; Wafayat. 3, p.447.
^Kaqatil, pp. 279-80; Rljal. pp. 227 f, 284. See also Agh., XXI, p.120;
Iqd, citing Utbi, 2, p.173.
4Tab., XII, p.533 citing al-Habi‘ b. Yunus; Khaplb, XIII, p.27; Dhahabi, 
fol. 39b. Indeed al-Kassim led a politically less active life than hie 
father. Nor was he interested in the field of religious knowledge. Never­
theless hewas also imprisoned by the suspicious al-RasJiid (170/786- 
193/809) and died in his prison without fulfilling the rOle of the
(cont.)
Al-Mahdl did not survive the failure of his conciliatory policy
towards the *Alids long enough to put his new plans into practice*
These may have aimed at a totally reversed policy. It is significant,
I . . .  ; v ;
however, that an important change in the formulation of the ‘Abbasid claim 
to succession was made in al-Mahdi * s ‘reign- Henceforward the ‘Abbasid 
claim was no longer based on the wagiyya of Abu Hashim but on the status 
of al-*Abbas as the uncle of the Prophet and his legitimate inheritor. ;
The revolt of al-Husayn b. *Ali
When al-Hadi succeeded to the caliphate (169/785-170/786), he 
abandoned the friendly policy of his father towards the ‘Alids and dis-
*— t 2
continued their *Afca*. However, the situation proved untenable, so
that they approached al-gusayn b. *Ali who seemed to be the most suitable ;
to undertake the leadership of the movement and incited him t> revolt.
Xa4qubi,s statement, supported by Tabari,^ is of importance in so far as
it reveals that the uprising was not casual but planned inadvance.
-  *.4
Ipbahani also states that at the beginning of. the pilgrimage about 
seventy men visited al-gusayn and stayed in the house of Ibn Af la£ which 
aroused the suspicions of the governor of Madina.
(cont.) the saviour (al-Qa*im) which was expected of him as the Seventh 
Imam. Bespite the numerous miracles attributed to him by his partisans 
after his death, his posthumous influence was small.
^Mdqatil. g.269* Ibn *Asakir relates that al-Mahdi imprisoned a gasanid 
called Abu ‘Abdallah al-Mafcji whose mother was a Tamimite. He therefore 
claimed probablj out of fear to be a Tamimite than an *Alid and lived at 
al-Balqa (Tarikh Dimashq, MS* fol* 188a).
1Piragi, p.43; Akhbar, fol, 74b,
2Y«‘cpIbI, II. P.488.
^Tab., Ill, pp. 553f 5&5% see also van Arendonk, qp.clt,, p.65o
4|^ qatil. p.296, citing ‘tJmar b a %abba; Fakhii, p.172. A
When, ‘llmar b. ‘Abdallah al- ‘iJmari was appointed governor of Madina in 
X69/785, he used strict measures against the ‘Alids, so that each of them 
had to be the guarantor of the other, and even al-yusayn b. ‘All himself 
was included.3" Al-Hadi also fried to interfere with 4Ali b. al-yusayn*s 
plan to marry Raqiyya bint *Umar al-Mahdi* s widow. ‘All justified his 
intention by stating that there was nothing in Islam to prevent a 
marriage with anybody’s widow, and actually married her. Soon al-^BmariL 
imprisoned and humiliated some 5Mids among them al-yasan b. Muhammad on 
the charge of wine drinking, an allegation which is rather difficult 
to prove. Ipbahani, Ya*qubi and Ibn al-Tiqtaqa naturally take the side
s
i j ’ 3of the Alids and describe the accusation as false pretext. However,
it seems to emerge from the argument between al-yusayn b. *Ali and al-
‘tJmari that they had in fact drunk wine; al-gusayn argued that al-^mari
had no right to flog them, as the Irafei school permitted the drinking
A
of a certain kind of wine. Al-Jasan b. Muhammad was only released 
on the condition that he reported daily to the authorities, and that al- 
gusayn b. ‘All and Yafcya b. *Abdallah became his guarantor*. The treat­
ment meted out to al-gaaan and other *Alids, provoked f strong anger in
^Maqatil. p.296 citing Muhammad^al-Nawfall and Ibn Shabba; Tab. ,111,
552, citing ‘Ajbdallah al-Ansari.
2Tab.f H I ,  p.587, citing Ibn Shabba.
^Maqatil, pp. 296-97; Ya‘gubi, II, p.488; Fakhri.p.260; see also Ibn 
al-Sa i, Kukhtagar.., p.24; Van Arendonk, op.cit., p.65, footnote 2.
4Tab., III, p.552 citing al-Fa£L b. Ishaq. Weil has accepted the allegation:
and presented it as a laxity of morals among those who claimed to be the 
most rigid observers of religious law (ll,pp.l23f).
the *Alid circles of Madina.1 As has already been mentioned, al-yusayn 
b. *AlI was already preparing for the revolt which was to take place 
in the coming pilgrimage season. He contacted the *A!id partisans of :
Kufa who had come to Madina under the pretext of performing the pil­
grimage. It was at that time that the *Alid al-gasan b. Mugammad failed 
to present himself to the authorities for three days. The governor of 
Madina Called upon his guarantor to produce him. The subsequent angry
exchange of words seems to have exacerbated the situation and preei-
2
pitated the already planned revolt. This hasty decision probably 
contributed to its failure.
The revolt found, in fact, no support among the people of Madina*
The main supporters were the twenty-six *A!ids who, in their majority, 
joined al-gusayn* Other supporters were mainly Kufites, probably Zaydiyya, 
who had already been pouring into Mecca as the revolt was planned for 
the time of the pilgrimage.^ Al-gusayn*s followers were, therefore, 
not numerous, Ya'qiubl estimates them at less than ?00, Ifbahani
■ '4' “
at about 300 which, probably, implies that they were less than that.
As to the ‘Abbasids, many of them were already in the gijaz intending 
to perform the pilgrimage under the leadership of Suleyman b. Abi Ja*far. :
I ' ' * V. A  ■
^Moscati, nLe califat d’aMHadi", S.0..XII. 1946, p.9.
2Tab., Ill, p.552 citing ‘Abdallah al-Anpari; Heqatil. p.297.
^Maqatil. pp. 296-7,^299, 305, citing *Umar b. Shabba, Kugaaaad al- ^ 
Hawf.il and Mada’ini; Tab., Ill, pp. 552, 5 6 3  citing «1-Kufa,$al b. Sail,.
S ' a ’qpbl^ IX, p.488; Baqatil. p.298.
ZoX.‘
Hearing of the revolt, al-Hadi ordered Muhammad b. Sulayman to take
M  1 ^
over the command of the ‘Abbasids* The Abbasid side.was composed of
‘Abbasid partisans who were performing the pilgrimage and a strong
body guard brought from Baghdad to. protect the pilgrimage caravan
2
against Bedouin attack*
Al-gusayn proclaimed his revolt in H&dina^ calling the people 
for al-Mur£afla min Si Muhammad.^ The governor of Medina fled but the 
‘Abbasid partisans rallied round Khalid al-Barbari, one of the officers, 
and attacked the Mosque where the rebels had entrenched themselves, 
but al-Barbari was killed and his followers were driven out. However, 
al-gusayn who had found no support in Madina had to leave for Mecca. 
Since the Meccans exhibited an equal lack of sympathy, he announced 
in order to reoruit followers that every slave who joined him was a
free man. This act created discpntent among the notables of Mecca and
6
he had to aeturn some slaves to their owners*
XTab. ,111, p.557 citing Hufcammad b. Salih; Khalifa, fol. 310; Muru.1. VI,266.
^Tab.z 111, p.557, Mas*udi estimates their number as 4,000 soldiers 
(Muruj, VI, p.266). On the bedouins* activities in this district see 
Tab. Ill, p*559? Athlr, VI, pp^ 51-52. It is interesting to notice that 
while Tabari uses the term A rab, Ibn al-Athlr uses ‘Arab.
^On the revolt sees Bayan, 3, p.557; Ma*arif. pp. 380-61; Bina, p^ .382; 
F.H.A. , pp. 284-5; K aqatil, pp. 295-508; Tab., Ill, 551-68; Shafaf. pp. 
184-5. i
^Tab., Ill, p*554t citing ‘Ali b. Mufcammad; of. Maqatil, p.301 where 
j-the title is "al-Rifla min al Muhammad" *
Tab., Ill, pp. 555-4,^citing al-Fa£l b. Isfca^ q and Mufcammad b. galifr; 
Maqatil, p.300; Aaraqi, III, p.212; Athlr, Vif p.61.
g
Tab., Ill, pju 555-557, citing ‘Abdallah b. Muhammad, Nafdr al-Juma^l and 
Mubaimad b. Jfalifc. One of the notables said to al-Husayjj, rt*Amaddata ila 
mamalik lam tamlukahum fa a taqtahum. Bima tastahilu. Bhalika?" Shafa*T 
pp. 184-5.
Subsequently, the *Abbasids marched towards Mecca, and al-gusayn 
decided to meet them* The fighting took place on the day of Tarwiya 8th 
of Dhu *1 giija/llth June in the valley of Fakhkh.^ Al-gusayn b.
*AlI was killed and more than a hundred *Alid partisans were massacred. 
The rest escaped by miring with the pilgrims* Muhammad b* Sulayman
declared an amnesty and nobody was pursued* It was in the battle of gakhkh 
that Yagya b. ‘Abdallah al-Magd and his brother Idris managed to get away. 
The former fled to the Daylam where he eventually revolted in the reign ; 
of al-Rashld in 176/792-3* while the latter escaped to the Maghrib where
1 g
he founded the Idrisid dynasty in 172/788* In spite of the amnesty, many
« . - 3 —
Alids were executed in cold blood. Trusting .the Aman, al-gasan b.
Muhammad who had been the cause of the revolt, surrendered voluntarily,
but he was executed by the orders of Musa b* *Isa. Both al-Hadi and
Muhammad b. Sulayman were indignant when they heard of the execution
•» ** a
of al-gasan, and Musa's property was confiscated by al-Hadi1 s orders.
Some historians describe al-Hadi as unwilling to kill the *Alids*^ 
This may be partly true, but he did not hesitate to treat the ‘Alid
^Ansab. fol* 229b-230af Ma*Srif, p.380; M aqatil, p.302; g.H.A*. p.283; 
Tab., Ill, p.559; Murui* VI, p*226* cf. Muntakhab (fol. 131a) where it is 
maintained that al-gusajn did not fall in batrEXe but was executed; see 
also Moscati* op.cit** pp, 12-13# B.I.? (Fakhkh).
^Ansab. fol. 230a; Tab., Ill, pp. 561, 562; ffujum. p.432.
3 §Hue to the heavy loss among the Alids in ffakhkh, the event was con­
sidered by the *Alld partisans as the most tragic one sf ter^Karbala^in 
60 A*H. (Tab. Ill, p.559. Maqatil* pp. 302-304;. Although l£sa al-Kiusim 
declined to support ai-gusayn's revolt (Maqatil, p. 299), some accounts 
represent him as being persecuted by al-Hadi (al-Fugul al-Muhlnmaj fol. 
I68b; ‘Amili, 4/2, p.31). On al-Kazim'3 relations with the Abbasids 
see further; Maqatil, pp. 331-6; Firaq, pp, 67, 71-72; Rijal,pp. 262, 
365-70. 372, 226 ff; Tab., Ill, p.649; A^ Ir , V T , ™ *  58-59F Wafayat. 5. 
p.463 (English trans.), Cairo ed* vol* 3/5*13; Amili, vol. I, p.p#,
Vol. 4# pt. 2, pp. 3-73^ al-Mufid, al-Irs|iad, pp. 288ff.
partisans harshly. They became, in fact, the object of terrible per* 
Edition in Madina and Knfa. At Madina, their houses and trees were 
destroyed, and their properties confiscated; at Kufa, they were made 
to suffer under strict control. Despite the pledge given to them that 
their freedom would be returned, al-Hadi had a number of captives exe­
cuted and hanged at Sab al-Jisr in Baghdad.* One of al-Hadi* s Hawaii, 
Mubarak al-Turki, was even reduced in rank and had his property con­
fiscated when it came to al-Hadi*s ears that he had been reluctant to
2fight al-gusayn.
(cont.)
^Tab.,‘ III, p.559 citing Muhammad b. $alih.
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Tab., Ill, pp. 560,^567, citing Asma‘1, Ka’anakum wal’lahi .11*tom bl 
ra’si Ta^hutln min 'l-tawaghit. Inna aqalla ma a.izlkum bihi an ahrumalmm 
min Jawa lzokum; see Huruj (p.268) where he uses the words **the head of 
a Turk or a Baylamite instead of Tartar”, Shafa*. p.185.
1Tab., Ill, pp. 560, 563, citing al-MufaJgal b. Sulayman.
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OTHER. OPPOSmOH  ^ HOYEkBKTS 
III THE -EARLY ‘aBBASID PERIOD
(a) The pro-Umayyad opposition movement
^ ‘’When . the Syrian Qaysite tribal chief 
Mansur b. JaSma al*~6Amiri heard the caliph 
al-Man§ur who was addressing the Syrians say­
ing 'Piiise God who has taken the plague 
from you in our reign.1* he replied ^Surely 
God is too just to give us both you /the
Abbasid/7 and plague.11
The Syrians who had failed to respond to Marwan’s appeals were 
soon to realize that, with the passing of the TJmayyads, they had lost 
their privileged position. Though indignant, they resigned themselves 
to their fate for a while hut soon risings broke out in many places in 
Syria and the Jazira.
The ‘Abbasids; are charged by several historians with having 
committed, in their obsession with revenge for their own and their 
cousins the ‘Alids1 wrongs, drastic and sensational acts intended 
to be symbolic. The conflicting and confused accounts of the chroniclers, 
differ on the attitude of the early ‘Abbasids towards the TJmayyads and 
their partisans. This confusion is partly due to various pro-‘Abbasid, 
pro-‘Alid and pro-TJmayyad sympathies which in one way or another 
affected the, narrative in that transitional period. For instance,
‘AbbaSM and even pro-‘Alid accounts ascribe the acts of the caliphs to
i ' t
motives of revenge for the martyrs of A M  al-Bavt such as Zayd, Yafeya 
and Ibrahim the Imam. Sometimes pro-‘Alid accounts eager to discredit 
the ‘Abbasids present them as tolerant towards the TJmayyads but cruel 
towards the ‘Alids. Pro-Umayyad accounts try to magnify the cruelties 
of the ‘Abbasids and exaggerate the extent to which the TJmayyads were 
victimised. Conversely several scattered but accidental accounts bear 
witness to the responsible policy of the ‘Abbasids, especially after 
the transitional period. Thus it is very difficult to deduce the truth 
from such involved accounts. The generalisation, vagueness and
1
repetitiveness of earlier accounts present another difficulty. Gertain 
events are attributed to more than one person. The descriptions of the 
scenes of "massacres" in different places such as Abi Futrus and gira 
are often so similar that they must be treated with caution as they may 
be different versions of one event. The discrepancies in the number of 
the victims and their names also point in that direction. Reports re­
present Abu *1 ‘Abbas, Ite^ud b. ‘Ali the governor of the gijaz and 
Sulayman b, ‘All the governor of Bagra in two contrasting ways, as 
passionate, tolerant and protective towards the TJmayyads, and on
mm ^  I
the other hand as terrible avengers. Kufi*& pro- Alid sympathies are 
apparent in this respect. stresses the rCle of early ‘Abbasids as 
avengers of ‘Alid martyrs. However there is an element of superficiality
and generalization in his accounts in this respect. Early chroniclers
3 •disagree on this topic. Later chroniclers exaggerate the picture of the
massacres and persecutions..
As to modem scholars the balance is more tipped in favour of
the TJmayyads who are pitied. Al-Zayyat and Kurd *Ali^ accuse the ‘Abbasids of
***See e.g. Khalifa, Tarikh. fol. 280; Azdi, fols. 116, 119; Akhbar Majmu‘a, 
vol. I, p.47. Ibn Adhari, vol. I, pp. 63ff. Muq., fol. 53a!”
o
Kufi, fols. 232a, 234b; Ya‘qubi, II, p.425.. Yawmun Ka Yawmi *1 ffusayn
3 .  ‘aiI7 wa la Sawa*.
Athir, vol. V, pp. 329 ff; Fakhrl. Cairo ed., pp. 120-121; Huq.. fol. 53a; 
al-I lam, p.86. Akhbar Majrau a, pp. 46-54.
Al-Tashayja'li Hu‘awiya..., Haqbriq. 1928, p..441; KiiJaJ: al-Shm, pp. 173-174. 
See also Maza im.., Hashriq, 1948, p.161: — — - — —
executing a large scale plan of bloodshed and attrocities against
1 -
the TJmayyads. Welhausen depending almost exclusively on Tabari
as his chief source naturally accepted that certain incidents such 
as that of Hahr Abl Fujus, and that at Abu *1 * Abbas1 court had 
really happened, but suspected additional descriptive details of 
the accounts of these massacres which are not mentioned in Tabari, 
Lammens in his sympathy for the Umayyads, had exaggerated the perse­
cution suffered by them and presented Syria at the advent of the 
‘Abbasids as a blood bath. He stated that thfe ‘Abbasids literally 
executed the plan suggested by a poet; nUnsheath your sword raise the
2 *5
whip, May God not find an Umayyad on earth any more,,. Spuler, sees
in these cruelties the reason why the caliph Abu *1 ‘Abbas was named 
- 4
al-Saffa^. Al-Jumard explains the "great purge" in terms of "Persians 
against Arabs", he stresses that Sh‘ubi hands were behind the scene 
conducting the massacres, Moscati believes that the massacre of the 
Umayyads is constituted by four different episodes; that of Damascus, 
that of Nahr Abi Fujrus, that of the gijaa and that of Bagra, He ex-
The Arab Kingdom,, pp, 562ff; see also DOni, *Agr,, p.59.
2LeSofiani, B.I.F.A.O., vol. 21, 1925t p.152,
3 -Iran*., p.45*
A ^ tm
Abu Ja far al-Mangur, pp. 118-128,
^"Le Massacre des Umayyades..,," Arch. Or,, 1950, pp. 101-102.
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plains "The fall of the TJmayyads was the signal which unleashed vengeance 
wherever they found themselves and not in one piece only, they were 
tracked down and killed11.
Regarding the massacre of Nahr Abi Fujrus which took place late
in 132/750, Baladhuri states that ‘Abdallah b. ‘All granted aman
to the Umayyads, summoned them to Nahr Abi Fufrus and,had them killed.
-2
Tabari briefly mentions that 72 Umayyads were killed there. A detailed
account of the massacre is related by the author of the Imama wa’l Siyasa.
Ya‘qubi and Has‘udi. According to them, ‘Abdallah b. ‘All invited about
80 Umayyads and when they came to the party he presented them with gifts.
But while the poet al-*Abdi recited his qaglda. he had them battered to
death by the Khurasan!s. Then ‘Abdallah had them covered with sheets
and had his meal served on them while some of them were still groaning
, \ 
in mortal agony. Among them were veteran Umayyads such as ‘Abd ai-Wafcid
b. Sulayman b. *Abd *l~Halik and ‘Abd al-Raj^man b. Mu‘awiya b. Hisham.
The latter, however, was warned and fled.
All authorities agree that the massacre of Nahr Abl Fujrus did
take place,but they differ on the number of the victims. Ansab and Aghani
4 < „
do not give numbers at all, Tabari followed by Ibn Asakir cited by al-
1Ansab. fols. 761a-761b; Huq.. fol. 239b.
2Tab., III, p.51.
Imama. pp. 231-235; Yaqubi, JJ, p.425; Muru.1. VI, p.75; Tanbih. p.329;
Moscati, "Les Massaci'e.. * .y op.cit*, pp. 100-101.
4 - ,
Ansab, fol. 761b; Agh.. vol. 4j p.94*
*Ayni give the number as 72, ^  while Khalifa b. KhayyaJ, Ibn gabib, Ibn 
Qutayba and Ya qubi, followed by others, assess it at around 80. 
Furthermore, only a few names of the victims are mentioned by the . 
chroniclers. The geneologists mention a series of names of victims of 
Abi Fujrus, but their total number amount to about half the figure given; I 
by the chroniclers. They geneologists also mention other victims of 
‘Abdallah b. ‘All without the explicit mention of Nahr Abi Fu£rus,^ 
but in no case does the total number of the names reach that given 
by the chroniclers. As to the name of the perpetrator, nearly all : :
authorities agree that it was f-Abdallah b. Alx. But was the massacre 
perpetrated by the caliph’s orders or on ‘Abd all all1 s own initiative? .
According to Kufi, Ya‘qub! and the author of al-*Uyun wa*!’hada*iq.
it was the caliph who ordered ‘Abdallah to execute every TJmayyad he y; 
caught. Although this policy was advantageous for the new state which
was trying to establish itself, it is difficult to believe, judging
by the nature of Abu *1 ‘Abbas whose mildness, patience and willingness 
to compromise are stressed by many historians/ that he was capable of 
such an act.. These accounts had the stamp of pro-‘Alid fabrications. A
^Tab., III, p.51} ‘Ayni, fol. 10b; Falchri. p.134.
Khalifa. Tarikh. fol.- 280, $abib, p.485; ‘llyun. I, p.207; Imama, p.255;V 
Ha‘arif. p.272; Dina, p*364; F.H.A.. p.207; Khajib. vol. 8,p.10.
Jamharat. pp. 80, 81, 82, 83, 95, 96, 120, 430.
4„
Op.cit., p.82; Zubayi'i, vol. 1, p. 165*
r
Compare ‘llyun where the name of al-Man§up is given^as the perpetrator, 
but subsequently mentions that of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali which proves that 
the former’s name was a mistake. (I, pp. 206-7). According to 
Dinawari (p.364) the perpetrator was ‘Abd al-Malik al-Asdi.
eKufI, fol. 230b: Ya‘qub“ . II. p.427; g.II.A., p.206.
7lmama. p,235; B&d . vol. 6, p.994
It is more probable tbat ‘Abdallah acted on his.ovm initiative in 
putting the Umayyads to death* It was Abu *1 ‘Abbas who wrote to his
uncle ‘Abdallah ordering him not to kill any Umayyad without his
. . 2permission.
In Damascus ‘Abdallah also seems to have taken a symbolic and 
sensational revenge on the bodies of the late Umayyad caliphs. Tabari
is silent about that; Baladhuri, Kufi and Yatjubi agree that ‘Abdallah
' c 3
violated the tombs of all Umayyad caliphs with the exception of Umar II,
but found nothing in the graves except bones and skulls, apart from
Hisham b* Abd al-Malik whose body was more or less intact. To revenge
his grandfather, ‘All the ‘Abbasid whom Hisham had once flogged,
‘Abdallah flooged Hisham*s. body. Then he burnt the bones of the Umayyad
caliphs and threw their ashes in the air. This symbolic act was mainly
political, intended as a revenge for the Hashimiie "martyrs'*, but no
doubt it enraged the Syrians who considered the Umayyad dynasty their
own dynasty and the Umayyad caliphs as the caliphs of Islam, Their anger
is exemplified by a woman from Damascus who shouted "Oh, ‘Abdallah, the
4
sheep is not hurt by flogging after slaughter".
1 - - * - 
See Ansab, fol. 801b; Khalifa, Tarikh, fols* 28, 285.
2Imama, p.235.
^Ansab. fol. 761b; Kufi, fol. 230b., citing Mada'ini; Ya‘qubi, II, 
pp. 427-8; Kuruj, Y, pp. 471f.
A ^ j
Ayni, citing Umar b. Shabba, fol. 10.a.
3/0.
The fall of Damascus was followed by a massacre and pillage
for three days. Dinawari attributes it to the orders of -^ bu *Awn al-Assdi
while Ibn §abib, Ya‘qubl and Mas‘udi state that its perpetrator was
‘Abdaliah b. ‘Ali.3, However Ya*qubi and Mas*udi disagree on the time
of Damascusf pillage;, the former place it before and the latter after
the events of Nahr Abi FuJrus.The former appears more acceptable as
the * Abbasids conquered Damascus before Palestine when they were pursuing ■
Marwan II. However the people of Damascus bear an equal share of the
-* ** 2
responsibility for these riots as according to Kufi and Asdi, the 
fighting started between the two rival groups Yamen and Qays even before 
the Khurasan! army entered the city.
In the gijafc the governor Da*ud b* *Ali is said to have killed
a number of Umayyads by order of Abu *1 4Abbas.'5 It seems strangely
incongruous with Da'ud*s proclaimed policy on his arrival at Mecca
4
which was marked with assurances and friendly overtures that he suddenly 
killed a number of Umayyads at Baja Harr without even indicating their 
numbersj their names or what they were accused of. Ya‘qubi^ simply 
states that Ba#ud promised aman to all people of the yijaz, but then
turned to the Umayyads and killed a number of them in Mecca. Then he
1gabib, pp. 485-6} Dina, p.364} Ta'qubi, II, pp. 42-5-7} Muru.i.
V, pp. 471f, VI, pp. 75f.
Kufi, fol. 228b; Azdi, fol. 116,
Ansab, fol. 751; Kufi, fol. 230; Tab, III, p.73; Tanbih. p.329,
where the number of the victimsis 80, thesame as the episode of Nahr
Abi Fufrus. See also *Xqd, citing Aprna1?, vol. 2t p.188. u
4
Ansab, fol. 751a.
^Ya^qubi, II, pp. 421-422*
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sent another group with irons to fa*if where they were executed or 
imprisoned. At Madina he did the same. Da*ud also sent §ammad b. al~ 
Abra§ to al-Muthanna b, "Yassid b. Hubayra in al~Yamama and had him 
assassinated.*** What renders the Mecca massacre more complicated is 
that this episode has two features in common with the incident of 
Nahr Abu Fujrus, namely the assembly of the Umayyads and the entry 
of a poet whose name, it should be pointed out, is different from 
that at Nahr Abi Fujrus. At any rate, the vagueness of the accounts 
as related by historians arouses doubts as to the.authenticity of
the details of the event which must have happened on a smaller scale*
%
2
Earlier geneologists mention single victims, which seems to confirm 
' this view.
.Bagra, as has already been mentioned, resented the ‘Abbasid 
authority from the very beginning. The unrest did not cease. The first 
‘Abbasid governor Sofyan b. Mu‘awiya al-Muhallabi was dismissed in 
favour of ‘Umar b. Jafg al-Muhallabi who was replaced by Sulayman 
b. ‘All. The latter was mild by nature. Baladhuri and Tabari^ stress 
his fair treatment of the Umayyads, a great number of them were already 
living there. Baladhuri states "They were not so safe anywhere as in
1Ansab, fol. 751b, qalu,
2Xbn al-Kalbl, fol. 19b; Zubayri, p!83? Jamharat, p.69, 74; See Agh. 
(4, P*94) mentions only one victim, while Khalifa mentions seven 
victims (Tarikh, fol. 285).
?Ansab. fol. 804b; Tab., Ill, p.21.
?1 2 Bagra". He gave shelter to many Umayyads, as well as Umayyad partisans.
The caliph wrote to him ordering him to confiscate the property of the
family of Ziyad b. Abi Sofyan Sulayman asked the head of the family
of Ziyad to surrender part of his px’operty to him as he wished "To
*7
prevent suspicions and demands on,the part of Abu *'1 ‘Abbas'*. On the
other hand, Aghani contains a tradition on the ill treatment meted out
by Sulayman h. ‘All to the Umayyads, who were dragged by their legs
and left to die in the streets of Bagra.^ Later chroniclers copy
5the same account with much elaboration. Although this could have 
happened in the early days of the ‘Abbasid regime in Bagra when the 
Umayyad partisans were still active it is inconceivable that it could 
have happened under Sulayman*s governorship. Several Umayyads, in fact, 
were still living and prospering under Sulayman*s governorship. If 
the account of ‘utbi is to be believed Sulayman oven procured a general 
amnesty from the caliph to the effect that every Umayyad who took refuge 
with Sulayman wouid be safe. That is why Abu Muslim used to call
— i —  6 1
Sulayman Kahf al- Ubbaq (i.e. the cave of those who run' away).
^Ansab, fol. 753b,.
20p.cit., fol. 754a; Futub, vol. I, p.429; ‘iqd, vol. 2, p.151, citing 
Amr b. Mu awiya.
^Ansab, fol. 753b.
^ Agh ., vol. 4, p.95*
^Athir, vol. 5» p.175; Abu *1 Fida, vol. 2 , p.224; Akhbar Majmu‘a, vol. 1, 
pp. 46f.
 ^‘iqd, citing al~‘utbi on the authority of ‘Amr b. M u ‘awiya, vol. 2, p.151*
1 !> '
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According to Kufi a group of Umayyads fled to Iralp to take 
refuge with Abu *1 ‘Abbas. They, headed by Sulayman b. Hisham b. ‘Abd 
al-Halik, visited Abu *1 *Abbas declaring their loyalty. They recalled 
their olose kinship and the caliph did not deter them from frequenting 
his court. However, it was not long before Sudayf b. Maymun the poet 
and the Mawla of Bapf H^shim visited the ‘Abbasid court. The ‘Alids, 
wishing to avengfe their martyrs, persuaded Sudayf to recite a qaglda 
with the object of provoking the caliph to kill the Umayyads. The tone 
of the qagida was aggressive and recalled the killing of gusayn b. ‘All,
Zayd b ‘Ali and Ibrahim the Imam, and also implied to the caliph that 
the Umayyad outward show of goodwill was prompted■by their fear and 
that at heart they hated the ‘Abbasids. The poet urged the caliph to 
dispose of old and young alike, which the caliph consequently did. ICufi 
gives their number as being the same as that of the victims of Nahr Abi 
Futrus, about 80, then, significantly, he goes on to relate the same 
acts which occurred at the massacre of Nahr Abl Fujruo, namely the 
laying of the table cloths over the dead bodies and then the repast,
o
an obvious confusion of the two events. I^bahani also relates the details# 
the Nahr Abi Fufcrus incident as if it happened at the caliph* s court, 
with few additional details such as the courageous reply of one of the 
Umayyads present. According to Kufi they were all killed with the ex-
1Kuf'i, fol o.2331?f 234b.
Agh.. vol. 4, pp. 93-94, 95-6.
f
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ceptinn of Sulayman b. Hlsljam and his two sons, while Igbahani mentions
*Abd al-*A2id b. ‘Umar b. *Abd al-‘Asls as the only survivor. Later
1 1 historians only copy the same version from early accounts but it is
interesting to point out that Ibn al-Athir is puszled by the confusion.
He attributes the massacre of about 80 Umayyads to ' ‘Abdallah b.- *Ali but
adds "It is said that the perpetrator was the caliph Abu *1 ‘Abbas and
not ‘Abdallah b. ‘All."
Consequently we have two alternatives: either, that no execution was
ordered at the court of Abu *1 *Abbas or else that it is a question of two
different episodes. The second alternative is more probable. First because
it is supported by the authority of al~Hay£ham b. ‘Adi, secondly because
the names mentioned, such as the poet Sudayf b. Maymun and Sulayman b.
Hisham do not coincide, and thirdly because the scene al-IJira is different.
It seems therefore that an actual incident at Abu *1 ‘Abbas’ court has
been partly confused with that of Nahr Abi Fujrus by the erroneous attri-
p
bution of several elements of the episode of Nahr Abi Fujirus. However, 
in so far as these two incidents are concerned, the confusion is due, 
not to the attribution of a single fact to several persons in different
  s
places, but to the attribution of several elements of one fact to another 
similar fact. In all probability, the name of the perpetrator, "‘Abdallah” 
which was the name of both the caliph and his uncle and the laqab
ICamil, t o U  4, ih8; Athir, vol. V* p.l75; ‘iqd. II, pp. 355-7;
Fakhri, pp. 132-33.
2
Moscati, "Le Massacre...," op.cit.. pp. 101 f.
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’’al-Saffafc" which was again ascribed to both of them have partly led 
to the confusion. Also likely to cause confusion was the affinity <f 
the episodes, the presenco of several poets and the citation of fragments 
of unknown provenance. Tho episode of gira, however, keeps all its 
characteristic ©leaiento, the perpetrator ol-SaffaJ^, the victims Sulayman 
b. Hisham with several Umayyads and tho poet Sudayf b, Maymun’.
Sulayman ,b. Hiqham b. *Abd al-Halik tho Umayyad rebel against 
Marwan II was first given aman and was favoured by Abu *1 ‘Abbas.*** 
However, this aman was not long lived. Despite tho assistance he lent 
during the crucial moments of the ‘Abbnsid revolution,^ he was considered 
a potentially dangerous Umayyad as he had ambitions to the caliphate
3 .* ^
in Harwah’s time, Kufi relates that after the poet Sudayf had recited 
his above mentined aggressive poem Sulayman b. Hisham was filled with 
apprehension and sought to discover the caliph’s attitude. The con­
versation terminated by the caliph ordering Abu al-Jahm, his chief of
police, and ‘Abd al-Jabbar b. ‘Abd al-Ragman oL-Asdi, his chief of
— 4. «, *.3
guards, to execute Sulayman and his two sons. Baladhuri attributes
the prompting for the execution to Abu Muslim who wrote to the caliph
"If you treat enemy and friend alike, how /lit, when/shall tlie loyal
1 ?
Apart froi^  Sulayman b. Hisham and his sons, the caliph is said to
have executed two or thr eo Umayyads^ who had been taken captives after
the fall of Damascus. (Khalifa, Tarikh. fol. 280; Habib, p.486).
Imama, p. 230} Ansab, fol. 795b; Kufi, fols. 231b, 232b.
*3 «  i -Imama, pp. 227-30; See also Tab., II, 1980; Asakir, vol. 6*, p.286.
4Kufi, fol. 233a; Jablb, p.486; FEddiri, p. 133.
Ansab, fol. 796a, citing. HayIjham b. ‘Adi,
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/man/ hope for favour from you and how shall the enemy he afraid of 
you?” It is rather interesting to note that a late historian, Ibn
1 mm
Taghribardi confirms Baladhuri’s view of Abu Muslim’s rdle in
Sulayman*s execution in a rather different way. He states that Abu
Muslim wrote to the caliph "A branch has been left of the cursed tree
/the Umayyad^" referring to Sulayman, but when the caliph did not
take heed Abu Muslim persuaded Sudayf to recite the qagida which was
the cause of Sulayman* s death. One wonders whether this was another
of the intrigues fictitiously attributed to Abu Muslim, or whether
Abu Muslim was really involved in it since the executioner was Abu 
2al-Jahm who was known to be his right hand at the caliph’s court.
The question arises who operated the levers of power at that time, 
the caliph in Ira£ or Abu Muslim in Khurasan. It is certainly safe 
to say that Abu Muslim who was by now the dominant figure in Khurasan 
seems to have had much to say in the policy of the state. It is, there­
fore, not surprising that Abu Muslim instigated the caliph to the 
murder of the Umayyad Sulayman b. Hisham.
f
AhrSufyani and the pro-Umayyad risings in Syria;
Owing to its central position in the Umayyad empire Syria had 
for almost a century enjoyed oertain privileges^, But not very long
^Nujum, p.365. 
Kufi, fol. 233a.
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after the ‘Abbasid victory the Syrians came to realise that they 
had lost their special status in the Islamic empire. In fact, the 
Umayyad ties with Syria went hack to the time of the Jahiliyya.
As a commercial family in the Jfijaz;, the Umayyads had a vital interest 
in Syria. In Islamic times, the Arab conquest of Syria was led almost 
exclusively by Umayyad commanders, arid shortly afterwards Mu‘awiya b.
Abi Sofyan ruled the province as a governor then as a caliph of the 
whole Arab empire.
With the downfall of the Umayyad dynasty, the Syrians felt 
frustrated and even suspected as supporters of the superseded dynasty.
The power had shifted to IraJj: and Syria was no longer the main province 
but one of the provinces. This change had many important, especially 
economic, consequences. Although the cities of the Jazlra and al-§ham 
had paid lip service to the powerful Khurasan is who were pursuing Marwan 
many of them now turned against the ‘Abbasids and closed their gates to 
the newly appointed governors Abu Ja‘far (later al-Mangur) and ‘Abdallah 
b. *Ali. The Syrians were not against the Umayyads in general, but 
against Marwan in particular who, deeply conscious of/unConventional, 
not to say questionable way in which he had attained power, turned 
against all potential rivals of his own family and applied, in his last 
years, tribal policies, throwing in his lot with the Qaysites against the 
Yamanites. The ICalbites who hat\ been the mainstay of the Umayyads were 
gravely discontented with Marwanfs intensive tribal policy and refused 
him their support at a critical moment.
3-2o-
Once Marwan had gone, the Syrians entertained new hopes of
regaining their lost privileged position and reinstalling an Umayyad
caliph. New messianic hopes appeared among the Syrians, The myth' of
al-Sofyani, i.e# the Saviour of the Syrians which had already appeared
probably after Mu*awiya the II* s death and the talce-over of power
by the Marwanids in 64/683, re-emerged among them and was fostered mainly
1by the Kalbites, However, the resentment of the Syrians expressed itself
not only in sectarian risings but also in such risings of purely political
\
nature.
The first rising against the ‘Abbasids was political without any 
connection with the Sofyani.; it occurred in the district of al-Balqa* 
and gawran, and was led by one of Marwan *s commanders gabib b. Mura al- 
Murri. The reason for his rising was merely that he feared for himself 
and his tribe. Tribal chiefs such as $abib al*atai were, at that transi­
tional period, anxious for the survival of their followers and their 
welfare, ‘Abdallah b, ‘All the governor of Syria besieged the rebels
t
but ^pon had to come to terms with them when he heard of the dangerous
2rising of Qinnissin and 'Aleppo, Trying to account for the latter 
rising, chroniclers attributed it to the insolence of one of the Khurasan! 
commanders who dared to propose marriage to a daughter of Maslama b, *Abdf
)  3
1-Malik or to his insulting behaviour towards them. This enraged one
___
On the traditions concerning al-Sofyani, see Fitan, fols. 75a ff. For 
the origin of the myth of Sofyani, see H. Lammens, "Le Sofiahi’1, op.cit. 
pp. 136, 141; see also Guidi,nOrigin dei Yazidi...r; R.S.O., 1932, pp. 274ff
2
Tab., Ill, pp. 55-6 citing AJimad b. Zuhayr,
■^Tab., III, p.52; Ansab. fol.801a,
of Marwan’s close associates Abu al-Ward Majaa’a b. al-Kawthar al-
Kallabi who raised his white banners against the ‘Abbasids. Whether
true or not this incident was only a pretext for a disappointed Syrian
tribal chieftain to justify his rebellion. He called upon other Syrian
cities to join in the rising, gimg and the Kalbite tribes of Ta&raur
(Palmdra) immediately joined. Abu Muhammad Ziyad b. ‘Abdallah b. Yazid
b. Mu*awiyan. who led the Kalbites of Tadmur, was proclaimed as the 
- - 1
Sofyani, the awaited saviour who would restore the Umayyads to power
and deliver the Syrians from their oppressed position. In his exaggerated
** 2
description of Syria under the ‘Abbasids Lammens attributes Abu 
Muhammad’s assumption of the leadership of the revolt not so much as to 
his personal merits as to the contention that "They^yrianj^ must have 
noticed that the ‘Abbasids had not left them too much choice. At 
that time it would have been difficult to discover in Syria two Marwanids 
who were of the age to carry arms." The claim is difficult to accept
for only a short time later Marwanids led or appeared in risings in Syria
*2 * 
itself. Furthermore, At>u Mufcamraad al-Sofyani was an active political
figure of the late Umayyad epoch.^4^ He was very conscious of the de­
teriorating status of the Umayyad state and was desperately trying to 
restore order in Syria. In the chaotic situation which had arisen after
"Sab., III, pp.. 51-45, citing A{imad b. Zuhayr; Ansab, fol. 801a.
2
Lammeus, op.cit..p.152.
3
See below, p •32$
Sts-
the murder of al-ttalid II he rightly foresaw that Marwan was the
best man to save the Umayyad throne, it was, therefore, due to his
- ’ 1 -
own initiative that Marwan was installed on the throne. But Abu
Muhammad1s relations with 'Marwan deteriorated and the suspicious Marwan 
imprisoned Abu Muhammad with other Umayyad princes. Abu Muhammad did 
not free himself when he had the opportunity after the defeat of 
Marwan'at the battle of great Zab. But the latter freed him, on his
i
 2 . -
withdrawal before the Khurasanis. The clever politician Abu Muhammad
retreated to Tadmur and concealed himself for a while to avoid the
ups and downs of the political upheaval at that critical time. The
choice of Abu Muhammad to the leadership of the present revolt was,
therefore, due to personality rather than the absence of other Marwanid
figures. The Sofyani legend was more popular among the Kalbites of
Syria and was of course limited to the descendants of Yazid b. Mu‘awiya
since the latter had a Kalbite mother.
By the middle of 132/751 prospects of the revolt seemed to be
bright, Syria rose against the ‘Abbasid authority. Balqa/, Damascus,
Qimsrin, 0imp, galab and Tadmur, as well as other cities of the Jazira,
were in a state of fury. Both the leading figures of the rising, Atru
XTab., II, p.1892.
2
Tab., Ill, p.43, citing Afcmad b. Zuhayr.
Lamraens, op.cit.» pp. 140-141.
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Muhammad and Abu al-Ward, agreed to join hands. The caliph ordered 
‘Abdallah b. ‘All to proceed immediately against the rebels and as 
the Khurasani troops were scattered over many cities of the Jazira 
and Syria the oaliph sent from Irafc: new reinforcements of 7*000
i ■
led by *Abd al-gammad b. *Ali and 5*000 led by Dhu*yb b. al-<Ash<ath.
It was obviously an Iraki-Khurasani occupation of Syria and the Syrians 
seemed determined to defy the Abbasids. The first engagements between 
the two camps were in favour of the Syrians who defeated the ‘Abbasid 
vanguard led by *Abd al-gammed b. ‘All, But *Abdallah b. *Ali with 
his Khurasani commanders such as gumayd alHJa*i,Basham b. Ibrahim , 
and IOiaffaf al-Masini crashed the Sofyani rising at Marj al- Althram
O  m m
in the last days of 135/july 751* Abu al*¥ard was killed in the
'i
battle viith several hundred of his close associates, while Abu Muhammad 
retreated to Tadnrur where he took refuge among his Kalbite supporters. 
Although militarily, the chances of the movement might have looked 
initially bright, its internal weakness was evident. There was first the 
rivalry between the tribal chief Abu al-Ward Majzafa al-Kallabi and Abu 
Muhammad al-Sofyani. The former, a Qaysite tribal chief, wanted to 
have the upper hand over Abu Muhammad, while utilizing his reputation, 
to gather more support for the revolt. In fact he intended to keep 
Abu Muhammad as a figurehead. But the shrewd politician and brave man
^Tab., citing Madafini, III, p.54; see also Ansab. fols. 801b.
2Tab., III, p.55, citing A^mad b. Suhayr.
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Abu Muhammad was too ambitious to let himself be used in that way*
Once he reached Qinisrin from Tadmur he got hold of 1he whole movement, 
keeping Abu al-Uard as commander of the army. Tabari calls Abu al~Ward 
al-Hutawali li amr al-^Aslcar wa Sahib al-qital and Ibn al- 4Adim gives 
him the title of Hudabbir al~.jaysh. * There was secondly the tribal 
divisions and antagonisms within the 40,000 troops who faced the 
united ‘Abbasid array. The left wing of Abu Muhammad’s array consisted 
of Kalbltes under al-Agbagh b, Dhu’ala al-Kalbi, and the right wing
t
2
of Qaysites led by Abu al-Ward. It must also be noted that the Qaysites 
of Qmmisrin were the mainstay of Marwan's power in Syria, and the 
inter-tribal antagonism between the Qaysite and the Kalbite Syrians 
was too deeply rooted to be reconciled. This was apparent even after 
the defeat. Abu Muhammad followed only by Kalbite partisans retreated 
unmolested to Tadmur. Both armies suffered heavy losses and ‘Abdallah 
refrained from punishing the rebel cities which surrendered readily.^ 
Politically the rising of al-Sofyani had dangerous consequences 
and fax’ reaching effects on the *Abbasid authority over Syria and Jazira 
as it gave a new ray of hope to the Umayyad partisans in many other 
cities. In Damascus ‘uthraan b. *Abd al-A^a al-Azdl rebelled against
^Tab., Ill, p.53; Zubda, vol. I, p.55.^VJhile al-Sofyani is called 
Ra'is and Hugaddam al-Jaysb wa Sabibahu. respectively.
2
Ansab, fol. 801b.
^D. Dennett, op.cit., pp. 235f, 241ff.
4Tab.^III, p.54, citing Ahmad b. Zuhayr. Umayyad rrisings against the 
‘Abbasids are often called Tabyid. i.e. the hoisting of the white 
banners, but this term was by no means confined to the Umayyad rebels. 
Muslim historians tend to throw together most rebels against ‘Abbasid 
authority in one category calling them Mubayyida and their rising Tabyid 
However some Umayyad rebels especially ill DyTIfi, chose red. (eont. )
the ‘Abbasid governor of the city ‘Abd al-gamid al-fa*! and massacred 
a great part of the Khurasan! garrison which was 4>000 strong* and 
plundered their provisions# In the Jazira, Raqqa, Qarqisya, al- 
Ruhha, Su§iaysat and Dara threw off the Abbasid yoke# Umayyad partisans 
gathered round Isfcaqb* Muslim al-‘Uqayli, a popular tribal chief and 
Marwan’s previous governor of Armenia who had his headquarters at
t
Suraaysat. He was helped by his brother and fellow rebel Bakkar al- 
*Uqayli as well as the tribal chief of the ever resentful tribe Rabi‘a. 
Bedouins readily joined the rebels and increased the bulk of their 
number. The ‘Abbasid governor Abu Ja‘far ‘Abdallah b# Muhammad was in 
a precarious position as the Khurasan! garrison of ganan was besieged 
by the rebels who were led by the Umayyad Muhammad b# Muslama b# ‘Abd 
al-Malik. However, after crushing the Sofyani rising ‘Abdallah b. ‘All 
was ordered to give help to the Khurasan! army in Jazira*^ The two 
characteristics of the pro-Umayyad Jasirite risings were that they lacked 
organisation, and that they were short-lived flaring up as swiftly as they 
subsided. Tabari states, describing the rebels, ’’The rebels were un­
disciplined, scattered, and had neither a qa’id nor a head round which 
they could gather”# However, Isfcaq al-‘Uqayl! with 60,000 followers 
resisted the seige at SumaysaJ for seven months until he was convinced
‘ (cont#) According to Baladhuri followed by Maqrizi, Abu Muhammad al- 
Sofyahi adopted red when he revolted^in 132. However, one finds accounts 
which describe the banner of al-Sofyani rising as white. This confusion 
relates to the twofold aspect of that rising which had two prominent 
figures, Abu Muhammad wiiftJTamanite, and Abu *1 Ward with Qaysite support 
The adoption of white by Abu *1 Ward is indicative of the friction existin 
between the two leaders.
1Tab., Ill, p.53.
^Tab., III, pp. 56-58 citing Ahmad b. Zuhayr; Ansab, fols# 790a-790b*
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of the death of Marwan, then he surrendered and received the am an.
Abu Ja*far found it expedient to spare, such an influential tribal
chief and to gain his loyalty rather than to kill him. Is^aq. al*-‘Uqayli
became one of the closest associates of the caliph at the court.
Meanwhile, according to Ibn al-‘Adim, another Sofyanid,al-
‘ Abbas b. Mufcammad b. ‘Abdallah b. Yazid b. Mu‘awiya, rebelled at 
2
Aleppo. He put on red clothes. His rising, however, was soon crushed
by Muqatil al-*Akki, a Khurasani commander who was sent by Abu Ja‘far
from Jarran and took Aleppo by force. Another Marwanid, Allan b. Mu‘awiya
b. Hisham with 4,000 followers rebelled at Sumaysaf. ‘Abdallah b. ‘All
3
crushed himand took the city by force.
It is interesting to note that in their desperate defiance of the 
‘Abbasid authorities Umayyads joined even Khari.jite rebellions,^ on 
the other hand it had become the practice of every rising in Syria and 
Jazira to choose an Umayyad and use him as a symbol of the revolt. Thus, 
when Bakr b. gumayd al-Shaybani rose against Abu Ja‘far the ‘Abbasid 
governor of the Jazira he was joined by Muhammad b. Safe b. ‘Abd al-‘Azlz 
the Urifeyyad who was killed in the battle with the ‘Abbasid troops.** .
(cont.)
4Tab., ill, p.57.
®Tab., III, p.56 citing Afcmad b. Zuhayr.
l t  '
^Qn.cit.. p. 57.
2Zubda, vol. 1, pp. 55-56.
3Op.cit.. p.56.
^Ansab, fol. 790b.
5Ibid,; of. Tab., Ill, p.57.
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It seems that the resentful Syria exercised a strange influence 
over several prominent ‘AbtSaid partisans for they acquired mutinous 
tendencies and turned against the central regime in Irafc. Bassam b. Ibrahim 
‘Abdallah b* 4All and Abu Muslim with several Khurasan! commanders all 
rebelled respectively in Syria* Although these revolts have been dealt 
with elsewhere, it would not be amiss tonote that the death of Abu *1 
‘Abbas in 136/755-4 gave rise to fresh hopes. A new wave of unrest
swept the province and culminated in the rising of ‘Abdallah b. ‘All
\ \ , , ;
which was adopted by the Syrians themselves. ‘Abdullah* s revolt was
almost entirely a Syrian rising against the forces of Irafc and Khurasan.
not only by its location and sympathies but also by the forces it com-
 ^ X
prised. It emerges ffrom Baladhuri that the Syrian commanders in ‘Abdullah1 
ranks encouraged him to rebel. Those commanders were, in fact, the same 
commanders who led the risingsin Syria at the advent of the ‘Abbasid to 
power, such as Bakkar b* Muslim al-»‘TJqayli and fathman b. Saraqa al- 
Azdi, while several Khurasani commanders tried to vdm him of the dis­
sensions among the ‘Abbasids which would have an adverse effect on the
fate of the new dynasty. It looked almost as if there were a common 
interest between ‘Abdallah b. ‘All and the Syrians. They both used each 
other to their own advantage; ‘Abdallah to win the caliphate, the Syrians 
to take revenge on the Khurasanis and, presumably, through ‘Abdallah to: 
regain the lost atatuss of their province from Irajf. But, as has already
been shown,the chances for ‘Abdallah b. *Ali to be raised to power by
Ansab, fol. 762a, citing Mada ini.
■such as anti-‘Abbasid people were very meagre indeed.
However, it was in Egypt that the Marwanid Ba^iyya b. Mug*ab b. 
al-Aebagh b. ‘Abd al- ‘AeIk b. Marwan b. al-gakam rebelled and claimed 
the caliphate.3* His rising, in fact, started at al-§a‘id in 165/781-2 
but the ‘Abbasid governor Ibrahim b. galifc b. ‘All (165/781-167/783) did 
not pay much attention to it. Al-Mahdi dismissed Ibrahim, and appointed 
Musa b. Mug‘ab al-Khath‘ami, but the latter*s aim seems, to have been to 
extract heavy taxes from the people, a policy which led to a revolt in 
al-gawf al-Sharqj. Moreover, Bagiyya seems to lave had the support of 
the majority of the Arab tribe of Tajib.^
Musa b. Mug‘ab was not a popular governor and he did not have 
the support of tribal chiefs nor of religious figures such as al-Layth b.
I *K
Sa d nor of the army commanders who abandoned him on the battlefield.
t
In the battle of the 9th of §hawwal In 168/784-85 Musa was killed and 
was succeeded by Usama b. ‘Amr whose efforts to crush Bagiyya,s rising 
were also in vain. Al-Mahdi was enraged by tlxe persistence of the re­
bellion and chose the ‘Abbasid al-Pagl b. galig b. ‘All whose appoint­
ment was now confirmed by al-Hadi who had ascended the throne (169/785 
A.B.).^ Al-Fagl left Syria for Egypt with loyal army units. He first
>i ___
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Ansab. vol. V, p.185; Wulat, pp. 125-130; Khitat, vol. 2, pp. 93ff; 
Nujum, pp. 442, 447.
^tfulat. p.126.
*Vulat. pp. 124-125, 128; Khitaft. vol. 2, pp. 94f.
^Wulat. pp. 129-130; Khijat, vol. 2, p.95.
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worked witli energy to quell the disturbances in the Bawf before trying
to face Da^iyya in the south. Da&iyya forces were obliged to retreat
for the first time after having been defeated in several engagements.
Finally Datyiyya himself was captured and executed in Jamadi II 169 •
Egypt was secure and al-Fa£l rightly used to boast of having quelled
inveterate disturbances. Dajjiyya seems to have been an agitator rather
than a rebel with clear cut objective. He figures in previous political 
2
disturbances. His recent rising was obviously a rising of discontent 
with an Umayyad figure to symbolize that discontent. The real leaders
r
were tri-bal chiefs of la jib and Azd such as Yusuf b. Napir al-Tajibi
and Fat£ b. al-^alj? al-Asdl.^ , Furthermore there was no coherence among
his partisans,besides the tribal element it included all other discontented
4groups such as the Berbers.
t
It is worth noting that rebels with purely political allegiance 
to the Umayyads continued to rebel from time to time, e.g. Is^aq b. Isma*11 
b. Shu * ay b rebelled in the reign of al-Ku^ta^im ’and seized Jazran. The 
Sofyani movement which was purely Syrian and more or less connected with 
the Yaraanites also continued to express itself occasionally until it lost
1
Khlfraj;, vol. 2, p.95; vol. 4, p.34.
2 t
See for example the *Alid disturbances of 144-145 (Uulat. p.112)
‘^ Wulat, pp. 128-129.
4OP.oit., p. 130. Da^iyya's head, was exhdhitadat a public place in Baghdad 
^Futuh., III, p.296 (Beirut edition).
^*Asakir. vol. 6, pp. 125-126; Tab., Ill, pp. 1319, 2277; Lammens. op.cit., 
pp. 136-137; Kurd ‘All, Khitat al-Sham. pp. 183-185. Bee also on.the 
question of possible connections between the Yazidis and the pro-Umayyad 
ghulww. ; Guidi, R.S.Q., xiii, 1932, pp. 266-300.
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all its religio-political meaning and only survived in the ffadith 
1collections.
Judging in retrospect it should be stressed that as the ‘Abbasi&s
f *had seized power- by force with the help of a well-prepared da wa. it
^  .I. .I .i
was natural that they took every precautionary measure to keep the power
in their hands. They were well aware that a remnant of the Umayyads
would persist on fighting hoping to regain their lost power, as Ibn al-
Huqaffa4 maintained that "people who lose authority do not lose the taste
for it'. Moreover, it was Ibn Khaldun who pointed out that "a new state
2needs, at the advent of its power, to use force”. However, one can find 
examples of ‘Abbasid tolerance exemplified by occasional scattered episodes, 
such as granting pardon to Syrian rebel cities, winning over influential 
Umayyad partisans, reported quite sporadically by chroniclers. It is this 
kind 6f unconsciously provided evidence that is most influential and 
authentic. It is our intention now to enumerate such latent evidence 
which points out to the ‘Abbasid friendly overtures and expediency rather 
than their cruelties.
To begin with it is significant that the dramatic and cruel acts of 
the .‘Abbasids took place, in fact, during the transitional period^ notably
■^Lammens, op.cit.. p.143; Guidi, R.S.O., xiil, 1932, pp. 274ff.
2 — — j —
Risala fi 1 Sababa. p.129. Muqaddima, vol. 2, p.633. The establishment 
of a new Umayyad power in Spain did in fact worry the ‘Abbasids and must 
have influenced their attitude towards the members of the Umayyad family; 
see chapter VI.
3 *. —
An account in Aghani indeed recognizes that this period was an exceptionally
instable period and calls it al-Fawra (vol. X, p,104).
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in the lifetime of Marwan II when many of his prominent supporters 
were still holding out in different strongholds in Ira£, Jazira and Syria 
itself. In our earlier accounts these cruel acts are disputed and con­
fused not only in their details but even in their very occurrence. The 
fate of several Umayyad personalities is disputed. Authorities are,'in 
fact, divided as to the perpetrators whether Marwan II» Abu *1-‘Abbas
or Abdallah b. ‘All or whether the victims met their death fighting
— > 1
in the battlefield at the great Zab or Damascus. The publicity of some 
of these deeds is due to their symbolic nature such as the desecration 
of the Umayyad tombs, the destruction of royal castles, a destruction
2which did not involve the community as it was only directed against centres 
which had a political meaning. After all, late Muslim historians as well 
as some modem scholars speaking of ‘Abbasid atrocities and large scale 
bloodshed in Syria tend to forget that the very same Syrians had shortly 
before the ‘Abbasid accession suffered large scale losses at Marwan*s
own hands and many Umayyad personalities were killed or persecuted either
-  *5 -
by Marwan himself or by the Syrians themselves. The body of Yazid III
is said to have been taken out of his grave and burnt by the Syrians,
so that the ‘Abbasid partisans were only following, so to say, a precedent
set by the Syrians.
1
Several examples of this kind are found throughout the historical accounts. 
The^striking example in ,this respeot^is Aban b. Mu‘awiya and al-Walld b. 
Mu‘awiya. See Ansab. fol. 760a; Kufi, fol. 228b; Muiuj. VI, p.
2 -
Graber,"Umayyad palace...", S.I.. 1963, p.11; see also Haywan. vol. 1,
p.73? Ibn ‘Abd al-gakam, p.116; Ibn Khurdadhiba, p.241.
t
5Tab., Ill,pp.43; IX, 1910, 1913.
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Umayyads are represented as being executed at the court of 
early ‘Abbasid cliphs such as Abu * I*1‘Abbas and al-Mahdi, but if
t
these accounts were authentic they would prove first and foremost the 
tolerance of the ‘Abbasid caliphs who kept Umayyads at their court as close
associates* Indeed several Umayyads were gafraba of Abu ’l ‘Abbas, al-
- - 2  Mnagur and al-Mahdi.
One should remember that ‘Abdallah's cruel acts in Syria took
place when he was met with stubborn resistance on the part of the Syrians,
He had hardly crushed one rebellion when he heard of a new one. If the
account in An sab is to be believed the massacre of Nahr Abi Fujrus was
ordered when ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali was in a precarious position. During his
stay in Palestine he learned of fresh outbreaks in his rear in Qinnisrin
and $ira§, *he was enraged and consequently ordered the execution of a
number of Umayyads. What happened was often less the fault of the caliph
than due to the shortcomings of provincial governors. Previous Umayyad
governors trying to gain ‘Abbasid favour had turned against the Umayyads
and killed them. ‘Abd .‘1-Ragman al-Fihri the governor of Ifriqiyya can
be named aa an example, ifriqiyya was a little later the scene of violence
conducted by the ‘Abbasid governor kufcammad b. al Agb‘ath al-Khuza‘i.
He,presumably, had to face a pro-Umayyad disturbance, but managed with
the help of the Khurasan! garrison to crush the rebels. Then he had all
^Kufi, fol. 253a, 234b; Agh., vol. IX, pl40.
2Zubayri, pp. 290, 218; Uulat, p.353; Kuhallabi, Masalik. j(in M.M.H.
4, 1948, pp. 57 ff.); Agh.. 4, pp. 94-95; Tanukhi, Mustajad, pp. 12- 
14} Tab., Ill, p.44): Jamharat. pp. 234, 235, 108, 76.
^Ansab, fol. 801a-801b; see also Tab., Ill, p.54.
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bearers of Umayyad names, such as Mu‘awiya, Sofyan and Marwan, he found 
among the rebels executed apparently considering them potentially 
dangerous. For that reason he was immediately dismissed by al-Man§ur.
The memory of the. Umayyads survived in the minds of their sympa­
thizers, pro-Umayyad voices were sounded in the court, as well as society.
In ,the words of an Umayyad partisan Abu Bakr b. *Ayyash "The Umayyads did
2much good to the people'*. Another Umayyad'partisan said "We were with 
people /the Umayyad/7 who mixed with us".'* Al-Mangur himself is reported 
to have stated "Favour them /She Umayyads^ so they will experience -under 
our rule what we experienced under theirs, and will be as well disposed 
towards us as we had been towards them..."^ This account, whether 
authentic or not, does indicate the attitude of al-Mangur towards the 
Umayyads. Al-Man§ur held high opinion of Mu‘awiya, *Abd al-Halik and 
Hisham. The last nanied was his favourite as a capable organism and a 
good administrator. Significantly al-Mangur seems to have been inspired 
in his policy by the Umayyad caliphs. In his critical moments, e.g. 
when he had to face Atu Muslim he compared himself with *Abd 'l-Malik 
b. Marwan who had managed successfully to survive the difficult period 
at the inception of hie reign. The latter too gave amnesty to many Umayyads
1iEVtuh. vol. 1, pp. 271-272, 275.
^Khatib. vol. XIV, p.375} see also Kufi, fols. 229b-230a.
Asalcir, vol. 4, p.47.
^Ibn al-Jawzi, fol. 95a; Amendroz, 1907, p.879.
r
^Ansab, p. 172 (ed. Ahlwart); Ansab, fol. 555; JahwL., p.81; Ta'qubi,
II, p.466; Tab., Ill, p.401; Muruj, VI, p.167; Muq.. fol.90b; Duwwal. 
fol. 110b.
•such as Zayd b. 'l-A^bagh, Muhammad b. al-5akam, Ibrahiim b. Suhayl and
‘Abd al-AzIz b. Marwan b. *1 Agbagh who had fled with many others to
1 ■,
Ifriqiyya in the time of the upheaval. When the hiding place of Abu
Muhammad al~Sofyani, the rebel of Syria who had fled to the p.jaz, was 
discovered by the ‘Abbasid governor Ziyad al-garithl, the latter sent 
soldiers to arrest him. But the courageous Abu Muhammad did not give in
and fought unto death. Al-Man$ur ’ pardoned his partisans and: freed his
2 ~two sons.......It was. also al^Mangur's-policy to win over pro-Uraayyad tribal
chiefs and influential figures. One of them was Is^aq k. Muslim al- 
‘Uqayli who with typical unabashed Arab arrogance and pride defended 
the Umayyads at the ‘Abbasid court. He was favoured, it is said, 
because of his integrity in not standing his ground until he knew of 
the death of Marwan to whom he had sworn allegiance. In point of fact he 
had a considerable tribal 'following and was- an influential figure in the 
Jazira. Among other pro-Umayyad chieftains who were favoured by the 
‘Abbasids were: Ma*an b. Za*ida al-Shaybani. Mansur b. Jamkur, Salm b.
Qutayba al~Bahili, Bakkar b. Muslim al- ‘Uqayli and his brother ‘Abd al- 
^‘Azis, Tal^a b. Isfeaq al-Kindi and al~Awza*i the f aqlh. ^  In Ba§ra the 
Umayyads seem to have enjoyed freedom and prosperity .as early as the 
governorship of Sulayman b. ‘Ali.^ If the account of the pro-‘Abbasid
^Tab., III, p.54 citing A^mad B. Zuhayr. Wulat, citing Ibn ‘Aqir, p.99.
P  '
^Tab., III, p.54 citing A^mad b. Zuhayr.
^Ansab. fols. 794b-795a citing Mada’ini; Muq., citing Mada*ini, fol. 90a; 
Jamharat, p.275«
^Ansab.fols. 806a, 806b, citing Abu ‘Ubayda, fol* 782b; Tab.,_III, ppj.65,73, 
394-7; ‘led, vol. I, pp.161-163, vol.2, pp.166,129; Ibn al-Daya,Mukafat-P • 3 5 5 
Jamharat, p.428; Bughya, B.U.,citing ‘All b. al-^asan,fols.93b,89a.
^Tab. ,111, p.49.citing A^inad b. Thabit.
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Jajjdz is authentic the Umayyads were haughtier than the, Hashimites in 
** l
the Hashimite realm. The basis of Lammen’s generalizations about 
the extermination of the Umayyad3 are thus questionable as, furthermore,
many accounts speak of Umayyad offspring flourishing in Bagra, al-Sham,
- 2al-Kufa and Ifriqiyya. Umayyads still enjoyed the privileges of having
a rank (Martaba) and some of them only lost it in the reign of al- 
Kusta‘in in 250/864-5/
Socially the Umayyads were indeed the equals of the ‘Abbasids.
The latter did not miss the. opportunity and showed their friendly in­
tentions in this way too. Al-Mangtur married Al-*Aliya bint 4 Abd al-Rafcman 
of the family of Abi *1 4Iy§ and had her sister married to his son Ja4far. 
Al-Mahdi, al-Rashid and Muhammad b. Sulayman all had Umayyad wives too/
In poetry too one could find sufficient proofs of the restrained ‘Abbasid 
policy towards the Umayyads. This is evident in the poem of Bashshar b.
5
Burd. Pro-Umayyad poets continued to express their views and occasionally
\
praised the Umayyads without incurring ‘Abbasid disfavour/
Rasa’il. (ed* Sandubl), p.107.
r2Ansab, vol. 4Z II, pp. 71, 74, 75-77, 147, 148, 153; al-Tamani,
Tarikh al-Yaman, pp. 1-4.
3 -
Tab., Ill, p.1533; on Martaba.see ffutub, vol. 2, p.416,
^Ansab, vol. 4, II, p.169, 153; Jamharat. p.76.
U^iwan. vol. 2, pp. 301-2. »
^0n the complaints of poets such as Abu *1 ‘Abbas al-A4ma, Ibn al-Mawla, 
Ibn Harama and Bashshar b. Burd, see Agh., 4, pp. 91, 102ff; 4Asakir,
2, p.234; Haywan. 1, p.300; Tab., Ill, p.508; Murujy vol. 3, p.210.
Once the revolution was over and the 4Abbasids firmly established, 
they tried to win the pro-Umayyad tribal groups and figures. Episodes of 
this kind though related at random by chroniclers imply the probability 
of the reverse or, at least, modify the alleged purge of the Umayyads.
The 4Abb£sids seem to have preferred within limits of possibility expediency 
to force. This friendly policy is observable in Ibn al-Huqaffa41s Risala 
fi *1 Sahaba where the author advises al-Mansur to adopt a fresh policy 
towards the Umayyads, to trust a group of them and regain their confidence. 
Ibp al-Muqaffa4 suggests that the caliph should choose a group* of them, 
and make them his close associates (khagga). This move, Ibn al-Muqaffa4 
continues, would divide the Syrians and make some of them pro-4Abbasids.
Ibn al-Kuqaffa4 then reminds the caliph that this policy was the very 
policy the Umayyad had adopted in Irafc. jjfor also advises the caliph 
to distribute their Fay4 among them, and enlist them in their Diwan. As 
to the danger of mutiny': on their part Ibn al-Muqaffa4 assures the caliph 
that "If justice were done to them they would not be expected to commit 
mistakes /and do7* w r o n g * H o w  Ibn al—Muqaffa4 could not have recommended 
this approach had the political atmosphere not been propitious.
The essays of Jajdz also throw a vivid light on the political climate 
since the fAbbasid victory. Loyal to the ‘Abbasids, Jajdz'e tone was, 
naturally, different f*om that of Ibn al-Muqaffa4. ja^iz states "the deeds 
and speeches of al-Mangur... alone would suffice to match /the deeds of7
^Risala fi*l Sababa, p.129. See also Goitein, "A turning point..." I.e., 
1949, pp. 120ff. ’
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- - 1 T-the kings of Bani Marwan*11 From, this very example where Ja^ Liz
attacks the Umayyads and desperately tries to show that the ‘Abbasids
were superior to them in deeds and virtues one can deduce that the
Umayyads though they lost their power did not lose their prestige. Nor
did they lose the sympathy of a M g  and increasing group of the society,
Hot only Ja^im but many other Muslim historians tried to discredit 
2
the Umayyads, but despite the deliberate denigratinn a section of the 
society respected their memory, To follow the development of the pro- 
Umayyad movement would exceed chronologically, at least, the limits of 
this survey. However, it is worth noting that the survival of the Umayyad 
memory was not only due to the continued loyalty to the Umayyads, but 
also to an attitude adopted by an "orthodox” section of the community 
which had no connection with the ‘Abbasids. This section was called 
Habita, i,e, the rising generation. Those Habita, according to Pellat,^ 
were young Muslims b o m  at the beginning of* the 3rd century. Being 
anti-Abbasid, anti-*Alid and anti-Mu*tazila, they found their ideal in 
I5u*awiya and were inspired, thereby, in their stand against the fAbbasids. 
Thus the Nabita were that section of society who revered' the memory
r •
the Umayyad caliphs. This association and common cause between this 
"orthodox" section and the pro-dJmayyad movement worried the Mu*tazilite
Bayan, vol. 3, pp. 217-218; Fafll Ban! Hashim, p.91.
Al-Zayyat, Maza/im.,., al Mashriq, 1948, pp* 161-168.
•^La "Nabita” de D.jabig, p,304; idem, "Le culte de M u‘awiya", S.I..
VI, 1956.
pro-‘Abbasid Jafciz who accused the Nabita of "impiety and guilt’1 since
1they refused to call the conduct of the Umayyads impious•
Although Ja&iz wrote several decades after the ‘Abbasid accession 
when the pro-Umayyad sympathies had crystallized out as politico-religious
cult, his writings reflect the whole development of the pro-Umayyad move-
\
ment since the advent of the * Abbas ids* Umayyad. sympathizers were of 
two categories; the first and earlier had a genuine loyalty to the 
Umayyads, the second and later chose M u‘awiya as their ideal because “he
f p
wa# the only one *diom they could glorify to belittle their adversaries”, 
This was evident in the Karamiyya and the ganablla movements of the 3rd 
century.^
In conclusion the enmity and resentment of the Syrians towards 
the Abbasids were ever present. This enmity was'never so vivid as it 
was during the civil war between al-Amin and al-Mu*mun. Al-Amin appealed 
to the Syrians for support in his struggle against Ma'mun* However, it 
should have been clear to him from the start that they would not support 
him wholeheartedly as the previous example of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali showed.
A Syrian who addressed his fellow soldiers warning them not to involve 
themselves in Am in-Ha ‘muii struggle for power said "There is death in the 
moustaches and hoods of the ‘Abbasid soldiers....*’
^Pellat. La '’Nabita11.... p.306.
Pellat,"Ga^lz a Baghdad et a Saraarra", R.S.O.. 1952, pp. 45 ff;
(Arabic trans. by I. Keilani), Damascus, 1961, p*391«
3 - - •
^0n the Karamiyya, see M.W.. I960, pp. 5-14; on the ffanabila see, Zayyat,
al-Maghriq, 1928, pp. 410 ff; E.I.* (Hanabila); Pellat, op.cit., S.I., 
1936, pp. 53-66. . r
Tab., III,, p.844.
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0 0  The Khari.jiteg
t "The Kharijite rebel al-Yashkuri wrote to al- 
* Hahdl fFrom 4 Abd *1 Salam b. riagjiim to Muhammad b.
Abdallah. Peace be with him who follows the right 
path and avoids oppression and has been proclaimed 
/caliph/ "the right way. You have not followed 
the right path, nor ,/bave yqu7 avoided oppression, 
Hor /h&ve yoxx beer/ rightly proclaimed £ caliph/.
I have received your letter expressing your surprise 
at my revolt, I shall not leave you in ignorance 
/lit. your blind state/, although you have deceived 
yourself. You know that I have rebelled because you 
have left the Umxaa misled and confused;; you have 
neither applied its laws nor given it its rights.,. 
Glory be to God!I was all that not an obscenity 
when perpetrated by one who claims to be the caliph 
of God'...ri
/Khalifa b. Khayyat. Tarikb» fols,309-3167
r
*t
3uo-
Scholars, with few exceptions, incline to the opinion that
f
Khari.jism, as a movement of opposition, was in the early ‘Abbasid 
period either dead or crumbling without real active resistance to 
the new regime. This under-estimation' of Kharijite activities is 
indeed largely due to the absence of annalitieal information on 
them. It is to be remembered, however, that even the scattered 
scanty information on the development of the Khari.jite mcvement is 
one sided and highly unfair to them. Contrary to Umayyad times 
Khari.jite activities developed, during the early ‘Abbasid period, 
not in the heart of the empire but in marginal and distant provinces 
such as Ifriqiyya, ‘Uman, Jasira, Sistan and the fringes of Khurasan.
It is presumably for this reason that chroniclers such as Tabari do 
not relate details of Khari.jite risings. More details are to be 
found in local histories of Mosul, Sistan, ‘Uman, Yaman and al-Maghrib 
as well as some late historians such as Ibn al- Atfcilr and Ibn Khaldun 
and al-Nuwayr! where one can see the persistence of Khari.jism in these 
provinces and consequently their danger to ‘Abbasid authority. Apart 
from the above mentioned historians it is highly significant that the 
early historian ai-Baladhuri has recognized the importance of the Khari-
t —  —  2jite risings in the early Abbasid period. In his Ansab he devotes 
several pages to the enumeration of the Khari.jite nomadic risings in the,
1 1E.I. , ICharijism; J, Vf.Mlbauaen, Die reli^ibs-politischen opposition- 
porterin.., (Arabic trans.), p.145? A. Amin, Dufra 1 Islam. 3/ P.335; 
K. V/att, Kharijite thought, der Islam. 1961, pp. 230 ff.
2Ansab, fob,, 558-562,
in the reign of al-Mangur. Ibn al-TiqJjaqa1 a late historian repeats 
this fact saying that among the causes of the weakness of the ‘Abbasids 
were the continued rebellions of the Khari.jites, because of which Hal- 
Mangur could not for a moment drink a sweet saliva". What complicates
t
the issue furthermore is that Khari.jite risings were readily joined 
by bedouins who did not profess Khari.iisnu so that the A ‘rab and 
shurat became almost inseparable. Baladhuri for example speaks of 
o 2 This indeed accounts
for the overwhelming nomadic character of Khari.jism in most stages of 
its development* Finally historians also contributed to the difficulty
of tracing the Khari.jite activities in thie specific period as the word
Khari.ji is sometimes applied by them to denote a rebel.^ This might 
suggest that the word Khari.ji had lost its original sectarian impli­
cations and had come to denote a rebel against the state who did not 
profess the doctrine of Khari.jism. But the allegation is easily refuted 
with regard to most Khari.jite risings discussed in this chaptert as their 
character as well as the conduct of their leaders and the exchanges of 
correspondence between them and that caliph exhibit a strongly sectarian 
character.
The Kharijites had load a large measure of success in the last days 
of the Umayyad dynasty. They controlled large parts of the Jazira, Ira£,
1 ' '"1. " ' . - r - "  , . ^  - .............................- ...................... . ^  „
Fakh'ri, p.25* see also Muhammad Amin al- Umari, Manhal al-Awliya*....
Hs. B.M. (No. 0R.2429), fol. 4.
2Ansab. fol. 558.
3Especially by late historians.
4Marwan XI sent his son and heir to lead the campaign against them in 
the Jazira. The seriousness of the undertaking is clearly shown in
(cont.)
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Uijaz and the Yamen, Marwan II had devoted all his energies to quell
them and thanks to his efforts their strength was broken in the §ijaz
and the Jazira. The Kharijites were driven southwards to ‘Umonand
the Yamen and eastwards to Pars whore a section of them joined ‘Abdallah
f
b. Mu‘aviya and after the failure of the latter1 s enterprise thejr re­
tro ate d to Sistan and IQaurasan where they contributed to the final
victory of the ‘Abbasids. However, Shayban al-Saghir the Kharijite leader
in IQiurasan immediately fell out with the Abbasid da is. Abu Muslim 
demanded that Shayban should swear allegiance to the new regime while 
Shayban raised the same demand with regard to Abu Muslim. Consequently 
Shayban was attacked by surprise and killed and his followers who were
^  I
mainly Rabi ites scattered*
The Kharijites looked at the ‘Abbasid regime with the same antagoni- 
stic eye as the previous regime. They considered the ‘Abbasids usurpers 
of the caliphate which should be on elective office,and bestowed on the 
best of society, whethere Arab or non-A ab. Barely a year had passed 
aftor the accession of Abu *1 ‘Abbas when the Kharijites came out in 
active opposition in many provinces, Burayka b, gumayd al-Shayb.mit la­
belled against Abu Ja‘far the governor of Jaaira aid was joined by 
Umayyad figures such as Muhammad b. Sa*id b. ‘Abd al~‘Asiz. lifter his
(cont.) the instruction given by Marwan to his son before the latter’s 
departure in which the caliph warns him to be cautious and always ready 
for a Kharijite surprise attack. It is worth noting that the Kharijites. 
are often described in the Umayyad period as harsh coarse nomads
\ ftJkXp or inexperienced men which,
indicates their rigid nomadio characteristic cud ever-lasting struggle 
against authority fca‘d , fol* 28b; Khalifa,, Tarlldifols._270~75; Tab.,
II, p,1942ff; Shafav"al-ghax^am, pp. lYBf* ICurT^^li, Rasarli, pp. 175 ff)
• Seo chaptex' II. See als<}, Vaglieri, "L'Imama'to iba^ita", A.1.0.M  .
1949, p.253.
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defeat in the battlefield Burayka fortified himself at Jabal Dara
■w t  —  1
where he was besieged and finally killed by Maqatil Al- Akki.
In Armenia and Adhur/bay.ian Musafir b. Kathlr al-Shaybani who had 
been appointed governor of these provinces by the Khari.jite al- 
Phafrbak b. Qays al~Shaybani. was still holding out. Abu *1 * Abbas 
sent Muhammad b. gawl to crush his resistance. Musafir was killed
with a number of his followers while the remainder fled to the
mountains of Sistan.^ As to ‘Uman it was the Kharijite defeat of 
129/746. in the gijaz*5 which gave the impetus to the Ibaglte Imamdte 
of Uman. Uman is a mountainous region and therefore difficult
of access. On its western border the desert stretched to the 
inland off Arabia which provided the nomadic inhabitants with an 
alternative escape if they were attacked. The ‘Umanites must have 
been excellent navigators. They were adventurers enough to risk longer 
voyages to trade with; India and the south east of Asia.^ The ‘Abliasid 
paid greater attention to the eastern provinces, conducted naval 
campaigns against India and gave a new impetus to the Jihad in Trans-
oxania. Thus it was vital for the *Abbasids to control the strategic
(
spots on the maritime route to the east such as cUman to ensure the 
safety of the sea route for military and commercial reasons. Although
knaab. fol. 790b; Muq.. fol. 86a. 
gutub. I, p.246; Kufi, fol. 235b.
Kufi, fol. 236a.
Veccia Vaglieri, "L'lmamato Ibaflita dell’ ‘Oman", A.I.O.M1949. p.15.
'lutf .
Muslim governors exercised certain authority in ‘uman, it is probable
that this authority did not cover the whole province and only exercised
over certain cities and strongholds. The first ‘Abbasid governox* Janaft
b. ‘Abadah al-Hunna*! does not seem to have been the master of the
whole province. treated the Iba^iyya Kharijites so mildly that they
*■* 1
were in fact in control of most of ‘Uman*
In 135 A.II./752 A.D. the Iba^iyya elected the Azdite al-Julanda b* 
Mas*ud Imam. He was a just, ruler and played a considerable part in 
spreading the Khari.jite doctrines from his capital Nezwa, However, 
another Kharijite group, the §ufriyya, headed by Shayban b. ‘Abd al- 
*Azis al-Yashkuri had already settled in the island of Ibn Kawan off
•7
the shore of ‘uman. To crush the mounting danger of the Kharijites
Abu *1 ‘Abbas sent a force of 700 soldiers led by Khazini b. Khuaayma
al-Tamimi in 134/751-2 A.D* The number of his troops seems to have
been small especially if one considers the character of his Khaxnjite
enemy who were known to be fierce on the battlefield. However, this
is understandable if we know that the caliph tbs in fact punishing
the commander Khazim for his killing of some tribesmen of Ban! al~ffarith
the caliph's uncles* But Khazim's forces were x*einforced by a member
of his tribe Tamim and the people of Morw al-Rudh.^ Due to the difficulties
of access, to the country by land the troops had to be transported by ship.
^Kashf al-ghuroma, p.15* English trans* by Ross, J.B.A.s,, 1874. p,121;
Ibn Rasiq, p.7.
2
Kashf al-ghumma, p.15; Ross, op.cit. * p.121; Ibn Rasiq, p.7; Tab,., Ill,
Ansab. foie. 783b-784a (quoted by Dunnett, op.cit.. p.291.)
4Tab.. Ill, pp. 75, 78.
The governor of Bagra Sulayman b. ‘All provided them with ships to 
sail for the island of Ibn Kawan where Khazim sent a division led 
by Na$la b. Na*ayra al-Hahahali to fight' Shayban al-Yashkuri who re- 
ti’eated for *Uraan followed by the ‘Abbasid navy*' Shayban the gufrite 
and al-Julanda the 4Iba$ite attempted a reconciliation but failed
eventually and the ensuing fight between the two factions ended in
** 2 ** *
Shayban * s defeat and death* On his arrival at ‘Uman's shore Khaaim
al-Tamimi approached al-Julanda informing him that now Shayban was 
killed he lad no desire to fight him and asked him to swear allegiance 
for the caliph* Al-Julanda refused bluntly and the hostilities began.
The Khai'ijites were defeated and almost the whole army perished in
- 3the battle of Juffar in which al-Julanda himself was killed* However
the campaign does not seem to have led to spectacular achievement.
The Iba$iyya Imamate seemed to have survived the blows of the ‘Abbasid 
army and after a period of unrest of which tribal antagonisms and ven­
dettas were the ominant feature,^ the Ibajites deposed their unpopular 
Imam Muhammad b* ‘Abdallah b. ‘Affan and paid allegiance to the new 
Khari.jite Imam *Abd al-Waidth b* Ka‘ab al—Aa&i who acquired the epithet 
of al-Sharj as he proclaimed that he would rather die for the sake of
1 ! '    " '1 1 '
Kashf al-ghumma, p.15? Ross, p.122; Tab., III, p.78.
2Tab., II, pp. 1949, 1946, III, p.77.
3 ' — 1
Kashf al-fthumma, pp. 16-17? Ross, p.122; Ibn Raaiq, p.8? Tubfat al-
A'yan, pJL03; Tab., Ill, pp. 78-79.
^Kashf al-ghumma, p.19; Ibn Raziq, p.10; Tuhfat al-A*yan. pp. 109-11*
..
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his principles than yield or flee. Thus *Uman though nominally
under ‘Abbasid authority virtually retained its autonomy.
In al~Man§3r*s reign, the Jazira- was the scene of strong Khari.jite
risings. Although-Mogul was no longer, a Khari.jite centre many Kharijite
risings during this period started in its vicinity. Anti-‘Abbasid in
their sentiments the people of the city often sympathized with the
Kharijites and gave them support or shelter. Consequently the ‘Abbasids
reinforced the garrison of Mosul by stationing a Rabija,for the purpose
2of quelling Kharijite insurrections. The number of the garrison varied
t.
according to circumstances, but this did not prevent the resentful; 
population from being a source of trouble. Mosul was never trusted 
by the early . ‘Abbasid caliphs who tried to exterminate its people and
destroyed its walls.^ In 157 A.H./754M5 A.D. a Kharijite rising broke
• — *• —4
out in the Jazira led by Mulabbad b. 0armala al-Shaybani of the tribe
» * .
of Rabi‘a which had been the core of Kharijite activities since the 
TJmayyad period. His rising was the most typical one as it was readily 
joined by not only bedouins who had no political conviction but also 
by Kharijites from other provinces who flocked to the place of unrest, 
thus increasing the volume of the rebellion. ! The Abbasid authorities
' l  " " n r " T T " n  1 " '  ■ r i n  i 1 . - ‘. r  ■ j m  "  ' '
The epithet of al~Sftari is the opposite of al-dafi i. The latter is 
synonymous.with the Shi‘ite Taqiyya (dissimilation). This Kharijite 
dissimilation is not in conflict with Iba$ite principles. Nevertheless, 
campaigning against adversaries in order to spread Kharijite doctrines 
was considered hue of the great merits and duties of the Imam. (Kashf 
al-ghumma. p.15; Tuhfat al-AVan, p.106.
2Azdi, fol. 170; Tab., Ill, p.354; Kufi, fol. 242a.
5Azdi, fol. 180; • Tab., Ill, p.645.
^Ka‘d^ fol. 5b; Ansab, fols. • 559-60; Khalifa. Tarilch, fol, 290; Tab., Ill,
p.120, Haqidi1s account put it in 133 A.H.; Azdi, fol. 145. See also
. mi.ium, p.377; Ibar, 3, p.356.
5A*dI, fol.145; Ansab. fols. 558, 559.
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were unable to apprehend Mulabbad who raoiaed the Jazira area all 
through the year 137 A.H./754-5 defeating several ‘Abbasid armies 
led by veterans such as Yazid al-Muhallabi, al-Muhalhal b. gafwan and
gumayd b. Qa^jaba who tried to buy him off with 100,000 dirhams.
*
Mulabbad accepted the offer and gave up the siege of gumayd's army.'*’ 
Mulabbad also occupied Mosul and threw the ‘Abbasid governor out 
and then advanced southwards defeating another ‘Abbasid detachment in 
Tikrit. Mulabbad1s rising grew dangerously and paralysed the central 
government control not only over the Jazira but Adhurbay.ian and Armenia 
as communications were cut off and ‘Abbasid garrisons were slaughteiYed.
In 138 A.K./755-6 A.D. al-Mangur sent a new army led by *Abd al- ‘Aziz
f  M  2
b. Abd al-Ra^man al-Azdi who was also defeated, and consequently the 
caliph chose the two commanders, who distinguished themselves at the 
battle of ‘Uman, namely Khazjm b. Khuzayma al-Tamimi and Najla b. Ku‘aym 
al-Nahshall at the head of about 8,000 men. Khazim made Mosul the base 
for his military operations. After a fierce pursuit Mulabbad was trapped 
and killed with a number of his followers; the rest took to flight.
It was from Mosul that the Khari.jite ‘Ajiyya b. Ba‘thar al-Taghlubj
3
started his rising with 100 partisans. However, he did not stay in
the town but took the route southwards aiming at al-Sus where he intended,
it is alleged, to rob a transport of governmental money. Frustrated in this
1Ansab. fols. 559-560.
2OP-Cit, fol. 560.
3OP-Cit, fols. 560-561.
3^»-
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undertaking he engaged in a battle with the governor of al-Sus where 
about 200 citizens of al-Sus were killed. Eventually on hia way 
back to Mosul *Atiyya was ambushed by Abu gumayd al-MerwuKi and 
killed, together with his followers. In. 148 A.H./765 A.D* gassan b.
4~ - -1
Yagya al-Wadi i al-Ham&ani , a native of Mosul, rose in rebellion 
in a village on the ■ outskirts of the city. The fact that gassan was 
from the tribe of Hamdan seems to have surprized al-Manpur as this tribe 
was not known for its Khari.jite sympathies. Only then he was told of 
* Hassanfs relationship with the renowned Khari.jite theologian gafs b.
mm 2 ^  mm mm mm
Ashim. gassan al-Hamdani attacked the *Abbasid array in the Rawabig of 
Mosul defeating the *Abbasid commander al-gaqar b. Najda al-Azdi and 
plundering the markets near the city, gossan1 s rising is yet another 
indication of the nomadic nature of Kharijism. As bedouins, they were 
known for their inclination to plunder and devastation which was motivated 
by the wish both to benefit materially and to demonstrate their resentment 
to the central regime. Interesting was that tribal feuds were still 
customary with gassan1 s Khari.iite movement. Itt is related ihat after
a battle with the government forces gassan spared the lives of Hamdanites
3
while killing Qaysites* This resulted in a split within his ranks which 
was.fostered by Khari.iite theologians who were in his army. His rising, 
in fact, waned as many left him because of his tribal favouritism. The
•J^" '  " ^  - r r r r  r r . r .  ..................... ill Ll.im nrJ i r . u . r t ^  i . y . m ,  j , , , , ,  „ r v .n , . i  „ ,,
Azdi^ fols. 176-180? Ansab. fol. 561, calls him gassan b. ghassan al- 
Hamdani. Athir, V, P*447j, ‘ibar. vol. 3, pp. 358-359, calls him 
gassan b. Mujalld al-Hamdani.
2Azdi, fols. 179-180.
3Aadi, fol. 177.
•Syf.
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rising of gassan is also interesting in that it reveals certain 
connections between gassan and the Khari.iiteo of ‘Uman.1 Probably 
on his way to al-Sind, gassan got in touch with them intending to 
make oommon cause but his offer was refused*
t
It ms after this insurrection and another series of unreststhat
al-Mangur summoned the jurists Abu ganxfa, Ibn Abl Layla and Ibn
- 2Shahrama to sanction the extermination of the people of Mog&l.
However Abu ganlfa rahnaged to persuade him to abandon his plan •
Instead he appointed Khalid b. Barmak governor of the city to put it in 
order.'5 In the following year 149 A.II./766-7 A.H. al-Mangur intended 
to visit Mogul but he desisted from his undertaking and stopped in 
gaditha al-Haugil.^
Apart from these risings the reign of al->Ian§ur witnessed another 
series of sporadic and shortlived Kharijite risings in the ^azira 
itself as well as other provinces such as upper Egypt and Abyssinia and 
Fars. It is significant that in dealing with Kharijite hot-beds, 
al-Mangur made use of tribal feuds and antagonisms. It has already
been mentioned that having been defeated in the gijaz a section of
6 - «the Kharijites retreated to the Yamen. Now al-Manpur appointed Ma an
^Athir, V, p.235# ed. Cairo.
2Azdi, fol. 180-182; Athir, V & 2 . 3 6 ;  .‘ibar. 3, p.360.
^Azdl, fols. 182-183; Athir* V, pp. 448 Leyden ed.
^Azdi, fol. 183; Tab., Ill, p.354. On gadithat *1 Maugil see Mu*.iam* 
II, p.222.
•^Ansab, fol. 561; Hu.jum, p.392.
%halifa, Tarikh# fols. 270 f; Tab., Ill, p.l942f; Khazra.ji, B.M. fols. 
T5*b—16a*
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b. Za'ida al-Shaybani governor of the /Semen in 141/758-9 with orders
to inflict harsh punishment cm the unruly population. Ma‘an staged 
a terrible massacre of the Yamanites. In retaliation to Ha ‘an* s 
exterminations and with the consent of al-Hangur, *Uqba b. Salci 
al-Hunna’i the Ass&ite governor of the Yamama and Bafcrayn inflicted heavy
4 2 *■
losses on the Rabi'ites there in 151/768. In so doing al-Hanfur had 
two objects in mind. One was to quell the Khari.iite activities in the 
Ytmen; the other to break tho alliance between the Yeaanites and 
the Rabi‘ites which, if continued, would threaten the central government 
authority especially in these distant tribal provinces. Al-Hanpur achieved 
his purpose, tut the two governors who were instrumental .in achieving 
it were both assassinated later on by Khari.iite or native avengers.
The Kharijitos found less resistance in Ifriqiyya due to its internal 
conditions and its greater distance from the central regime. In 132/
749-50 *Abd ’l Rafeman b. gabib al’-Pihri the governor of Ifriqiyya had * 
declared himself for the *Abbasids. Though he was confirmed in his 
post by the new regime, his relations with the central government sooni
deteriorated as he was unwilling to meet its fiscal demands and resented 
its authority.^ This situation ■ obliged Abu *1 * Abbas to put the province
^Khalifa. Tarllch. fol. 291; Asdi, fol. 152; Khazra.ii, fols. I6b-17a;
Tab., Ill, p.133.
2Azdi, fol. 152; Tab., Ill, pp. 367-8; Athir, V, p.243.
^Khalifa, Tarikh. fol. 295; Tab., Ill, p.369; Azdi, fol. 151; Ya‘qubi, 1I> 
p.462. -
^Ibn <Adhari, vol. I, p. 64; Athir, V, pp. 235f; Marcais, Berberie 
musulmane, p.45; Levi-Provenjal, Histoire do l'Sspa^ne musulmana. I, 
pp. 97, 121 f.
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under the jurisdiction of the governor of Egypt, galifc b. *Ali in 
156/753-4* ‘Abbasid missionaries were sent to influence the population 
of Ifriqiyya and pave the way for the expected ‘Abbasid army, Abu 
*Awn al-Azdi was appointed commander-in-chief of the forces whose van­
guard was led by ‘Amir b. Isma*!! al-Masalli, Also a naval expedition
T
was about to sail when the death of the caliph prevented the enterprise.
The new caliph al-Mangur needed the forces to quell new outbreaks in 
Syria which were more dangerous to the ‘Abbasids than distant Ifriqiyya.
Abu ‘Awn al-Azdi, who had already reached Barqa on his way to Ifriqiyya 
was recalled and the ‘Abbasid plans in the province were frustrated 
at the very eve of fulfilment. New attempts to invade Ifriqiyya from 
Egypt in the governorship of Muhammad b. al- Ash‘ath al-Khuza*i (141- 
142) never materialized and cost the latter his post.^ Meanwhile, 
the struggle for power within al-Fihri’s family - inspired probably 
by the ‘Abbasids - led eventually to its total destruction and by then ;
neither they nor the ‘Abbasids had any real power in the province which
3was virtually controlled by the Kharijites.
f -
Abu *1 Khattab ‘Abd *1 A*la b. al-SamJi *1 Mu‘afri was proclaimed 
Imam in al-§ayyad, west of Tripoli, in 139-140/757-6 and. was able to
A
stage a great Berber rising* He took possession of the whole of Ifriqiyya
^Wulat. pp. 102-103; Khitat* 2, pp. 91-2; Nujum, p.566.
2Uulat, pp. 108f; Khifaf,2,pp.92f; Nujum pp. 382-63. Compare Nujum, 
p.385 where the ahtiior relates that in 143A.H. guraayd al-Ta'i sent an 
expedition to Ifriqiyya. This seems to be a confusion with 141 A.H.
T a ‘qubi, li, p.403; Ibn ‘ Adhari, I, pp. 67-70; Marcais, op.cit., p.48. 
Levi-Provencal, op.cit., pp. 97, 121-2. Commenting on the conditions of 
the western part of the empire at the advent of the ‘Abbasids, Professor 
Gibb says; ’’The principle of ’Universal Islam* might seem to have-been , 
favoured by the establishment of the Universal empire of the Abbasids, but
(cont.)
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and even occupied Qayruwan whose new Khari.iite governor was *Abd al-Rafcman
- 1
b. Rustam, the future fodder of the Rustamid dynasty of Tahart, while 
in Tilimsan, a Sofrite leader, Abu Qurra, had already proclaimed himself
ft
Imam* Warned by this development, al-Mansur sent in 143/760-1 Mufcaamad 
b. al-Ash*ath al-Khuaa< 1 with 40* 000 troops to Ifriqiyya. He crushed 
the Iba^ites in a fierce battle at Tawurgha where Abu *1 Khafrjab himself
was killod in 144/761. The new governor rebuilt al-Qayruwan and sta-
• ■ "h - 
tioned his army there* He pursued an arbitrary policy and executed in cold
blood all rebels who bore the name of Mu*awiya, Sofyan or Marwan. This
may well indicate that a section of the natives had expressed tfmayyad
sympathies? on the other hand the accusation may only have been used
as a pretext for the summary execution of the rebels.^
However, due to the struggle for power among ambitious cffleers in
£ S*M
the Abbasid army unrest continued and the central government was not 
able to control Ifriqiyya* Governors replaced each other at short 
intervals and at one time, al-Hangur was even compelled to appoint, in 
150/767, al-jfas an b. gabib al-Kindi, the very leader of the mutiny,
3 1 ' V -
governor’ ox xirzqiyya. The critical situation justified the choice of the 
veteran *Umar b, gafg al-^Atlci, better known as Hasarmard, who was 
nominated governor of Ifriqiyya in 151/768. As the latter obviously could
(cent.) the rapid social and economic development of Iraq and Persia was 
not parallelled in Syria and the African provinces Whets the Arab tribal 
structure persisted with little change and solutions worked out in the 
former might be inapplicable to the latter. (Studies on the civilisation..., 
p.ll).
\ b u  Zakariyya, Chronique..., pp. ISff; Ibn * Adhari* I, pp. 70-71; Vaglieri, 
ho Yicencle .del .R£rigism$v 1949, p.53; Lewick, Les Ibadites. *•, pp.4f.
1Ita al-goghlr, pp. 30f; E.X.1 (lluotaiaids); r .I.2 (AbS ’l jaaJjSb).
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neither rely on the mutinous Khu'rasanI army stationed in Ifriqiyya
X i
nor on the natives he came accompanied by his own army. The Abbasid 
army can be regarded as an army of occupation, as Kharijites seem to 
have enjoyed the support of the whole country, while Umar al- Atki
£ M
was forced to build and repair military strongholds such as Abbasiyya
2and fobna, to station his troops there.
It was during al-^tki's term of office that the Kharijites broke out
in a dangerous revolt. Profitting by the absence of ‘Umar b. Jafg at
£obna the Kharijites, led by Aim §atim Ya^ub b. Tamim al~£indi and
Abu ‘Ad1 seized the capital and killed the deputy governor 5a^Ib b*
$abib al-Muhallabi.^  It is significant that, in Jobna, both the
Ibaflltes and the gofrites made common cause against the ‘Abbasid
authority and apparently recognized Abu Qurra the gofrite as caliph.^"
In considerable numbers they besieged *Umar al~4Atki who was eventually ,
able to break through their lives. Returning to Qayruwan he temporarily .
scattered the Kharijites and sent a detachment to pursue *Abd *1
Ragman b, Rustam who withdrew to al-Maghrib and entrenched himself
in Tahart where he became in 16o/?76 the first Iba^ite Imam. Meanwhile,:
"XcontT)' " T "r " "  '   ' , ur i '  ™ 1 j - -
2Tab., III, p.371? see also Ibn 4Adhari, I, p.70; E.I.l ( ‘Omar b. Hafg).
^Khalifa,wfol. 292; A,bu Zakariyya, op.cit., pp. 57ff; Ya‘qubl, II, p.464; 
Ibn ‘Adhari. I, p.72.
 ^ BVtuh. vol. I, p.279; Al-Wafi bi *1 wafayat, vol. 2, p.228.
^Ya‘qubi, II, p.465; Tab., Ill, p.570; Ibn ‘Adhari, I, pp. 62, 72f.
1 - . « _
Abu Zakariyya, op.cit.. pp. 41f; Tab., Ill, p.559; Ibn Adhari, I,
pp. 75, 77.
^ffutub, vol. I, p.275; Athir, V, p.241.
3AtJjir, V, pp. 457T; Ibn ‘Adhari, I, p.75; .Bhahabi, Puval, I, p*80;
Bad*. pp. 6, 87. . “  ^ o o n t . )
.Umar al-‘;Vtld. appealed to al-Manpur but was killed in 154/771
before help could reach him* Qayruwan was taken in 155/771-72
by another detachment of Abu gatira and Kharijite leaders with 400,000
2
partisans seized control of Ifriqiyya*
Al-IIangur, alarmed by the situation, was desirous to arouse the 
spirit of a holy war and, remembering the rdle played by the Iluhallabites 
in the struggle against the Kharijites during the TJmayyad period, decided 
to choose Yazid b* gatim al-Muhallabi for the leader of the 50,000 strong 
army to be sent to Ifriqiyya. He recruited troops from al-Sham and 
the Jasira and lavished much care on the preparations on which he is
f
said to have spent 65 million dirhams. To stress the importance of 
the undertaking the caliph accompanied the army to Jerusalem in 154/
771. When Yazid arrived in Ifriqiyya Abu gatim was virtually 
in control for about a year. After a,series of fierce battles Yazid 
succeeded in crushing the Kharijites in 'the battle of Tripoli where
Abu gatim was killed in 155/771-2 and the remnants of his followers
4 -s-withdrew to the mountainous area of the Berbers* Yazid decided to
^Tab.,111,pp.570-571; Azdl, fpl.188; Ibn *Adhari, I,p.77; Dhahabi, op.cit.
p.8Q. -
bLewiclo., Los Ibaditee.... pp. 5f•
3-Azdi, fol* 186.
p ^  f ...........
Azdi, fol. 188; Ibn Adhari, I, p.76; see also Tab., III, p.570.
5Ibn‘Xakari, Ij, p.78; Y a ‘q.ubl, II, pp. 464-5; Tab., Ill, p.372; Azdi, 
fol. 190; Athir, V, pp. 460f; Dhahabx, Buwal. I, p.80; Bad*, 6, p.87.
Ibn ‘Adliarj, I, p.79; Ya‘qubi, II, p.464; Azdi, fol. 190. E.I.2 (Abu
gatimjr
f
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follow the insurgents and sent an army to the Berber labels of Katama.
The Kharijite doctrine found a fertile soil among the Berbers who
resented the Arab rule and adopted Khari.jism to defy the ‘Abbasid
1
political ^ rstem by using of Islamic concepts. However the clash was 
more of a conquered people against conquerors. Sulayman b. ^uraayd al-ghafiqi 
one of the Arab officers who died in 160 A.H. gave expression to his con­
tempt for the Berbers; "Yfe did not shrink from their attack because they 
are fierce. Hhat is there about a Berber that we /Arabs/ could fear”.
The lack of stability was also due to the ambitions of officers whose 
mutinies against governors often originated in pay disputes. The Hnqatila 
continued to live in garrison cities in complete separation from the 
populatioxa. They failed to control the country, especially the mountain­
ous Berber areas, isolated fortresses and parts of the shore inhabited 
by Christians.^
By the end of al-Hangur* s reign Khari.iite activities were also 
noticeable in the eastern part of the empire, especially in: Sistan,
Pars, Kirman and the fringes of Khurasan. It is worth pointing out 
that by tho end of the Umayyad regime Khari.iite partisans in Pars and 
Sistan were mainly Arabs driven out of Ira£ and the Jasira. They were 
therefore strangers to the eastern provinces. However, Kharijism by its 
doctrine of equality and elective caliphate was bound to attract the
^Professor^Gibb rightly states that a close association of orthodoxy with , 
the ‘Abbasid caliphate led to the rejection of orthodoxy by sections poli­
tically opposed to Abbasid rule as in the adhesion of the Berber to 
Kharijism. See Studies in the civilisation of Islam, p.11.
2 —  —  ■
Ibn Adhari, 1, pp. 37,72? see talso Melanges Taba Husayn. p.3.
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non-Arabs in the eastern provinces* Besides as an opposition movement
f .
it gave the opportunity to Iranians disappointed with the new regime
to express.their resentment.
According to Waqidi and Ya‘qubi it was in 15l/?68 that I*Ia‘an b.
Za’ida al-Shaybanx was appointed governor of Sistan to put things
' 1in order and suppress Khari.iite activities. In the first months cf
his governorship, Ma'an pacified the area and carried the war to the
eastern autonomous regions of Sistan where he even subdued Prince
Ratbil, But when he had been there for barely a year, he was assassin-
— 2 '
ated by a group of Khari.jites in his own house at Bust. Ibn al-Athir 
merely states that the IChari.iites were dissatisfied with his policy, 
while the author of Tarildi4i Sistan enlarges on it in the following 
account on his murder: “Sensible people were dissatisfied with Hagan’s 
extraction of property, his bad administration and tyranny until the 
time when a group of Khari.jites conspired to kill him”. According 
to al-Khasraji^ Ma‘an was murdered by two people from pa^ramaut who 
followed him and killed him in Sistan in revenge for their fathers 
who had been victims of the great massacre he had conducted. The latter 
(cont.) ' ' "
^Futufo. vol. I, p.227.
XTab., Ill, pp. p68f; Ya‘qubi, II, p.462; JOmssra;}!, B.H., fol* 17b;
Azdi, fol. 151-152.‘
2 -
Athir, VY p.464, Leyden.
5 - - ■ - -
Tarikh~i Sistan, p.146.
I^fliazra.i i. fol. 17b.
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account is to be doubted as it is not confirmed by other historians.
The first insurrection in Sistan led by ‘Amir b. al-pa^a^ al-Shaybanl 
with 1,000 partisans and probably Kharijite in character occurred in 
the reign of al-Mangur.'*' Sistan, in fact, was uniquely suited for
the spread of Khari.iite Ideas. It was one of the Iranian provinces
2 ‘ 
in which Zoroastrian traditions had been preserved, so that more
conservative elements there opposed the infiltration of Islam
and the imposition of the Arab rule by joining the Khari.iite movement.
Thus the rank and file of Kharijism in Sistan consisted of Arab
strangers as well as native Iranians. Though the rebel ‘Amir was
killed after a short time the Khari.iite movement gathered head and
became dangerous in the reign of al-Rashld (170-193/786-809) extending
to Badghls, Herat and Bushang*
The reign of al-Mahdi was no less troubled by Khari.iite insurrections.
In 160 A.H./776 A.D. the caliph ordered the governor of Sistan, Yazid
b. Hazyad al-Shaybani, who had already been fighting the Khari.iite-
Yapya al-Shari^ to advance hastily to Khurasan where a serious revolt
under Yusuf b. Ibrahim called al-Barm had just broken out. Early
accounts differ on the nature of the rising. Ya*qubi and Ibn al-Athir
r
classify it as Kharijite. Tabari does not commit himself and merely 
1
Ansab, fol. $62.
2
Sadighi, op.pit., p.80; on the spread of Kharijism among the non- 
Arabs see W. Thomson, “Khari j ism and the Kharijites “ in D.B. Macdonald ' 
presentation volume, 1933, pp. 374-389; M. Watt,. Kharijite thought..., 
op.cit.. pp. 230-231.
^Tarikh-i Sistan, pp. 156f; Vagleiri, uLe vicende del Harigismo",
^Ya/qubi, XX, p.47S. _ .
5Baidas p.303s Athir, V., p.470. Sea also p.jwan Efaslim b., aX-vfal^g ^ . )
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states that Yusuf protested against al-Mahdi*s policy, while in another
account of his he states that Yusuf was “considered unbeliever by some .
Muslims11 ^  ^  ^ Accordingly, modern histories
are divided in their opinions Qn Y^suf al-Barm.u Sadighi and Moscati
2 3
consider him a Kharijite, while Spuler is not explicit about it 
and merely describes his rising as one of the “outbreaks of religiously 
dissatisfied masses". It is however very probable that ^usuf ai-Barm 
was, in fact, a Kharijite. Despite the scarcity of information on his 
attitude towards the ‘Abbasid regime one can detect in the rigid attacks 
on the injustice of the caliph and the slogans he raised elements of !
Kharijite rigorism.^ He occupied Bugbang, Merw al-Rudh, falqan and 
Jurjan; his movement attracted . _ considerable numbexs and must have 
been quitetstrong as the troops of Khurasan had already failed to crush 
him. Little is known of Yusuf’s insurrection and success except the 
murder of the brother of Harj&ama of A*yan, a jaiuraeanx commander, 
until.Yusuf was finally subjected by Yazid al-Shaybani. Ya‘qubi says 
in his account of the battle that when Yazid had n d e e d  that the Kharijites 
were beginning to retreat he raised a red banner calling upon them to
1Tab., Ill, pp. 470-71, 773.
2 -
Sadighi, op.cit., p.174; Moscati, “Studi storici;..", Orlentalia,
1945, PP- 332£.
3
Spuler, Iran in ffruh..., pp. 51-52.
^Yij/qubi states that he insisted on^the right being upheld and the 
injustices being abolished. « ^  (ll» pp. 470,
478; see also Tab., Ill, p.470).
5lab., Ill, p.471.-
(cont.) Cairo edition*
gather round it and promising amnesty to whoever did.so. The appeal
was successful and Yusuf, deserted by many of his followers, was arrested
and sent to Baghdad. On arrival at Nahrawan Yusuf and his partisans
1were made to mount camels facing their tails. That It was in Nahrawan 
that the ‘Abbasid authorities began to ti’eat the prisoners with con­
tempt is another indication of their Kharijite connections. For it 
had been in Nahrawan that Kharijism first emerged as a movement of 
opposition to the authority, and suffered its first defeat in 36 A.h ./ 
658-9- The triumph which consolidated Yazid*s position was commemorated 
by the poet gari al-Ghawani in the verse :
However a group of Kharijite dare-devils determined to revenge their 
followers on Yazid penetrated into Baghdad and one day trapped Yazid 
on the bridge* In a hand, to hand battle Yazid was miraculously saved. 
According to Ya‘qubl it was the only occasion on which Kharijites 
entered Baghdad and killed a number of people.
According to several historians a Kharijite revolt led by *Abd al~
Sal am b. Hashim al-Yashkari broke out in the Jazira and northern Syria 
in 160 A.H./776 A.D. with its centres in Qinnisrln and Aleppo.4 This 
insurgence lasted two years during which several commanders were
Ta'qubi, II, p. 478; Tab., Ill, p.471.
2^ „ *» ^ — t al 1 ** 17
^Ya‘qubi, II, p.463*
4Ma*d/ fol. 94a; Khalifa, Tarikh, fol. 308f; Tab., Ill, p.782; Zubda,
I, p.60; Nujum, pp. 41 ff-
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defeated, Khalifa b. Khayyat and Aadi cite a letter alleged to have 
been sent by al-Mahdi to fiAbd al-Salam reminding him of his disobedience 
to God and the oaliph of God, accusing him that his intention belied 
his words: "his words were
good but his intention wicked", The letter goes on presenting al- 
Mahdi as a defender of ‘All, cursing the Khari.iite rebel for his con­
demnation of *Ali b* Abl Jalib, and ends by warning him to refrain
—  2
from the use of force. Only Khalifa b. Khayyat records the harsh 
reply of *Abd *1 salam to the caliph in which the Kharijite leader
professes to be surprised at al-Mahdi1s claim to bo the caliph of God
i
while deviating from the right path, committing acts of tyranny and 
injustice, leading the Umma astray, flouting his promises and being 
pre-occupied with 'huh:ting, building, drinking and singing. "The 
*Ajam /the Sasanidj*7 used to resent lesser wrongs than this." *Abd 
*1 Salim ends by calling him yaghlya, and threatening him vri.th war.
Only when ShaMb b. V/ajj al-Mermisi was sent against *Abd al-Salam with
a large army whose morale he kept up by additional pay of 1,000 per
head, didthe forces of the central government succeed in crushing the
< - 3revolt ancl killing Abd al-Salam at Qinnisrin.
In 168 A.H./784-5 A.D. Mogul witnessed yet another Kharijite revolt
-  -  -  4
led by the Tamimite Yasin al-Maugili. He defeated the governor of
^Khalifa, Tarildi, fols. 308-9; Assdi, fol. 206.
Khalifa. Tarikh. fols. 309-310.
AzdX, fol. 210; Tab., Ill, p.492; Ifu.jum, pp. 42f.
Azdi, fol. 218; Athir, VI, p.92; *Ibar. Vol. 3, p.361.
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the city and maintained control over large areas of the Jazira, .
Yasin followed a doctrine of a fellow Tamiraite, galib b. Musanib who
had been killed in 76 A.II./695-6 A.D. The central government had to
send troops led. by Muhammad b. ffarrulch and Harthma b. A*yan, whereupon
lasin was killed fighting and his followers dispersed;,
In 169/785-6 the IChuza'ite $amza b. Malik led another Khari.iite
insurrection in the Jazlra. The people of Mogul hard pressed by the
‘Abbasid extortionate fiscal policy supported him in defionxe of the
‘Abbasid regime* His efforts were initially successful, for he defeated
the ‘Abbasid army in the battle of Mogul, Unable to overcome him by
force, the ‘Abbasid government x^esorted to a ruse. Two men were sent,
who professed the wish to join him but assassinated him when the
1
opportunity presented itself. Like similar Kharijite insurrections 
this rising depended for its cohesion mainly on the figure of the 
leader and .once he had perished his followers dispersed until another 
leader of equal temerity would present himself. It was probably the weakness 
of Kharijism in the Jazira that all insurrections with few exceptions, though 
numerous were of short duration. Ho sooner did an insurrection materialize 
than it died down, Events often took similar course: first Mogul was
occupied, the ‘Abbasid govemox' was thrown out and a tribute imposed on 
the population of the city* only then were other regions occupied. An 
exception is observable in the rising of the Taghlabi al-Ualid b. ^arif
1Azal, fol. 225.
Val-Shari in 178 A.H./794-5*'*' He attacked STigibin and killed the ‘Abbasid 
governor Ibrahim b. Khazim. After wandering in Armenia and Adhurbayjan, 
he returned to Jazira and besieged Balad which capitulated paying a
9 ^  j
ransom of 100,000 dirhams. Al-Walld al-Shari even set a seige to
Raqqa threateiing Baghdad itself. Igbahani relates the fears of the
people of Baghdad that al-Walld would launch a surprise attaok.
Al-Rashld intended to wipe out the people of Mogul, but was dissuaded
from this undertaking by his chief Qa$l Abu Yusuf. Instead he demolished
the wall of the city to prevent Khari.jites and nomads from using it as
4their stronghold. The episode seems to have made a deep impression 
on the c omraunity. Ja$dz expresses his admiration to the Kharijite bravery 
by comparing them with the Turks for whom he had a special regal’d.
He also stresses that only the Turks in the ‘Abbasid army could over- 
come al-Walld*s rising, and it was a Turk who killed al-Walld.
Al-Rashid sent Yazid b. Mazyad al-Shaybani against him. The latter 
who belonged to the same tribe as the rebel al-Walld tried to settle 
the matter with negotiation. This involved a delay in putting an end 
to the revolt which led to court intrigues against ^azid and aroused 
the suspicion of the caliph. Eventually. Yazid al-Shaybani was able
Ha‘d. fol. 17a.i Azdi, fol: 242; Tab., Ill, 631; Athir, VI, p.971.
2Atxh., vol. XI, p.8; Azdi, fol. 243.
^Agh.. Vol. XI, p.8., see also Wafayat. vol. 2, p.374, ed. Cairo.
4Azdi, fol. 246; Tab. II, p.645.
Manaqib, p. 36. Although Turksbad been introduced in the Abbasid court 
since the reign of al-Mangur (ibn Igfandiyar, vol. 2, p.118), it is not 
known to what degree they were employed in the army before al-Mu‘tasim.
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to kill al-Walld in 179/795-6 A.D. Both the relief felt by al-Rashid
and the vords of the poet gari‘ al-Ghawani indicate that the very existence
2
of the caliphate 'was in danger.
The reign of al-Rashid witnessed yet another serious Khari.iite 
rising in Sistan and Khurasan, gamza b. ‘Abdallah al-Asraq al-Shari 
broke out in rebellion in 179/7 snd was proclaimed jWJx-_al=»
IIu>niinin by his partisans in 181 A.H./797-8 A.D.^ After .defeating 
the troops sent by 4All b. 4Isa the governor of Khurasan, he found 
himself in control of most of Sistan and Fare. Advancing, he defeated 
the garrison of Herat whose governor *Amr b. Yazid al-Azdi was killed. 
According to Tarikh-i Sistan, which describes 5amza*s activities in 
Sistan, Fars and Kirraan and whose sympathies are with the. ICharijite 
, rebels, as many as 30,000 men followed gamza. The caliph al-Rashid had 
to visit the eastern provinces in order to see for himself the growing 
danger of gamza in 193/808-809. He wrote to gamza from Jurjan asking 
him to "join the Jama4a11 promising him his share of Fay1 and Sadaqa and 
offering him the aman.
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■^ AzdjL, fols. 242-35 Agh.. XI, pp. 8-9; Tab., Ill, p.638. The confrontation 
between the two Rabi ites inspired^ a poet to say; ^
(r^ ^* * iii, p.638, 2,p.375).
^Diwan Sari4 al-ghawani , pp. 6, 7, 15, 16; Azdi, fol. 244; Tab., Ill, p.638
^Tarikfo-i Sistan. pp. 156 ff; Tab., Ill, p.638; Y a 4qubi, II, p*87. For _ . 
other insignificant Kharijite risings in the reign of al-Rashid see Azdi, 
fols. 231, 235 , 238,^40, 242, 246; Tab., Ill, p.732.
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Hamza calling himself Amir al-Mu1aminin replied:
MI have received your letter calling me /to abidjg/by 
the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet.., As 
to the Book of God to which X myself summon /others/, 
and with the instructions of which I m  satisfied, I 
would take no other verdict. As to my fight against your 
governors it is not motivated by the /ambition/ to wrest 
the Hulk from you, nor by worldly pleasures or prestige 
or fame, but is_merely dictated by their /She governors/" 
misrule of thecAmma1 s affairs and what they commit in 
tho field of executions, plunder and other misdeeds by 
which they victimized the Muslims... La iyikma ilia 1illah 
Yafgul bi *1 baqq wahuwa Khayru *1 Fagiliyn.'^^
However, the bloody battles between the ‘Abbasid- army and H ^ ^ a  failed
to put an end to the latter^ rising as al-Rashid was faced with
Rafi* b. al-Layth* e revolt in Khurasan and tho Byzantines1 threat from
2
the north. gamza*s rising was crushed only in the reign of al-Ma’mun 
by the efforts of ^ahir b. al-5usayn and as can be git he red from Tarikh-i 
Sistan Kharijites remained, indeed, the real masters of souther Iran ’ 
until the time of the gafarids. These petty states in the eastern part 
of the empire (the fahirids and the §afarids) as well as in the western 
part (the Aghlabifls and the Idrisids) finally either crushed the 
Kharijites or piit a limit to their activities.
To sum up, one can say that, though a number of scholars4 concerned 
themselves with particular aspects or centres of Kharijite activity, 
none except L. V. Vagliera has attempted a general survey of Kharijite
Sistan, pp.^!56ff. On the letters exchanged between Hamza 
al-Shari and al-Rashid soe Scorcia, "La scambio di lettere....M, A* 0
1964, pp. 623-645. ",ip,w
Tab., Ill, p.730} Ya‘qubi, II, p.515} Azdi, fols. 262 ff.
Tarijdi-i Sistan, pp. 187, 189f; Muru.i. V, p.440; Sadighi, op.cdt.. p.56.
4
See bibliography under: G. Haroais, W. Thompson, M. Watt, T. Lewicki,
G. Scaria mid E.A.Salem.
5 . it ‘ -
Vaglieri, Lg vicende del Hargismo...”, R.S.O., 1949} idem, "L1Imamato 
I b a H i t a . A . 1 . 0.^1949. ”
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activities in the early Abbasid period. Brunnow and Wellhausen who
were specially concerned with Kharijites did not pursue their research
to ‘Abbasid times. Inher articles on Khari.iism Vagliera covers too
long a period to go deep into the events. The article on the Iba#ite
Imamate of ‘liman * only about four pages of it are devoted to the period
of our concern. As to the article on the vicissitudes of Kharijism in the
‘Abbasid era, the author limits her research territorially to the Jaslra
and the eastern provinces of the Muslim empire. Besides, she did not
utilise several local and general works such as Azdi1 a Tarikh al-Mausil,
the manuscript of Baladhuri1 s Ansab or Khalifa b. IChayyat1 s Tarikh. ‘
In order to demonstrate the active character of Khar jlie opposition
in txe early ‘Abbasid • period and to avoid undorestiraating their effect
on the new regime, it lias been attempted, in this chapter, to give an :
overall picture of Kharijite risings over the whole period in question
and in all the provinces of the empire. The IChari.i it os exhausted the
government financially as well as militarily aid even twice threatened
its very capital, Baghdad. Khari.iite attacks were still feared as their
name was still used as cover for political assassination, e.g. Abu
Salama*s assassination was attributed to them.
No doubt, all the abovo mentioned risings strongly exhibit many of
the politico-religious characteristics of the Kharijite sect. ^his is
borne out by a number of facts such as: (l) Rebel loaders are often
1
Brttnnow, Die charidschiten unter den ersten Omayyaden, Leyden 1884; 
Welhausen, Die religlos-polltischen opuositinnspartelen..., Berlin, 1901.
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defined as Kharijite and even sometimes §ufrites, Ibaflites and Assraqites. 
(2) Some trace back their doctrines to certain j^arijite religious figures 
such as §alit b. Musarit while others were known in Khari.iite circles 
before staging their revolts such as AtS *1 Khattab,"1* (3) among the 
partisans of these movements there were Khari.iite fuaaha and quarrels 
occurred within some Kharijite groups due to the neglect of certain 
Khari.iite doctrines. (4) Partisans of Khari.iism from many provinces, 
especially the Jaeira, used to hurry to the help of fellow-Kharijite rebels 
in other provinces.
JVag!ieri, vicende del Harigismo.. ,  op.cit. , p.34.
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Chapter VI
MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS II-I THE EARLY ‘ABBASID PERIOD
"When Abu Ja*far al-Mangur learnt of 
the dangerous gasanid revolt in Bagra, he 
exclaimed 'By God, I do not know what to do,
,. I have only 2,000 men as I^hnve scattered 
iny army: 30,000 with al-Mahdi in al-Rayy,
4.0,000 with Muhammad b. al-Ash*at]i in Ifriqiyya 
and the remainder with *Xsa b, Musa J±n the 
gijajs7 * By God, if I ever survive this 
/crisis/, I will always keep 30,000 at my camp."
/Tab., III, pp. 304-3027
s
The advent of a new regime usually gives rise to reaction in 
various forms* The ‘Abbasid regime was no exception* Having given 
a detailed account of the sectarian risings such as internal *Abbasid» 
‘Alid Kharijite and Umayyad movements wo shall, in thefollowing 
chapter, attempt to examine certain significant political events in 
tho context of tho political conditions of the localities in which
l
they alose and where they spread *
The revolt of Mosul in 133/750~751
In the early days of the new regime, al»Shaia the Umayyad centre, 
and al-Jnsxra the centre of tribal unrest both caused equal trouble 
to the Abbasids, To neutralise and control those two provinces, the 
‘Abbasids adopted measures of different kinds: l) They appointed new 
governors who wore ‘Abbasids and wore occasionally accompanied by n 
body of Khurasan! troops; 2) they installed Khurasan! garrisons in 
many cities such as geirran, Mogul, Damascus and Qinni&rln; 3) they
built tho new garrison city of Rafiqa on a strategic point on the way 
to Syria and the Jaseira, manning it with Khurasan! troops,p 4) they won
■^ The difficulties the ‘Abbasids had to face were both greater and more 
numerous in the eastern rather than tho western part of the empire.
The natives in Iran turned against the new regime which failed to 
satisfy the very hopes it had evoked by its accession, and joined 
now movements which promised more satisfaction* The series of in­
surrections in Iran have been examined in detail by several scholars* 
What should be stressed here is that they were eminently syncretistlc.
(oont.)
M f .
over many tribal chieftains, with whose help, they tried to pacify 
their districts;3* 5) early ‘Abbasid caliphs also visited occasionally 
these provinces either on their way back from the pilgrimage or on
_  2
their way up to the Thughur.
Mosul, the centre of Diyar Rab!‘a, was in a turbulent state 
throughout this period. Though it ;;had been a centre of the Khari.jites
v
in the Jazira during the Umayyad period, it lost that vital position
due to Marwan's efforts. However, the Arab population of the city,
exhausted by Marwan's campaigns, remained resentful of his policy and
opened the gates of the city to the Khurasan! army which was £>ursuing the
fleeing caliph. In recognition of the support given to the ‘Abbasids a
number of Arab tribal chieftains of Mosul were granted estates by Abu *1
‘Abbas and later al~»Mangur. But the tribal leaders soon -defied the
new ‘Abbasid governor of the city, the Mawla Muhammad b. §awl, shouting
* 4’’Are we to be ruled by a Mawla of Khath am?". He was driven out of
(cont. )ji3ach one of these risings, such as Bihafrid's, Sonba4h*s, 
Ustadhsi1s and al-Muqanna* s, was a complex in itself, to which 
economic, political, social,psychological and even religious factors 
had contributed. However no single motive of decisive influence canbe 
pinpointed with any certainty. (On these risings see bibliography under 
Bausani, Barthold, Duri, Gibb, Lewis, Sadighi, Spuler, ¥right,
and Yakubousky).
2Tat>., Ill, p.75; §afadi, Umara’ Dimashq, pp. 3, 49, 50-59, 75, 202ff;
Zambour, Manuel de Geneologie^..V p. SB.~
3Tab., Ill, p.373; Azdi, fol. 194.
^Azdi, fol. 13S.
^Dina, p.379; _Wulat. p.106; Ya‘qubi, II, p.480; Tab., Ill, pp. 129, 
498-500; p.308; Zubda, 1, p. 61; Theophanes, Chronographia,
1, p.446; Mabasin al-Hasa‘1, p.114; ’ Azdi, fol. 215.
^Azdi, fols. 135-36.
4Azdl, fol. 325; Athir, V., p.340. ‘ibar. HI, p.378 (ed. Beirut 19^7).
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the city and the caliph had to nominate his own brother Yafcya b*
Muhammad governor of Mogul* However, Muhammad b. gawl was left
1 m *there in an advisory capacity* The new governor was, according to
|  mm '<n P
Ya qubi accompanied by 4,000 troops* According to Azdi and Ibn al- 
- 3Athir he had as many as 12,000 troops among whom there were 4,000
Tension developed between the population of Mosul and the 
Khurasani army, and a clash was inevitable especially as Yafcya was 
known to be irresponsible in his behaviour in the early days of the 
daS?a*^ To appoint him governor of this unruly and antagonistic city 
was therefore a wrong move on the part of the caliph* The strained 
situation came to a breaking point as early as 135/750-1. It is re­
lated that a woman accidentally poured some water from the roof of
her house on a Khurasani soldier, and that the ensuing quarrel led
5 -6
to the revolt and consequently the massacre* According to Azdi
the massacre was caused by two reasons: first, the pro-Umayyad sentiment
1Ansab. fol. 586; Azdi, fol. 125.
2fa‘qubl, III, pp. 428-9.
5Azdi, fol. 124; Athir, V, p.340.
A&hbar. fol^ 115a. See also Ansab, fols. 586-587. Kjina Yajjya 
A.julan qalil al-Rawiya*
■’Azdi, fol. 125.
60p.oit.. fols. 120, 125-126.
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of the people of Mosul; secondly, their refusal to accept the 
Mawla Muhammad b. §awl as their governor* Though a proportion 
of the population in Mosul might have evinced pro-Umayyad sentiments 
the reason of the present , outburst should be sought in the resentment
of the inhabitants of the city against the measures applied by the
* 1 new regime no less than in their general unruly character.
Anticipating a revolt, the governor Yaftya, instigated by Muhammad
b. gawl, arrested and-executed a number of prominent figures accusing
2them of pro-Umayyad sympathies. This led to a clash which lasted 
several days. Then Yafcya resorted to a trick and proclaimed an amnesty 
for those who would take refuge in the great mosque. When the people
had entered the mosque in great numbers a massacre ensued in which
%
Mufcaramad b. gawl played a leading part. The number of the victims 
cannot be given with any certainty. No information to that effect 
can be found in Tabari who avoids deaLing with the event in detail, 
while the figures given by Y a ‘qubi and Azdi are no doubt exaggerated 
under the influence of their anti-‘Abbasid loyalties.^" Azdi, a native 
of Mogul, gives vent to his resentment when he mentions the event and
XIt is worth noting that according to an account in Ansab the people of 
Mogul consisted of three categories: Khari.jites. robbers and merchants 
who were called Khazar al-‘Arab because of their roughness (Ansab, 
fol. 586.) “  ‘
2AadI, fol. 125.
3Op.cit.. fols. 126, 142; Khalifa, Tarilch, fol. 286.
4 i -  ~
Aecording to Ya qubi, 18,000 Arabs were killed together with their 
Mawali and *Abid (XI, p.429). While Azdi followed by Ibn al-Athir relate 
that the number of the victims was 11,000 (fol. 128; p.341), another 
account In Azdi puts the figure of the victims as high as 50,000 (Azdi, 
fol. 152). See als’o the versa of Abu Firas al-gamdani (d.557) commemorat­
ing the massacre (Diwan. 256 ff).
TJX
his account on the massacre must he taken with a grain of salt. He
deals with the massacre in detail, citing the names of prominent men
who were killed, and poems said in their praise; he also states that
many quarters remained in ruins for many.years after the massacre.
He is most indignant at the ‘Abbasid attitude towards Mogul and even
cites a religious figure as condemning the murderers the ‘Abbasids/
1 < — —as non-Muslims. Ya‘qubi says "Their blood mixed with the colour of
2
the Tigris and, they did not rise again"* However, the latter account 
is not strictly true because Mogul continued to be the centre of the 
troubles despite or perhaps because of the deep impression the massacre 
had made on its population. Nor did the situation change when Abu *1 
4Abbas dismissed both Ya&ya and Muhammad b. §awl from their offices 
and appointed his uncle Israa‘il b. 4All who condemned Ya^ya’s policy 
and promised compensation to the relatives of the victims.
The position of the ‘Abbasid governor of Mogul was always dependent 
on the loyalty of the Khurasani troops. In 142/759-60, Isma‘il b.
‘All resented al-Mangur’s order to give up his post, but had finally 
to give in, as the commander of the Khurasani garrison of Mogul, Ibn 
Mashkan, aided with the new governor, Malik b. al-Haytham al~Khuza‘i.^ 
Realising the inimical attitude of the people of Mogul which caused
1Azdi, fols. 126, 132-135.
Aa'qubi, XI, p.429.
3 « -
Azdi, fols.154-55. The remarkcf Ja^is which describes Ya£ya*s acts in
Mo^ul as bravery is hardly appropriate (Fafll banl Haaliim. p. 115)*
4A*di, fols. 154-155.
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any ambitious governor who resorted to rebeXlion could count on their
support al-Ksngur was very cautious and even tactful in dealing with
— - 1his own governors of the city* According to Azdi and Tabari, he sent
his son al-Mah&i accompanied by Khalid b. Barmafc to Hosul in 158/
774-5 ostensibly in transit to Raqqa but in realty with secret orders
to arrest the governor MUsa b. JCa‘ab, a task in which al-Mahdl acquitted
himself successfully. It can be seen that the caliph preferred to deal
with the matter in a less straightforward way as he suspected that
the governor would resist and be backed by the anti- ‘Abbasid population.
More-over it seems that what the people of Mogul resented most was the
2burden of heavy taxation. They often ceased paying under the pretext 
that Khari.iite raids had done heavy damage, and although this was true 
in some cases the ‘Abbasid authority used such harsh methods in extracting
*5
the money that people fled the city.
Slave riots in Bapra in 14l/758-9
In 141, unrest arose among the ** *Abld and the S u d a n who were 
easily overcome by the troops and, after having lost some fourteen men,
Tab., Ill, p.j383} Assdi, fol. 195, cf. op.clt.. fol. 196.
2 *» ?
Assdi, fol. 258. Local sources usually teem with complaints about the 
harsh fiscal policy of local ‘Abbasid governors.
^op.cit.. fols. 258,21-0, 246 ff.
The use of the terms ‘Abid (slaves), Sudan (blackmen), Zunuj (negroes) 
by early historians is loose. They are subatituable andised to denote 
black slaves. However their connotation was social rather than racial. 
After the establishment of the ‘Abbasid regime we see the words Sudan, 
Zunu.i and Afariqa used alternatively to denote a minor unit in the ’Abbasid 
army. (Asdi, fol. 129, Tab.,^III, 269, 305, 907, 873, 1005). Apart from 
that they served at the ‘Abbasid court, especially in the harem. (On these 
terms see Jafciz, Rasa’il. ed. 1964, pp.,178, 179, 190, 194, 198, 201, 210, 
211, 216, 224 f; Ibn Mansur, Lisan al- Arab, vol. 2, p.290, vol. 3,
\ c on t /
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1 -  2 -  easily dispersed. In his essay ffakhr al-Sudan..., Ja^iz-states that
they were forty in number and that their rising had spread over parts
of the lower Euphrates where they drove the people to flight and per-
petuated a large soale massacre at Ubulla. Baladhuri indicates that
the insurrection had no political aim or organisation and was mainly
due to economic reasons (darra bihim al-Ju* wa*l faqr). Slaves lived
in conditions of utter want and exploitation, and this incident is
Only one of the series of occasional outbursts which occurred not
only in Bagra but also in other cities of the empire. However, in
early 4Abbasid times, lack of organisation among the slaves and the
strength of the central government prevented large-scale revolts, but
in later times when ihe central government was weak and the slaves found
a leader, their risings such as in 255/869 assumed dangerous proportions
and threatened Baghdad itself.
Bandar1s rising ±i the Lebanon
A Christian rising broke out in the mountain of Lebanon in 142/
759-60 or 145/760-61. The leader of the rebels Bandar, who declared
himself a king and proclaimed Christainity the official faith of his
domain, invaded the Muslim villages of the Biqa4, but was soon defeated
 '(coat*) pp. 224 , 270; al-Mu4 .iam al-WasTt, vol. lY  pp. 464. 404: vol. 2,
p.585; Pellat, Le Milieu Basrien..., p.78; E.I.^ ( Abd).
^Ansab, fol. 567, Khalifa. Tarikh, fol. 291; Azdi, fol. 101.
2Jabdz, Rasa’il, ed., 1964, p.195.
5Tab., Ill, pp. 1785-6.
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and took shelter in ”the country of Rum”, The inhabitants of the
mountain were expelled by §ali^ b, ‘All, and subsequently scattered 
} Xall over Syria. This evoked the opposition of the renowned Syrian
jurist al-Awza*5. In an impassioned plea he wrote: "Why do you
punish the whole /Christian^ population for the mistakes of a few?
... They are not slaves to be taken at will from one country to
2 «
the other, but free men and Ahl Dhimma." The ‘Abbasid authorities 
obviously'considered the Christians of al-Sham and al-Jasxra susceptible 
to exploitation by the Byzantines and a potential danger in general.
The ‘Abbasidi defensive policy towards Byzantium entailed the intro­
duction of certain restrictions in these border provinces. It was 
due to security reasons that the governor of Jazira :al-‘Akkl ordered
all the Sfosliras of the province to put on Sawafl to distinguish them
3 * * a
from the non-Muslims of that border province. According to Baladhuri.
al-Mangur' s policy to order transfers of border population to free the 
frontier of suspects, especially Christians, is to be seen as a pre­
cautionary measure.
^ ‘Asakir, vol. 5, p.341#
A
ffutuhj, p.222; Ibn ‘ubayd, al-Amwal, pp. 170-171* ”Fa*innahum laysu 
bi abid... wa la kinnahum afrrSr Ahl Dhimma.”
3 2
Dionysius, op.cit., p.46; see also E.I. (Dhimma).
^Futuh, 1, p.196. See also Theophanes (Ghronographia, 1, p.446) 
who states that after *Abdallah /al-Man^ux7 returned to Jerusalem, 
he started to persecute the Christians and Jews. Many of the Christians 
fled by sea to Byzantine territory.
h !d • '
Revolts in the Yemen and Bafrrayn and al-Mangur* s tribal policy
After the advent of the ‘Abbasids, the Yemen was administratively 
linked with the gijaz* The governor of the gijaz, Da*ud b, *All, sent 
the Qurayshite ‘Umar b. *Abd al-Majid al-^Adawi to deputize for him 
in the Yemeni Owing to the remote geographical position of the Yemen 
and its mountainous nature, the *Abbasids found it difficult to control. 
The governor used to administer it through local representatives (i.e.
of the tribes, but/it seems that al-Man§ur desired to enhance
" \
the authority of the centrai government, especially after the defeat 
of his governor ^Abdallah b. al-Rabi* al-garithl by the rebel tribes 
in Rabi* I 140 A.H,/July 757.^ With this aim in view the caliph ap­
pointed Ma* an b* 2a-ida al-Shaybani governor of the province. Mahan's 
policies, especially after the murder of his cousin at al-Ma‘afir, and 
heavy taxation seems to have been very harsh and caused shortly after 
the outbreak of a rebellion in gajramaut which was crushed severely.^" 
When a Qurayshite at the court of the caliph expressed his dismay at 
Kazan's actions, al-Manpur pretended that Ma‘an was punishing Khari.iite 
rebels and avenging the Qurayshites who had been killed at the battle
fol.
Khazraji, B.M. ,/ 16a; Khazra.ji, B.N., fols*9bf.
2Ibid.
^Khazra.ji, B.M., fol. 16b; see also Tab., Ill, p.594.
^Khazraji, B.M., fol. l?a; Azdi, fols. 151-152; Khalifa, Tarikh 
fol. 291? p.229.
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of Qa&id. The appointment of Ma‘an al-Shaybani seems to lave been, 
in fact, part’ of a deliberate plan, as al-Mangur had already realised 
the importance of tribal alliances in politics. Ma‘an who was a Rabi‘ite, 
was nominated governor of a predominantly Yamanite province with orders 
to break the Bilf between Rabi‘a and Yaman. This view is supported 
by the events which followed when al-Hangur appointed the Yamanite ‘Uqba 
b. Salm al-Hunna*i governor of the Yamama and Bafcrayn where he took 
revenge for himself and his tribe on the Rabi‘ite inhabitants of the 
province. According to Tabari a revolt broke out in Bafcrayn in 151 A.H. 
during which rebels killed the ‘Abbasid governor Abu fl Saj. He was 
replaced by ‘tJqba b. Salm al-Hunna*i whose brutal policy of exter­
mination against Rabi ‘a is said to have been inspired by ‘Agabiyya.
It was to have been a revenge for massacre of the Yamanite s by Ha‘an al- 
Shaybani in the Yemen. Numerous Bedouins were killed, others taken 
captive and sent to Baghdad. This is of great significance as it ex­
emplifies the trend of al-Mangur's policy, who vras determined not to 
let any tribe grow in power, and played them out against each other. Iii 
this particular case,both governors staged heavy massacres, Ma‘an among 
the Yamanites and ‘Uqba among the Rabi‘ites. Al-Mangur1 s manoeuvre in
^Khasrajl, B.K., fols. 16b-17b.
2AssdIt fols. 151-152; Tab., Ill, pp. 594 f.
Ya'qubi, II, p.463; Azdi, fol. 186; Tab., Ill, pp. 367-8; Athir,
7, p.462. -
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destroying the old alliance between Kabila and Yaman was entirely 
1
successful. Consequently, the unruly Yemen not only suffered harsh
caliphal treatment, but was also t o m  by internal strife. There were
conflicts between the people of §an‘a and of al-Jand in the reigns of
*» 2
al-Mahdi and al-Hadi.
A naval attack on Jadda by al-Kurk in 153/770
The origin of al-Kurk is obscure end even their name is .doubtful,
as it occurs in different forma. Speaking of the sixth Abyssinian kingdom,
Ya^ubi^ hints at its proximity to al-Sind and the people of al-Kurak
who are nto be counted with and whose hearts are united". This account
*  -  4
is confirmed by Yaqut' who mentions the Island of Kurk in the Indian
Ocean. But IbnTaghribaldT5 states that it was the Ahyssinians who
attacked the port of Jadda in 153 A.H. Thus the Kurk could either have
come from Abyssinia, as there had been a previous attack by Abyssinian
pirates in <the reign of Sulayman b. ‘Ab& al-Malik,' or else they were
7pirates from the Indian Ocean possibly of Indian origin. Al-Mangur
' After having performed their^tasks the two governors were later 
assassinated, ‘Uqba in Baghdad by a bedouin from Bafcrayn and Ma‘an 
in Bust by the Kharijites (Ya'qubl, II, p.478; Tab., Ill, p.369;
Azdi, fol. 186).
2 — — 
Khazraji, B.M. ,^fols. 17b-18b. The harsh oppressive policy of ^aminad al~
Barbari al-Raghld’s governor of the Yemen led to the emergence of dis-
integratSry^ten&encies. The Yemen though it paid, for a time, lip service
to the ‘Abbasids, was one of the first provinces to break away when the
Ziyadids seized control in 202/817-18 (al-gakaml, Kitab Tarikb al-Yaman,
PP* 2-3; van Arendonk, Les debuts de 1♦imamat Zaidite..*. pp. 106ff
Tllarun al-RasJjid) .
Ya^qubi, I, p.219.
^Mu/jam, I, p.29. ’
R m*
Nu.jum, p.412.
SMaqrlsI, al-Ilmam bi akhblr al-gub&an, p. 3? Trimight on, ,l£laa_2^ .
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immediately dispatched a naval force from Bagra to deal with the
XKurk and saved the port of Jadda.
Coptic and Bedouin disturbances in Egypt
Egypt was, in the early ‘Abbasid times, a vital base for military 
operations in Xfrqiyya. 5>ali£ b. ‘All the caliph's uncle was the first
/  M  2
governor of Egypt to be appointed by the Abbasids in Mu£arram 132 A.H.
Generous distributions of ‘ata* to the soldiers and gadaqat to the
needy which characterized the ‘Abbasid accession to power in many
provinces, followed his nomination. $alifc also rewarded those dignitaries
who were ready to join the ‘Abbasids by allotting to them qati‘as in 
- ~ - 3
villages of Bulaq and A^ tnas. They also exempted the Copts of Bashmur. 
from the Khara.1 tax and gave them rewards for their help against the 
Umayyads.^ When the critical situation in Syria obliged the caliph to 
recall §ali£ b. ‘All from Egypt in Sha‘ban 133 A.H., §alifci made Abu 
*Awn ‘Abd al-Malik al-Azdi governor of Egypt. Al-Azdi had a new garrison 
city built in the north east of al-Pusfaf. It was called al-‘Askar (i.e. 
the camp). Khurasan! troops were stationed there, and itbeld also the 
residenc e of the governor. The establishment of al-‘Askar wets pre-
(cont.) Ethiopia, pp. 51* 60.
7
H.K.Elliot, The History of India.... London, 1867, vol. I, pp. 429-30, 508-11 
vol. II, p.246} G. P. Haurani, Arab. Seafaring# Princeton University Press, 
1951, p.70. _______
■''Tab., Ill, p.359; F.H.A.. p.261.
Tab., Ill, p.50; Khitat. 2, p.88; Hu.ium. pp. 351-2.
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Khitat. 2, pp. 88-89; A, p.9; Suyuti, 2p.l76.
4Severus, V, pp. 187-188.
5wulat. p.100; Khitat, vol. 2, pp. 88-89, 91, vol. 4, p.2; Suyuti,
(eont.^
3to •
suraably a move to avoid clashes between the people of al-FusJaJ and
 1
the Khurasanis.
Internally, Egypt had more than one problem to contend with. The
Copts, hardpressed by taxation and occasionally discriminated against,
rebelled many a time. The turbulent, predominantly Qaysite region. of
al-gawf al-Sharqi as well as the Bedouins of al-§a‘id were continuous
trouble spots. The subjects, whether Arabs or Copts, had one thing in
common, namely their grievances against the bureaucracy. Thus they
formed the core of every rebellion, and more than once joined hands
against the governmental forces. Heavily taxed by the Umayya&s,
the Copts were already in rebellion when 1-iarwan II entered Egypt and
2helped to crush Marwmn's resistance. They naturally expected the advent 
of the ‘Abbasids to result in an improvement of their position but were 
soon disappointed. They expressed their resentment in a series of 
risings, some of which were rather violent.
It was as early as 133/750-751 that Abu Mina the Copt^ rebelled 
at gamnawud in Upper Egypt, but he was sopn killed and his rising 
crushed by *Abd al-Malik al-Azdi (135-136/750-753). In 150/767 a violent 
rising broke out in Safcia* The Copts defeated the local governor and took 
control of the surrounding districts. The rebels were joined by several
"l
foont.) Husan aI-Mubadara» yol. 2, p.176. Tulun, p.14. E.I.
(Cairo, Egypt); E.I.2,(Egypt).
Incidents of such kind did occur. See Ibn ‘Abd al-gakam, p. 240;
Wulat, p.356; cf. al-Shayyai, Tarikh Misr al~lslamiyya, .vol. I, .pp. 54f.
^Imama, 2, pp. 229-230; KhitaJ;, 4, p.395» Severus, V, pp. 172-3.
^Wulat, p.102; Khijat, 4, p.395? Nujum, p.361,
other villages, and tho Khurasanis and local recruits which formed
the ‘Abbasid army sent against them by the governor Yazid b. gatim,
al-Kuhallabi under the command of his kinsman Na^r al-Muhallabi, were
1
defeated and suffered heavy losses. There is no detailed information 
of how the rising was ultimately put down, but an account mentions 
that, before retreating, a division of the ‘Abbasid army succeeded 
insetting; the camp of the Copts on fire. The rising seems to have 
subsequently subsided only to break out again in 156/772-5 in Balhit 
under'the governor Hus a b. ‘Aii al-Lakhami (155-161/771-777). This 
last rising, however, proved abortive, and Egypt witnessed peace 
and tranquility for a period of six years. This was due to the justice 
of the governor Hus a al-Lakhami.
Apart from fiscal demands, the Copts were subject from time to 
time to a measure of discrimination. At times their churches were 
destroyed and their property plundered or confiscated, though these
were, according to Maqrlzi, merely reprisals for incriminating Christian
  4
actions. The consent of a Qadi was needed to build a church. The
governors occasionally, discriminated against one Christian denomination
^Wulat, pp. 116-117; Khijfa$, 4, P*29.
2Wulat. pp. 119-120; Khifraj;. vol. 4, pp. 396, 29.
^Wulat. pp. 131, 399} Khi^at, 4, p.396. It is worth nothing that except
for the serious revolTTin 226/840 which was caused, as it is indicated
by the statement^ of caliph al-Ha^mun, by the extortionate policy of 
the governor ‘isa b. Hangur (Wulat, p.192) there were no more dangerous 
Coptic outbursts, (see Kbit aft, 4, p.596.
'cM tv-sP' k ^  ^  ‘ •
a ' ' ■ ' wiiu)
Wulat. p.105.
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in favour of another. On one occasion the Melekite patriarch asked
the caliph to reward him, for services rendered, by the restoration
of the property of his denomination which was in the hands of the Jacobites,
1and his plea was successful.
As has already been pointed out, disturbances in Egypt were caused
apart from the Copts by the unruly Qaysite tribes of the gawf and the
nomads of $a‘Id who rebelled in 168/784 against Musa b. Mug‘ab (167/
783-168/784, and in 178/794-5 against Isfcaq b. Sulayman (177/793 -178/794),
killed the former in the battle and foiled the endeavour of the latter to
2curb their resistance. Consequently, fresh troops had to be sent from 
Baghdad to put down the rebellion. Arab risings and disturbances in 
Egypt such as that of ‘All b. Muhammad the gas&nid in 144/761-2 or that 
of Dafciiyya b. al-Agbagh in 168-169/784-86, sometimes adopted Umayyad
tsr
or ‘Alid slogans. However the real cause of these risings was economic 
rather than political* The tribes were resentful of heavy taxation and 
authority exercised by the governor. The fact that governors were usually
in charge of both military and financial administration made them more
4 __
powerful as well as arbitrary. Besides they relied more on Khurasani
than native troops. Newly appointed governors were accompanied by
XTabaqat al-Atibba’. X, p.83 (ed. Cairo 1299).
2Y a ‘qubi, II, p.483; Tab., Ill, pp. 629-30; Khitat, vol. I, p.128;
Azdi, fol. 219.
3See above pp.
^On the financial administration of Egypt see the bibliography under 
C.H.Becker, A Grohmann and Kashif. It is interesting to note that the 
^Lmjr^of the Kharai of Egypt was more respected than the governor.
(Wulat, pp. 108-9}• Although the early ‘Abbasids combined these 
two offices in the hands of one man, they sometimes appointed, in 
order to extract more money, a separate Amir of Kharaj (Ibid.; Nudum,
(cont.)
Khurasani divisions especially at the time of disturbances. It is
known that the ‘Abbasid army in Egypt was increased in the governorship
of §alifc b. *Ali who added 2f000 ffuqafrila to it.1 When Jumayd b.
Qafcjaba arrived in 143/760 he was accompanied by 20,000 troops which
2
were soon reinforced by an additional contingent from Baghdad,
The size of the ‘Abbasid garrisons stationed in Egypt was obviously
i
connected with the caliph* s plan to subjugate Ifriqiyya where the 
Kharijites had a free hand. It was obvious that Egypt was regarded 
as the basis of all military operations in Ifriqiyya and lad to harbour 
‘Abbasid armies on their way there. Consequently the economic burden 
on tiie people of Egypt was increased not only by its military commit- 
-ments but also be economic ones, the more so as Egypt had to feed the 
gijaz by exports of food stuffs, especially grain. Taking these diffi­
culties into consideration, it is surprizing that the governor Tazld b. 
gatim al-Huhallab! (144/761-152/769) could exceed his limits and success­
fully crush the Abyssinian rebel Abu Haymun. He even brought Barqa for 
the first time under his jurisdiction in 148/765-6.^
The subjugation of Armenia and the war with'Khazaria
In the early ‘Abbasid period Armenia and Adhurbayj&n were occasionally
(cont.) pp. 382-3).
W,„w,
2 —OpJcii, p. 107s Nujum, p.385. The army also included sometimes non- 
Khurasani divisions such as the Hosulite division (Azdi, fol. 219).
i&ifrat? 2, p • 93; Nu.ium. p. 116. The army stationed in Egypt also dealt 
with disturbances in Palestine in 133 A.G. (See Wulat, p. 100; Niijum,
p.366). ' . ' '
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administered by one governor* When Abu J a‘far (al-Manpur) was
appointed governor of the Jasira, Armenia and Adhurbay.ian, he sent
Yazid b. Asid al-Sulami as his deputy to Armenia and Yazid b. jgatxm
- 2
al-Muhallabi to Adhurbayjan where the first Arab Yamanite settlement
took- place at the time* Azd, Jay and other Yamanites vrere settled in
3different garrisons in the province* The mountainous character of
this area and the scarcity of food rendered it often difficult to 
4control. As a result, the routes were infested with highwaymen, so 
that a garrison had to be stationed at Sisr to guard the routes.
Armenia was plagued by occasional Khasar raids. According to Baladhuri,
Ya*qubi and Kufi, these raids were so troublesome that al-Mangur ad­
vised his governor to establish cordial relations with the Khazar by 
seeking marriage with the daughter of the Khazar1s king, a marriage 
which actually took place. Al-Mansur seems to have paid great attention 
to the frontier which divided the Muslim territory from Khazaria, and
rj
used to call it al-Taghr aI-A*g.am (i.e. the greatest frontier). How­
ever, the hostilities were soon resumed when the bride died some two
^Ya^qubi, II, p.430; Tab., Ill, p.72; R. Vasmer, Chronologic der 
arabischen.., pp. 3ff.
2  t «  t  -  -
Ya qubx, II, -p.446; Kufi, fol. 241b; Dunlop, The history of the Jewish 
Khasars, p.179*
^Ya‘qubl, II, p.446.
A nm
On the disturbances^in the late Umayyad period see Movses Kalankatuaci, 
The history of the Caucasians Albanians, p.207; S.I.^ (Armenia).
^Futuh, 2, p.381; Hamadani, Mukhtagar, p.239.
Futubt, p.210; Ya‘qubi, II, p.446; Kufi, fol. 241b. An account in Tabari 
relates that the marriage took place in 183 A.B. in the reign of al- 
Rashid between al~Fa$l b. Ya&ya al-Barmaki, the governor of Armenia and
(cont.)
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years later in 145/762-3. Yazid, with 7,000 cavalry, was unable to 
sustain the attack of Has Tarkhan the commander of the Khazar and had
4 ~ — 1 *•
to appeal for reinforcements. According to Ya qubi, al-Manpur sent 
Jibril b. Yatiya al-Baj^i with 20,000 Syrians, Jazirites and Mosulites. 
Kufi provides a detailed list of the trbops sent to Armenia; about
10.000 Syrians; 35,000 Irakis, 10,000 of whom were headed by Jibril 
al-Baj^i, 5,00.0 by garb al-Ravandi, 10,000 by Mukhallad b. al-gasan 
fand finally 10,000 by Humayd b. Qa&Jaba. This strong Muslim array found 
itself facing the Khazar^ odds. As many as 100,000 Khazars inflicted
heavy losses on Yazid who withdrew to Bardha*a. One of the Muslim
« - - 3
commanders, garb b. Abdallah al-Rawandi, las killed in the battle.
Faced by this danger, al-Man$ur decided to built a new series of
fortifications in Armenia. Several military headquarters, e.g. al-Mugara-
madiyya, Karckh and Babwaq were erected there by skilled masons and
7.000 prisoners. The new garrisons were manned by Ruqatila who consisted 
mainly of Syrians and Jazirites; the pay they received was exactly 
equal in amount to what used to be paid by the Umayyads.^ The caliph 
also utilized the experience of Jazirite tribal leaders such as Bakkar
(cont.) and the daughter of the king of the Khazars j(Tftb., III, p.647). 
This account belongs probably to the reign of al-Manpur. See Dunlop, 
op.cit., p.180.
7Muq., fol. 92b.
^Ya'qubi, II, pp. 446f.
2Kufi, fol. 242a.
3
Tab., III, p.328.
4Kufl, fol. 242b; Ya'qubi, XI, p.447.
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b. Muslim al-‘lJqayli who had been instrumental in checking disturbances 
in this area during the later Umayyad period, But there were no other 
gireat battles with Khasaria in the early ‘Abbasid period. On the con­
trary, Khazar troops were found forming part of the Muslim army in 
the campaign of 151/768 against the Byzantines, Armenia, however, 
was never completely pacified under the early ‘Abbasids, Unwilling 
.to scatter his Khurasan! troops, al-Mangur did not use them to quell 
disturbances in remote provinces unless it was necessitated by serious
danger. An emergency of this kind arose in 147-148 A.H. when Khuraaani
3troops were sent to Armenia to reinforce the garrisons. Again, 
when the gannariyya^ rising broke out in 148/765-6 under the governor­
ship of al-JJasan b, Qa^faba al-fa'i, the caliph sent four Khurasani 
commanders with 30,000 cavalry, ‘Smir b, Isma‘11 al-Masalli al-Jurjani, 
‘Isa b. Musa al-Khurasani, al-Fagl b. Dinar and Muqatil b. §ali£ to 
put down the revolt. Ap^asan al-^a’i appointed his sons Qa^Jaba,
Ibrahim and Muhammad subgovernors of the Armenian districts. According 
- *r 5 t*
to Kafr, Mu^ammadS extortionate fiscal demands provoked a rising of 
the Christian Armenians led by the patriarch Mushabdh. A new army
1Kufi, fol. 242b.
2
Dunlop, op.cit.. p.180,
^Tab., Ill, pp. 328, 352; Ya‘qubi, II, p.447; Kufi, fols. 242b-243a. 
^Kufi, fol. 243a.
. 5Ibid.
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arrived from Irafc and put down the revolt. The Muslim troops plundered
.ohurohes where they found, as Kufi states, not only money but also
arms. It was surely to accelerate the process of integration of the
province into the Muslim empire by strengthening Arab control that al-
Mangur initiated a systematically organised settlement of Arabs in
Armenia. They settled, presumably together with their families, in
the newly built garrison cities. Moreover it should be borne in mind
that Armenia had a common frontier with the Byzantine empire, so that
there was always the danger that the Christian Armenians would receive
support and encouragement from the Byzantine authorities or help the
Byzantine army in its fight against the Arabs. As Dionysius of Tell 
*1
Mahre points out, this was by no means frequent, and the Armenians 
occasionally sided with the Muslims against Byzantium, or informed the 
Muslims of the movements of the Byzantine army, thus enabling the Mhslims 
to inflict heavy losses on them in unexpected attacks. His judgment 
on the Armenians, no doubt inspired by sectarian prejudice, is that they 
lived by dishonesty and were double-dealers, who frequently changed 
their allegiance in the Ar&-Byzantine conflict.
Abbasid attempts to regain al-Andalus
Since 138/755-56 the ‘Abbasids had to consider the possible danger 
threatening them on the part of the Uraayyad regime newly established in
^Dionysius, op.cit.. pp. 101-102.
m
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Spain by ‘Abd * 1-Ra^man b. M u ‘awiya b. Hisham.^ For the ‘Abbasids, 
the Umayyad prince of al-Andalus was not only a rebel in a remote 
province of the empire, but he was a potential danger to the exist­
ence of the new regime as the pro-Umayyad population of Syria con­
sidered him their deliverer from the ‘Abbasids* A number of current 
traditions speak of the Umayyads of al-Andalus as the would-be
y O
saviours of Syria from the ‘Abbasid yoke. Consequently al-Mangur 
ordered in 146/763 al-‘Ala* b. Kughith al-Yafcsubi to launch an attack 
on Spain. Al-*Ala3 al-Ya^gubl was able to cross the Straits of Gibraltar 
and landed at tiaja where he found sympathizers and deployed the black 
banner of the ‘Abbasids. But he was soon defeated and his army decimated 
in the battle of Seville. Many of the heads of the kHLed ‘Abbasid 
soldiers were sent to Qayruwan and Mecca where the caliph was performing 
his pilgrimage. Thus the first attempt to regain Spain ended in failure.
The second attempt, made in 161/777-78 by *Abd *1 Rafcman b. Habib 
al-Fihri al-§iglabi*^ With a Berber army he landed in Spain near 
Tudrair. He contacted Sulayman b. Yaqzan al-A*rabi, governor of Barcelona, 
who is described by al-Maqqarl as Ra*s al-Fitan (i.e. the head of
1 >Levi-Proven$al, Histoire de l*Espagne...,‘pp. 74ff.
^Lammens, "La Sofiani", B.I.F.A.O.. 1923, pp. 141, 143.
■^ Xbn al-£utiya, pp. 32-34; Akhbar Majmu‘a, pp. 101-103; Ibn ‘Adhari, 
vol. II, pp. 51-52; Athir, vol. V, p.440, ed. Brill, 1871; Nuwayri 
fol. 92a; Mug._. fols. 54a-54b; Maq.qari, vol. I, pp. 214-215; Kutubi,
‘llyun al-Tawarikh. fol. 2b. See also Levi-Proven§al, -op.cit-. p.'78.
^Akhbar Ma.imu*a, pp_. 110-111; Ibn ‘Adhari, vol. II, p.55} Athir, vol. VI, 
pp. 36-42; Nuwayri, fol. 93a-93b; "‘ibar, vol. 3, p.446. Mosoati,"Studi 
storici^sul califfato di al-Mahdi", Orientalia. 1945, PP» 321-326. *Abd 
al-Ra^man was called al-§iqlabi (the Slav)' because of his height, his^ 
fair hair and his blue eyes, (ibn‘Adhari, II, p*55, of. E.I.2 where it 
is alleged that he was thus called to distinguish him from another (cont.)
dissensions) First al-A^abi seems to have been in two minds 
about it, but then refused to support the invader. The resulting clash 
between al-Pihrl and al-A*rabi ended in the defeat of the former, who 
retreated southwards towards the coast. At that moment the Umayyad 
‘Abd *1 Ragman attacked the exhausted army of al-Fihrl whose ships 
hehad already destroyed. Al-Fihri entrenched himself in the outskirts 
of Valencia, but his resistance was not of long duration as he was 
murdered by a Berbermmed Miskar who had been induced by ‘Abd al- 
Rahman*s offer of 1,000 dinars for the head of al-Fihrx.
The Umayyad prince now took the initiative and planned a retaliatory
O
naval attack on the centre of Umayyad sympathies, Syria, in 163/779-80, 
but he had to face internal troubles in Barcelona and Saragossa led
by SulaymSn al-Angari and desisted from his under talcing.
\
Thus the precautionary measures of the early ‘Abbasids were justified, 
the more so as there was always the threat of a fifth column being formed 
in Syria itself to work for the restoration of the Umayyad regime. As 
to the part played by the two ‘Abbasid caliphs in the Spanish campaigns, 
there is no doubt that the first campaign ofl46/763 went back to the 
initiative of al-Mansur himself. However, there is some d isagreement 
among the scholars as to who was the originator of the second campaign
(cont.) pgEson of the same name.
1
Maqqari, vol. II, p.33; R. Boay, Histoire dec musulmans d*Espagne, I, 'pp. 375 
ff. Levi Provencal, op.cit., p.86.
2 ~ - 
Athir, VI, p.42; Huwayri, fol. 93b; Moscati, op.cit., p.322.
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in 161/777-78• Weil^ is of the opinion that it was al-Mahdi who
o ~
ordered the attack while Moscati states that "al-Fihri acted in­
dependently and that his exploit is to be considered rather as an 
episode in the struggle between the Fihrites and the Umayyads for 
dominion in Spain than direct initiative of the *Abbasid Caliph11 .
The question is difficult to decide* Al~FihrI is said to have made 
propaganda in the name of al-Mahdi, the ‘Abbasid caliph* However, 
independent action by influential men or governors in remote parts 
of the empire could be taken without consulting the central regime* 
Nevertheless there is some correspondence to suggest that al-Mahdi 
evinced certain concern in al-Andalus, It is reported that the latter 
exchanged harsh letters with the Umayyad prince, among these letters
one witten by Hisham al-K^lbi, the geneologist and historian, pointing
3out the vices of the Umayyads. Thus there is some reason to suppose 
that al“Fihr±fs campaign had the support and the blessing of al-Mahdi.
The Raid on India
It was from Bagra that al-Mahdi organised in 159/775-6 a naval 
expedition to India. ^  He sent Mijiriz b. Ibrahim to Bagra to supervise
1
Weil, Qeschiohte der Chalifen, II, p.116.
p
Moscati, op.cit.. p,325*
5l’ab., Ill, p.531. 
4Tab., Ill, pp. 460 f., 476-77; Athir, Vi, pp. 30-31.
if/.
the formation of the army* The expedition consisted of 2,000 Magatila
-  i t h
of Bagra led by Ghassan b* Abdallah, 1,500 Mu$aww a led by al-Mun&ir
al-Jaxudi, a Syrian division led by Yazid b. al~§abbab al-Mud£p^l, and
4,000 Aswariyin and Sayabij a. ^  ‘Abd al-Malik b, Shihab al-Masma*! was 
in charge of this naval expedition whioh anchored in Barbad. The ex­
pedition gives the impression of hasty improvisation. The idea behind 
it seems to have been the wish to satisfy Hhe needs of the Muqatlla 
by raids on rich infidel territories from which they used to return 
with plentiful booty. However, this expedition should also be viewed 
within the framework of al-Mahdl's reign. In his early days as caliph 
al-Kahdl seems to have been obsessed by the rdle of a saviour as devised 
by his father, al Mangur. He seems to lave had in mind a return to the 
'•good old days" when Jihad played a prominent rble in Muslim life*
His concern with Jihad in the north against Byzantium and in the east 
against Transoxonia and India bears witness to this fact. However, 
neither the Byzantium nor the Indian confrontation had fruitful results* 
As to the Indian expedition of 159 A.H./775 A.D. the Muslims attacked 
the city of Barbad and finally penetrated into it. The inhabitants took 
refuge in their religious sanctuary and remained there oven though it was 
set on fire. That the expedition was intended as a raid (i.e. ahazwa) 
is obvious'sinee having taken the ghanima and captives the Muslims
1 <w*
These were originally from India and south east Asia, settled in Irafc: 
before the Arab conquest. (See Pellat, be Milieu Basrien..., pp. 68, 78).
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immediately prepared to sail back to Ba§ra.l But the stormy sea 
prevented ther&turn of the Muslims and an epidemic, which affected 
the mouth, spread among them and in, a short time killed about 1,000 
men. They hdrried to Bagra, tut another disaster was awaiting them 
in the Persian Gulf when a storm destroyed part of the fleet. Only 
a few ships reached Bapra in safety.
This disastrous expedition also reveals a number of interesting 
facts* l) The people of al-Shara still represented a fighting body 
which the ‘Abbasids tried to utilise not only in campaigns against 
India but also other campaigns* This is jet another indication of the 
change of policy towards the Syrians whose troops had been disbanded 
after the fall of Wapit in 152 A.H. 2) The number of non- 
Arabs in Bagra seems to have been great* The ‘Abbasids made use of 
this element too in arranging military expeditions. 5) It may have been 
one of the motives behind al-Mahdi1 s Indian expedition to occupy the 
unruly elements in fighting a jihad rather than creating trouble for 
the central government.
The conquest of Tabaristan
The conflict between the central government and the local princes 
of the region of the Caspian Sea was, primarily, a war of occupation.
The ‘Abbasid central government tried to impose its authority on many 
regions which had hitherto enjoyed independent or autonomous rule and to
lMoscati, op.cit.. 1945* p.326.
i
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whom Islam was unknown.
With Khurasan comparatively quiet under the governorship of al- 
Mahdl 140/757,’*’ al-Man§tur directed his efforts towards the Caspian 
l’egion. In planning to subjugate these regions, the caliph was in 
fact trying to incorporate fabaristan and its neighbouring districts 
and to penetrate as far as possible into Daylam. Al-Mahdi1 s long 
residence at his headquarters in Rayy (140-151/757-768) indicates that 
the caliph attached great importance to the unrest in the eastern part, 
and that he was determined to impose the authority of the central 
regime in several autonomous or independent regions, Islam]bad little
j
or no effect in the Caspian provinces', as people still clung to their
ancient faith and fire temples still existed in many parts.
jabaristan was a rich province which al-Man^ur was eager to exploit. ;
Helped by its geographical position and the mountainous nature of its 
2
land which made the terrain almost impassable, it had hitherto 
resisted Arab penetration. Its local princes had exercised a great 
influence on the people, and ruled effectively for centuries. Tabari 
says that as *Abd al-Jabber al-Azdi^ revolt (142/7-59-60) had been de­
feated more easily than had been expected, al-Mangur tried to find another
1Xa‘q5bi,'IIl pp. 445-6; Tab., Ill, p.133.
2
See R.^Vasmer, Die Broberung Tabaristons duroh die Araber..., pp. 86ff; 
Sadighi, op.cit.. p. 26; Rabino^Les prefets du calif at... J.A.. 1939,
pp. 224-56.
( 5Tab., Ill, p.136; Athir, V, p.387.
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use for the army to justify the expenses incurred on the expedition.
- 1The cause, however, seems to be deeper* Recording to Ibn Igfandiyar 
al-Mangur had already made one futile attempt to obtain Abu Muslim's 
possessions from the Igpahbadh Khorshid. Al-Mahdi now asked his 
father not to press, his demands too hard lest the Igpahbadh should 
revolt. Al-Mangur, consequently, sent a royal crown to the Igpahbadh. 
to which the latter reacted by sending the tribute he used to pay 
to the Sasenid kings* But the caliph.was not satisfied with that, as what 
he wanted was direct rule over Jfabaristan. He therefore resorted to 
a trick and ordered al-Mahdi to seek the permission of the Igpahbadh 
for a division of the ‘Abbasid army to pass through fabaristan on its 
way to Khurasan under the pretext that the p assage of such great number 
of troops would lead to a shortage of food if they all took one route.
The unsuspecting Igpahbadh gave his permission and the Arab troops, 
led by al-Mangur's Mawla Abu *1 JChagib Marzufc, ‘Umar b. al- ‘Ala' 
and Abu 4 Awn b, ‘Abdallah, penetrated far into the province and occupied 
it. The Igpahbadh fled to Jilan and, hearing that the last fortress 
al-Taq had fallen, he took poison and died. It was mainly owing to 
the effort of ‘Umar b. al- 4 Ala7 that Jabaristan ■ came under direct Arab 
control. The conquest however cannot be equated with complete subjugation*
1
Ibn Igfandiyar, p.118.
Interesting is the manner in which Abu Muslim's possessions and treasure 
eradrge over and over again in most controversies between the caliph 
and rebels. It seems as if the possession of Abu Muslim's inheritance 
had had a symbolic significance which makes its surrender an act 'of 
unconditional obedienpe on which the caliph was bound to insist.
2 -
Ibn Igfandiyar, pp. 119-22? Tab.,- Ill, pp. 136f.
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Unrest continued to prevail in the province. ‘Abbasid governors 
were only able to maintain their authority by depending on the army 
stationed in garrisons. 'The first ‘Abbasid governor Abu *1 Khagib 
Marzuk (145/760-61) built mosques and encouraged conversion to Islam,* 
but these efforts met with considerable difficulties as the natives 
adhered not only to their faith and traditions, but also to their 
local princes whose influence seems to have been tolerated by Muslim 
governors *
For the rest of al-Mangur’s reign, fabaristan was comparatively
quiet. But in 164/780-81, when ‘Abd al-yamid Majrub was appointed
governor of it, his arbitrary fiscal demands led to a rebellion of
the natives who invited Wandad Harmuzd to lead it against the ‘Abbasid 
2rule. Wandad Hurtmizd accepted the offer on condition that he obtained
the consent of influential princes, especially the Igpahbadh Sharwln
and the Mag-mughan walash. Uhen both agreed, a general massacre
- 3
of the Arabs ensued and, if the account of Ibn Igfandiyar is to be 
credited, even women who had married ’’Muslims” which in fact meant 
'’Arabs"were put to death. The governor ‘Abd al-gamid Ma$rub was among 
the victims. Between 164-166/780-782 the struggle between Wandad 
Hurmuzd assisted by Sharwin and the Muslim troops was characterized
1Tab., Ill, pp. 136f.
Ibn. Igfandiyar, pp. 122 fj Moscati, op.cit., pp. 347 ff.
3 —
Ibn I^fandiyar, p.126,
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by frequent Muslim defeats. The Muslim commander Salim al-Farghani
was assassinated in his owncamp by a suicidal group. Also Parasha, 
a Mawia of al-Mahdi and the governor of Qumus and Dunbawand (164-167/ 
780-783) led an unsuccessful expedition in which he lost his life.
Host of the governors adopted a militant policy towards Jabaristan, 
and when in 167/785-4 unrest stirred again, al-Mahdi sent new troops 
led by his heir Musa al-Hadi and the commander Yazid b. Kazyad al- 
Shaybani. The new army was reinforced in 168/784-85 by Sa:*i& al- 
Barshi with 40,000. The war was eventually concluded by an agreement 
between Husa al-Hadi and Wandad Murmuzd who surrendered on a promise 
of pardon to the effect that the latter would desist from his militant 
activities, but maintain his authority over the mountains* He also 
agreed to accompany Musa on a visit to Baghdad. According to Ibn 
Igfandiyar Wandad gafran, the youngest brother of Wandad Hurmuzd, 
killed shortly afterwards a native of J?abaristan who had been converted 
“to Islam by al-Hadi himself. The latter, who was row caliph, was en­
raged and decided to execute Wandad Hurmuzd in retaliation for the 
murdered Muslim, However Wandad Hurmuzd succeeded in convincing the 
caliph that ithad been his brother* & primary intention to get rid of 
himself, his elder brother, who had foreseen that al-Hadi*a anger would
10p.oit-..pp.X26 ff; Sab., Ill, pp. 500, 505, 517, 520; Ta'qubi, II, p.479; 
ff.H.A.. p.279.
2Tab,, III, pp. 518, 521.
3 -
Ibn Igfandiy&r, p*131. Moseati, S.O., 1946, pp. 8-9? Spuler, Iran*
P.50. ,
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turn against him and put him to death. He promised al-Hadi to 
execute the murderer if he was permitted to return to Jabaristan.
Though the caliph finally permitted him to do so, he never fulfilled 
his promise.
On the whole, the regions of the Caspian Sea put, up . a stubborn
* ■
resistance to the Muslim authority. Some local princes embraced Islam
for merely political reasons, as conversion enabled them to keep their
positions. However their deeds reveal that they had persisted in
2their attachment to their old faith. In contrast to Islam which was
supported by the ‘Abbasids, i.e. the Musawidda, they called their 
faith the "white religion"^ . The Khramiyya developed
into a strong movement under Babak, during the reign of al~Mu‘tasim, and 
constituted a danger not only to ‘Abbasid authority but also to Islam 
itself..
Al-Khayguranfs coup d ’etat 170/786
After the strict rule of al-Mangur, al-Mahdi*a reign (158/775- 
169/785) appeared mild. But, as years went by, It became increasingly 
apparent that the caliph was not only mild but weak and that the "expected
■^ Ibn Igfandiyar, pp. 131-2.
2
Tab., Ill, pp. 1269-, 1276 ff. Kinorsky, La Domination des Dailamites, pp.
5 ff*
Tab., Ill, p. 1311* The Mubammira and Khuramiyya which started in Jurjan 
as early as 162 A.H. under the^leadership of Abd *l~Qahhar (Tab., Ill, 
p. 493?^Xa‘qubi, II,^p.479; Dina, p.382) developed into a strong movement 
under E&bak and Mazyar in the^ reign of al-Mu‘ta§im (218-2?7/833-42).
On Babak1s revolt, see Sadighit op.cit., pp. 229 ff? OSsan, The reign 
of al-Hu‘tagim, Ph.. 3). Thesis^ 1963; E. M. Wright, ]£bak of Badhdh.
M.¥., 1948, pp. 43-131; B.I.f (Babak). ~ ~
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saviour” had become himself a victim of his wife al-Khay zuran, and 
let himself be .swayed away by intrigues of courtiers and Ifoiwfrli.
Be it as it may, barely one year of al-Mahdi'o reign had passed , . 
when he decided to nominate his son Musa his heir. Thus he set Aside 
once more the claims of *5sa b. Musa whom he subjected to humiliations
1 mm
until he gave in on the 4th of Mufrarram 160/776-77. Beside Musa
the only possible heir al-Mahdl considered was Harun, his other son
by al-Khaysuran, who was nominated in 166/782-3 second in succession
2to the caliphate. This is rather surprising, as the caliph had, by 
a Hashimite cousin,, called Rija bint Abi *1 1 Abbas, another son named 
*Ali whose Hashimite descent could have enlisted enthusiastic support 
on the part of Ban! Hagfeim.^ However al-Mahdl1 s preference for IJtisa 
and Harun shows how strong an influence al-Kh ayzuran exercised upon 
him.
The issue, however, was far from settled. Al-Mahdi*s weakness of 
character made him, as has been stated, an easy victim of pressure 
of various court intrigues and of his wife al-Khayzuran who favoured 
Harun rather than her elder son Musa* When, in 167/783-84 Musa was 
sent to Jurjan and yabaristan to put down a revolt, he wa3 accompanied
^Anaab, fol. 564; Tab., Ill, pp. 467, 471-2; Asdi. fol. 205; Jah., p*141. 
Ya qubi mistakenly puts it in 159 A.H. (ll, p.476).
2 ' ' —  —  -  
Tab., XII^ pp. 503-506; compare Dinawari where he puts the nomination
of al-Hadi and Harun at the same time in 162 A.H, (p.382). See Moscati,
op.cit., pp. I60f.
3N. Abbot, The two queens..., p*25.
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by Yazid b. Mazyad al-Shaybani.* Owing to the talent of Yazid, the real
commander of the army, the military operations were successful and ended
with the surrender of tfan&ad HarmuzJthe prince of 'fab aids tan. One would
expect this formidable success to have worked out in favour of Musa and made
him appear worthier of the caliphate. But al-Mahdi suddenly changed his
mind and decided to put Harun before Musa in the succession to the
caliphate. On Musa's resistance al-Mahdi had no alternative but to go
himself to force Musa to renounce his right. However, the caliph died in
mysterious circumstances on his way there in al-Ru^hdh on the 22nd
Mu&arrara 169/4th of August 785.^
Al-Mahdi’s sudden change of mind and the mystery surrounding his
death present one of the most obscure episodes of this period. As to
his death at the age of 36, conflicting accounts render it still more
suspect. Some accounts relate a hunting accident as the reason, others
say it was due to poisoning but exclude foul play,^ but ’all agree that
it was sudden and it took many of his companions by surprise. However,
one cannot help suspecting that al-Hadi’s supporters may have conspired
— > ” 5to put an end to the caliph's life. The author of al-lmama wa 1 Sjyasa
^Tab., III, pp. 518f; Ibn I^fandiyar, pp. 125 ff.
2l’ab., III, p.523.
ha'qlbi, XI, p.484; Tab. Ill, 524; F akhrl. p.163.
4Tab., Ill, pp. 524-5; Fajchri, p.163.
Imaaa. vol. 2, p.290. '
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states that al-Mahdi was poisoned by his son ‘Abdallah (sic) which may be 
a mistake for Musa. A later historian Ibn al-Athir was not convinced 
that al-Mahdi died a natural death.3* Since al-Badi's group immediately 
seized power the lack of information may be due to their having been able 
to remove all traces.
In retrospect, we notice that al-Mahdi. had sown the seeds of rivalry 
between the two brothers, Musa and Harun. To stress the superior right 
of Khayzgan*s sons, Al-Mahdi divided the empire between M~sa and Harun, 
giving the former the eastern provinces and the latter the western 
provinces. In this he committed a grave mistake as the two brothers 
became the gathering point of two rival political factions. Although 
Harun*s group fostered by al-Khayzu&nihad a considerable influence on 
al-Mahdi, al-Hadi*s group was far from weak. He had in his company 
several Hashimites as well as powerful figures such as Taaid al-Shaybani 
and the cunning counsellor Ibrahim al-garrani. It is only with the 
help of scattered information on the prominent personalities of these 
political groupings that light can be thrown on the court politics of 
that time. According to Jahshayari al-Mahdi,probably suspecting that 
Ibrahim al-garrani was behind al-Hadi*s refusal, asked the latter in
htblr, VI, pp. 54-55. 
2Tab., Ill, p.545. 
5jah., p.167.
Uoi,
vain to send Ibrahim back to Baghdad. Furthermore the death of 
al-Rabi* b. Yamis^ shortly after the accession of al-Hadi was probably 
due to the latter1 s approval of al-Mahdi* s plans favouring HarSn and his
reported attendance at meeting;: called by Khayzuran before‘al-Hadi*s
— 2 — — -**arrival in Baghdad. On the advice of Yaby& al-Barmaki Harun, who
accompanied his father, behaved very tactfully and took the Bayua^to al-
f
- 3Hadi. Here it is significant to stress the r$le of the army in 
politics. The Qawwad have already been instrumental in al-Mahdi*s 
nomination. The latter made further use of them in the execution of 
his plans. On al-Mahdi*s death Yafcya al-Barmaki also advised Harun 
to make gifts of money to the soldiers to the amount of 200 dirhams 
each and order a return to Baghdad, a gesture which they would appreciate 
as it meant a return to their families. On the other hand, al-Mahdi*s 
death was kept secret from them and a mutiny was temporarily avoided. 
Al-Mahdi was buried at al-Rudhdh and Nugayr al-YfapIf was sent with 
the insignia to al-Hadi.4
hhen the army reached Baghdad where al-Mahdx had left al-Rabx* 
b* Yunus as his deputy, they learnt of al-Hah&i*s death and mutinied 
seizing the opportunity to demand more pay. They caused damage to some
1Tab., Ill, p.548.
2Tab., III, p.546.
Ansab. fol. 584} Jah., p.167; Y a ‘qubi, II, pp. 487-488; Tab., Ill, 
p.545; Azdi, fol. 222; Agh., vol. 21, p.128; Kuru.i. VI, pp. 262-263; 
Khafib, vol. 15, p.21. Sourdel, Le Vjgarat.... pp. 154 f-
^Tab., III, p.545; Ansabf fol. 534; Jah., p.167; Mu*.jam. Vol. I, p.250, 
Vol. II, p.775. * '
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governmental offices and the house of al-Rabi*. Al-Khayzuran called 
for a meeting to discuss the political situation which al-Rabi* attended ■ 
but Yafcya who shrewdly realised al-gadi*s resentment of his mother
did not. At the meeting a decision was taken to give the troops two
1 ' 
years* or eighteen months’ pay. The ..mutiny did not seem to have
any political colour as sources agree that the troops* main concerny
was pay, and it seems th&t it had become customary for the troops to
be given additional pay on the occasion of the accession of the new
caliph. The figures behind Harun made the shrewd move of sending almost.
immediately envoys to the provinces to receive the oath of allegiance
to al—Hadi and to harun as the latter’s heir.^
Al-Hadi arrived at Baghdad on the 20th of gafar 169/765-6 and took
over power nominating his men to the key offices of the central govern- 
3 —  —ment. Al-Hadi was obviously determined to grasp the caliphal authority, 
which he was about to lose, without giving way to court intrigues or 
the interference of women, especially his mother, ol-Khaysaran, which 
was characteristic of his father*s reign. It is significant that 
/ al-Hadi never forgot that his father wanted to deprive him of his right 
to succession. Although Harun had taken the Bay/a. for him at Rudhdh 
and Bay*a was also sworn for him in Baghdad, it must be remembered that, 
under the special circumstances which followed al-Mahdi*s. sudden death
1Tab., Ill, pp. 544-546, 547} g.H.A..pp.282 f.
2Tab., Ill, p.547.
He appointed Al-Rabi‘ b. Yunus Wazir,_entrusting the administration to 
him alongside with ‘Ubaydallah b. Ziyad, the chief chancellery, Mufcammad 
b. Jamil in charge of. the the revenue of the Ira^ayin; he also made *Ali 
b. *l‘sa secretary to the army and chief of guards., ‘Abdallah b, Malik 
chief of the police. The seal he entrusted to Ali b. Yaqtin. (Tab. Ill, 
pp. 547-6, see also Moscati, S.O., 1946, p.18.)
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there was hardly an alternative to his proclamation as caliph as he 
was the legitimate heir. However Harun'3 name figured on the order 
circulated to the provincial governors which stated unequivocally 
that he was al-Hadi*s heir, and that the Bay*a at Baghdad had been 
taken from the troops in both their names.
It was not long until the relations between al-Hadi and al-Khayzuran 
became strained. For several months she had in politics the same in­
fluence as in al-Mahdi1s .reign but suddenly al-Hadi ordered her to 
refrain from any political rdle and keep within the precincts of the
s
1harem. Several accounts present him as almost obsessed with fear and 
suspicion of BSrun who had Khayguran^ and Yafcya behind him. He expressed 
these suspicions to Abu Yusuf the Qa£i who vouched for Haiun's loyalty 
and tried to dissuade the caliph from taking preventive, measures?
Meanwhile the conduct of Harun'3 affair was still in the hands of Y^feya
b. Khalid who had been his tutor-cuin-secretary since the reign of al-
Mahdi. It was no doubt a tactical error of al-Hadi to keep the shrewd,
i  " ,
tactful Yafcya as secretary of Harun, for when shortly later he decided 
to nominate heir his son Ja‘far, Harun would have given in had Yajiya ■
A.
not prevented him from doing so. Many commanders such as Yazid b.
Mazy ad al-Shaybani, Muhammad b. Farrukh al-Kindi, Abu ‘ipma, ‘Ali b.
‘isa, b. Mahon and *Abdallah b. Malik encouraged al-Hadi to go through
5 T  r ' '  ; . ' ■ ' ....... ........  1 1 " m " 1 .............. ■ ' 1 .. ■
Tab., Ill, p.569; Assdx, fol. 224. If some accounts are to be believed he
erven tried to poison her but failed in his attempt. (Tab., Ill, p.570;
Faithri, p. 173 ).
2
KhayzurUn had been a slave girl from the Yemen, freed and married by Mahdi 
in 159 A.H. Onjier origin see Tab* 111^466*. *599; JHhru.i. VT* p.289. Tanbih, 
pp. 344f4 Khatib, vo,* 14,pp.5 , 430; H. Abbott, The two‘ queens-... pp.22-26.-
. Al-Mukafat. pp. 52-53 citing Yusuf b. Ibrahim.
with his plan. Some even seem to have sworn allegiance to Ja‘far as 
1 * -
heir. Karan suffered numerous humiliations and was deprived of the
prerogatives of the heir apparent. People avoided associating with
him for fear of losing the favour of al-Hadi. Only Ta^ya stood firmly
by Haiun. He succeeded in winning over to his side Ibrahim al-^arrani
through whom he su'cceeded in getting hi3 Katib_ Isma *ll b. §abiji
appointed a Katib in the central administration who kept him informed
- - 2
about the intentions of al-Hadi1 s group. Knowing Yafcyajs influence 
upon Harun, al-Hadi asked him to persuade Harun to renounce his rights. 
Yafciya tried very tactfully to convince the caliph that the violation 
of an oath after so short a time would have disasti'ous consequences.
He suggested to leave Harun*s rights untouched and pointing to Ja£ar*s,
tender age and the difficulty of having him accepted caliph in case
of al-Hadi*s sudden death, he advised the ca3.iph to nominate him second 
in succession.
Ya^ya then cleverly drew the attention of the caliph to those ‘Abbasid 
princes who were anxiously trying to wrest the caliphate from the ruling 
line. Ya^ya then pledged with the caliph that if he mi ted until Ja ‘far 
was of age then he Jj&bya? himself would persuade Harun to give in.*5
(cont.)
^Tab., Ill, p.573? (Yajjtya b. Khalid); Moscati, 3.0., XIII, 1946,
pp. 19 ff. _________ __
^Ya'qubi, II, p.489 
Tab., Ill, p.572; ff.KA ., p.285.
2Ibia. ■ . ,
3Tab., Ill, pp. 574-575.
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If Yafrya succeeded in convincing al-Ha$i his success can only have;
been temporary for according to Tabari pressure was again brought
to bear on Harun who to avoid it left for a hunting trip and sbayed 
— 1at Qa$r Muqatil. But this manoeuvre was of little avail for he 
was summoned back to court and arrested together with Yajiya al-Barmaki.
At this juncture the situation becomes mysterious. According to 
aL-^Uyun wa1! ffada jg Harthama b. A ‘yan had already received the 
orders to kill the imprisoned Harun and Ya^ya when al-Hadi suddenly
died in obscure circumstances. Conflicting accounts depict his death
3 ' f 4
either as natural or a murder by his mother or accidental poisoning
throtgh the fault of a slave girl. The second account is the most 
probable as it is transmitted by trustworthy narrators. Significantt
I
- 6
is.Asdi’s revelatory remark which points to the equivocal rdle played 
by al-Khaysuran in this event; "There is no need to tell" preceded 
by the statement that she was more in favour of Harun than al-Hadi.
This statement seems to. suggest that al-Khayauran had a hand in al-IIadifs
H a b . , III, p.515. '
Q O
F.H.A., pp. 286f; see also E.I. (Harthama b. A ) *
^Tab., Ill, p*578, citing al-Fa$l b. Dakin.
^.Tab., III,pp. 578-579; ff.H.A., p.288; Faldirl, p.173.^ The mystery 
and suspicion still deepens when one considers that Ha&i's body was 
not taken for burial in the Qurayshite cemetery but was buried on the spot.
5 - « - -
Yasdi, farikh al-Baramak, ed. eh. Schefer, pp. 12 ff;.Moscati, op.cit.,
P-23- " " ,
SAzdi, fol. 224. ."3 ^
premature death. When al-Hadi returned from a trip to $aditha barely 
twenty-six years of age and in good physical condition the tension be­
tween him and his mother increased by her anxiety for ter imprisoned 
favourite Harun, had reached its climax. According to Tabari and 
the author of al-*U.yun wa *1 ffadg^iq al-Hadi suddenly fell ill and 
during this illness -. of which it is not said what had brought it on - 
Khayzuran is related to have ordered her servants to suffocate or poison 
him. The author of al-*Uynn describes her activities on the crucial day. 
It was shevas prevailed upnn Harthama b. k*y&ri to delay the execution 
of Harun and Yafctya admitting that she had overheard al-Hadi giving
* — t -1him the orders. According to Ya qubi and to Tabari she personally
-  -  -2
informed Yafyya of al-Hadi* s death. Tabari presents her as calm and
indifferent at thp news of her son’s death. He relates'that she dis­
tributed gifts of money as if it had been a cause for rejoicing.
Tabari also relates that before al-Hadi*s death she told Yatyya to 
keep in readiness for nal-Hadi is dying” and ordered him to prepare 
a proclamation to be sent to the provinces summoning people to swear 
the Bay ‘a to Harun al-Rashid.
After al-Hadi * o death the plan to elevate Ja^ar to the caliphate 
was foiled by a coup d’etat in which both Khayzuran and several courtiers 
and servants were involved. Neither the names of the plotters nor details
Ha'qSbi, XI, p.490? Tab., XII, p.578.
of the plot are known, simply because the conspirators seised power 
and were able to conceal the facts. What is known is the part played 
by the commander Harthama b. A ‘y&n and Khasim b. Khusayma al-Tamimi 
who, accompanied by 5,000 soldiers, arrested Ja*far and had him proclaim 
to the people next day that he had no right to the caliphate which 
belonged to his uncle Harun and therefore absolved everybody of the 
oath they had sworn in his favour** Al-Hadi was buried on the spot 
in the gardens of his castle at 4Isa Abadh in Rabi 1 I in 170/
p
September 786.
Thus Harun al-Rash id was raised to power not by his own efforts 
but by the machinations of his mother and Yaj?ya. It is therefore no 
surprise that he put the whole administration in the hands of Yahya.*^
His first measure as caliph was to revenge himself on those who had 
encouraged al-Hadi*s plan, such as Abu ‘igma who had humiliated him 
once by making.Ja*far precede him and addressing the latter as Waji*1
4Ahdr Ibrahim al-garrani and Sal lam al-Abrash who were arrested and
* 5 —
their property confiscated* Khayzuran suggested that all those who
P.H.A.. pp. 290-291} Tab., Ill, p.569.
2g.H.A.. p.289.
3 2B.I.,. (Barmacides); Sourdel, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 134ff.
A ' t
Tab., Ill, p.602.
^Op.cit*. p.603.
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had sided with al-Hadi should be executed, but this massacre was 
averted by the advice of Ya^iya to send them to war: ,!If they defend
themselves, it will keep them busy and if they perished, you /Khayzuran/ 
have got rid of them*'1’*' It was in accordance with this policy that the 
commander Muhammad b. Farrukh al-Kindi was sent to deal with the 
Khari.jite rebel of Jazira al~§ah§afc# However, Muhammad b. Farrukh 
was later arrested and brought to Baghdad where he was executed in 
171/787-8.^ Al-Hadi fell victim of court intrigues and the hidden 
struggle for power among political groupings. It had been his intentiont
to rule effectively and he bad made it clear that he would brook no inter­
ference but-he was overwhelmed by Khayzuran and her faction. Al-Rashid 
on the other hand was ready to submit to the group which brought him to
power. However, in his policy towards the dynastic succession, al-Rashid
3does not seem to have learned from his hard experience.
H a h . , p.176.
2Tab ., Ill, p.606.,
^E.I .2 (Harun al-Rashitl)
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